China's Accelerated Expansion of its Nuclear Arsenal Represents a Shift in China's Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine: A Debate with Dr. Tong Zhao and Dr. Fiona Cunningham
Jan 9, 2024
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Two leading experts, Dr. Tong Zhao and Dr. Fiona Cunningham, debate whether China's expanding nuclear arsenal represents a shift in China's nuclear strategy. They discuss China's evolving view on nuclear weapons, its pursuit of escalation management capability, and the implications of its accelerated nuclear expansion. The debate also covers China's nuclear deterrent system, advanced warhead technology, and the role of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan contingency. Lastly, they explore the connection between China's non-nuclear strategic capabilities and its nuclear strategy.
China's nuclear strategy has shifted to view nuclear weapons as a tool to influence international perception and maintain regime security.
Assessing China's nuclear strategy requires a thorough understanding of its overall security and foreign policy thinking.
China's nuclear build-up aims to maintain a credible second-strike capability and prevent nuclear coercion, but also focuses on nuclear signaling and influencing international perceptions of its power.
Deep dives
China's nuclear strategy and increasing existential threat perception
China's nuclear strategy has been changing in response to an increasing sense of existential threat. It now views nuclear weapons not only as a means of deterrence, but also as a tool to influence international perception of its strategic power. Chinese leadership has become more determined to preventively address rising threats and to maintain regime security. China's nuclear build-up is driven by a desire to counter increasing geopolitical threats and to influence the behavior of US-led Western countries. However, the lack of checks and balances in China's decision-making process, as well as the increasing centralization of power, has led to tensions and contradictions in its nuclear thinking. Changes in means and goals of China's nuclear strategy are primarily a result of internal factors, such as Xi Jinping's personal influence and a less coherent decision-making process.
The need for a high evidentiary bar
Given the lack of transparency and information from China, a higher evidentiary bar is necessary when assessing its nuclear strategy. Making erroneous assumptions about China's nuclear strategy can have serious consequences. A thorough understanding of China's overall security and foreign policy thinking is important, as nuclear strategy is closely linked to these broader goals. Studying China's domestic politics, relationships with defense industries, and its role in the international community is crucial to gaining insights into its decision-making process. It is essential to have expertise in both nuclear matters and regional knowledge to develop a clearer picture of China's nuclear strategy.
China's nuclear capabilities and goals
China's nuclear build-up involves increasing its arsenal size, improving accuracy, and diversifying its nuclear forces. While some argue that China is pursuing nuclear parity with the US or adopting a competitive nuclear strategy, there is not enough evidence to support these claims. China's goals for its nuclear strategy and doctrine have shown elements of both continuity and change. It aims to maintain a credible second-strike capability and prevent nuclear coercion, but there is also an increasing attention to nuclear signaling and influencing international perceptions of China's power. Changes in China's nuclear decision-making processes do not necessarily indicate a shift in its goals, but rather reflect a more political-driven decision-making approach. Given the potential consequences, caution should be exercised in making assumptions about China's nuclear strategy.
Implications in a Taiwan contingency
In assessing the nuclear dimension in a Taiwan contingency, it is important to consider that China is not pursuing a nuclear first-use posture. Its nuclear capabilities are primarily aimed at preventing conventional conflicts with the US from escalating to the nuclear level. However, China's strategic deterrent system, which includes nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities such as offensive cyber operations and counter-space weapons, plays a role in influencing escalation risks and deterring potential adversaries. The strong strategic deterrent system is designed to provide options for escalation management rather than targeting Taiwan directly with nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons in a Taiwan contingency would have significant implications and is not a primary goal for China's nuclear strategy.
Lessons from Russia's war in Ukraine
Chinese scholars and officers have observed the use of tailored and flexible nuclear signaling by Russia during the war in Ukraine. They have learned from this experience that nuclear capabilities can be used implicitly to influence an adversary's concern about escalation risks and decision-making at the conventional and political levels. China's own understanding of deterrence has been shaped by these observations, emphasizing the importance of credible nuclear signaling and understanding the impact of nuclear threats on an adversary's decision-making process in a conflict. However, there is no evidence to suggest that China is emulating Russia's war in Ukraine or pursuing a similar nuclear strategy in a Taiwan contingency or other regional conflicts.
On Thursday, October 5, 2023, the China Power Project held its eighth annual conference. The conference consisted of five separate debates by leading experts each taking a side on core issues underpinning China’s power. We will be releasing each of these debates as their own podcast throughout the holiday season. We will be back with our regularly scheduled debates in Mid-January 2024.
For this debate, the proposition is “China's accelerated expansion of its nuclear arsenal represents a shift in China's nuclear strategy and doctrine.” Arguing for this proposition is Dr. Tong Zhao, who is a senior fellow at the Nuclear Policy Program and Carnegie China at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Arguing against this proposition is Dr. Fiona Cunningham who is an assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania.