Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Mallory v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 8, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2023. Petitioner: Robert Mallory.Respondent: Norfolk Southern Railway Co.. Advocates: Ashley C. Keller (for the Petitioner) Carter G. Phillips (for the Respondent) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Robert Mallory sued Norfolk Southern Railway Co. in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas for claims arising under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA). According to his complaint, Mallory was exposed to harmful carcinogens while employed by Defendant in Ohio and Virginia between 1988 through 2005. He did not allege that he suffered any harmful occupational exposures in Pennsylvania but sued in Pennsylvania court on a theory that the court could exercise jurisdiction over the Virginia company because it had registered to do business in Pennsylvania. Under Pennsylvania law, a foreign corporation “may not do business in this Commonwealth until it registers” with the Department of State of the Commonwealth. State law further establishes that registration constitutes a sufficient basis for Pennsylvania courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction over that foreign corporation. Norfolk Southern Railway objected to the exercise of personal jurisdiction, arguing that the exercise violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court agreed and held Pennsylvania’s statutory scheme unconstitutional. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. Question Does a state registration statute for out-of-state corporations that purports to confer general personal jurisdiction over the registrant violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion A Pennsylvania law requiring out-of-state companies that register to do business in Pennsylvania to agree to appear in Pennsylvania courts on “any cause of action” against them comports with the Due Process Clause. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the main opinion of the Court. The outcome in this case is controlled by the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), which held that suits based on the defendant’s consent to jurisdiction do not deny the defendant due process of law. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded otherwise based on its erroneous belief that the Court had “implicitly overruled Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). However, rather than displace Pennsylvania Fire, International Shoe merely paved an additional road to jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations. Thus, the facts of this case fall squarely within Pennsylvania Fire, and there is no due process violation. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion noting another precedent, Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982), which she finds “particularly instructive.” Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito agreed with the plurality that exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the state registration statute does not violate the Due Process Clause, but he opined that the statute might be unconstitutional on other grounds not before the Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Brett Kavanaugh joined, arguing that compelled state registration does not constitute “consent.”

Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2022.Decided on Apr 14, 2023. Petitioner: Axon Enterprise, Inc..Respondent: Federal Trade Commission, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Axon Enterprises manufactures personal body cameras for law enforcement. In 2018, it acquired a competitor body camera company called Vievu. After the acquisition, the Federal Trade Commission informed Axon that the transaction raised antitrust concerns and that the Commission would be investigating. At the end of 2019, the FTC informed Axon of its demands, which it could either accede or face administrative proceedings. Axon filed a lawsuit in federal district court alleging that (1) the FTC’s administrative proceeding violates Axon’s Fifth Amendment due process rights, (2) the FTC’s structure violates Article II by providing improper insulation from the President, and (3) Axon’s acquisition of Vievu did not violate antitrust law. The district court dismissed Axon’s complaint, holding that the FTC’s statutory scheme required Axon to raise its constitutional challenge first in the administrative proceeding. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that Congress impliedly barred jurisdiction in federal district court. Question Do federal courts have jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedure, and existence, or must such challenges be raised first in the administrative proceeding? Conclusion Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence. The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”? The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction. First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over. Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran. Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts.

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cochran Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 7, 2022.Decided on Apr 14, 2023. Petitioner: Securities and Exchange Commission, et al..Respondent: Michelle Cochran. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for Michelle Cochran) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the SEC, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In April 2016, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought an enforcement action against Michelle Cochran, a certified public accountant, alleging that she had failed to comply with federal auditing standards. After a hearing, an SEC administrative law judge (ALJ) agreed that Cochran had violated federal law, fined her $22,500, and banned her from practicing before the SEC for five years. The SEC adopted the ALJ’s decision, and Cochran objected. Before the SEC could rule on Cochran’s objection, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC, in which it held that SEC ALJs are officers of the United States under the Appointments Clause, who must be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a department head. In response to that ruling, the SEC remanded all pending administrative cases for new proceedings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, including Cochran’s. Cochran filed a lawsuit in federal district court arguing that while Lucia may have addressed one constitutional issue with ALJs, it left uncorrected another problem: because SEC ALJs enjoy multiple layers of "for-cause" removal protection, they are unconstitutionally insulated from the President's Article II removal power. The district court dismissed Cochran’s case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a reading of the Exchange Act as implicitly stripping district courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to ongoing SEC enforcement proceedings. A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, but the Fifth Circuit sitting en banc reversed as to that interpretation of the Exchange Act. Question Does a federal district court have jurisdiction to consider claims challenging the constitutionality of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s administrative proceedings? Conclusion Federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the structure or existence of the SEC or FTC notwithstanding statutory review schemes set out in the Securities Exchange Act and Federal Trade Commission Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion holding that the Federal Trade Commission Act (in 21-86) and the Securities Exchange Act (in 21-1239) did not preclude district courts’ ordinary subject-matter jurisdiction to hear challenges to those agencies’ structure, procedure, or existence. The Court considered three factors, known as the Thunder Basin factors, to determine whether particular claims concerning agency action are “of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure,” and thus would preclude district court jurisdiction. The three factors are: (1) Could precluding district court jurisdiction “foreclose all meaningful judicial review” of the claim? (2) Is the claim “wholly collateral” to the statute’s review provisions? (3) Is the claim “outside the agency’s expertise”? The Court concluded that all three factors supported the conclusion that district courts retained subject-matter jurisdiction. First, preclusion of district court jurisdiction “could foreclose all meaningful judicial review” because Axon and Cochran will lose their rights not to undergo the complained-of agency proceedings if they cannot assert those rights until the proceedings are over. Second, the claims are “wholly collateral” to the statutes’ review provisions because challenges to the Commissions’ authority have nothing to do with either the enforcement-related matters the Commissions regularly adjudicate or those they would adjudicate in assessing the charges against Axon and Cochran. Finally, the claims are outside the agencies’ expertise because neither specializes in constitutional issues like separation of powers. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion to express “grave doubts about the constitutional propriety of Congress vesting administrative agencies with primary authority to adjudicate core private rights with only deferential judicial review on the back end.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that he would reach the same conclusion as the majority by applying only 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which establishes federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts.

Bittner v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2022.Decided on Feb 28, 2023. Petitioner: Alexandru Bittner.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Matthew Guarnieri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Alexandru Bittner erroneously failed to report his interests in foreign bank accounts on annual FBAR forms, as required by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). The government fined him $2.72 million—$10,000 for each unreported account each year from 2007 to 2011. Bittner challenged the fine, and the district court reduced the assessment to $50,000, holding that the $10,000 maximum penalty attaches to each failure to file an annual FBAR, not to each failure to report an account. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed on this issue, holding that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation subject to penalty. Question Is a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or is there a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported? Conclusion The Bank Secrecy Act’s $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-4 majority opinion holding that Bittner was subject to a fine only for each report he failed to file, not for each account he failed to report over that five-year period. The plain language of Section 5321 addresses the legal duty to file reports, not of individual accounts or their number. The penalty the statute prescribes for nonwillful violations must therefore be based on the number of reports, not on the number of accounts. In contrast, for willful violations, the statute expressly considers a penalty on a per-account basis. The government’s guidance as to these provisions, as well as the drafting history, further support this understanding. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that “the most natural reading of the statute establishes that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation.”

Jones v. Hendrix Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2022.Decided on Jun 22, 2023. Petitioner: Marcus DeAngelo Jones.Respondent: Dewayne Hendrix. Advocates: Daniel R. Ortiz (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent, supporting affirmance) Morgan L. Ratner (court-appointed amicus curiae, supporting the judgment below) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A jury convicted Marcus DeAngelo Jones of one count of making false statements to acquire a firearm and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. Jones appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jones then filed a motion to vacate his sentence on the grounds that it was illegally imposed. The district court denied his motion, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that Jones’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the two felon-in-possession counts as duplicative. The district court vacated one of his felon-in-possession convictions and resentenced him. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to convict someone under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew both that he had a prohibited status and that he possessed a firearm. Because Jones had been convicted of this offense without proof that he knew he had a prohibited status, he filed a habeas petition challenging his conviction. The district court dismissed his petition, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Question May a federal inmate who did not challenge their conviction on the ground that the statute did not criminalize their activity subsequently apply for habeas relief after the Supreme Court retroactively invalidates the circuit precedent on which the inmate relied in not challenging their conviction? Conclusion Section 2255(e) does not allow a prisoner asserting an intervening change in interpretation of a criminal statute to circumvent the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996’s (AEDPA) restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions by filing a §2241 habeas petition. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. The majority first clarified the relationship between §2255 and §2241 in the context of federal prisoners challenging their sentences. Congress introduced §2255 to allow prisoners to challenge their sentences in the sentencing court, rather than through a habeas corpus petition under §2241. While the saving clause in §2255(e) preserved access to §2241 in specific situations, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) added restrictions on second or successive §2255 motions. The saving clause does not permit prisoners to circumvent AEDPA's restrictions, even if they are challenging a new interpretation of a criminal statute. The majority found unpersuasive arguments by both Jones and the federal government regarding when §2255 might be considered “inadequate or ineffective,” thus allowing recourse to §2241. AEDPA’s restrictions reflect Congress’s deliberate choice to balance finality with error correction in the justice system. Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan jointly dissented, arguing that Jones presents the precise type of mismatch contemplated in §2255(h) and would those remand for the lower courts to consider his claim under the proper framework. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion arguing that §2255 requires that Jones’s petition alleging legal innocence should have been considered on the merits.

Cruz v. Arizona Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 1, 2022.Decided on Feb 22, 2023. Petitioner: John Montenegro Cruz.Respondent: Arizona. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Petitioner) Joseph A. Kanefield (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2005, a jury convicted John Montenegro Cruz of first-degree murder for the 2003 killing of a Tucson police officer and sentenced Cruz to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’s conviction and sentence, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. In 2012, Cruz filed a petition in state court for post-conviction relief, which the court dismissed, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied review. In 2014, Cruz initiated federal habeas proceedings. In 2016, while those proceedings were ongoing, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Lynch v. Arizona (Lynch II), holding that the Arizona Supreme Court had misapplied precedent. Cruz then filed a second petition for post-conviction relief. Ordinarily that second petition would be barred, but state law provides for an exception if there was an intervening “significant change in the the law.” Cruz argued that the decision in Lynch II was a signficant change in the law, that it applies retroactively, and would probably overturn his sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that Lynch II was not a significant change in the law and was instead based on precedent well established at the time the defendant was convicted and sentenced. Question Is the Arizona Supreme Court’s ruling that a state rule of criminal procedure precluded post-conviction relief an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment against him, thereby precluding review by a federal court?  Conclusion The Arizona Supreme Court’s holding below is not an adequate state-law ground supporting that judgment and thus does not preclude federal court review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. If the judgment of a state court rests on “adequate and independent state-law grounds,” the Supreme Court will not decide a simultaneously presented question of federal law. Generally, a state’s procedural ruling is adequate to foreclose a review of a federal claim. The Arizona Supreme Court’s decision holding that Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613, did not represent a “significant change in the law,” as it was entirely new and conflicted with existing state law. Because the interpretation was so novel and unforeseeable, it cannot constitute an adequate state procedural ground. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court should have given the “utmost deference” to the state court’s interpretation of its own precedent and that it failed to do so.

Students for Fair Admissions v. President and Fellows of Harvard College Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2022. Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..Respondent: President & Fellows of Harvard College. Advocates: Cameron T. Norris (for the Petitioner) Seth P. Waxman (for the Respondent) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued Harvard College over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discriminating against Asian American applicants in favor of white applicants. Harvard admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. After a 15-day bench trial, the district court issued a detailed opinion in favor of Harvard. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at the University of North Carolina under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, but the Court severed the cases. Question May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions? If so, does Harvard College’s race-conscious admissions process violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?

Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2022.Decided on Jun 29, 2023. Petitioner: Students for Fair Admissions, Inc..Respondent: University of North Carolina, et al.. Advocates: Patrick Strawbridge (for the Petitioner) Ryan Y. Park (for the University Respondents) David G. Hinojosa (for the Student Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Petitioner Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) sued the University of North Carolina (UNC) over its admissions process, alleging that the process violates the Fourteenth Amendment by using race as a factor in admissions. UNC admits that it uses race as one of many factors in its admissions process but argues that its process adheres to the requirements for race-based admissions outlined in the Supreme Court’s decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. After an eight-day bench trial and litigation that spanned nearly seven years, the district court ruled that UNC’s admissions policy survived strict scrutiny and was consistent with Grutter v. Bollinger. SFFA appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed to hold the case in abeyance after the U.S. Supreme Court granted review. The case was originally consolidated for oral argument with a similar case challenging the admissions policies at Harvard University under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, but the Court subsequently severed the two cases. Question May institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions? If so, does UNC’s race-conscious admissions process violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution? Conclusion The University of North Carolina admissions program violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion. First the Court concluded that Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA) had organizational standing because is a voluntary membership organization with identifable members who support its mission and whom SFFA represents in good faith.  Second, while the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that laws apply equally to everyone, regardless of race, both the Supreme Court and the nation failed to uphold this principle, most notably in Plessy v. Ferguson, which sanctioned “separate but equal” facilities. However, the landmark case Brown v. Board of Education overturned this, and the equal protection principle has since expanded to various areas of life. Any exceptions to equal protection must satisfy “strict scrutiny”; that is, the government must show that the racial classification serves a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Justice Lewis Powell’s opinion became the touchstone for evaluating the constitutionality of race-based admissions, reasoning that diversity in the student body could be a “compelling state interest,” but that race could only be used as a “plus” in admissions and not as a quota. In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court adopted Powell's viewpoint, while also setting limits to ensure race-based admissions did not result in stereotyping or harm to non-minority applicants, and stating that such race-based programs should eventually come to an end. Harvard’s (and UNC’s, in the consolidated case) race-based admissions systems fail to meet the strict scrutiny, non-stereotyping, and termination criteria established by Grutter and Bakke. Specifically, the universities could not demonstrate their compelling interests in a measurable way, failed to avoid racial stereotypes, and did not offer a logical endpoint for when race-based admissions would cease. As a result, the programs violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court noted that nothing prohibits universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected the applicant’s life, so long as that discussion is concretely tied to a quality of character or unique ability that the particular applicant can contribute to the university. Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh each wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined (except Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of the case against Harvard). Justice Jackson wrote a separate dissenting opinion.

Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc. v. Hewitt Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2022.Decided on Feb 22, 2023. Petitioner: Helix Energy Solutions, et al..Respondent: Michael J. Hewitt. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioners) Edwin Sullivan (for the Respondent) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael J. Hewitt worked on an offshore oil rig managing other employees. His employer, Helix Energy Solutions Group, Inc., paid Hewitt based solely on a daily rate, and he often was required to work well over forty hours per week. Hewitt sued Helix for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Helix argued that it was not required to pay Hewitt overtime because Hewitt was a “highly compensated employee,” and highly compensated employees are exempt from overtime pay. Hewitt argued that because his pay was calculated on a daily rate, he was not paid on a salary basis and thus was entitled to overtime pay regardless of the dollar amount he was paid. The district court ruled for Helix, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.  Question Is a supervisor who makes over $200,000 annually, calculated on a daily basis, entitled to overtime pay, despite a regulation that carves out an exception for highly paid executives? Conclusion Daily-rate workers, of whatever income level, qualify as paid on a salary basis only if they satisfy the three conditions outlined in the Fair Labor Standards Act. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court holding that Hewitt was not an executive exempt from the FLSA’s overtime pay guarantee. Under the FLSA, an employee is considered a bona fide executive excluded from the FLSA’s protections if the employee meets three tests: (1) the salary basis test, which requires that the employee receive a predetermined and fixed salary that does not vary with the amount of time worked; (2) the “salary level” test, which requires the preset salary to exceed a specified amount; and (3) the job “duties” test, which considers whether the employee has responsibility for managing the enterprise, directing other employees, and hiring and firing other employees. It was undisputed that Hewitt satisfied (2) and (3); at issue was whether he was paid on a salary basis. Under Section 602(a), an employee is paid on a salary basis if they regularly receive each pay period on a weekly or less frequent basis. Under the plain meaning of that provision, it does not apply to daily-rate workers. Hewitt’s pay, in contrast, was determined on a daily basis, despite receiving paychecks every two weeks. Because he did not satisfy the first part of the test, he was not an exempt executive within the FLSA and was thus entitled to overtime pay. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the case should have been dismissed as improvidently granted because the issue originally presented was different from the issue argued and addressed. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that Hewitt was a bona fide executive based on his salary level and duties, and the fact that he was certain to make at least $963 per week for any week he worked.

Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 12, 2022.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc..Respondent: Lynn Goldsmith, et al.. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondents) Yaira Dubin (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Artist Andy Warhol created a series of silkscreen prints and pencil illustrations (“Prince Series”) based on a copyrighted 1981 photograph of the musician Prince, taken by Lynn Goldsmith. Warhol made some aesthetic changes to Goldsmith’s original photograph, but they remained “recognizably derived” from the original. Goldsmith sued the Andy Warhol Foundation, successor to Warhol’s copyright in the Prince Series, for copyright infringement. The Foundation raised fair use as a defense. The district court granted summary judgment for the Foundation, concluding that Warhol had “transformed” the original photograph by giving it a new “meaning and message.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, holding that because the Prince Series remained “recognizably derived” from the original, it failed to transform and was thus not fair use. Question What is the proper test for whether a work is “transformative” under the first factor of the Copyright Act’s fair use doctrine? Conclusion The “purpose and character” of the Andy Warhol Foundation (AWF)’s particular commercial use of Lynn Goldsmith’s photograph of the musician Prince does not favor AWF’s fair use defense to copyright infringement. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. The fair use defense to copyright infringement promotes creativity by recognizing that some secondary works make unauthorized use of original works but serve a different purpose, add new expression, or convey new ideas. Andy Warhol’s “Orange Prince,” one of the Prince Series that was derived from the photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, appeared on the cover of a Vanity Fair magazine commemorating the late musician for a fee of $10,000—all of which to AWF and of which Goldsmith received none. In contrast, Goldsmith’s photographs were licensed and used on several other magazine covers commemorating Prince. AWF’s use of Orange Prince on the cover of Vanity Fair served essentially the same commercial purpose as Goldsmith’s original. Thus, the first fair-use factor—the purpose and character of use, including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit purpose—weighs against the conclusion that AWF’s use of Goldsmith’s photograph for the specific purpose of a magazine cover commemorating Prince was fair. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson joined, emphasizing the narrowness of the majority’s opinion and its appropriate focus on the specific use challenged. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts joined, criticizing the majority of stifling creativity and disregarding the reality that creativity relies upon the borrowing of works that came before.