Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Reed v. Goertz Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 11, 2022.Decided on Apr 18, 2023. Petitioner: Rodney Reed.Respondent: Bryan Goertz, et al.. Advocates: Parker Rider-Longmaid (for the Petitioner) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Rodney Reed was sentenced to death in Texas for the 1996 rape and murder of Stacey Stites. He unsuccessfully sought federal post-conviction relief, and when the state asked to set an execution date, Reed requested to have DNA testing conducted on several items on or near the victim’s body. A state trial court declined his request. Reed then filed a federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging the constitutionality of the Texas law governing post-conviction DNA testing. The district court dismissed his claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that Reed’s claims are barred by the state’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims, which begins to run as soon as the plaintiff becomes aware that he has suffered an injury.” Question When does the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begin to run? Conclusion When a prisoner pursues state post-conviction DNA testing through the state-provided litigation process, the statute of limitations a procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 begins to run when the state litigation ends. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion holding that, in Reed’s case, the statute of limitations on his § 1983 claim began when the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his motion for rehearing, not when the state trial court denied DNA testing. A statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action.” When that occurs depends on the cause of action. The violation of procedural due process rights, as Reed alleged in this case, requires two elements: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (2) inadequate state process. Thus, a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” for a procedural due process violation not at the time of deprivation, but at the time the state fails to provide due process. In Reed’s case, the State’s alleged failure to provide him with a fundamentally fair process was complete when the state litigation ended and deprived Reed of his asserted liberty interest in DNA testing. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case for lack of standing. Justice Thomas would dismiss the case on the finding that Reed’s action presents no original Article III case or controversy between him and the district attorney. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that there are a number of points in the case at which the statute of limitations could begin to run—all before the denial by the Criminal Court of Appeals, and all leading to the conclusion that Reed’s claim is time-barred.

Timothy S. Bishop argues that California's Proposition 12 infringes on the Commerce Clause, while Edwin S. Kneedler supports this view on behalf of the U.S. government. Michael J. Mongan defends the state regulations, asserting they don't violate interstate commerce. Jeffrey A. Lamken emphasizes the ethical standpoint, advocating for animal welfare. The discussion navigates the complex interplay between state laws, morality, and commerce, as the Justices probe the potential extraterritorial effects of the law on pork production across the nation.

Arellano v. McDonough Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2022.Decided on Jan 23, 2023. Petitioner: Adolfo R. Arellano.Respondent: Dennis McDonough, Secretary of Veterans Affairs. Advocates: James R. Barney (for the Petitioner) Sopan Joshi (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Adolfo R. Arellano served honorably in the Navy from November 1977 to October 1981. On June 3, 2011—more than 30 years after he was discharged—he applied for disability benefits on the basis of psychiatric disorders that rendered him 100% disabled. He sought retroactive benefits from the day after his discharge, arguing that the one-year filing deadline to submit disability claims should be extended in his case because his mental illness had prevented him from filing his claim earlier. The VA Regional Office granted his claim, but only from the date the claim was received. The Board of Appeals rejected his argument, and the Veterans Court affirmed that decision, concluding that Mr. Arellano's claim was “squarely foreclosed by binding precedent” in Andrews v. Principi, 351 F.3d 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2003), which held that principles of equitable tolling are not applicable to the time period in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1). Question Can the one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged be extended under principles of equitable tolling? Conclusion The one-year filing deadline for veterans to submit disability claims after they are discharged cannot be extended under principles of equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barret authored the unanimous opinion of the Court holding that the effective date of Arellano’s award of disability compensation was the day the VA received his claim. Equitable tolling can extend a deadline when a litigant diligently pursues their rights but is nonetheless prevented from bringing a timely action due to extraordinary circumstances. Courts presume that equitable tolling applies, but that presumption is rebuttable by evidence that it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The default rule of 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a)(1) establishes that the day VA receives a claim is the effective date, subject to the limited exception in § 5110(b)(1), which states that “the effective date of an award . . . shall be fixed in accordance with the facts found, but shall not be earlier than the date of receipt of application therefor.” Moreover, the structure of § 5110, which sets out 16 exceptions that explain when each type of benefits qualifies for an effective date earlier than the default, suggests Congress intended only certain enumerated exceptions to the default date. This statutory language and structure indicate Congress’s intent that principles of equitable tolling not apply.

Allen v. Milligan Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 4, 2022.Decided on Jun 8, 2023. Appellant: Wes Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al..Appellee: Evan Milligan, et al.. Advocates: Edmund G. Lacour, Jr. (for the Appellants/Petitioners) Deuel Ross (for the Appellees) Abha Khanna (for the Respondents) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Appellees/Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) After the 2020 census, Alabama created a redistricting plan for its seven seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. One of the districts in the plan is a majority-Black district. Registered voters and several organizations challenged the map, arguing that the state had illegally packed Black voters into a single district while dividing other clusters of Black voters across multiple districts. The challengers alleged that the map effectively minimizes the number of districts in which Black voters can elect their chosen candidates, in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which bans racial discrimination in voting policies. A three-judge district court agreed with the challengers that the map likely violated Section 2 of the VRA, granting a preliminary injunction that ordered the state to draw a new map. Alabama asked the U.S. Supreme Court to freeze the district court’s injunction, which the Court did by a 5-4 decision pending a merits decision. Question Does Alabama’s 2021 redistricting plan for its seven U.S. House seats violate Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act? Conclusion The district court correctly applied binding Supreme Court precedent to conclude that Alabama’s redistricting map likely violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court’s decision in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) sets out a three-part framework for evaluating claims brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. First, the plaintiffs must prove that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district (measured by criteria such as contiguity and compactness). Second, the plaintiffs must show that the minority group is politically cohesive. Third, the plaintiffs must show that under the totality of the circumstances, the political process is not “equally open” to minority voters. The majority applied that three-part framework to the facts in the record and agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their challenge. The plaintiffs submitted maps demonstrating the traditional districting criteria, and the district court found “no serious dispute” that Black voters are politically cohesive or that the challenged districts’ white majority consistently defeated Black voters’ preferred candidates. Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined the majority opinion except for a discussion of the difference between race-consciousness and race-predominance. He concurred separately to emphasize and clarify four additional points. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in full, and Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Samuel Alito joined in part. Justice Thomas argued that Section 2 of the VRA does not require Alabama to redraw its congressional districts so that Black voters can control a number of seats proportional to Black voters in its population. Justice Alito authored a dissenting opinion in which Justice Gorsuch joined arguing that the majority’s understanding of Gingles—specifically its understanding of the phrase “reasonably configured” within the context of the first precondition—is flawed, and that a correct understanding would lead to a different result in this case.

Sackett v. Environmental Protection Agency Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022.Decided on May 25, 2023. Petitioner: Michael Sackett and Chantelle Sackett.Respondent: Environmental Protection Agency. Advocates: Damien M. Schiff (for the Petitioners) Brian H. Fletcher (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael and Chantall Sackett own a residential lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, and want to build a home there. However, shortly after they began placing sand and gravel, the federal Environmental Protection Agency told them that they could not build on their lot because construction on the land violated the Clean Water Act. According to the EPA, the Sacketts’ lot contained wetlands that qualify as “navigable waters” regulated by the Act, so they needed to remove the sand and gravel and restore the property to its natural state. Litigation ensued, and in 2012, the Supreme Court permitted the Sacketts to litigate their challenge to the EPA’s order in federal court. During the litigation, the EPA removed its compliance order. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA’s withdrawal of the compliance order did not render the Sacketts’ challenge moot and that the EPA does have jurisdiction over their property under the Clean Water Act. The court reasoned that, under binding circuit precedent, “jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense.” Question What is the proper test for determining whether wetlands are “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act?  Conclusion The Clean Water Act extends only to wetlands that have a continuous surface connection with “waters” of the United States—i.e., with a relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate navigable waters. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion of the Court that was unanimous in the judgment reversing and remanding. In 1973, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Army Corps of Engineers, which jointly enforce the Clean Water Act, initially defined “the waters of the United States” differently. By 1980, they had adopted identical definitions, which encompassed “all waters that could affect interstate or foreign commerce.” Since then, they have repeatedly sought to define and redefine “waters of the United States” through rulemaking procedures. Despite this history, the Court found that the meaning of “waters” in the CWA encompasses “only those relatively permanent, standing, or continuously flowing bodies of water.” The mere presence of water is too broad; such a definition would include puddles and isolated ponds. Thus, wetlands are not per se “waters of the United States”; rather, only those with a continuous surface connection to traditional navigable waters fall within that category. Justice Clarence Thomas joined Justice Alito’s majority opinion in full but concurred separately, along with Justice Neil Gorsuch, emphasizing the importance of curbing the expansion of federal authority through agency action. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Kavanaugh disagreed with the Court’s “continuous surface connection” test because, in his view, it “departs from the statutory text, from 45 years of consistent agency practice,” and from the Court’s own precedents. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson joined. Justice Kagan lamented that, in her opinion, the majority “substitutes its own ideas about policymaking for Congress’s.”

Delaware v. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2022.Decided on Feb 28, 2023. Petitioner: State of Delaware.Respondent: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Wisconsin. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (for Delaware) Nicholas J. Bronni (for Arkansas et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) MoneyGram Payments Systems, which is headquartered in Delaware, returns unclaimed checks to that state. Pennsylvania and Wisconsin argue that the checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments,” which federal law requires to go to the states where they were purchased. Invoking the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over interstate disputes, Delaware filed the case directly in the Supreme Court. The Court appointed a special master, who concluded that MoneyGram’s checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus should go to the states where they were purchased. Delaware asked the Court to review the Special Master’s findings for error. Question Are unclaimed MoneyGram checks “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to a federal law that remits them to the states where they were purchased? Conclusion Unclaimed MoneyGram checks are “money orders” or “similar written instruments” and thus subject to the Federal Disposition Act, which remits them to the states where they were purchased. Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson authored the opinion of the Court, which was unanimous as to its conclusion (but only 5-4 as to the discussion of legislative history supporting that conclusion). The unclaimed checks at issue in this case are sufficiently similar to “money orders” to fall within the Federal Disposition Act (FDA) for two main reasons. First, they are similar in function in operation because they are prepaid financial instruments used to transmit a specified amount of money to a named payee. Second, because of the recordkeeping practices of the entity issuing and holding on to the prepaid funds, it would be inequitable for unclaimed checks to go to the state where the creditor is incorporated, as common law would require. For these reasons, the FDA, not the common law, applies to unclaimed MoneyGram checks.

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2022.Decided on Jun 29, 2022. Petitioner: State of Oklahoma.Respondent: Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the Petitioner) Zachary C. Schauf (for the Respondent) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta, a non-Native, was convicted in Oklahoma state court of child neglect, and he was sentenced to 35 years. The victim, his stepdaughter, is Native American, and the crime was committed within the Cherokee Reservation. Castro-Huerta challenged his conviction, arguing that under the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which held that states cannot prosecute crimes committed on Native American lands without federal approval. Oklahoma argued that McGirt involved a Native defendant, whereas Castro-Huerta is non-Native, so McGirt does not bar his prosecution by the state. Question Do states have the authority to prosecute non-Natives who commit crimes against Natives on Native American lands? Conclusion The federal government and the state have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. The Court has held that States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against non-Natives on Native American lands. Native American land is not separate from state territory. And States have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Native American land unless preempted. Preemption may occur either under ordinary principles of federal preemption, or when the exercise of state jurisdiction would unlawfully infringe on tribal self-government. Neither is present in this case, so states have jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-Natives against Natives on Native American land. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. Justice Gorsuch argued that the Court’s decision ​​reneges on the federal government’s centuries-old promise that tribes would remain forever free from interference by state authorities.

Biden v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022.Decided on Jun 30, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President of the United States, et al..Respondent: State of Texas, et al.. Advocates: Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the Petitioners) Judd E. Stone, II (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2018, the Trump administration announced the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPPs), under which policy certain noncitizens arriving at the southwest border of the United States were returned to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. Known as the “remain in Mexico” policy, the MPPs faced legal challenges shortly after their enactment, but the Supreme Court allowed the Trump administration to enforce it. In June 2021, the Biden administration sought to end the policy, but Texas and Missouri challenged that effort, arguing that rescinding the policy violated federal immigration law and that the policy change violated the Administrative Procedure Act. A federal district court agreed with the challengers and ordered the Biden administration to implement the MPPs in good faith or initiate new agency action in compliance with the APA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit declined to block the lower court’s ruling, as did the Supreme Court. In October 2021, the Department of Homeland Security issued a new decision ending the policy supported by a memorandum explaining the decision. A district court again ordered DHS to continue the CPPs, and the Fifth Circuit upheld the order. The Biden administration sought expedited review as to whether federal immigration law requires it to maintain the policy and whether the October decision to end the policy has any legal effect. Question Must the Biden administration continue to enforce the Trump administration’s Migrant Protection Protocols, or does the Biden Department of Homeland Security decision ending the policy have legal effect? Conclusion The Government’s rescission of Migrant Protection Protocols did not violate section 1225 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the then-Secretary of Homeland Security’s October 29 Memoranda constituted valid final agency action. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion. Although the district court lacked jurisdiction to issue its injunction, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the case. By using the word “may,” Section 1225(b)(2)(C) confers a discretionary authority to return nonresidents to Mexico. Historical context confirms this understanding. ​​Section 1225(b)(2)(C) was added to the statute more than 90 years after the mandatory language that appears in a nearby provision. And since its enactment, every presidential administration has interpreted section 1225(b)(2)(C) as purely discretionary. Interpreting the provision as mandatory would impose a significant burden upon the Executive’s ability to conduct diplomatic relations with Mexico, which Congress likely did not intend. Once the district court vacated the original attempt to rescind the policy, DHS properly  “issue[d] a new rescission bolstered by new reasons” absent from the original rescission. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch joined.

Shoop v. Twyford Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2022.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: Tim Shoop, Warden.Respondent: Raymond Twyford. Advocates: Benjamin M. Flowers (for the Petitioner) Nicole F. Reaves (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) David A. O'Neil (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 1993, an Ohio jury convicted Raymond Twyford of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. Twyford unsuccessfully pursued direct appeals and also filed a federal habeas petition. In November 2018, Twyford asked the federal district court to allow him to undergo neurological imaging to substantiate allegations of neurological problems due to childhood abuse, neglect, and injuries. The district court granted Twyford’s motion and ordered the prison warden to transport Twyford for his neurological imaging because the results might assist the court in exercising its habeas review. The warden appealed the order, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question May a federal district court order the transportation of a state prisoner to help him develop evidence for his habeas petition, even before determining the admissibility of the evidence? Conclusion A transportation order that allows a prisoner to search for new evidence is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of” a federal court’s adjudication of a habeas corpus action when the prisoner has not shown that the desired evidence would be admissible in connection with a particular claim for relief. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. A federal court may never needlessly prolong a habeas case. For that reason, before a federal court may admit new evidence, either the claim must rely on a new and previously unavailable rule of constitutional law made retroactively available by the Supreme Court, or it must rely on a factual predicate that could not have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. In this case, the court granted Twyford’s request for transportation under the All Writs Act. But the All Writs Act cannot be used to circumvent binding procedural rules. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) is the source of binding rules and limits review to the record that was before the state court. The district court’s failure to determine how Twyford’s request for transportation would aid the adjudication of his habeas petition before granting the request was thus erroneous. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the state’s interlocutory appeal. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the case as improvidently granted.

Kennedy v. Bremerton School District Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 25, 2022.Decided on Jun 27, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph A. Kennedy.Respondent: Bremerton School District. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Richard B. Katskee (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Joseph Kennedy, a high school football coach, engaged in prayer with a number of students during and after school games. His employer, the Bremerton School District, asked that he discontinue the practice in order to protect the school from a lawsuit based on violation of the Establishment Clause. Kennedy refused and instead rallied local and national television, print media, and social media to support him. Kennedy sued the school district for violating his rights under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court held that because the school district suspended him solely because of the risk of constitutional liability associated with his religious conduct, its actions were justified. Kennedy appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Question Is a public school employee’s prayer during school sports activities protected speech, and if so, can the public school employer prohibit it to avoid violating the Establishment Clause? Conclusion The Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment protect an individual engaging in a personal religious observance from government reprisal; the Constitution neither mandates nor permits the government to suppress such religious expression. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the majority opinion of the Court. The District disciplined Coach Kennedy after three games in October 2015, in which he “pray[ed] quietly without his students.” In forbidding Mr. Kennedy’s prayers, the District sought to restrict his actions because of their religious character, thereby burdening his right to free exercise. As to his free speech claim, the timing and circumstances of Kennedy’s prayers—during the postgame period when coaches were free to attend briefly to personal matters and students were engaged in other activities—confirm that Kennedy did not offer his prayers while acting within the scope of his duties as a coach. The District cannot show that its prohibition of Kennedy’s prayer serves a compelling purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieving that purpose. The Court’s Lemon test, and the related endorsement test, are “abandoned,” replaced by a consideration of “historical practices and understandings.” Applying that test, there is no conflict between the constitutional commands of the First Amendment in this case. Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito filed concurring opinions. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined.