Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Egbert v. Boule Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 2, 2022.Decided on Jun 8, 2022. Petitioner: Erik Egbert.Respondent: Robert Boule. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Huston (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Felicia H. Ellsworth (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Erik Egbert, a Customs and Border Patrol Agent, went to the Smugglers Inn, which sits at the U.S.-Canada border, and approached a car carrying a guest from Turkey. The inn’s owner, Robert Boule, asked Egbert to leave, and when Egbert refused to do so, Egbert pushed Boule to the ground. After Boule complained to Egbert’s supervisors, Egbert suggested to the IRS that it investigate Boule. Boule filed a Bivens lawsuit (so called because of the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, which first recognized the right of plaintiffs to sue federal officials for damages arising from violations of their constitutional rights) against Egbert arguing that the agent had violated his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The district court ruled against Boule, finding his claims beyond the scope of those permitted under Bivens. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the full (en banc) Ninth Circuit denied Egbert’s petition for rehearing. Question Does a plaintiff have a right to sue federal officers for First Amendment retaliation claims or for allegedly violating the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights while engaging in immigration-related functions? Conclusion A plaintiff does not have a right to sue Border Patrol officers engaged in immigration-related functions for First Amendment retaliation claims or for alleged excessive force. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the majority opinion of the Court. Although Bivens permits suits against federal officials for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment, its application to Border Patrol officers raises national security concerns. Thus, “judicial intrusion” would be harmful or inappropriate in this arena. As to the First Amendment, Boule’s claim is a novel concept and no factors weigh in favor of judicial extension of Bivens to that claim. Moreover, for both claims, Congress is better suited to authorize a damages remedy. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Gorsuch would overrule Bivens entirely. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, concurring in the judgment as to the First Amendment claim but dissenting as to the Fourth Amendment claim. Justice Sotomayor argued that Boule’s Fourth Amendment claim was squarely within the scope of Bivens and only his First Amendment claim was in a new context.

Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan v. DaVita, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan, et al..Respondent: DaVita, Inc., et al.. Advocates: John J. Kulewicz (for the Petitioners) Matthew Guarnieri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) DaVita is the leading provider of dialysis treatment in the United States. Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan is a self-funded plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). Patient A is an anonymous individual with end-stage renal disease who is a member of the plan and has been receiving treatment by DaVita since April 15, 2017. The Plan defines three tiers of reimbursement, and dialysis providers are categorically in the lowest tier and are considered out of network, entitling them to the lowest level of reimbursement relative to all other providers. DaVita challenged the Plan as violating the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which prohibits health plans from treating individuals with kidney failure differently in eligibility or access to benefits. The district court dismissed all of DaVita’s claims, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed in part, finding that DaVita had plausibly alleged that the Plan engaged in unlawful discrimination. Question Did the Marietta Memorial Hospital Employee Health Benefit Plan violate the Medicare Secondary Payer Act’s non-discrimination provisions through its reimbursement structure for dialysis providers? Conclusion The Marietta Plan’s coverage terms for outpatient dialysis do not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C) because those terms apply uniformly to all covered individuals, and the Medicare Secondary Payer statute does not authorize disparate-impact liability. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Section 1395y(b)(1)(C)(ii) prohibits a plan from differentiating in benefits between individuals with and without end-stage renal disease. The language of the provision cannot fairly be read to authorize liability for disparate-impact claims. Because the Marietta Plan provides the same outpatient dialysis benefits to all Plan participants, whether or not they are eligible for Medicare, it does not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(C). Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that because outpatient dialysis is an almost perfect proxy for end-stage renal disease, differentiation on the basis of one is equivalent to differentiation on the basis of the other.

Ruan v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Xiulu Ruan.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lawrence S. Robbins (for the Petitioner in 20-1410) Beau B. Brindley (for the Petitioner in 21-5261) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A federal jury in Alabama convicted Xiulu Ruan and several other pain management physicians of running a medical practice constituting a racketeering enterprise in violation of several federal statutes, including provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Ruan allegedly prescribed medicines, including Schedule II drugs (many of which are opioids), outside the standard of care for his practice. At trial, prosecutors showed that Ruan and other physicians in his practice prescribed medications for their own financial gain rather than for the benefit of their patients. Ruan and other defendants challenged their convictions, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Question May a physician alleged to have prescribed controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice be convicted of unlawful distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) regardless of whether he “reasonably believed” or “subjectively intended” that his prescriptions fall within that course of professional practice? Conclusion The crime of prescribing controlled substances outside the usual course of professional practice, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, requires that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally” acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In general, criminal law seeks to punish conscious wrongdoing. Thus, when a criminal statute is silent as to the mental state required, courts infer a requirement of knowledge or intent. When it is not silent, the general mental state provision applies to each term of the provision. Thus, the “knowingly or intentionally” requirement of 21 U.S.C. § 841 applies to the phrase “except as authorized.” As such, once the defendant proves their conduct was “authorized,” the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted in an unauthorized manner. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Alito looked to the Harrison Act, which preceded the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). Regarding the Harrison Act, the Court held that a registered physician acts “in the course of his professional practice” when the physician writes prescriptions “in good faith.” Justice Alito would thus hold that this rule applies under the CSA and vacate the judgments below and remand for further proceedings.

West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 28, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2022. Petitioner: West Virginia, et al..Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency, et al.. Advocates: Lindsay S. See (for the state Petitioners) Jacob M. Roth (for the private Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the federal Respondents) Beth S. Brinkmann (for the power company Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Trump administration repealed the 2015 Clean Power Plan, which established guidelines for states to limit carbon dioxide emissions from power plants, and issued in its place the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, which eliminated or deferred the guidelines. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit vacated the ACE Rule as arbitrary and capricious. One of the challengers, North American Coal Corporation, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s authority to so broadly regulate greenhouse gas emissions. Question Does the Environmental Protection Agency have the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in virtually any industry, so long as it considers cost, non-air impacts, and energy requirements? Conclusion Congress did not grant the Environmental Protection Agency in Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act the authority to devise emissions caps based on the generation shifting approach the Agency took in the Clean Power Plan. Under the “major questions doctrine,” there are “extraordinary cases” in which the “history and the breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted,” and the “economic and political significance” of that assertion, provide a “reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress” meant to confer such authority. This is one such case, so the EPA must point to “clear congressional authorization” for the authority it claims. It cannot do so. The EPA has admitted that issues of electricity transmission, distribution, and storage are not within its traditional expertise, yet it claims that Congress implicitly tasked it with the regulation of how Americans get their energy. Without “clear congressional authorization” for the EPA to regulate in such a manner, the agency lacks authority to implement the Clean Power Plan under the Clean Air Act. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined.

Arizona v. City and County of San Francisco Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Arizona, et al..Respondent: City and County of San Francisco, California, et al.. Advocates: Mark Brnovich (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the federal Respondents) Helen H. Hong (for the state Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Although federal immigration law uses the term “public charge,” referring generally to recipients of federal benefits, it lacks a precise and clear definition. Under the Clinton administration, it referred only to a noncitizen who received cash benefits (as opposed to other types of benefits). In 2019, the Trump administration issued a final rule defining “public charge” as a noncitizen who would likely need cash benefits and/or government-provided housing, food assistance, or medical insurance for more than twelve months. The rule was subject to legal challenges, and the Biden administration stopped defending the rule and dismissed all the cases challenging the rule. The federal government also took additional steps to revert the definition to that of the Clinton administration. Several states sought to intervene in the litigation and take up the defense of the rule where the federal government left off. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the states’ motion to intervene. Question Can states with interests intervene to defend a rule when the United States ceases to defend it? Conclusion Dismissed as improvidently granted.

Denezpi v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merle Denezpi.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Michael B. Kimberly (for the Petitioner) Erica L. Ross (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Merle Denezpi, a member of the Navajo tribe, pleaded guilty to an assault charge in the Court of Indian Offenses. That court is a trial court that exercises jurisdiction over Native Americans where there are no tribal courts to do so. Six months later, a federal grand jury indicted Denezpi on a charge of aggravated sexual assault based on the same underlying events. He was found guilty and sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Denezpi challenged his prosecution in federal court, arguing that it violated the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause because the Court of Indian Offenses is a federal agency. The district court ruled against Denezpi, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a prosecution in the Court of Indian Offenses trigger the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause? Conclusion The Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions of distinct offenses arising from a single act, even if a single sovereign prosecutes them. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit prosecuting a person twice “for the same conduct or actions,” but for the same “offence.” Under the dual-sovereignty principle, two offenses arising from the same act can therefore be separately prosecuted without offending the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they have identical elements and could not be separately prosecuted if enacted by a single sovereign. Denezpi’s single act constituted assault and battery under the Ute Mountain Ute Code and aggravated sexual abuse in Indian country under the U.S. Code. His prosecution for both crimes does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined in part, arguing that the same prosecuting authority charged the same defendant twice for the same crime—the very definition of double jeopardy proscribed by the U.S. Constitution.

Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, et al..Respondent: State of Texas. Advocates: Brant C. Martin (for the Petitioners) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Lanora C. Pettit (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Ysleta del Sur Pueblo is a federally recognized tribe with a reservation near El Paso, Texas. Under the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act, passed by Congress in 1987, the Pueblo agreed that its gaming activities would comply with Texas law. Another law, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, also regulates tribal gaming operations. The Pueblo engaged in gaming activity that violated state law but not the IGRA, and Texas filed a lawsuit to enjoin the tribe’s gaming operations. The district court ruled in favor of the State of Texas, finding that the more restrictive Restoration Act controlled and prohibited the gaming operations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Question Which federal law governs the legality of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo’s gaming operations, the Restoration Act or the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act? Conclusion The Ysleta del Sur and Alabama and Coushatta Indian Tribes of Texas Restoration Act applies to the case at hand and bans on tribal lands only those gaming activities also banned in Texas. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court Section 107 of the Restoration Act directly addresses gaming on the lands of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, providing that “gaming activities which are prohibited by [Texas law] are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.” Activities that Texas law merely regulates and does not prohibit are outside the scope of the Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined.

Federal Election Commission v. Ted Cruz for Senate Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on May 16, 2022. Petitioner: Federal Election Commission.Respondent: Ted Cruz for Senate, et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Appellant) Charles J. Cooper (for the Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The day before Election Day in 2018, Senator Ted Cruz loaned Ted Cruz for Senate (“Cruz Committee”) two campaign finance loans totaling $260,000. After Election Day, the Cruz Committee used the funds it had on hand to pay vendors and meet other obligations instead of repaying the loans to Senator Cruz. Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations place a $250,000 limit on the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to pay back a candidate's pre-election loans more than 20 days after Election Day. After 20 days had elapsed, the balance of those loans that exceeded BCRA's $250,000 statutory cap on post-election contributions ($10,000)—converted into a campaign contribution. The Cruz Committee filed a lawsuit seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act and its implementing regulations as violating constitutional and administrative laws. A three-judge court ruled for Cruz, finding that the restrictions place a burden on political speech without adequate justification. Question Do appellees have standing to challenge the statutory loan-repayment limit of 52 U.S.C. § 30116(j), and does the limit unconstitutionally burden political speech without justification? Conclusion Appellees have standing to challenge Section 304 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, and that section—which limits the amount of post-election contributions that may be used to repay a candidate who lends money to his own campaign—violates the First Amendment rights of candidates and their campaigns to engage in political speech. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. As to standing, appellee’s injuries are directly inflicted by the Federal Election Commission’s (FEC’s) threatened enforcement of the provisions at issue. That appellees intentionally triggered the application of the provisions does not undermine their standing to challenge them. Additionally, although the jurisdiction of a three-judge district court is limited to actions challenging the enforcement of a statute (as opposed to a regulation), the enforcement is traceable to the operation of the statute itself. Thus, the appellees may challenge the FEC’s threatened enforcement of the loan-repayment limitation through its implementing regulation. As to the merits, the loan-repayment limitation burdens candidates who wish to make expenditures on behalf of their own candidacy through personal loans. By seeking to deter candidates from loaning money to their campaigns, Section 304 raises a barrier to entry thus abridging political speech. The Government fails to describe how the limitation furthers a permissible interest—namely, the prevention of “quid pro quo” corruption or its appearance. Although the Government argues that the types of contributions at issue raise a heightened risk of corruption because they are used to repay a candidate’s personal loans, it does not identify a single case of quid pro quo corruption as a result of these types of contributions. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan argued that the majority overstates the the First Amendment burdens Section 304 imposes and understates the anticorruption values Section 304 serves. Because the regulated transactions personally enrich those already elected to office, they threaten both corruption and the appearance of corruption, “bring[ing] this country’s political system into further disrepute.”

Concepcion v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 19, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Carlos Concepcion.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Charles L. McCloud (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2008, Carlos Concepcion pleaded guilty to crack cocaine charges, and in 2009 he was sentenced to 228 months in prison. While he was serving his sentence, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act, which reduced the statutory penalties for most federal crimes involving crack cocaine. In 2018, Congress made these changes retroactive, and Concepcion moved for resentencing. The district court denied his motion, and Concepcion appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the district court was not obligated to update and reevaluate the sentencing factors. Question Must or may a district court consider intervening legal and factual developments when deciding whether to “impose a reduced sentence” on an individual under Section 404(b) of the First Step Act of 2018? Conclusion The First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. District courts enjoy substantial discretion to consider all relevant information at a sentencing hearing. That discretion extends to subsequent hearings modifying sentencing, as well. The First Step Act preserves this discretion, allowing the district court to reduce sentences based not only on the changes to sentencing ranges, but also on other legal or factual changes that have occurred since the original sentencing. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the text of the First Step Act authorizes district courts to reduce sentences based only on changes to the crack-cocaine sentencing ranges, not on other unrelated changes that have occurred since the original sentencing.  

Shurtleff v. Boston Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on May 2, 2022. Petitioner: Harold Shurtleff, et al..Respondent: City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al.. Advocates: Mathew D. Staver (for the Petitioners) Sopan Joshi (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Douglas Hallward-Driemeier (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The City of Boston owns and manages three flagpoles in front of City Hall, the seat of Boston’s municipal government. Ordinarily, the City raises the United States flag and the POW/MIA flag on one flagpole, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts flag on the second flagpole, and its own flag on the third flagpole. Upon request and after approval, the City will occasionally fly another flag for a limited period of time instead of its own flag. Gregory T. Rooney, Commissioner of Boston’s Property Management Department, reviews applications for flag-raising events to ensure the flag is consistent with the City’s message, policies, and practices. The City has approved 284 flag-raising events over a 12-year period, and Rooney had never denied a flag-raising application. Camp Constitution is an organization that seeks “to enhance the understanding of the country’s Judeo-Christian moral heritage” and applied to fly a “Christian flag” for its event. Rooney denied Camp Constitution’s flag-raising request, finding it was the first time any entity or organization had requested to fly a religious flag. Camp Constitution sued, and the district court found for the City. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Does Boston’s refusal to fly a private religious organization’s flag depicting a cross on a city flagpole violate the organization’s First Amendment rights? Conclusion Boston’s flag-raising program does not constitute government speech, so its refusal to fly the private religious organization’s flag violates the organization’s First Amendment rights. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court first considered whether Boston’s flag-raising program is government speech. The test for government speech is a holistic inquiry that considers, among other things, the history of the expression at issue, the public’s perception as to who is speaking, and the extent to which the government has controlled the expression. Although the history of flag displays favors Boston, the other two factors outweigh the first factor. The public would not necessarily associate a flag’s message with the City, and, most importantly, the City has exercised almost no control over flag content. In fact, the City has no record of denying a request until the Petitioner’s in this case. Thus, on balance, the flag-raising program is not government speech. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment disallows the government from engaging in “impermissible viewpoint discrimination.” When it is not speaking for itself, the government may not exclude speech based on “religious viewpoint.” Thus, Boston’s refusal to allow Shurtleff and Camp Constitution to raise their flag based on “religious viewpoint” violated the First Amendment. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion to reiterate that the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it treats religious persons or organizations equally with secular persons or organizations, but it does violate the Free Speech Clause when it excludes religious persons or organizations. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, disclaiming the three-factor test used by the majority. Rather, when faced with a question whether speech constitutes government speech, Justice Alito would ask “whether the government is actually expressing its own views or the real speaker is a private party and the government is surreptitiously engaged in the ‘regulation of private speech.’” Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the so-called Lemon test the Court adopted for resolving Establishment Clause disputes. Justice Gorsuch argued that Boston erroneously relied on the now-abandoned Lemon test, leading it to believe that flying the flag would violate the Establisment Clause.