Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Siegel v. Fitzgerald Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Alfred H. Siegel.Respondent: John P. Fitzgerald, III. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) Curtis E. Gannon (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Since 1978, bankruptcy courts in the United States have operated under two programs for the handling of their proceedings — the Trustee program and the Bankruptcy Administrator program. Eighty-eight of the 94 judicial districts operate within the Trustee program, while the other districts (in Alabama and North Carolina) are under the Bankruptcy Administrator program. The former is part of the Department of Justice, while the latter is overseen by the Judicial Council of the United States. Each program is also funded differently. The Bankruptcy Administrator program is funded by the judiciary's general budget, whereas the bankruptcy debtors in Trustee districts primarily fund the Trustee program. All Chapter 11 debtors, regardless of district, paid quarterly fees under a consistent formula until January 1, 2018, at which time the Trustee program experienced a funding deficit. To remedy that deficit, Congress passed the 2017 Amendment, which increased the quarterly fees for larger Chapter 11 cases in the Trustee program. In 2008, Circuit City—then a national chain of consumer electronics retail stores throughout the United States—filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District of Virginia, which is a Trustee district. As part of its liquidation plan, Circuit City was to pay fees to the U.S. Trustee until the close of bankruptcy. However, after the quarterly fees increased, Circuit City refused to pay the increased fees, arguing that the 2017 Amendment is unconstitutional because it creates nonuniform bankruptcy laws in violation of the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia ruled for the Circuit City trustee, finding the 2017 Amendment violated the Bankruptcy Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded. Question Does the 2017 Amendment (part of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act) violate the uniformity requirement of the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause by increasing quarterly fees solely in districts under the U.S. Trustee program and not in those under the Bankruptcy Administrator program? Conclusion The 2017 Amendment to the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act, which imposed a significant fee increase that exempted debtors in two States, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The 2017 Act increased fees differently for Chapter 11 debtors in different regions. That difference was due not to an external and geographically isolated need, but from Congress's creation of a dual bankruptcy system which allowed certain districts to opt into a system more favorable for debtors. The Constitution’s Bankruptcy Clause does not permit Congress to treat identical debtors differently based on artificial distinctions Congress itself created. Thus, the 2017 Amendment violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause.

United States v. Washington Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 18, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: State of Washington, et al.. Advocates: Malcolm L. Stewart (for the Petitioner) Tera M. Heintz (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Hanford site was a federal nuclear production site in Washington State that operated between 1944 and 1989, producing substantial amounts of radioactive and chemically hazardous waste. The U.S. Department of Energy now oversees cleanup of the site, which is largely conducted by private contractors and subcontractors. In 2018, Washington amended its state workers’ compensation laws specifically for these cleanup workers. The amended law creates a rebuttable presumption that certain conditions and cancers are occupational diseases. The federal government challenged the law as violating the principle of intergovernmental immunity. The district court granted summary judgment for Washington, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does a Washington state workers’ compensation law that applies exclusively to certain federal workers in that state violate the principle of intergovernmental immunity? Conclusion Washington’s workers’ compensation law is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause because it facially discriminates against the federal government and does not fall within the scope of the federal waiver of immunity. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Supremacy Clause prohibits states from interfering with or controlling the operations of the federal government, also known as the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Washington’s law explicitly treats federal workers differently from state and private workers, and imposes costs upon the federal government that state and private entities do not bear. As such, it is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. Contrary to Washington’s claims, no federal law “clearly and unambiguously” waives federal immunity from workers’ compensation laws.

Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 30, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Viking River Cruises, Inc..Respondent: Angie Moriana. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Scott L. Nelson (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Angie Moriana worked as a sales representative for Viking River Cruises, Inc., and agreed to submit any dispute arising out of her employment to binding arbitration. Notwithstanding that agreement, Moriana sued Viking on behalf of herself and similarly situated workers under California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). Moriana relied on a 2014 decision by the California Supreme Court, Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, which held arbitration agreements that waive the right to bring PAGA representative actions in any forum (such as the one between Moriana and Viking) are unenforceable. Viking moved to compel Moriana’s claims to arbitration, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis overruled Iskanian. The trial court denied Viking’s motion. The appellate court affirmed. Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act require enforcement of a bilateral arbitration agreement providing that an employee cannot raise representative claims? Conclusion The Federal Arbitration Act preempts a California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to bring representative claims. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion holding that the FAA preempts the rule in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles to the extent that Iskanian precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate. The California Supreme Court’s holding in Iskanian, holding unenforceable any arbitration agreement that waives the right to bring a PAGA representative action, presents parties with an impermissible choice: either arbitrate disputes using a form of class procedures, or do not arbitrate at all. The FAA protects bilateral arbitration from undue state interference. To the extent that Iskanian precludes bilateral arbitration, it is preempted by federal law. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the FAA does not apply to state-court proceedings.

Torres v. Texas Department of Public Safety Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 29, 2022.Decided on Jun 29, 2022. Petitioner: Le Roy Torres.Respondent: Texas Department of Public Safety. Advocates: Andrew T. Tutt (for the Petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Leroy Torres enlisted in the U.S. Army Reserve in 1989. In 1998, he was employed by the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) as a trooper, where he served until his deployment to Iraq in 2007. In 2008, he was honorably discharged and sought reemployment by DPS. However, due to a lung condition he acquired in Iraq, Torres requested employment with DPS in a position different from the one he held before. Instead, DPS offered Torres only a “temporary duty offer,” which he declined. Torres sued DPS in 2017, alleging that the agency’s failure to offer him a job that would accommodate his disability violated the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), which prohibits adverse employment actions against an employee based on the employee’s military service. The trial court ruled in favor of Torres, finding that USERRA properly abrogated DPS’s sovereign immunity under Congress’s constitutional war powers. The appellate court reversed. Question Did Congress properly abrogate state sovereign immunity for claims arising under the federal Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA)? Conclusion Congress properly exercised its power to raise and support the Armed Forces when it authorized private damages suits against nonconsenting States, as in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the majority opinion of the Court. In PennEast, the Court held that Congress could, pursuant to its eminent domain power, authorize lawsuits against nonconsenting States because, upon entering the federal system, the States implicitly agreed that their “eminent domain power would yield to that of the Federal Government.” Under PennEast, the test for structural waiver is whether the federal power is “complete in itself, and the States consented to the exercise of that power—in its entirety—in the plan of the Convention.” Congress’s power to build and maintain the Armed Forces fits PennEast’s test. Thus, in joining together to form a Union, the States agreed to sacrifice their sovereign immunity for the good of the common defense. Justice Elena Kagan authored a concurring opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined.

Southwest Airlines Co. v. Saxon Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Southwest Airlines Co..Respondent: Latrice Saxon. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the Petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Latrice Saxon is a ramp supervisor, which entails managing and assisting workers to load and unload airplane cargo for Southwest Airlines. Unlike ramp agents, supervisors like Saxon are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement and instead are required to arbitrate wage disputes, in accordance with their employment contract. Notwithstanding the arbitration requirement, Saxon, on behalf of herself and other ramp supervisors, sued Southwest under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay overtime work. Southwest moved to stay the suit pending arbitration, or to dismiss it altogether in light of the arbitration agreement. Saxon argued that the Arbitration Act did not apply to her lawsuit because she and other ramp supervisors were “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and therefore exempt under Section 1 of the Act. The district court ruled for Southwest, finding that a transportation worker must actually transport goods, not merely handle them at one end or the other of a network. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding the act of loading cargo onto a vehicle to be transported interstate is itself commerce, and thus Saxon and the class of workers she represents are exempt from the Act. Question Is an airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor a “transportation worker” under Section 1 of the Arbitration Act and therefore exempt from the Act’s arbitration requirement? Conclusion An airline employee who works as a ramp agent supervisor, frequently loading and unloading airplane cargo, belongs to the “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” and is therefore exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act’s arbitration requirement. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous 8-0 opinion of the Court. The “class of workers” language of Section 1 refers not to what Southwest does generally, but what Saxon, as a worker, does specifically: physically loading and unloading cargo on and off airplanes. This work qualifies as being “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” as these workers are directly involved in transporting goods across state or international borders. Thus, Saxon falls within Section 1’s exception. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Company Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 28, 2022.Decided on Apr 28, 2022. Petitioner: Bradley LeDure.Respondent: Union Pacific Railroad Company. Advocates: David C. Frederick (for the Petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) J. Scott Ballenger (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Bradley LeDure is a conductor for Union Pacific Railroad Company. In August 2016, LeDure reported for work at a rail yard in Salem, Illinois, to assemble a train for a trip to Dexter, Missouri. Three locomotives were coupled together on a sidetrack, and LeDure decided only one locomotive would be powered on. On an exterior walkway on his way to shut down one of the locomotives, LeDure slipped and fell down the steps. Upon investigation, LeDure noticed a “slick” substance, which Union Pacific later reported to be a “small amount of oil” on the walkway. LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence under the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims, finding the locomotive was not “in use” and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, and LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Question Is a train that makes a temporary stop in a railyard as part of its unitary journey in interstate commerce “in use” and therefore subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act? Conclusion The judgment of the Seventh Circuit, affirming that the train was not "in use" and therefore not subject to the Locomotive Inspection Act, was affirmed by an equally divided Court. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

ZF Automotive US, Inc. v. Luxshare, Ltd. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 23, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: ZS Automotive US, Inc., et al..Respondent: Luxshare, Ltd.. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioners in 21-401) Joseph T. Baio (for the Petitioners in 21-518) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Andrew R. Davies (for the Respondent in 21-401) Alexander A. Yanos (for the Respondent in 21-518) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In August 2017, Luxshare entered into a large-scale business deal with ZF Automotive US, and the deal closed in April 2018. Luxshare allegedly discovered that ZF fraudulently concealed certain material facts, inflating the purchase price. The parties’ purchase agreement required that all disputes be settled by three arbitrators in Germany, and Luxshare intended to bring claims for the losses as a result of ZF’s allegedly wrongful conduct. However, it first sought to obtain discovery from ZF and its senior officers and asked a federal district court to compel discovery under 28 U.S.C. 1782(a). Question Does 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), which gives federal district courts authority to order litigants subject to their jurisdiction to give testimony or produce documents “for use in a foreign or international tribunal,” apply to private commercial arbitral tribunals? Conclusion Although 28 U.S.C. §1782(a) permits a district court to order discovery “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,” only a governmental or intergovernmental adjudicative body may qualify as such a tribunal, and the arbitration panels in these cases are not such adjudicative bodies. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The word “tribunal” in the context of § 1782, with modifiers “foreign or international” is best understood to refer to an adjudicative body that exercises governmental authority. The statute’s history confirms this understanding, as does analogy to the Federal Arbitration Act. The adjudicative bodies in these cases are not governmental or intergovernmental and thus are not subject to § 1782(a).

Golan v. Saada Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 22, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Narkis Aliza Golan.Respondent: Isacco Jacky Saada. Advocates: Karen R. King (for the Petitioner) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Richard Min (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Isacco Saada and Narkis Golan married in Italy in 2015 and had a son. From the very start of their relationship, Saada was violently abusive toward Golan, including in front of their son (though allegedly not toward the son). In 2018, Golan and their son traveled to the United States and remained there. Saada asked a court to return their son under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The district court found that Italy was the child’s country of habitual residence for the purposes of the Hague Convention. However, it also found that returning the child to Italy would subject him to a grave risk of psychological harm based on Saada’s abuse of Golan. Under binding precedent, the district court was also required to determine whether there were any ameliorative undertakings it could impose on Saada that would mitigate the risk of harm in returning the child to Italy. The district court ordered Saada to stay away from Golan, to pay her $30,000, and to visit their son only with Golan’s consent. After the district court coordinated with an Italian court to enforce the orders, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. Question Under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, musts courts consider all measures that might mitigate the grave risk of harm if the child were to return to their country of habitual residence? Conclusion A court is not required to examine all possible ameliorative measures before denying a Hague Convention petition for return of a child to a foreign country once the court has found that return would expose the child to a grave risk of harm. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the majority opinion of the Court. Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention gives a court the discretion to grant or deny return of a child to a foreign country if it finds that return would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm. Nothing in the Convention’s text either forbids or requires consideration of ameliorative measures in exercising this discretion.

Berger v. North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: Philip E. Berger.Respondent: North Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, et al.. Advocates: David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Elisabeth S. Theodore (for the NAACP Respondents) Sarah Boyce (for the State Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The North Carolina chapter of the NAACP challenged a North Carolina voter-ID law, arguing that it violates the Constitution and the federal Voting Rights Act. Although the state attorney general, a Democrat, is already is representing the State's interest in the validity of that law, defending its constitutionality in both state and federal court, Republicans Phil Berger, president pro tempore of the state senate, and Tim Moore, speaker of the state house representatives, sought to intervene to also represent the interests of the State. The district court twice rejected their requests to intervene, and the full (en banc) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit also rejected their request. Question Do the two North Carolina legislators have a right to intervene in this case to defend a state voter-ID law? Conclusion North Carolina’s legislative leaders are entitled to intervene in this litigation. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides, in relevant part, that one has a right to intervene in litigation if they have an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, and are “so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede” their ability to protect their interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest. When a State chooses to divide its sovereign authority among different officials and authorize their participation in a suit challenging state law, full consideration of the state’s interests may require the involvement of various officials. Intervention by the legislators neither violates the North Carolina Constitution nor gives them authority beyond what the law already provides them. The existing parties do not adequately represent the legislators’ interest, as the presumption of adequate representation applies only in cases where interests fully overlap, which is not the case here. Thus, the legislators have a right to intervene in the litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor dissented, arguing that the Court erroneously presumed that a State is inadequately represented in federal court unless whomever state law designates as a State’s representative is allowed to intervene and incorrectly implied that the attorney general’s defense of the constitutionality of the voting law at issue here fell below a minimal standard of adequacy.

Morgan v. Sundance, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Mar 21, 2022.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: Robyn Morgan.Respondent: Sundance, Inc.. Advocates: Karla A. Gilbride (for the Petitioner) Paul D. Clement (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In September 2018, Robyn Morgan sued Sundance, Inc. for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, alleging that Sundance failed to pay her for overtime work. The district court denied Sundance’s motion to dismiss. Sundance then answered Morgan's complaint but did not assert its right to arbitrate Morgan's claims. After filing its answer, Morgan participated in a settlement mediation with plaintiffs in another similar lawsuit in Michigan. The Michigan case settled, but Morgan's case moved forward. Nearly eight months after the filing of Morgan's complaint, Sundance moved to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding Sundance's participation in the litigation waived its right to arbitration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Question Does the arbitration-specific requirement that the proponent of a contractual waiver defense prove prejudice violate the Supreme Court’s instruction that lower courts must “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts”? Conclusion Federal courts may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule conditioning a waiver of the right to arbitrate on a showing of prejudice. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Outside of the arbitration context, a federal court assessing whether a party has waived a right does not generally ask about prejudice. Rather, waiver is “the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” It focuses on the actions of the person who held the right, not the effects on the opposing party. Although the FAA may express policy favoring arbitration, that policy does not authorize federal courts to invent special arbitration-preferring procedural rules. Federal courts thus may not adopt an arbitration-specific rule requiring that a party show prejudice in order to prevail on a claim of waiver.