America aims to avoid nuclear war by relying on the principle of 'mutually assured destruction,' right? Wrong. Or at least... not officially.As today's guest — Jeffrey Lewis, founder of Arms Control Wonk and professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies — explains, in its official 'OPLANs' (military operation plans), the US is committed to 'dominating' in a nuclear war with Russia. How would they do that? "That is redacted." Links to learn more, summary and full transcript. We invited Jeffrey to come on the show to lay out what we and our listeners are most likely to be misunderstanding about nuclear weapons, the nuclear posture of major powers, and his field as a whole, and he did not disappoint. As Jeffrey tells it, 'mutually assured destruction' was a slur used to criticise those who wanted to limit the 1960s arms buildup, and was never accepted as a matter of policy in any US administration. But isn't it still the de facto reality? Yes and no. Jeffrey is a specialist on the nuts and bolts of bureaucratic and military decision-making in real-life situations. He suspects that at the start of their term presidents get a briefing about the US' plan to prevail in a nuclear war and conclude that "it's freaking madness." They say to themselves that whatever these silly plans may say, they know a nuclear war cannot be won, so they just won't use the weapons. But Jeffrey thinks that's a big mistake. Yes, in a calm moment presidents can resist pressure from advisors and generals. But that idea of ‘winning’ a nuclear war is in all the plans. Staff have been hired because they believe in those plans. It's what the generals and admirals have all prepared for. What matters is the 'not calm moment': the 3AM phone call to tell the president that ICBMs might hit the US in eight minutes — the same week Russia invades a neighbour or China invades Taiwan. Is it a false alarm? Should they retaliate before their land-based missile silos are hit? There's only minutes to decide. Jeffrey points out that in emergencies, presidents have repeatedly found themselves railroaded into actions they didn't want to take because of how information and options were processed and presented to them. In the heat of the moment, it's natural to reach for the plan you've prepared — however mad it might sound. In this spicy conversation, Jeffrey fields the most burning questions from Rob and the audience, in the process explaining: • Why inter-service rivalry is one of the biggest constraints on US nuclear policy • Two times the US sabotaged nuclear nonproliferation among great powers • How his field uses jargon to exclude outsiders • How the US could prevent the revival of mass nuclear testing by the great powers • Why nuclear deterrence relies on the possibility that something might go wrong • Whether 'salami tactics' render nuclear weapons ineffective • The time the Navy and Air Force switched views on how to wage a nuclear war, just when it would allow *them* to have the most missiles • The problems that arise when you won't talk to people you think are evil • Why missile defences are politically popular despite being strategically foolish • How open source intelligence can prevent arms races • And much more.Chapters:Rob’s intro (00:00:00)The interview begins (00:02:49)Misconceptions in the effective altruism community (00:05:42)Nuclear deterrence (00:17:36)Dishonest rituals (00:28:17)Downsides of generalist research (00:32:13)“Mutual assured destruction” (00:38:18)Budgetary considerations for competing parts of the US military (00:51:53)Where the effective altruism community can potentially add the most value (01:02:15)Gatekeeping (01:12:04)Strengths of the nuclear security community (01:16:14)Disarmament (01:26:58)Nuclear winter (01:38:53)Attacks against US allies (01:41:46)Most likely weapons to get used (01:45:11)The role of moral arguments (01:46:40)Salami tactics (01:52:01)Jeffrey's disagreements with Thomas Schelling (01:57:00)Why did it take so long to get nuclear arms agreements? (02:01:11)Detecting secret nuclear facilities (02:03:18)Where Jeffrey would give $10M in grants (02:05:46)The importance of archival research (02:11:03)Jeffrey's policy ideas (02:20:03)What should the US do regarding China? (02:27:10)What should the US do regarding Russia? (02:31:42)What should the US do regarding Taiwan? (02:35:27)Advice for people interested in working on nuclear security (02:37:23)Rob’s outro (02:39:13)Producer: Keiran HarrisAudio mastering: Ben CordellTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Join expert Jeffrey Lewis, a professor and director at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, as he delves into the complexities of nuclear deterrence. He discusses Putin's diminishing nuclear blackmail tactics and the implications of Russia's new nuclear doctrine for global stability. Lewis also unpacks lessons from the Ukraine conflict and critiques the recent resurgence of Iran's nuclear ambitions. Additionally, he explores U.S. nuclear needs and the growing Chinese nuclear threat, illuminating vital geopolitical dynamics.

Rep. Lauren Boebert's lack of class is discussed. Mike Rothschild shares insights from his new book on the Rothschilds. Jeffrey Lewis talks about the reasons we're still here. Topics include GOP support for controversial figures, interconnectedness of global issues, debunking Rothschild myths, critique of Bill Maher's views, and Republican hypocrisy.

Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program and nuclear strategy expert, joins Jon and David to discuss the troubling implications of presidential access to nuclear codes. They reveal historical crises where miscommunication led to danger and emphasize the need for stronger safeguards against unstable leadership. The conversation dives into the roles of AI and human judgment in nuclear decision-making, advocating for reforms to ensure accountability and security in the face of unpredictable governance.

Jeffrey Lewis, a renowned nuclear expert and author, dives into the contentious proposal from former Trump officials to restart nuclear testing. He discusses the historical context of nuclear tests and their geopolitical implications. The conversation sheds light on the shift from physical tests to computer simulations and the complexities surrounding confidence in the reliability of nuclear weapons. Lewis also addresses the evolving global security landscape with advancements by rivals like China and Russia, challenging perceptions of U.S. deterrence.