Supreme Court Oral Arguments

City of Austin, Texas v. Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2021.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: City of Austin, Texas.Respondent: Reagan National Advertising of Texas Inc., et al.. Advocates: Michael R. Dreeben (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Reagan National Advertising of Austin and Lamar Advantage Outdoor Company own and operate signs and billboards that display commercial and non-commercial messages. They filed applications with the City of Austin to digitize existing billboards, but the City denied the applications because its sign code does not allow the digitization of off-premises signs. Reagan and Lamar sued, arguing that the code’s distinction between on-premise signs and off-premise signs violates the First Amendment. The district court held that the sign code was content-neutral and thus that it need only satisfy intermediate scrutiny—it must further an important government interest through means that are substantially related to that interest. The court found the code satisfied this test and entered judgment for the City. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the code’s distinction is content-based, therefore subject to scrutiny, and that it cannot withstand strict scrutiny. Question Does the Austin city code’s distinction between on-premise signs, which may be digitized, and off-premise signs, which may not, constitute facially unconstitutional content-based regulation? Conclusion The City of Austin’s on-/off-premises distinction is facially content-neutral under the First Amendment. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. When the government regulates speech based on its content, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. A regulation of speech is content based if it “applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.” The City’s off-premises distinction is agnostic as to content. It does not single out any topic or subject matter for differential treatment, and its focus on location is akin to ordinary time, place, or manner restrictions, which are also not subject to strict scrutiny. Thus, it is facially content neutral. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a concurrring opinion arguing that while Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) is binding precedent that determines the outcome in this case (as the majority acknowledges), he disagrees with the Court’s reasoning in that decision. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. He would reverse the lower court’s holding that the signs are facially unconstitutional but disagrees with the majority that the provisions defining on- and off- premises signs do not discriminate on the basis of content, at least as applied in some situations. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett joined, arguing that the majority misinterprets Reed’s rule for content-based restrictions and replaces it with “an incoherent and malleable standard.”

Ramirez v. Collier Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2021.Decided on Mar 24, 2022. Petitioner: John H. Ramirez.Respondent: Bryan Collier, Executive Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, et al.. Advocates: Seth Kretzer (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) State laws differ and have vacillated as to whether and to what extent spiritual advisers may be present in the execution chamber. In 2019, the Court upheld Alabama’s refusal to allow an imam present at the execution of a Muslim man, even though the state at the time permitted a Christian chaplain to be present. A month later, the Court prohibited Texas from executing a Buddhist inmate unless he was allowed to have a Buddhist priest present. As a result, Texas passed a law prohibiting all spiritual advisers from the execution chamber but then after another legal challenge reversed course to allow their presence. The Court subsequently prohibited another Alabama death-row inmate’s execution without his pastor present, so the state executed him eight months later with his pastor at his side, praying with him and touching his leg. John Ramirez, a Texas death-row inmate, brought a lawsuit asking that he be permitted to have his pastor present at his execution and that his pastor be allowed to pray audibly and touch him while he is being executed. Question Does Texas’s decision to allow Ramirez’s pastor to enter the execution chamber but not to lay hands on the parishioner as he dies, sing, pray, or read scripture violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment or the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act? Conclusion Texas’s restrictions on religious touch and audible prayer in the execution chamber violate the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) because they burden religious exercise and are not the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s compelling interests. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 8-1 majority opinion holding that Ramirez satisfied the test for a preliminary injunction and reversing the court below. As a threshold matter, Ramirez properly exhausted his administrative remedies before seeking a judicial remedy. As to the merits, Ramirez satisfied all of the requirements of a preliminary injunction—likelihood of success on the merits, risk of irreparable harm, and balance of equities and public interest. First, Ramirez demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. RLUIPA prohibits the state from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate unless imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. Texas’s ban on audible prayer and touch imposed a substantial burden on Ramirez because the laying on of hands and prayer are significant parts of his religious exercise. Although the state has compelling interests in monitoring an inmate’s condition during the lethal injection process and in preventing disruptions in the execution chamber, the State failed to show that its refusal to grant Ramirez’s request is the least restrictive means of achieving those interests. Further, even though the State has compelling interests in security in the execution chamber, preventing unnecessary suffering of the prisoner, and avoiding further emotional trauma to the victim’s family members, it failed to show that a categorical ban on touch is the least restrictive means of accomplishing any of these goals. Second, Ramirez is likely to suffer irreparable harm because without injunctive relief, he would be prohibited from engaging in protected religious exercise in the final moments of his life. Finally, the balance of equities and public interest tilt in Ramirez’s favor because it is possible to accommodate Ramirez’s sincere religious beliefs without delaying or impeding his execution. Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to underscore the importance of the legal obligation of prison officials to set clear grievance processes. Justice Brett Kavanaugh also joined the majority opinion in full but wrote a separate concurring opinion to point out the need for states to treat all religions equally; to highlight how difficult it is under RLUIPA to determine whether a state interest is “compelling” and whether a particular rule is the “least restrictive means”; and to call upon states to clarify their processes to ensure efficient executions in the future. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that Ramirez was simply seeking to further delay his execution and that his claims either do not warrant equitable relief or are procedurally barred.

United States v. Vaello-Madero Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2021.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Jose Luis Vaello-Madero. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioner) Hermann Ferré (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress established the Supplemental Security Income program in 1972 to provide cash benefits to low-income people who are 65 or older and have disabilities. The program extends to residents of the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the unincorporated territory of the Northern Mariana Islands, but not to those living in Puerto Rico. Jose Luis Vaello-Madero was born in Puerto Rico in 1954 and moved to New York in 1985. In 2012, he started receiving SSI payments after he experienced severe health problems, and in 2013, he moved back to Puerto Rico to help care for his wife. In 2016, the Social Security Administration (SSA) informed Vaello-Madero that because he had moved back to Puerto Rico, it was terminating his SSI benefits. Moreover, the federal government filed a lawsuit in federal court in Puerto Rico to recover over $28,000 in benefits it had paid Vaello-Madero between 2013 and 2016 when he was living in Puerto Rico. The district court ruled for Vaello-Madero, finding, among other things, that the exclusion of Puerto Rico violated the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Did Congress violate the Fifth Amendment by establishing the Supplemental Security Income program in the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the Northern Mariana Islands, but not in Puerto Rico? Conclusion The Constitution does not require Congress to make Supplemental Security Income benefits available to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court reversing the lower court. Two precedents dictate the answer to the question presented in this case. In Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1 (1978), the Court held that Congress’s decision not to extend Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to Puerto Rico did not violate the constitutional right to interstate travel because Congress had a rational basis for that decision (that residents of Puerto Rico were exempt from paying federal taxes). And in Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S. 651 (1980), the Court held that Congress’s differential treatment of Puerto Rico did not violate the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it had the same rational basis for doing so. Applying these two precedents to the present case, the Court concluded that because Congress had a rational basis for the differential treatment, it was not required to extend SSI benefits to the residents of Puerto Rico. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is a better basis for prohibiting the federal government from discriminating on the basis of race than the so-called equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion noting that although no party asked the Court to overrule the Insular Cases, in which the Court held that the federal government could rule Puerto Rico and other territories without regard to the Constitution, those cases are based on racial stereotypes and “deserve no place in our law.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that there is no rational basis for treating needy citizens living within a territory of the United States so differently from others.

Unicolors, Inc. v. H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2021.Decided on Feb 24, 2022. Petitioner: Unicolors, Inc..Respondent: H&M Hennes & Mauritz, L.P.. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the Petitioner) Melissa N. Patterson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Peter K. Stris (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Unicolors, Inc., a company that creates art designs for use on fabrics, created and copyrighted as part of a collection of designs a two-dimensional artwork called EH101 in 2011. In 2015, retail clothing store H&M began selling a jacket and skirt with an art design called “Xue Xu.” Unicolors sued H&M for copyright infringement, alleging that the Xue Xu design is identical to its EH101 design. The district court rejected H&M’s argument that Unicolors’ copyright was invalid because it had improperly used a single copyright registration to register 31 separate works. The court noted that invalidation of a copyright requires an intent to defraud, and no such evidence was presented in this case. Further, it concluded that the application contained no inaccuracies because the separate designs in the single registration were published on the same day. A jury returned a verdict for Unicolors, finding that it owned a valid copyright in EH101, that H&M had infringed on that copyright, and that the infringement was willful. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that there is no intent-to-defraud requirement for registration invalidation, and the district court failed to refer the matter to the Copyright Office, as required under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(2), when it was informed of inaccuracies in the copyright registration. Question Does 17 U.S.C. § 411 require a district court to request advice from the Copyright Office when there are questions about the validity of a copyright registration but no evidence of fraud or material error? Conclusion Lack of either factual or legal knowledge can excuse an inaccuracy in a copyright registration under 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A)’s safe harbor. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-3 majority opinion. The Copyright Act safe harbor, 17 U.S.C. § 411(b)(1)(A) says that a certificate of registration is valid regardless of whether it contains inaccurate information unless the inaccurate information was included “with knowledge that it was inaccurate.” The statutory language makes no distinction between lack of legal knowledge or lack of factual knowledge. The U.S. Court of Appeals thus erred in holding that a copyright holder cannot benefit from the safe harbor if its lack of knowledge stems from a failure to understand the law. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, and Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case as improvidently granted because the Court granted certiorari on a question of fraud but Unicolors put forth a different argument that the court below did not meaningfully consider.

Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Fazaga Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2021.Decided on Mar 4, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Bureau of Investigation, et al..Respondent: Yassir Fazaga, et al.. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the Petitioners) Catherine M.A. Carroll (for the Agent Respondents) Ahilan T. Arulanantham (for Respondents Fazaga, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Respondents Sheikh Yassir Fazaga, Ali Uddin Malik, and Yasser AbdelRahim are three Muslim residents of Southern California who regularly attended religious services at the Islamic Center of Irvine. They filed a lawsuit in federal court alleging that the FBI had used a confidential informant to conduct a covert surveillance program for at least fourteen months to gather information at the Islamic Center based solely on their Muslim religious identity. Their claims included violations of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clauses; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause; the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a; the Fourth Amendment; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1810; and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346. The U.S. Attorney General asserted the state secrets privilege with respect to evidence in the case and moved to dismiss the discrimination claims based on that privilege. It did not move to dismiss the Fourth Amendment or FISA claims based on privilege, but on other grounds. The district court dismissed all but one of the claims on the basis of the state secrets privilege. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court should have reviewed any state secrets evidence in camera to determine whether the alleged surveillance was unlawful under FISA. The appellate court then denied a petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 displace the state-secrets privilege and authorize a district court to resolve the merits of a lawsuit challenging the lawfulness of government surveillance by considering the privileged evidence? Conclusion Section 1806(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) does not displace the state secrets privilege. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. First, the text of FISA lacks any reference to the state secrets privilege, suggesting that its passage did not alter the privilege at all. Regardless of whether the privilege arises from common law or the Constitution, Congress could not have abrogated it without clear statutory language. Second, § 1806(f), which provides a procedure under which a trial-level court may consider the legality of electronic surveillance conducted under FISA, is not incompatible with the state secrets privilege. They involve different inquiries, award different forms of relief, and different procedures.

New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al..Respondent: Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Barbara D. Underwood (for the Respondents) Brian H. Fletcher (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The state of New York requires a person to show a special need for self-protection to receive an unrestricted license to carry a concealed firearm outside the home. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch challenged the law after New York rejected their concealed-carry applications based on failure to show “proper cause.” A district court dismissed their claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Does New York's law requiring that applicants for unrestricted concealed-carry licenses demonstrate a special need for self-defense violate the Second Amendment? Conclusion New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms in public for self-defense. The right to carry a firearm in public for self-defense is deeply rooted in history, and no other constitutional right requires a showing of “special need” to exercise it. While some “sensitive places” restrictions might be appropriate, Manhattan is not a “sensitive place.” Gun restrictions are constitutional only if there is a tradition of such regulation in U.S. history. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion arguing that the effect of guns on American society is irrelevant to the issue. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, noting that many state restrictions requiring background checks, firearms training, a check of mental health records, and fingerprinting, are still permissible because they are objective, in contrast to the discretionary nature of New York’s law. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a concurring opinion noting two methodological points the Court did not resolve. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that states should be able to pass restrictions in an effort to curb the number of deaths caused by gun violence, and the Court’s decision “severely burdens the States’ efforts to do so.”

Badgerow v. Walters Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 31, 2022. Petitioner: Denise A. Badgerow.Respondent: Greg Walters, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Denise Badgerow was employed as an associate financial advisor with REJ Properties, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, from January 2014 until July 2016, when she was terminated. During her employment with REJ, Badgerow signed an agreement to arbitrate any disputes that may arise between her and the three principals of the corporation. After her termination, Badgerow initiated an arbitration proceeding against the three principals before an arbitration panel of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), seeking damages for tortious interference of contract and for violation of Louisiana’s whistleblower law. The panel dismissed all of her claims with prejudice. Badgerow then brought a new action in Louisiana state court, asking the court to vacate the dismissal because the whistleblower claim was obtained by fraud. The principals removed the action to federal court, and Badgerow filed a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction over the petition to vacate and denied remand. On the merits, the court found no fraud and denied vacatur of the FINRA arbitration panel’s dismissal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Circuit affirmed. Question Do federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award when the only basis for jurisdiction is that the underlying dispute involved a federal question? Conclusion Federal courts do not have subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm or vacate an arbitration award because the “look-through” approach recognized in the context of Section 4 does not apply in the context of Sections 9 and 10. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009), the Court recognized that in the context of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), a federal court may “look through” the petition for arbitration to the “underlying substantive controversy” to decide whether it has jurisdiction. Its decision in that case relied on “distinctive” language in Section 4 that directed the “look through” approach. Sections 9 and 10, at issue in this case, do not contain that same language, so the “look through” approach does not apply. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion arguing that the majority’s narrow focus on the statute’s literal words “creates unnecessary complexity and confusion,” while consideration of the statute’s purposes would lead to a better and clearer outcome.

Houston Community College System v. Wilson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2021.Decided on Mar 24, 2022. Petitioner: Houston Community College System.Respondent: David Buren Wilson. Advocates: Richard A. Morris (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Michael B. Kimberly (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Houston Community College (HCC) System operates community colleges throughout the greater Houston area. HCC is run by a Board of nine trustees, each of which is elected by the public to serve a six-year term without remuneration. David Wilson was elected to the Board as a trustee on November 5, 2013. Starting in 2017, Wilson criticized the other trustees, alleging that they had violated the Board’s bylaws, and made various other criticisms of the Board. As a result, the Board censured Wilson and barred him from holding officer positions on the Board or from receiving travel reimbursements. Wilson sued HCC, alleging that the censure violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The district court ruled against him, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed. In holding for Wilson, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the First Amendment precludes community college boards from censuring members for their speech. Question Does the First Amendment restrict the authority of an elected body to issue a censure resolution in response to a member’s speech? Conclusion A purely verbal censure does not give rise to an actionable First Amendment claim. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that Wilson lacked an actionable First Amendment claim against the Houston Community College System. The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech,” which includes a prohibition on “retaliatory actions” for engaging in protected speech. However, elected bodies have long exercised the power to censure their members, and the Court’s precedents affirm that mere censure does not afoul of the First Amendment. That Wilson was an elected official and that the censure itself was mere speech by other members within the same elected body support the conclusion that the censure was not a materially adverse action and thus did not give rise to a First Amendment claim.

Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: Whole Woman's Health, et al..Respondent: Austin Reeve Jackson, Judge, District Court of Texas, 114th District, et al.. Advocates: Marc A. Hearron (for the Petitioners) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge. Question Can the petitioners in this case pursue a pre-enforcement challenge to Texas Senate Bill 8 (SB 8), which prohibits providers from performing or inducing an abortion after a fetal heartbeat is detected and which allows for direct enforcement of the law through private civil actions? Conclusion The petitioners in this case may proceed past the motion-to-dismiss stage only as to the defendants who are state medical licensing officials. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court.   Writing for himself and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett, Justice Gorsuch concluded that the petitioners cannot sue defendants Penny Clarkston and Austin Jackson (a state-court clerk and state-court judge, respectively) because states are generally immune from lawsuits under the Eleventh Amendment, and even the limited exception recognized in Ex Parte Young does not permit an ex-ante injunction preventing state courts from hearing cases. Additionally, state-court clerks and judges are not “adverse litigants” and thus a pre-enforcement challenge against those parties does not constitute a “case or controversy” as required under the Constitution. The same five Justices also concluded that the petitioners cannot sue Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton because the attorney general lacks authority to enforce the challenged law. All nine Justices agreed that the petitioners cannot sue the individual private defendant Mark Lee Dickson because they cannot establish an injury “fairly traceable” to his unlawful conduct, as required by the Constitution. All but Justice Clarence Thomas agreed that the petitioners may proceed in their lawsuit against the state licensing officials because each may or must take enforcement actions against the abortion providers if the providers violate SB 8. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Roberts noted that SB 8 has the purpose and effect of “nullify[ing]” the Court’s rulings and thus threatens the entire constitutional system. Writing on behalf of herself and Justices Breyer and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor extended the Chief Justice’s concerns, pointing out that the Court’s narrow ruling “effectively invites” other states to follow Texas’s example in nullifying constitutional rights.

United States v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2021.Decided on Dec 10, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Texas, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the state Respondent) Jonathan F. Mitchell (for the private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Texas legislature passed a law, SB 8, that prohibits abortions after about six weeks of pregnancy. Additionally, the law criminalizes any person who "aids or abets" any such abortion and permits any private citizen (as opposed to the state itself), to file a lawsuit for damages against such persons. Abortion providers challenged the law, and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the providers’ initial request to block enforcement of the law. After the law went into effect, the providers filed another legal challenge, as did the federal government. A federal district court temporarily enjoined enforcement of the law, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the lower court's injunction. The Department of Justice asked the Court to reinstate the district court's judgment. Question Can the United States sue the State of Texas in federal court to prohibit enforcement of an unconstitutional abortion law? Conclusion The court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and denied the application to vacate the stay.