Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 22, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Twitter, Inc., et al..Respondent: Mehier Taamneh, et al.. Advocates: Seth P. Waxman (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting reversal) Eric Schnapper (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the same set of facts as Gonzalez v. Google. Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, all three platforms were liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez. The district court dismissed the claims based on aiding-and-abetting liability under the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. Question 1. Does an internet platform “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more “meaningful” or “aggressive” action to prevent such use? 2. May an internet platform whose services were not used in connection with the specific “act of international terrorism” that injured the plaintiff still be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333? Conclusion Twitter did not “knowingly” provide substantial assistance under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, and thus cannot be said to have aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul, Turkey. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 2333 establishes liability for anyone “who aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism.” To “aid and abet” requires three elements: (1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury, (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an illegal activity at the time he provides assistance, and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.” The plaintiffs (respondents) in this case satisfied the first two elements by alleging both that ISIS committed a wrong and that the defendants knew they were playing some sort of role in ISIS’s enterprise. They failed to show, however, that the defendants gave such knowing and substantial assistance to ISIS that they culpably participated in the Reina attack.  Courts use six flexible factors to assess the third element, whether a defendant knowingly and substantially assisted the principal violation: (1) “the nature of the act assisted,” (2) the “amount of assistance” provided, (3) whether the defendant was “present at the time” of the principal tort, (4) the defendant’s “relation to the tortious actor,” (5) the “defendant’s state of mind,” and (6) the “duration of the assistance” given. Applying these factors, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that Twitter did more than transmit information by billions of people—most of whom use the platform for interactions that once took place via mail, on the phone, or in public areas. Without more, their claim that Twitter aided and abetted ISIS in its terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul must fail. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a concurring opinion to point out the narrowness of the decision due to the stage of litigation (the motion to dismiss stage).

Gonzalez v. Google LLC Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Feb 21, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: Reynaldo Gonzalez, et al..Respondent: Google LLC. Advocates: Eric Schnapper (for the Petitioners) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Lisa S. Blatt (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) This case arises from the same set of facts as Twitter v. Taamneh. Nohemi Gonzalez, a U.S. citizen, was killed by a terrorist attack in Paris, France, in 2015—one of several terrorist attacks that same day. The day afterwards, the foreign terrorist organization ISIS claimed responsibility by issuing a written statement and releasing a YouTube video. Gonzalez’s father filed an action against Google, Twitter, and Facebook, claiming, among other things, that Google aided and abetted international terrorism by allowing ISIS to use its platform—specifically YouTube—“to recruit members, plan terrorist attacks, issue terrorist threats, instill fear, and intimidate civilian populations.” Specifically, the complaint alleged that because Google uses computer algorithms that suggest content to users based on their viewing history, it assists ISIS in spreading its message. Gonzalez claimed that all three platforms were also liable for aiding and abetting international terrorism by failing to take meaningful or aggressive action to prevent terrorists from using its services, even though they did not play an active role in the specific act of international terrorism that actually injured Gonzalez. The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss the claim based on Section 230, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Does Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider? Conclusion Citing its decision in Twitter v. Taamneh, the Court declined to reach the question presented in this case and vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that opinion. Although this disposition technically favors Gonzalez, the practical effect on remand is dismissal of Gonzalez's claim.

Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, et al. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2023.Decided on Mar 21, 2023. Petitioner: Miguel L.V. Perez.Respondent: Sturgis Public Schools, et al.. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Shay Dvoretzky (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Miguel Perez is a 23-year-old deaf student in Michigan. Although the school assigned him a classroom aide, the aide was not trained to work with deaf students and did not know sign language. Shortly before Perez was supposed to graduate, the school notified his parents that he did not qualify for a diploma. Perez filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Education alleging that the school denied him an adequate education and violated numerous federal and state education laws: the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and two Michigan disabilities laws. Before a hearing on the IDEA claim, the parties settled. As part of the settlement, the school agreed to pay for Perez to attend the Michigan School for the Deaf, for any post-secondary compensatory education, and for sign language instruction for Perez and his family. Perez then sued the school district and board of education in federal court, claiming that the school discriminated against him by not providing the resources necessary for him to participate in class. The district court dismissed the ADA claim based on failure to exhaust administrative proceedings because he settled his IDEA claim before the hearing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Do the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) require a student to exhaust his administrative proceedings against the school district even when such proceedings would be futile? Conclusion An Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit seeking compensatory damages may proceed without exhausting the administrative processes of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) because the remedy sought is not one IDEA provides. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that Perez may pursue his ADA claim. Section 1415(l) contains a general rule and an exception. As a general rule, IDEA does not restrict the ability to seek “remedies” under “other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities.” However, before filing a civil action under other federal laws “seeking relief that is also available” under IDEA, “the procedures under [§1415](f) and (g) shall be exhausted.” If a plaintiff seeks, as Perez did in this case, remedies that are unavailable under IDEA, the second provision does not require the plaintiff to exhaust other procedures for relief.

Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S. v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2023.Decided on Apr 19, 2023. Petitioner: Turkiye Halk Bankasi A.S..Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Turkiye Halk Bankasi (“Halkbank”) is a commercial bank that is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. A 2019 grand jury charged Halkbank with participating in a money-laundering scheme involving billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil and natural gas proceeds, in violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Halkbank moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) immunizes it from criminal prosecution because it is majority-owned by the Government of Turkey. Further, it argued that FSIA’s exceptions to immunity apply only to civil, not criminal, cases, and even if they include criminal cases, it is nevertheless entitled to immunity under common law. The district court rejected Halkbank’s arguments, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, finding that even if FSIA confers immunity from criminal prosecutions, the conduct at issue falls within FSIA’s commercial activity exception. Question May the district courts properly exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over the criminal prosecution against Halkbank in this case based on the commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act? Conclusion The district court has jurisdiction in this criminal prosecution; the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s comprehensive scheme governing claims of immunity in civil actions against foreign states and their instrumentalities does not cover criminal cases. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 contains a broad jurisdictional grant: it gives district courts original jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” Absent a textual exclusion of foreign states, the most natural reading of that provision is that it includes them. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act covers only civil cases. It grants district courts original jurisdiction over “any nonjury civil action against a foreign state” as to “any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity” and describes procedures and remedies applicable exclusively in civil, not criminal, cases. FSIA is silent as to criminal prosecutions. Its one provision that a “foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter” must be read in conjunction with the rest of the Act, which focuses exclusively on civil matters. However, principles of common-law immunity might preclude this criminal prosecution even if the FSIA does not. Thus, the Court affirmed the appellate court’s determination that the district court had jurisdiction, reversed as to its conclusion that FSIA granted immunity from criminal prosecution, and vacated and remanded as to the issue of common-law immunity claims. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Justice Samuel Alito. Justice Gorsuch argued that FSIA alone dictates the answer to the immunity questions in this case and thus agrees with the majority as to all but the judgment to vacate and remand the question of common-law immunity.

Santos-Zacaria v. Garland Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 17, 2023.Decided on May 11, 2023. Petitioner: Leon Santos-Zacaria.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: Paul W. Hughes (for the Petitioner) Yaira Dubin (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Santos is a native and citizen of Guatemala seeking asylum in the United States based on the likelihood of persecution due to her sexual orientation and transgender identity. An immigration judge denied her application for withholding removal, finding one prior assault was insufficient to establish past persecution. The immigration judge also denied her claim for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Santos appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed her appeal. Although the Board concluded her past assault was sufficient to establish past persecution and thus a presumption of future persecution, the government had rebutted that presumption. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s determination that Santos had not established eligibility for relief under the CAT. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Santos’s petition to review the Board’s determination that she was not eligible for relief under CAT and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her challenge to the adequacy of the Board’s analysis because she failed to raise that argument in a motion for reconsideration. Question Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) bar a court of appeals from reviewing an immigrant’s claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals had engaged in impermissible factfinding because the immigrant had not exhausted that claim through a motion to reconsider? Conclusion Title 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) is not a jurisdictional provision; it does not require an immigrant to seek a motion to reconsider, which is a discretionary form of review, only remedies available as a matter of right. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the majority opinion of the Court. The language of § 1252(d)(1) is substantially different from jurisdictional provisions found elsewhere. Absent a clear statement that Congress intended the forfeiture rule to be jurisdictional, courts should not interpret such rules as jurisdictional because of the potentially harsh consequences of doing so. Thus, § 1252(d)(1) is best understood to require a noncitizen to exhaust only those remedies available as of right. Justice Samuel Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined.

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2023.Decided on May 11, 2023. Petitioner: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico.Respondent: Centro de Periodismo Investigativo, Inc.. Advocates: Mark D. Harris (for the Petitioner) Aimee W. Brown (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur) Sarah M. Harris (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Centro de Periodismo Investigativo (“CPI”) is a nonprofit media organization based in Puerto Rico. It seeks disclosure of documents relating to Puerto Rico’s fiscal situation from the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (“the Board”). The Board has declined to release the requested documents, and CPI asked the district court to compel production. The Board asked the district court to dismiss the litigation, arguing that it is immune from suit pursuant to both the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”). The district court disagreed with the Board, finding PROMESA abrogated any possible Eleventh Amendment immunity the Board might have enjoyed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. Question Does the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)’s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims? Conclusion Nothing in the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) categorically abrogates any sovereign immunity the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico enjoys from legal claims. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. If Congress wishes to abrogate sovereign immunity, it must do so using “unmistakably clear” language in the statute. The Supreme Court has found such language only in two types of situations: when a statute expressly states that it is stripping immunity from a sovereign entity, and when a statute creates a cause of action and authorizes a lawsuit against a government based on that cause of action. There is no such language in PROMESA, nor does it create a cause of action for use against the Board or Puerto Rico. Even § 2126(a)—which provides that “any action against the Oversight Board, and any action otherwise arising out of [PROMESA] . . . shall be brought” in the Federal District Court for Puerto Rico—does not amount to a clear intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that Puerto Rico lacks state sovereign immunity, which would make the question of abrogation superfluous.

Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2023.Decided on Jun 1, 2023. Petitioner: Glacier Northwest, Inc..Respondent: International Brotherhood of Teamsters. Advocates: Noel J. Francisco (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Darin M. Dalmat (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Glacier Northwest is a Washington corporation that sells and delivers ready-mix concrete to businesses in the state. It employs approximately 80-90 truck drivers to deliver concrete, and Local 174 is the exclusive union representative for Glacier’s truck drivers in King County. In 2017, during negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA), Glacier truck drivers went on strike, resulting in the loss of some of Glacier’s concrete. Glacier sued Local 174 in state court for six tort claims arising from Local 174’s alleged role that resulted in Glacier’s loss of concrete. The trial court dismissed the claims arising before the CBA was reached, finding they were preempted by the federal National Labor Relations Act, and it granted summary judgment dismissal of the remaining claims primarily on state law grounds. The appellate court reversed as to the pre-CBA claims, finding the NLRA did not preempt those claims. The state supreme court reversed as to the preemption issue. Question Does the National Labor Relations Act preempt a state-court lawsuit against a union for intentionally destroying an employer’s property during a labor dispute? Conclusion The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preempt Glacier’s state-court lawsuit alleging that the union intentionally destroyed the company’s property during a labor dispute. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The position of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is that while the NLRA generally recognizes the right of workers to strike, it does not protect from liability strikers who fail to take “reasonable precautions” to protect their employer’s property from foreseeable harms caused by the sudden cessation of work. At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true. Accepting the allegations here as true, the Union failed to take reasonable precautions to protect Glacier’s property, as the Union knew that concrete is highly perishable and, if left to harden in a truck’s drum, will cause significant damage to the truck. Because the Union knew of this risk—and indeed intended that result—the strike went beyond the conduct protected by the NLRA. Because the strike was not protected by federal law, the state tort claims were not preempted. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas would reach the same conclusion that the state-court claims are not preempted based on adherence to the Court’s decision in ___. He wrote separately to emphasize the “oddity” of the “broad pre-emption regime” in the case the majority relied on—San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)—and suggesting that the Court reassess its holding in that case. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which both Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would reach the same conclusion based solely on the Court’s longstanding position that the NLRA does not immunize strikers who engage in trespass or violence against the employer’s property. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored a dissenting opinion, pointing out that the test in Garmon is only whether the conduct at issue is “arguably” protected by the NLRA, as determined by the Board. She criticized the Court for stepping in to make that determination instead of allowing the Board to do so.

The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department v. Federal Labor Relations Authority Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2023.Decided on May 18, 2023. Petitioner: The Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, et al..Respondent: Federal Labor Relations Authority, et al.. Advocates: Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioners) Nicole F. Reaves (for the federal Respondent) Andres M. Grajales (for the union Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2016, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General (the “Guard”) decided to end its 45-year-long relationship with the union that represents its technicians, who are civilian federal employees but are described as dual-status employees because of their hybrid civilian and military roles. As it was terminating the relationship, the Guard informed the union that it did not have Standard Form 1187s, which federal-sector bargaining-unit members are required to submit and which the Guard was obligated to maintain. The union filed four Unfair Labor Practice charges (ULPs) with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA). The FLRA’s regional general counsel investigated and found that the Guard had refused to negotiate in good faith. The Guard responded that it was not an “agency” and that the technicians were not “employees” within the meaning of the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute. An administrative law judge (ALJ) disagreed, and a three-member FLRA panel adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision in full. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the Guard’s petition for review, finding the FLRA has jurisdiction to adjudicate the collective-bargaining dispute. Question Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 empower the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias? Conclusion The Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) had jurisdiction over this labor dispute because the state militia was acting as a federal agency when it hired and supervised dual-status technicians serving in their civilian roles. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), the FLRA has jurisdiction only over labor organizations and federal agencies. The FSLMRS defines “agency” to include the Department of Defense. Dual-status technicians are defined by statute to be employees of the Department of the Air Force or Department of the Army—both of which are components of the Department of Defense and thus plainly within the jurisdiction of the FLRA. By hiring and supervising these employees, the Ohio National Guard and its Adjutant General were acting as a federal agency. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that while the Guard may act as a federal agency, exercise the authority of such an agency, and function as an agency, is not actually an agency and thus is outside the jurisdiction of the FLRA.

In re Grand Jury Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 9, 2023.Decided on Jan 23, 2023. Petitioner: In re Grand Jury. Advocates: Daniel B. Levin (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) A grand jury issued subpoenas to two parties—“Company” and “Law Firm”—requesting documents and communications related to a criminal investigation into the owner of Company and client of Law Firm. In response to the subpoenas, Company and Law Firm refused to disclose certain documents, citing attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine because the primary purpose of the documents at issue was to seek legal advice, not to obtain tax advice. The government moved to compel production, and the district court granted the government’s motion in part. Company and Law Firm disagreed with the district court’s ruling and continued to withhold the documents. The district court then held Company and Law Firm in contempt. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding the primary purpose of the communications was to obtain legal advice. Question If a communication involves both legal and non-legal advice, when is it protected from disclosure by attorney-client privilege? Conclusion The Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted.

Moore v. Harper Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2023. Petitioner: Timothy K. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, et al..Respondent: Rebecca Harper, et al.. Advocates: David H. Thompson (for the Petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for the Private Respondents) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the State Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 Census, in which North Carolina gained an additional seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and thus required redistricting of the state, North Carolina’s Republican-majority state legislature passed a partisan gerrymander. The map was challenged in state court, and in February 2022, the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the map for violating the state constitution’s “free elections clause” and other provisions. The legislature proposed a second gerrymandered map, so the court ordered a special master to create a map for the 2022 congressional elections. The legislators asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review based on an argument that the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives state legislatures alone the authority to regulate federal elections—the so-called Independent State Legislature theory. Question Under the U.S. Constitution, does the state legislative body, independent of any constraints by state courts or other laws, have sole authority to regulate federal elections? Conclusion The Federal Elections Clause does not vest exclusive and independent authority in state legislatures to set the rules regarding federal elections. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. First, the Court confirmed that it had jurisdiction to review the case. The North Carolina Supreme Court’s decision to overrule its previous judgment did not moot the case because there remains a live dispute between the parties. Second, the Court concluded that the Elections Clause does not grant state legislatures exclusive authority to regulate federal elections. Judicial review has been an accepted practice since Marbury v. Madison, and under the Court’s precedents, the Elections Clause authority of state legislatures is subject to checks and balances provided by the state constitution. State legislatures are not wholly independent bodies, and they are bound by the constraints imposed by the state constitutions. Third, state courts have the authority to interpret state laws affecting federal elections, but they cannot sidestep federal law. The Court declined to decide whether the North Carolina Supreme Court in this case overstepped its authority because that issue was not properly before it. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion noting that while the Court need not answer the question of which standard a federal court should employ to review a state court’s interpretation of state law in a case implicating the Elections Clause, there are three standards from which to choose that all convey the same point—deference but not abdication. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Neil Gorsuch and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the question presented in the case was moot, and that the writ of certiorari should be dismissed.