Skepticism towards dialoguing between Thomism and analytic philosophy

There are several arguments for skepticism about the possibility of meaningful dialogue between Thomism and analytic philosophy. These arguments can be classified into two categories: impossibility arguments and impracticality arguments. Impossibility arguments claim that dialogue is impossible due to factors such as doctrinal or methodological disunity, lack of common ground, or incommensurability of doctrines or conceptual frameworks. On the other hand, impracticality arguments acknowledge the possibility of dialogue but argue that it is not worthwhile or fruitful. These arguments suggest that engaging in dialogue with analytic philosophers is a waste of time due to concerns such as reinventing the wheel, learning a new philosophical language, minimal common ground, or the belief that time could be better spent elsewhere. While these arguments present plausible reasons for skepticism, they may not provide sufficiently strong grounds to dismiss the potential benefits of dialogue. It's important to consider the limitations of these arguments and the possibility for fruitful exchange between Thomism and analytic philosophy.