Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., et al..Respondent: Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, et al.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Thomas C. Goldstein (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Shareholders of Goldman Sachs Group filed a class-action lawsuit alleging that the company and several of its executives committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the company’s freedom from, or ability to combat, conflicts of interest in its business practices. The district court certified a shareholder class, but in 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order because the district court did not apply the “preponderance of the evidence” standard in determining whether Goldman had rebutted the legal presumption that the shareholders relied on Goldman’s alleged misstatements in purchasing its stock at the market price (known as the Basic presumption). On remand, the district court certified the class once more, and this time, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's order certifying the class. The court concluded that, on remand, the district court had applied the correct legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Goldman’s rebuttal evidence to conclude that it had failed to rebut the Basic presumption. Question 1. May a defendant in a securities class action rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security? 2. Does a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption have only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion? Conclusion While a defendant in a securities class action may point to the generic nature of the alleged misrepresentations to show that those statements had no impact on the price of the security in overcoming the Basic presumption, that defendant bears not only the burden of production, but also the burden of persuasion. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion of the Court, in which she was joined in full by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Stephen Breyer, Elena Kagan, and Brett Kavanaugh.  Justice Neil Gorsuch—joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito—concurred in part and in the judgment, while Justice Sonia Sotomayor concurred in part but dissented from the judgment. Justice Barrett wrote, “The parties now agree, as do we, that the generic nature of a misrepresentation often in important evidence of price impact courts should consider at class certification” and not just at the merits phase of securities litigation. Because the Court concluded that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit may not have properly considered the generic nature of the alleged statements, it vacated that court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. As for which party bears the burden of persuasion, the Court held that the Second Circuit properly allocated the burden to the defendant but noted that “the burden of persuasion should rarely be outcome determinative” at the class certification stage. While concurring in the decision to remand the case because the Court of Appeal did not sufficiently consider the generic nature of the alleged misstatements, Justice Gorsuch disagreed that the defendant should bear the burden of persuasion in overcoming the Basic presumption. Justice Sotomayor, on the other hand, dissented from the Court’s judgment because she believed the Court of Appeal had, in fact, adequately considered the generic nature of the alleged misstatements before granting class certification. In other words, while she agreed with the entirety of the Court’s analysis of how to proceed, she believed that the Second Circuit had met that standard and would not have vacated its ruling.   

Caniglia v. Strom Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 24, 2021.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: Edward A. Caniglia.Respondent: Robert F. Strom, et al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Marc Desisto (for the Respondent) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Edward Caniglia and his wife Kim got into a heated argument, during which Caniglia displayed a gun and told Kim something to the effect of “shoot me now.” Fearing for her husband’s state of mind, Kim decided to vacate the premises for the night. The next morning, she asked an officer from the Cranston Police Department to accompany her back to the house because she was worried that her husband might have committed suicide or otherwise harmed himself. Kim and several police officers went to the house, and while the encounter was non-confrontational, the ranking officer on the scene determined that Caniglia was imminently dangerous to himself and others and asked him to go to the hospital for a psychiatric evaluation, which Caniglia agreed to. While Caniglia was at the hospital, the ranking officer (with telephone approval from a superior officer) seized two of Caniglia’s guns, despite knowing that Caniglia did not consent to their seizure. Caniglia was evaluated but not admitted as an inpatient. In October of 2015, after several unsuccessful attempts to retrieve his firearms from the police, Caniglia’s attorney formally requested their return, and they were returned in December. Subsequently he filed a lawsuit under Section 1983 alleging the seizure of his firearms constituted a violation of his rights under the Second and Fourth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the Caniglia appealed. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “community caretaking” as an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in the context of a vehicle search, whether that concept applies in the context of a private home was a matter of first impression within the First Circuit. The appellate court held that the doctrine does apply in the context of a private home and affirmed the lower court’s decision. Question Does the “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement extend to the home? Conclusion The “community caretaking” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, described in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), does not extend to the home. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion, holding that police officers’ seizure of the petitioner’s guns from his home violated his Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches and seizures. The lower court’s conclusion that the “community caretaking” exception permitted the officers to seize the petitioner’s guns relied on an extension of Cady, which held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that vehicle searches are different in kind from home searches, the latter of which are subject to the highest level of protection the Constitution affords. The Court has repeatedly declined to expand the scope or number of exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home, and it declined to do so here. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer joined, to clarify that the Court’s decision does not disturb the Court’s holding in Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006), that a peace officer does not need a warrant to enter a home in situations where there is a “need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.” Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion to note that while he agrees with the Court’s opinion, there are certain related questions the Court did not decide.

United States v. Cooley Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2021.Decided on Jun 1, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Joshua James Cooley. Advocates: Eric J. Feigin (for the Petitioner) Eric R. Henkel (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joshua James Cooley was parked in his pickup truck on the side of a road within the Crow Reservation in Montana when Officer James Saylor of the Crow Tribe approached his truck in the early hours of the morning. During their exchange, the officer assumed, based on Cooley’s appearance, that Cooley did not belong to a Native American tribe, but he did not ask Cooley or otherwise verify this conclusion. During their conversation, the officer grew suspicious that Cooley was engaged in unlawful activity and detained him to conduct a search of his truck, where he found evidence of methamphetamine. Meanwhile, the officer called for assistance from county officers because Cooley “seemed to be non-Native.”  Cooley was charged with weapons and drug offenses in violation of federal law. He moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that Saylor was acting outside the scope of his jurisdiction as a Crow Tribe law enforcement officer when he seized Cooley, in violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”). The district court granted Cooley’s motion, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Saylor, a tribal officer, lacked jurisdiction to detain Cooley, a non-Native person, without first making any attempt to determine whether he was Native. Question May a police officer for a Native American tribe detain and search a non-tribe member within a reservation on suspicion of violating a state or federal law? Conclusion A tribal police officer has the authority to detain temporarily and to search a non-tribe member traveling on a public right-of-way running through a reservation for potential violations of state or federal law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Native American tribes are “distinct, independent political communities” exercising a “unique and limited” sovereign authority within the United States. Among the limitations is the general lack of inherent sovereign power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. However, the Court recognized two exceptions to this rule in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). First, a tribe may regulate the activities of non-tribal members “who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” Second, a tribe may “exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” The authority at issue in this case aligns with the second exception “almost like a glove.” None of the policing provisions Congress has enacted fit the circumstances of this case as well as the Court’s understanding in Montana, and particularly the second exception. Rather, legislation and executive action appear to assume that tribes retain the detention authority presented in this case.  Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion noting that his agreement is limited to a narrow reading of the Court’s holding.

Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Cedar Point Nursery, et al..Respondent: Victoria Hassid, et al.. Advocates: Joshua P. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Michael J. Mongan (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1975, California enacted the Agricultural Labor Relations Act (“ALRA”), which, among other things, created the Agricultural Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). Shortly after Act went into effect and established the Board, the Board promulgated a regulation allowing union organizers access to agricultural employees at employer worksites under specific circumstances. Cedar Point Nursery, an Oregon corporation, operates a nursery in Dorris, California, that raises strawberry plants for producers. It employs approximately 100 full-time workers and more than 400 seasonal workers at that location. On October 29, 2015, organizers from the United Farm Workers union ("the UFW") entered the nursery, without providing prior written notice of intent to take access as required by the regulation. The UFW allegedly disrupted the workers, and some workers left their work stations to join the protest, while a majority of workers did not. Sometime later, the UFW served Cedar Point with written notice of intent to take access. Cedar Point filed a charge against the UFW with the Board, alleging that the UFW had violated the access regulation by failing to provide the required written notice before taking access. The UFW likewise filed a countercharge, alleging that Cedar Point had committed an unfair labor practice. Cedar Point then sued the Board in federal district court alleging that the access regulation, as applied to them, amounted to a taking without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and an illegal seizure, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the Board’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and Cedar Point appealed. Reviewing the district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss de novo, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that the access regulation does not violate either provision, and it affirmed the lower court. Question Does the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitute a per se physical taking under the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion The California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property to solicit support for unionization constitutes a per se physical taking. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the government from taking private property for public use “without just compensation.” There are two types of takings: physical appropriations of land and imposition of regulations that restrict the landowner’s ability to use the land. Physical takings must be compensated. Use restrictions are evaluated using a flexible test developed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which balances factors such as the “economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.” In this case, the California regulation granting labor organizations a “right to take access” to an agricultural employer’s property is a physical taking. The regulation does not restrict the growers’ use of their own property, but instead appropriates the owners’ right to exclude third parties from their land, “one of the most treasured rights” of property ownership. By granting access to third-party union organizers, even for a limited time, the regulation confers a right to physically invade the growers’ property and thus constitutes a physical taking. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion describing another way the Court could have arrived at the same conclusion, using a different precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the regulation does not physically appropriate growers’ property; rather, it temporarily regulates their right to exclude others and as such should be subject to the “flexible” Penn Central rule.

Carr v. Saul Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 3, 2021.Decided on Apr 22, 2021. Petitioner: Willie Earl Carr, et al..Respondent: Andrew M. Saul, Commissioner of Social Security. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioners) Austin L. Raynor (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Willie Earl Carr sought disability benefits from the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), but an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his claim and the agency’s Appeals Council declined to review the decision. Carr appealed to a federal district court. While his case in the district court was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held, in Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, that Securities and Exchange Commission ALJs are “inferior officers” under the Appointments Clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, and as inferior officers, they must be appointed by the President, a court, or the head of the agency. In response to Lucia, the SSA Commissioner appointed the SSA’s ALJs. After these appointment actions, Carr raised a claim for the first time that the ALJs who had rejected their claims had not been properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. The district court agreed, vacating the SSA’s decision and remanding the case for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs. By agreeing on the merits, the district court held that Carr had not waived his right to raise an Appointments Clause claim by failing to raise that claim during the administrative proceedings. The SSA Commissioner appealed, arguing that Carr did waive the Appointments Clause challenge by failing to raise it earlier. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed and reversed the lower court. Question Does a person seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act forfeit their ability to challenge the appointment of an administrative law judge under the Appointments Clause if they fail to present that challenge during administrative proceedings? Conclusion Persons seeking disability benefits under the Social Security Act need not argue at the agency level that the administrative law judges hearing their disability claims were unconstitutionally appointed for that argument to be preserved on appeal. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion. Generally, administrative review schemes require parties to give the agency an opportunity to address an issue before seeking judicial review of that question, known as “issue exhaustion.” However, if there is not a statute or regulation that imposes an issue-exhaustion requirement, courts decide whether to require issue exhaustion in a manner consistent with “the rule that appellate courts will not consider arguments not raised before trial courts.” In this case, issue exhaustion was not necessary. First, agency adjudications are not well suited to address structural constitutional challenges because such issues usually fall outside the adjudicators’ areas of technical expertise. Second, issue exhaustion is generally not required when the agency is unable to provide meaningful relief to resolve the issue. As such, the Courts of Appeals erred in imposing an issue-exhaustion requirement on petitioners’ Appointments Clause claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas agreed with the Court that there was no need for an exhaustion rule based solely on the conclusion that the proceedings bear little resemblance to adversarial litigation. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, noting that in his view, the “nonadversarial nature” of the agency’s procedures is generally irrelevant to whether the ordinary rule requiring issue exhaustion ought to apply.” However,  the Appointments Clause challenges at issue fall into the well-established exceptions for constitutional and futile claims.

Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2021.Decided on Jul 2, 2021. Petitioner: Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al..Respondent: Democratic National Committee, et al.. Advocates: Michael A. Carvin (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1258 (Arizona Republican Party, et al.)) Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners in No. 19-1257 (Mark Brnovich, Attorney General of Arizona, et al.)) Jessica R. Amunson (for Respondent Secretary Hobbs) Bruce V. Spiva (for Respondents Democratic National Committee, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Arizona offers two methods of voting: (1) in-person voting at a precinct or vote center either on election day or during an early-vote period, or (2) “early voting” whereby the voter receives the ballot by mail and either mails back the voted ballot or delivers the ballot to a designated drop-off location. Arizona law permits each county to choose a vote center or a precinct-based system for in-person voting. In counties using the vote-center system, registered voters may vote at any polling location in the county. In counties using the precinct-based system, registered voters may vote only at the designated polling place in their precinct. About 90% of Arizona’s population lives in counties using the precinct-based system. If a voter arrives at a polling place and is not listed on the voter rolls for that precinct, the voter may cast a provisional ballot. After election day, election officials review all provisional ballots to determine the voter’s identity and address. If officials determine the voter voted out of precinct (OOP), the county discards the ballot in its entirety, even if (as is the case in most instances), the OOP voter properly voted (i.e., was eligible to vote) in most of the races on the ballot. The Democratic National Committee challenged this OOP policy as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it adversely and disparately affects Arizona’s Native American, Hispanic, and African American citizens. Arizona law has permitted early voting for over 25 years, allowing voters to request an early vote-by-mail ballot either on a per-election basis or on a permanent basis. Some counties permit voters to drop their early ballots in special drop boxes, but all counties permit the return of early ballots by mail, or in person at a polling place, vote center, or authorized election official’s office. Many voters (particularly minorities) who vote early use third parties to collect and drop off voted ballots, which, until 2016, was permissible. Despite “no evidence of any fraud in the long history of third-party ballot collection in Arizona,” Republican legislators in 2016 passed H.B. 2023, which criminalized the collection and delivery of another person’s ballot. The DNC challenged H.B. 2023 as violating Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment because it was enacted with discriminatory intent. After a ten-day bench trial, the district court found in favor of Arizona on all claims. The DNC appealed, and a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. A majority of the full Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc, and the court reversed, finding the district court “clearly erred.” Question 1. Does Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? 2. Does Arizona’s H.B. 2023 violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment? Conclusion Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), and H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Justice Samuel Alito wrote the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. As a threshold matter, the petitioner, Arizona Attorney General Brnovich, has standing to appeal the decision below because he is an authorized representative of the state. Additionally, the Court declined to establish a test to govern all VRA § 2 challenges; its decision applies only to the facts of the cases below. This is the first time the Court has considered how Section 2 of the VRA applies to time, place, or manner voting rules. The text of that provision prohibits a state from abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. Although the statute requires equal openness and equal opportunity to vote, they are not separate requirements; equal openness is the “core.” This openness is assessed using the “totality of the circumstances.” Neither Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy nor H.B. 2023, the ballot-collection law, violates Section 2 of the VRA. Neither imposes burdens on voters that exceed the “usual burdens of voting,” and any racial disparity in burdens is “small in absolute terms.” The state has legitimate and important interests in ensuring even distribution of voters among polling places and preserving the integrity of election procedures. Finally, the Court accepted the district court’s finding that H.B. 2023 was not enacted with a discriminatory purpose. Justice Neil Gorsuch concurred with the majority opinion in full but wrote a concurring opinion, which Justice Clarence Thomas joined, to note that the parties did not raise the question (and therefore the Court did not decide) whether the VRA provides an implied cause of action under Section 2. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the majority’s decision narrowly reads the language of Section 2 of the VRA in a way that undermines its essential purpose to guarantee that members of every racial group have equal voting opportunities.

United States v. Arthrex, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Arthrex, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States) Mark A. Perry (for Smith & Nephew, Inc., et al.) Jeffrey A. Lamken (for Arthrex, Inc.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Patent Trial and Appeal Board consists of a Director, a Deputy Director, a Commissioner for Patents, a Commissioner for Trademarks, and administrative patent judges. Under 35 U.S.C. § 6(a), the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), appoints Administrative Patent Judges (APJs) to the Board. Among other responsibilities, APJs decide questions of patentability in inter partes review, a “hybrid proceeding” with “adjudicatory characteristics similar to court proceedings.”  Arthrex owns a patent that was subject to inter partes review, and a three-judge panel consisting of three APJs issued a final written decision finding the claims unpatentable. Arthrex appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Federal Circuit, claiming that the appointment of APJs violates the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Federal Circuit agreed, finding that the statute as currently constructed makes APJs principal officers, who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. The court severed the portion of the Patent Act restricting removal of the APJs in order to render them inferior officers and thus remedy the constitutional appointment problem. Question 1. Are administrative patent judges principal officers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, or inferior officers who may be appointed by a department head? 2. If they are principal officers, can they be rendered inferior officers by severing the portion of the Patent Act restricting their removal? Conclusion The unreviewable authority wielded by APJs during inter partes review is incompatible with their appointment by the Secretary to an inferior office. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined in that holding by Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. Having found a constitutional violation, Chief Justice Roberts cured the defect by requiring that the Director of the USPTO hold the ultimate authority to review the final outcome of inter partes review proceedings--a departure from the statutory scheme passed by Congress. Though only Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined this part of the opinion, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer and joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan approved of the remedy despite disagreeing with the holding that made it necessary.   Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  While he was part of the majority that held APJs wielded unconstitutional authority, his remedy would have been to invalidate the statutory scheme and send the problem to Congress for a fix that complied with the Constitution.   Justice Clarence Thomas dissented from the majority’s approach. He concluded both that the APJs were inferior officers under the Constitution under the statutory scheme approved by Congress, and that the appropriate remedy once the Court held otherwise was to have vacated the decision of the APJs at the heart of the dispute. 

Lange v. California Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 24, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Arthur Gregory Lange.Respondent: California. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Petitioner) Samuel T. Harbourt (for the Respondent, supporting vacatur) Amanda K. Rice (Court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Erica L. Ross (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting affirmance) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A California Highway Patrol officer observed a parked car “playing music very loudly,” and then the driver, Arthur Gregory Lange, honked the horn four or five times despite there being no other vehicles nearby. Finding this behavior unusual, the officer began following Lange, intending to conduct a traffic stop. After following Lange for several blocks, the officer activated his overhead lights, and Lange “failed to yield.” Lange turned into a driveway and drove into a garage. The officer followed and interrupted the closing garage door. When asked whether Lange had noticed the officer, Lange replied that he had not. Based on evidence obtained from this interaction, Lange was charged with two Vehicle Code misdemeanors and an infraction.  Lange moved to suppress the evidence obtained in the garage. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that Lange committed a misdemeanor when he failed to stop after the officer activated his overhead lights and that the officer had probable cause to arrest Lange for this misdemeanor offense. Based on this probable cause, the prosecutor argued that exigent circumstances justified the officer’s warrantless entry into Lange’s garage. Lange’s attorney argued that a reasonable person in Lange's position would not have thought he was being detained when the officer activated his overhead lights, and the officer should not have entered Lange's garage without a warrant. The court denied Lange’s motion to suppress, and the appellate division affirmed. Lange pled no contest and then appealed the denial of his suppression motion a second time. The appellate division affirmed Lange's judgment of conviction. In the meantime, Lange filed a civil suit, asking the court to overturn the suspension of his license, and the civil court granted the petition after determining Lange's arrest was unlawful. The court reasoned that the “hot pursuit” doctrine did not justify the warrantless entry because when the officer entered Lange's garage, all the officer knew was that Lange had been playing his music too loudly and had honked his horn unnecessarily, which are infractions, not felonies. Based on the inconsistent findings of the courts, Lange petitioned for transfer to the California Court of Appeal, which concluded that Lange's arrest was lawful and affirmed the judgment of conviction. Question Does the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement apply when police are pursuing a suspect whom they believe committed a misdemeanor? Conclusion Pursuit of a fleeing misdemeanor suspect does not categorically qualify as an exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless entry into a home. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires a police officer to obtain a warrant to enter a home, but under settled law, an officer may enter a home without a warrant under certain specific circumstances, including exigency. The Court has recognized exigent circumstances when an officer must act to prevent imminent injury, the destruction of evidence, or a felony suspect’s escape. That a suspect is fleeing does not categorically create exigency. In United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), the Court recognized that the “hot pursuit” of a felony suspect created exigency that justified warrantless entry into a home. However, that case did not address hot pursuit of misdemeanor suspects. Rather, the Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents support a case-by-case assessment of the exigencies arising from a particular suspect’s flight. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that the reasoning of the majority and that of Chief Justice John Roberts in his opinion concurring in the judgment are not so dissimilar as they might seem at first. Rather, cases involving fleeing misdemeanor suspects “will almost always” involve a recognized exigent circumstance” such that warrantless entry into a home is justified. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas noted that the general case-by-case rule described by the majority is subject to historical, categorical exceptions. Joined by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas also noted that the federal exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered in the course of pursuing a fleeing suspect.  Chief Justice Roberts authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Samuel Alito joined. The Chief Justice argued that it is well established that the flight, not the underlying offense, justifies the “hot pursuit” exception.

Garland v. Dai Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2021.Decided on Jun 1, 2021. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General.Respondent: Ming Dai. Advocates: Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the Petitioner) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Respondent in No. 19-1156 (Alcaraz-Enriquez)) David J. Zimmer (for the Respondent in No. 19-1155 (Dai)) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ming Dai, a native and citizen of China, sought asylum in the United States. An immigration judge denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, although it did not expressly state that Dai’s testimony lacked credibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the immigration judge’s decision. Dai appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which overturned the BIA and the immigration judge's ruling, holding that Dai was entitled to withholding of removal proceedings. The appellate court specifically noted that absent a finding that Dai was not credible, he was entitled to a presumption of credibility. This case was consolidated with Garland v. Alcaraz-Enriquez, No. 19-1156. Question Can a court of appeals presume that an immigrant’s testimony is credible and true if an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals did not specifically find that he was not credible? Conclusion A court of appeals cannot presume that an immigrant’s testimony is true or credible simply based on an absence of an explicit adverse credibility determination. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires that a court reviewing a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) accept “administrative findings” of fact as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Coupled with the established principle that a reviewing court is “generally not free to impose” additional judge-made procedural requirements on agencies, this requirement means that so long as the record contains “contrary evidence” that a reasonable factfinder could find sufficient, a reviewing court may not overturn the agency’s factual determination. Although another provision of the INA does describe a presumption of credibility on appeal, it notes that outside the appeal, there is no such presumption of credibility. However, a court’s review of decisions by the BIA is not an appeal in this context. The only “appeal” is from the immigration judge (IJ) to the BIA. Subsequent judicial review is not an appeal but a “petition for review”; as such, there is no presumption of credibility at that stage of review.

Florida v. Georgia Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2021.Decided on Apr 1, 2021. Petitioner: Florida.Respondent: Georgia. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Plaintiff) Craig S. Primis (for the Defendant) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This is an ongoing case of original jurisdiction, the facts of which are explained here. In sum, the case involves a water-rights dispute between Georgia and Florida over the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. Question Is Florida is entitled to equitable apportionment of the waters of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and appropriate injunctive relief against Georgia to sustain an adequate flow of fresh water into the Apalachicola Region? Conclusion Florida failed to establish that Georgia’s overconsumption of interstate waters was either a substantial factor contributing to, or the sole cause of, Florida’s injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion on behalf of the unanimous Court.  To succeed on its claim, Florida must show by the heightened “clear and convincing evidence” that the harm it suffered—collapse of its oyster fisheries—was caused by Georgia’s overconsumption. The record evidence establishes at most that increased salinity and predation contributed to the collapse of Florida’s fisheries, not that Georgia’s overconsumption caused the increased salinity and predation. Thus, Florida failed to meet its burden of persuasion, so its exceptions to the findings of the Special Master’s report are overruled, and the case is dismissed.