Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022.Decided on Feb 28, 2023. Petitioner: State of Delaware.Respondent: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Wisconsin. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for Delaware) Nicholas J. Bronni (for Arkansas et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) MoneyGram Payments Systems, which is headquartered in Delaware, returns unclaimed checks to that state. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argue that the checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments,” which federal law requires to go to the states where they were purchased. Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over interstate disputes, Delaware filed the case directly in the Supreme Court. The Court appointed a special master, who concluded that MoneyGram’s checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus should go to the states where they were purchased. Delaware asked the Court to review the Special Master’s findings for error. Question Are unclaimed MoneyGram checks “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to a federal law that remits them to the states where they were purchased? Conclusion Unclaimed MoneyGram checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to the Federal Disposition Act, which remits them to the states where they were purchased. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous as to its conclusion (but only 5-4 as to the discussion of legislative history supporting that conclusion). The unclaimed checks at issue in this case are sufficiently similar to “money orders” to fall within the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) for two main reasons. First, they are similar in function in operation because they are prepaid financial instruments used to transmit a specified amount of money to a named payee. Second, because of the recordkeeping practices of the entity issuing and holding on to the prepaid funds, it would be inequitable for unclaimed checks to go to the state where the creditor is incorporated, as common law would require. For these reasons, the FDA, not the common law, applies to unclaimed MoneyGram checks.

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Michael Sackett and Chantelle Sackett.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Damien M. Schiff (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael and Chantall Sackett own a residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, and want to build a home there. However, shortly after they began placing sand and gravel, the federal Environmental Protection Agency told them that they could not build on their lot because construction on the land violated the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands that qualify as “navigable waters” regulated by the Act, so they needed to remove the sand and gravel and restore the property to its natural state. Litigation ensued, and in 2012, the Supreme Court permitted the Sacketts to litigate their challenge to the EPA’s order in federal court. During the litigation, the EPA removed its compliance order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s withdrawal of the compliance order did not render the Sacketts’ challenge moot and that the EPA does have jurisdiction over their property under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that, under binding circuit precedent, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Question What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act?  Conclusion The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment reversing and remanding. In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly enforce the Clean Water Act, initially defined “the waters of the United States” differently. By 1980, they had adopted identical definitions, which encompassed “all waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Since then, they have repeatedly sought to define and redefine “waters of the United States” through rulemaking procedures. Despite this history, the Court found that the meaning of “waters” in the CWA encompasses “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The mere presence of water is too broad; such a definition would include puddles and isolated ponds. Thus, wetlands are not per se “waters of the United States”; rather, only those with a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters fall within that category. Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in full but concurred separately, along with Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing the importance of curbing the expansion of federal authority through agency action. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with the Court’s “continuous surface connection” test because, in his view, it “departs from the statutory text, from 45 years of consistent agency practice,” and from the Court’s own precedents. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Kagan lamented that, in her opinion, the majority “substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s.”

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2022.Decided on Jun 29, 2022. Petitioner: State of Oklahoma.Respondent: Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Zachary C. Schauf (for the Respondent) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation. Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state. Question Do states have the authority to prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives on Native American lands? Conclusion The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court has held that States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on Native American lands. Native American land is not separate from state territory. And States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Native American land unless preempted. Preemption may occur either under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither is present in this case, so states have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s decision ​​reneges on the federal government’s centuries-old promise that tribes would remain forever free from interference by state authorities.

Biden v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al..Respondent: State of Texas, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it. In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court. In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect. Question Must the Biden administration continue to enforce the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols, or does the Biden Department of Homeland Security decision ending the policy have legal effect? Conclusion The Government’s rescission of Migrant Protection Protocols did not violate section 1225 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the then-Secretary of Homeland Security’s October 29 Memoranda constituted valid final agency action. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion. Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue its injunction, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the case. By using the word “may,” Section 1225(b)(2)(C) confers a discretionary authority to return nonresidents to Mexico. Historical context confirms this understanding. ​​Section 1225(b)(2)(C) was added to the statute more than 90 years after the mandatory language that appears in a nearby provision. And since its enactment, every presidential administration has interpreted section 1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary. Interpreting the provision as mandatory would impose a significant burden upon the Executive’s ability to conduct diplomatic relations with Mexico, which Congress likely did not intend. Once the district court vacated the original attempt to rescind the policy, DHS properly  “issue[d] a new rescission bolstered by new reasons” absent from the original rescission. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined.

Shoop v. Twyford Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: Tim Shoop, Warden.Respondent: Raymond Twyford. Advocates: Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) David A. O'Neil (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question May a federal district court order the transportation of a state prisoner to help him develop evidence for his habeas petition, even before determining the admissibility of the evidence? Conclusion A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. A federal court may never needlessly prolong a habeas case. For that reason, before a federal court may admit new evidence, either the claim must rely on a new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactively available by the Supreme Court, or it must rely on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. In this case, the court granted Twyford’s request for transportation under the All Writs Act. But the All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent binding procedural rules. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is the source of binding rules and limits review to the record that was before the state court. The district court’s failure to determine how Twyford’s request for transportation would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition before granting the request was thus erroneous. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the state’s interlocutory appeal. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the case as improvidently granted.

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph A. Kennedy.Respondent: Bremerton School District. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Richard B. Katskee (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him. Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause? Conclusion The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to his free speech claim, the timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirm that Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. The District cannot show that its prohibition of Kennedy’s prayer serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose. The Court’s Lemon test, and the related endorsement test, are “abandoned,” replaced by a consideration of “historical practices and understandings.” Applying that test, there is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined.

Nance v. Ward Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: Michael Nance.Respondent: Commissioner, Georgia Department of Corrections and Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison. Advocates: Matthew S. Hellman (for the Petitioner) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Stephen J. Petrany (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1993, Michael Wade Nance robbed a bank, and, in the process of fleeing, killed a person. In 1997, a jury convicted Nance of murder, and he was sentenced to death. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his death sentence and rejected a petition for collateral relief. Nance then filed a federal habeas petition; the district court denied the petition, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Then, in 2020, Nance filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the State’s lethal-injection protocol was unconstitutional as applied to him because of two medical issues. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Nance’s complaint, concluding that it was untimely and failed to state a claim. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals concluded that because the relief Nance sought implied the invalidity of his death sentence, his complaint must be construed as a habeas petition, and because he had already filed an earlier habeas petition, it was properly considered a “successive” petition, over which a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Question What is the proper legal procedure for a death-row inmate’s challenge to the method by which the state intends to execute? Conclusion Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the procedural vehicle appropriate for a prisoner’s method-of-execution claim even if an order granting the relief requested would necessitate a change in state law. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion of the Court. Both Section 1983 and the federal habeas statute allow a prisoner to complain of “unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials.” However, Section 1983 has an implicit exception for actions that lie “within the core of habeas corpus”—that is, relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” In two prior cases, the Court allowed a prisoner to bring a method-of-execution claim under Section 1983, but those cases did not require a change in state law, only in an agency’s uncodified protocol. In contrast, here, Nance’s requested relief would require Georgia to change its statute to carry out Nance’s execution by firing squad. However, this requirement is not a substantial impediment, nor would it necessarily imply the invalidity of his death sentence. Thus, Section 1983 remains the proper vehicle for his method-of-execution claim. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the Court erroneously considered the law as it could exist, rather than as it is. Justice Barrett argued that because the relief Nance requests precludes his execution under current state law, habeas is the proper vehicle for seeking that relief.

Vega v. Tekoh Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2022.Decided on Jun 23, 2022. Petitioner: Carlos Vega.Respondent: Terence B. Tekoh. Advocates: Roman Martinez (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Paul L. Hoffman (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terence Tekoh worked as a patient transporter in a hospital in Los Angeles. After a patient accused him of sexual assault, hospital staff reported the allegation to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Carlos Vega went to the hospital to ask Tekoh some questions and to take Tekoh’s statement. Although the parties described vastly different accounts of the nature of the interaction between Tekoh and Vega, it is undisputed that Vega did not advise Tekoh of his Miranda rights prior to questioning him or taking his statement. Tekoh was arrested and charged in California state court, but a jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Following the acquittal on the criminal charge, Tekoh sued Vega under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Vega violated Tekoh’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by taking his statement without first advising him of his Miranda rights. Based on the district court’s instructions, a jury found for Vega. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the verdict, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Question Is the use of an un-Mirandized statement against a defendant in a criminal case sufficient to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action? Conclusion A violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court. Miranda imposed a set of prophylactic rules requiring that police officers issue warnings before a custodial interrogation and disallowing the use of statements obtained in violation of those rules. A Miranda violation is not necessarily a Fifth Amendment violation. Expansion of Miranda rules to provide a right to sue for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 would provide very little benefit and would impose substantial costs on the judicial system. Justice Elena Kagan authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, arguing that the Court’s precedents recognize Miranda as conferring a constitutional right, and as such, violation of that constitutional right should be sufficient to support a claim under 42 U.S.C § 1983.

Kemp v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Dexter Earl Kemp.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Andrew L. Adler (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dexter Kemp and several co-defendants were charged and convicted of drug and firearms offenses. Kemp and some of the co-defendants appealed, but their sentences were affirmed. Some of the co-defendants, without Kemp, filed petitions for rehearings, rehearings en banc, and certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. Over a year later, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied his motion as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). Kemp argued that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3, which provides that if a petition for rehearing is timely filed in the lower court, the time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of the denial of rehearing. The court denied his motion, finding that it fell under Rule 60(b)(1) because it alleged the court made a “mistake,” and that such motions must be filed within one year. Question Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law? Conclusion The term “mistake” in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) includes a judge’s errors of law, but Kemp’s motion was untimely under Rule 60(c)’s 1-year limitations period. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word “mistake” applied to any “misconception,” “misunderstanding,” or “fault in opinion or judgment” as to any law or fact. The text, structure, and history of the Rule support the understanding that it applies to judicial mistakes, not just party mistakes. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion clarifying that the Court’s opinion does not disturb establish precedent or break new ground. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that he would have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.

George v. McDonough Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 19, 2022.Decided on Jun 15, 2022. Petitioner: Kevin R. George.Respondent: Denis R. McDonough. Advocates: Melanie L. Bostwick (for the Petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Kevin R. George and Michael B. Martin are both military veterans who sought and were denied disability benefits several decades ago based on the straightforward application of a regulation. Since then, the regulation was overturned, so George and Martin sought revision of those denial decisions based on the “clear and unmistakable error” (CUE) by the VA. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals denied the motions, holding that it was not clear and unmistakable error to faithfully apply a regulation that existed at the time. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed. Question When the Department of Veterans Affairs denies a veteran’s claim for benefits in reliance on an agency interpretation later deemed invalid under the plain text of the statutory provisions in effect at the time of the denial, is that the kind of “clear and unmistakable error” that the veteran may invoke to challenge the VA’s decision? Conclusion The invalidation of a Department of Veterans Affairs regulation after a veteran’s benefits decision becomes final cannot support a claim for collateral relief permitting revision of that decision based on “clear and unmistakable error.” Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the majority opinion of the Court. The “clean and unmistakable error” doctrine evolved over several decades. Its history reveals that this category of error does not encompass a subsequent change in law or in interpretation of law. Because the invalidation of a prior regulation constitutes a “change in interpretation of law,” this type of error does not encompass a claim like George’s. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the history of “clear and unmistakable error” is not so clear as the majority suggests. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court erroneously excuses an agency’s departure from its statutory commands.