The Basis of Moral Consideration

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Agency, defined as the basic ability to set and pursue goals in a self-directed manner, is considered a potential basis for moral significance. While some believe that agency alone is sufficient for moral consideration, others, like the speaker, have reservations. The concept of agency extends beyond human beings to include other primates, mammals, vertebrates, and even invertebrates, implying a broader scope for moral consideration than previously thought. The discussion prompts a critical examination of why agency might be seen as a valid premise for moral significance in ethical considerations.

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How did we end up with factory farming? How many animals do we kill every year in factory farms? When we consider the rights of non-human living things, we tend to focus mainly on the animal kingdom, and in particular on relatively larger, more complex animals; but to what extent should insects, plants, fungi, and even single-celled organisms deserve our moral consideration? Do we know anything about what it's like (or not) to be an AI? To what extent is the perception of time linked to the speed at which one's brain processes information? What's the difference between consciousness and sentience? Should an organism be required to have consciousness and/or sentience before we'll give it our moral consideration? What evidence do we have that various organisms and/or AIs are conscious? What do we know about the evolutionary function of consciousness? What's the "rebugnant conclusion"? What might it mean to "harm" an AI? What can be done by the average person to move the needle on these issues? What should we say to people who think all of this is ridiculous? What is Humean constructivism? What do all of the above considerations imply about abortion? Do we (or any organisms or AIs) have free will? How likely is it that panpsychism is true?

Jeff Sebo is Associate Professor of Environmental Studies; Affiliated Professor of Bioethics, Medical Ethics, Philosophy, and Law; Director of the Animal Studies M.A. Program; Director of the Mind, Ethics, and Policy Program; and Co-Director of the Wild Animal Welfare Program at New York University. He is the author of Saving Animals, Saving Ourselves (2022) and co-author of Chimpanzee Rights (2018) and Food, Animals, and the Environment (2018). He is also an executive committee member at the NYU Center for Environmental and Animal Protection, a board member at Minding Animals International, an advisory board member at the Insect Welfare Research Society, a senior research fellow at the Legal Priorities Project, and a mentor at Sentient Media.

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