Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 18, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Cassirer.Respondent: Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation. Advocates: David Boies (for the Petitioners) Masha G. Hansford (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners) Thaddeus J. Stauber (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Cassirer and others filed a lawsuit to recover a painting by French Impressionist painter Camille Pissarro, which was stolen from their ancestors by the Nazi regime in 1939. The district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the court needed to determine, as a threshold matter, whether TBC had actual knowledge the painting was stolen. If it had such knowledge, then it could be an accessory after the fact under Spanish Civil Code Article 1956. On remand, the district court determined that TBC did not have actual knowledge that the painting was stolen when it purchased the painting in 1993. Cassirer again appealed, arguing among other things the Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision erred in holding that Spanish law governs the substantive claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court, finding no factual or legal developments that would justify revisiting its original holding. Question Should a federal court hearing state law claims under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act apply the forum state’s choice-of-law rules or federal common law to determine what substantive law governs the claims at issue? Conclusion A federal court hearing state-law claims under the FSIA should determine the substantive law by using the same choice-of-law rule applicable in a similar suit against a private party. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion holding that, in this case, that means applying the forum state’s choice-of-law rule, not a rule deriving from federal common law. Although the FSIA generally recognizes foreign sovereign immunity absent a statutory exception, it does not affect the substantive law determining the liability of a foreign state when the entity is not immune from suit. Rather, in that situation, the foreign state is subject to the same substantive law as a private party. In this case, Section 1606 requires the use of California’s choice-of-law rule.

Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 12, 2022.Decided on Apr 21, 2022. Petitioner: Boechler, P.C..Respondent: Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Advocates: Melissa Arbus Sherry (On behalf of the Petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (On behalf of the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On June 5, 2015, the Internal Revenue Service sent Boechler, P.C., a letter noting a discrepancy between prior tax document submissions. After not receiving a response, the IRS imposed a 10% intentional disregard penalty, which Boechler did not pay. The IRS mailed Boechler a notice of intent to levy. Boechler timely responded but failed to establish grounds for relief. On July 28, 2017, the Office of Appeals mailed a determination sustaining the levy to Boechler's last known address in Fargo, North Dakota. The notice of determination, delivered on July 31, stated that Boechler had 30 days from the date of determination, i.e. until August 28, 2017, to submit a petition for review. Boechler mailed a petition for a CDP hearing on August 29, 2017, one day after the 30-day filing deadline had expired. The Tax Court received Boechler's untimely petition, and the IRS moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Boechler argued that the 30-day time limit in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the time limit should be equitably tolled, and calculating the time limit from issuance rather than receipt violates due process. The tax court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, and Boechler appealed. Question Is the 30-day time limit to file a petition for review in the Tax Court of a notice of determination from the commissioner of internal revenue in 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) a jurisdictional requirement or a claim-processing rule subject to equitable tolling? Conclusion The 30-day time limit of 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) is a nonjurisdictional deadline subject to equitable tolling. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the opinion for a unanimous Court. A procedural requirement is jurisdictional only if Congress “clearly states” it is. Section 6330(d)(1) provides that a “person may, within 30 days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).” Thus, the meaning of this provision turns on the meaning of “such matter.” Because the phrase “such matter” in that sentence lacks a clear antecedent, the text does not “clearly” mandate a jurisdictional reading. Nonjurisdictional limitations periods are presumptively subject to equitable tolling, and nothing in the facts of this case rebuts that presumption.

Garland v. Gonzalez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al..Respondent: Esteban Aleman Gonzalez, et al.. Advocates: Curtis E. Gannon (for the Petitioners) Matthew H. Adams (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Gutierrez Sanchez are natives and citizens of Mexico who reside in the United States. The federal government had initiated removal proceedings against them, but asylum officers determined that each had a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico. Gonzalez and Sanchez both requested a bond hearing before an immigration judge after they had been detained for 180 days, but both requests were denied. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion District courts lack jurisdiction to entertain the respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. Justice Samuel Alito authored the majority opinion reversing the judgment of the lower court. Section 1252(f)(1) generally strips lower courts of “jurisdiction or authority” to “enjoin or restrain the operation of ” certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Although that section includes one exception, to “enjoin or restrain the operation of” the relevant statutory provisions “with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated,” that exception does not apply to claims on behalf of an entire class. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion, joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan, dissenting from the Court’s holding as to the interpretation of Section 1252(f)(1) but concurring in the judgment insofar as it concludes the government prevails on the merits.

Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 11, 2022.Decided on Jun 13, 2022. Petitioner: Tae D. Johnson, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al..Respondent: Antonio Arteaga-Martinez. Advocates: Austin L. Raynor (for the Petitioners) Pratik A. Shah (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States without inspection. In May 2018, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested and detained him and initiated removal proceedings. Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding and deferral of removal based on fear of violence in Mexico. Six months after the start of his detention, he requested a bond hearing and challenged his continued detention without one. Question Is a noncitizen who has spent more than six months in immigration detention awaiting resolution of their deportation withholding claim entitled to a hearing before an immigration judge to determine whether they can be released on bond? Conclusion The Government is not required to provide noncitizens detained for six months with bond hearings in which the Government bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. No plausible construction of the text of 9 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings with the procedures mandated by the Third Circuit. It says nothing about bond hearings before immigration judges or burdens of proof. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurrring opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined in part, arguing that while the majority reached the correct conclusion, he would hold that the Court lacks jurisdiction, the Due Process Clause does not apply to removal of noncitizens, and Zadvydas v. Davis should be overruled. Justice Stephen Breyer authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. He argued that Zadvydas control the outcome in this case.

Gallardo v. Marstiller Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 10, 2022.Decided on Jun 6, 2022. Petitioner: Gianinna Gallardo, an Incapacitated Person, By and Through her Parents and Co-Guardians Pilar Vassallo and Walter Gallardo.Respondent: Simone Marstiller, In Her Official Capacity as Secretary of the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration. Advocates: Bryan S. Gowdy (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Henry C. Whitaker (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Gianinna Gallardo suffered catastrophic injuries when she was hit by a truck after getting off her school bus, and she remains in a persistent vegetative state. She eventually recovered $800,000 in a court-approved settlement, which applied to her past medical expenses, future medical expenses, lost wages, and other damages. However, the settlement amount covered only a fraction of each type of damages. Medicaid had paid $862,688.77 toward her past medical expenses, so in an attempt to recover reimbursement for its payments, pursuant to Florida law, the State of Florida asserted a lien over the compensation for past medical expenses, which Medicaid had paid, as well as the compensation for future medical expenses. Gallardo’s counsel filed a lawsuit asking the court to enjoin the state from asserting its lien over the portion of her tort recovery compensating for future medical expenses and to declare that Florida’s reimbursement statute violates the Medicaid Act. The district court ruled for Gallardo, finding that the Medicaid Act preempted the Florida law to the extent that the law allows the State to satisfy its lien for past medical expenses from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed. Question Does the federal Medicaid Act provide for a state Medicaid program to recover reimbursement for Medicaid’s payment of a beneficiary’s past medical expenses by taking funds from the portion of the beneficiary’s tort recovery that compensates for future medical expenses? Conclusion The Medicaid Act permits a state to seek reimbursement from settlement payments allocated for future medical care. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 7-2 majority opinion. Section 1396p(a)(1) of the Medicaid Act prohibits states from recovering medical payments from a beneficiary’s “property,” that is, from settlement amounts other than those allocated for past medical care paid for by Medicaid. But that provision does not apply to state laws expressly authorized under the Act. Florida’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act falls squarely within this exception to Section 1396p(a)(1). The plain text of the provision, as well as the statutory context, support this interpretation. The language granting rights to payment of “any medical care” includes both past medical payments and future medical payments. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority “read[s] one statutory provision in isolation while giving short shrift to the statutory context, the relationships between the provisions at issue, and the framework set forth in precedent. As such, Justice Sotomayor argued, its holding “is inconsistent with the structure of the” Medicaid program and will cause needless unfairness and disruption.

Biden v. Missouri Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: Joseph R. Biden.Respondent: Missouri, et al.. Advocates: Brian H. Fletcher (On behalf of the Applicants) Jesus A. Osete (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A240) Elizabeth Murrill (On behalf of the Respondents in No. 21A241) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Does the Department of Health and Human Services have the authority to enforce a rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption? Conclusion The Department of Health and Human Services has the authority to enforce its rule requiring health care workers at facilities that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 unless they qualify for a medical or religious exemption. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the applications to stay the two injunctions barring the Secretary of Health and Human Services from enforcing the regulation. The Court reasoned that a core function of HHS is to ensure that the healthcare providers who care for Medicare and Medicaid patients protect their patients’ health and safety, and the interim rule at issue here seeks to do precisely that. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. The dissenters found no statutory support for such an exercise of authority.  

National Federation of Independent Business v. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2022.Decided on Jan 13, 2022. Petitioner: National Federation of Independent Business, et al..Respondent: Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Advocates: Scott A. Keller (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A244) Benjamin M. Flowers (On behalf of the Applicants in No. 21A247) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (On behalf of the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) None Question Did the Occupational Safety & Health Administration exceed its authority in promulgating a rule mandating that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing? Conclusion The challengers to the OSHA rule requiring that employers with at least 100 employees require covered workers to receive a COVID–19 vaccine or else wear a mask and be subject to weekly testing are likely to succeed on the merits. In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court granted the application to stay the OSHA rule. Congress created OSHA to set workplace safety standards. The challenged rule goes well beyond that and is effectively a broad public health measure. Even the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic do not justify such an expansion in the agency's authority. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, reiterating that the States and Congress—not OSHA—have the authority to decide how to respond to the pandemic. Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan filed a joint dissent, arguing that the pandemic directly affects the safety of workplaces and thus that OSHA has the authority to issue regulations to curb the effects of the pandemic in workplaces. The dissenters argue that by granting the stay, the Court acted outside of its competence and without legal basis, displacing the judgments of officials who have the responsibility and expertise to respond to workplace health emergencies.

Shinn v. Ramirez Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on May 23, 2022. Petitioner: David Shinn, Director, Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry.Respondent: David Martinez Ramirez. Advocates: Brunn W. Roysden III (for the Petitioner) Robert M. Loeb (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) David Ramirez was convicted by a jury and sentenced to death by a judge for the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter. On direct appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed his convictions and sentence, including the trial court’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and imposition of the death sentence. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Ramirez filed a petition for post-conviction relief in state court, alleging various claims, but did not claim ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state court denied his petition, and the Arizona Supreme Court denied the petition for review. Ramirez then filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court. The court substituted his counsel “due to concerns regarding the quality of representation” and allowed Ramirez to amend his petition to add the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. However, the court ultimately found the claim procedurally defaulted because Ramirez had not raised it earlier. In 2012, while Ramirez’s appeal was pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that a federal court cannot consider evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, but “a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” In light of Martinez, the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of whether post-conviction counsel’s ineffectiveness was cause to overcome the procedural default of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The district court again determined that Ramirez’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was procedurally barred and denied Ramirez’s request for more evidence. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding Ramirez demonstrated cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. Question Does the Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan render the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief? Conclusion Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not conduct an evidentiary hearing or otherwise consider evidence beyond the state-court record based on the ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the 6-3 majority opinion of the Court. Federal habeas relief is narrowly available because it overrides a state’s power to enforce criminal law and incurs certain costs. For example, a federal order to retry or release a state prisoner overrides the state’s power to enforce “societal norms through criminal law,” and federal intervention imposes significant costs on state criminal justice systems. Thus, federal habeas relief is an “extraordinary remedy” that guards only against “extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.” The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires state prisoners to exhaust state remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. The doctrine of procedural default generally prevents federal courts from hearing any federal claim not presented in state court according to the state’s own procedural rules. A federal court may excuse procedural default only in narrow circumstances: the prisoner must demonstrate cause for the default and prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law. Attorney error cannot generally serve as such “cause.” Specifically, state postconviction counsel’s ineffective assistance in developing the record is attributed to the prisoner, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the Court “guts” the reasoning of two key precedents establishing that a habeas petitioner is not at fault for any failure to bring a trial-ineffectiveness claim in state court and “arrogates power from Congress” by “reconfigur[ing] the balance Congress struck [in AEDPA] between state interests and individual constitutional rights.”

Carson v. Makin Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 8, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al..Respondent: A. Pender Makin. Advocates: Michael Bindas (for the Petitioner) Christopher C. Taub (for the Respondent) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The State of Maine relies on local school administrative units (SAUs) to ensure that every school-age child in the state has access to a free education. Not every SAU operates its own public secondary school. To meet the state requirements, an SAU without its own public secondary school may either (1) contract with a secondary school to provide school privileges or (2) pay the tuition of a secondary school at which a particular student is accepted. In either circumstance, the secondary school must be either a public school or an “approved” private school. To be an “approved” school, a private school must meet the state’s compulsory attendance requirements (which can be demonstrated by accreditation by a New England association of schools and colleges or by approval by the Maine Department of Education), and it must be “nonsectarian in accordance with the First Amendment.” The Carsons, Gillises, and Nelsons live in SAUs that do not operate a public secondary school of their own but instead provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to an “approved” private school. The three families opted to send their children to private schools that are accredited but do not meet the nonsectarian requirement because they are religiously affiliated. Because the schools are not “approved,” they do not qualify for tuition assistance. The families filed a lawsuit in federal court arguing that the “nonsectarian” requirement violates the Constitution on its face and as applied. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted judgment to the State and denied judgment to the plaintiffs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed, noting that it had twice before rejected similar challenges, and even though the U.S. Supreme Court had decided two relevant cases in the interim, those cases do not produce a different outcome here. Question Does a state law prohibiting students participating in an otherwise generally available student-aid program from choosing to use their aid to attend schools that provide religious, or “sectarian,” instruction violate the Religion Clauses or Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion Maine’s “nonsectarian” requirement for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments to parents who live in school districts that do not operate a secondary school of their own violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice Jonh Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. Two cases resolve the dispute in this case. In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not permit Missouri to discriminate against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. And in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, the Court held that a provision of the Montana Constitution barring government aid to any school “controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination” violated the Free Exercise Clause because it prohibited families from using otherwise available scholarship funds at religious schools. Applying those precedents to this case, Maine may not choose to subsidize some private schools but not others on the basis of religious character. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined, arguing that the majority gives “almost exclusive” attention to the Free Exercise Clause while paying “almost no attention” to the Establishment Clause. In Justice Breyer’s view, Maine’s nonsectarian requirement strikes the correct balance between the two clauses. Justice Sotomayor dissented separately, as well, to highlight the Court’s “increasingly expansive view of the Free Exercise Clause” that “risks swallowing the space between the Religion Clauses.”

United States v. Taylor Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 7, 2021.Decided on Jun 21, 2022. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Justin Eugene Taylor. Advocates: Rebecca Taibleson (for the Petitioner) Michael R. Dreeben (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Justin Eugene Taylor and a co-conspirator intended to rob a drug dealer, who ended up being shot during the transaction. The Government’s indictment charged Taylor on seven counts, including conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The indictment also alleged two predicate crimes of violence: the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and the attempted Hobbs Act robbery. Taylor pled guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and use of a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence,” and the Government agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. Taylor was convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). On habeas review, Taylor asked the court to vacate his conviction and remand for resentencing based on the argument that the two predicate offenses are not “crimes of violence” under § 924(c). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated Taylor’s § 924(c) conviction, finding that because the elements of attempted Hobbs Act robbery do not invariably require “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” the offense does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c). Question Does the definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) exclude attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which may be completed through an attempted threat alone? Conclusion Attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A) because no element of the offense requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 7-2 majority opinion. To convict a defendant of attempted Hobbs Act robbery, the prosecution must prove that the defendant intended to complete the offense and that the defendant completed a “substantial step” toward that end. Neither element requires proof that the defendant used, attempted to use, or threatened to use force (even though, in many cases, force is present). As such, attempted Hobbs Act robbery cannot constitute a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(3)(A). Justice Clarence Thomas dissented, arguing that under the facts of this case, Taylor did in fact threaten violence, so his attempted Hobbs Act robbery was a “crime of violence” even if that incomplete crime might not be a crime of violence in some other hypothetical situation. Justice Samuel Alito also dissented, rejecting the majority’s categorical approach as disregarding the real world.