The AMI Podcast

Empirical research analysing the lived experiences of Muslims often shows a one-sided narrative about gender relations, intra and inter-faith relations, and societal relations. In seeking to reduce the impact of such discourse I speak from a secular position, and also with understanding of the Islamic seminary but with full awareness of the limitations of both epistemological approaches. Accusations are often brought against the reputed hegemony of such approaches by the ‘other’ side and this adversarial position creates an unfortunate and self-defeating binary. Antagonisms are created between social conservatism and social liberalism, each exaggerated by use of decontextualized argument. This situation is exacerbated by current right wing populist debates around free speech: freedom of expression is often presented in another counterproductive binary as either a libertarian right or as an extreme risk (Scott-Baumann and Perfect 2021). In order to break the hegemony of this secular device, it is necessary to consult Islamic thinkers and ethical experts, such as Kamali and Rabb and El Fadl. Yet immediately we are faced with different approaches to free speech within modern Islamic thought.

Unrestricted freedom of thought and responsible freedom of expression are key factors in the process of intellectual and moral progression of humanity. These freedoms are intuitive and are attested to rationally. Any form of restriction to these freedoms inevitably results in tension since they stand in contradiction to the human existential condition of growth and self-realisation. Accordingly, the role of a successful religion is one of liberating humanity from factors restricting these freedoms and in addition to empower human beings to evaluate and critique established belief systems and status quo. Islam challenged the existing norms and the belief systems of the time by appealing to human intuition and reason. This standard of critical examination was extended to its own teachings by verses that encouraged the initial community of Arabia to evaluate the content of the Quran. The appeal and success of Islam was squarely due to its being in tune with human intuition and reason. As such the religion Islam in this respect is subordinate to the existential facet of growth and therefore the debate of what level of freedoms Islam allows is a redundant debate. The restrictions placed on the freedom of expression by the Sharia is no more than human intervention similar to the restriction applied by modern states in order to ensure state security and prevention of disorder among other things. Such restrictions are time bound and are open to revisions with the change of context; they are not immutable or eternal. Similarly, the lack of right to offend others in the process of critique is assured by human nobility primarily, and subsequently, echoed by Islam. In areas of freedom of thought and the level of freedom of expression religion merely reinforces what is already known intuitively and attested to rationally. With this it is inconceivable that there should be an unquestionable sacred space within religion that restricts freedom of thought be it in the form of teachings contained within primary religious sources or their subsequent interpretations. More obviously there cannot be eternal law within Sharia that restricts the right of expression in the form of the laws of apostacy and blasphemy.

Freedom of intellectual expression has become a central topic in the modern era, being thoroughly examined within religious discourses and tackled by jurists under the heading ‘books of misguidance’ (kutub al-ḍalāl). An examination of the jurisprudential literature will lead us to the following observations: 1. The concept of misguidance is extremely ambiguous and was frequently utilised as a means of character assassination. Apart from a few examples, no one coined for this concept a clear and precise meaning through which it’s instances could be understood. Are books of blasphemy and other religions books of misguidance? What about books of certain denominations? Or books of mockery and poems against religion? Or books that oppose Truth? If so, which truth is intended? Is it all truths within religion or a specific part of a doctrine? Some jurists even consider books that are true to be books of misguidance if they lead to the misguidance of people, such as the books of mystics! More problematic than this is the lack of differentiation between the right of ijtihād and ingenuity in religious thought, and the concept of misguidance and innovation. 2. It becomes clear that the Qur’an does not speak directly about this issue. Rather it refers to generic concepts, such as the prohibition of misguiding people or the prohibition on helping others in sin. However, the jurists have attempted to apply these generic concepts on specific instances and as a result of this many errors and confusion have been made. What is quite shocking is that no primary textual evidence, with the exception of four traditions, three of them which are weak, can be found from the Prophetic traditions. Even these traditions that exist don’t support the idea of removing individual freedom. In addition, opposing evidences can be found within the hadith and historic literature that strengthen the notion that the state should not interfere in silencing different opinions. 3. Rational proofs have been the main type of evidence used by jurists. These were then employed contextually to help deal with deviant thought. There is no religious command found in the scripture that specifies a specific method of how to tackle falsehood. This gives us the space to come to a reasonable solution that does not result in taking away intellectual freedom. A comprehensive reading on this subject concludes that whilst the law gives importance on protecting religious values it has not described for us specific measures that we can use in countering devious thought. This entails that we have been left free to employ measures that are rational and in accordance with the changes of time and place.

Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) in his Fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-Islām wa al-zanadaqa, offers one way as to how one navigates intra-Muslim disagreements on doctrinal issues. The question is whether Ghazālī offers some insight into how we can discuss freedom of speech from within Islamic parameters. Would a Ghazālian reading create some space for how one can hold strong views that are antithetical to the views of other individuals but yet still be part of one faith community. If there is space for legitimate disagreement within a single faith community, what insights does Ghazālī offer for multi-religious and politically plural communities? The idea of free speech is an essential element of cultures that aspire form of liberty and freedom in some form of liberal, socialist or any kind of democratic formation. Muslims find themselves in Western and in non-Western societies where this element of open and free conversation about difficult topics is a requirement of public discourse. Given the secular nature of liberalism and socialism, all topics including religious claims and beliefs are subject to public debate. Critique of religion or the challenge to religious pieties and symbols are part of such public discourse in democracies that foster free speech. The Muslim tradition (turāth) is embedded in a culture of obligation and duty rather than freedom. The idea of freedom is also different in multiple polities and is always subject to higher norms of duty and obligation. Freedom is not absolute but an aspirational goal, mediated by political and social realities. Often times, Muslim advocates make claims that the historical tradition allows for untrammeled freedom of expression and speech. This is not always accurate. There are certain boundaries and limits of expressing opinion historically such as the reverence for the Prophet of Islam, the sanctity of the Scripture, the sanctity of the imāms in the Shīʿī tradition, the honor of Companions for the Sunnīs, as well as for the founders of the law schools and other personages. Any free speech directed at some of these figures can generate charges of insult and blasphemy. Free speech in Muslim discourse is always trumped by some higher interests and principles. My paper will elucidate and discuss some of the issues drawing on the writings of Ghazālī.

Like the overwhelming majority of instances of freedoms and rights, freedom of expression is not a categorical right. It can be restricted by some qualifications including hate speech. Some Human Rights documents, including article 7 of the International Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Paragraph c of article 3 of the Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide(1948), article 4 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and article 20 of International Covenant on Civil and Political rights(1966), prohibit and/or necessitate criminalization of hate speech. Hate speech is not formally defined in the literature of Human Rights. However, it is understood as any kind of communication in speech, writing or behavior, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are; in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, color, descent, gender or other identity factors. (United Nations Strategy and Plan of action on Hate Speech). Some national legal systems are not open to limit freedom of speech by hate speech because it is potentially capable of jeopardizing freedom of speech. Islamic teachings seem to be in line with the permissibility of excluding hate speech from freedom of expression. Beyond Islamic justification for the inherent value of freedom, Islam values freedom of expression due to its fundamental role in truth discovery. Hate speech in many cases does not help truth to be realized, recognized and expanded. Instead, it develops enmity and even atrocity in human relationships which in their turn result in hiding truth. Moreover, due to some recognized values in Islamic value system like equality, peace, promotion of common good through communication and education, tolerance and moderation I will argue that Islamic teachings not only welcome exclusion of hate speech from freedom of expression, but also necessitate it. As long as hate speech concerns religious issues, it is prohibited when it raises hatred between followers of any faith and religion. This means that a Muslim can expect respect for his/her religious opinions when he/she respects other religions and faiths. Commitment to this approach necessitates some religious teachings and public customs and ceremonies of different faiths including Shiite Muslims to be reread and revised. The article, however, insists that hate speech should be distinguished from scholarly critique and qualification of freedom of speech should be along with a high level of sensibility, precision and precaution. This means that every single qualification of freedom of speech is only allowed when it is quite necessary.

The concept of unadulterated free speech is regularly vilified within many Muslim circles in the UK. Free speech is often perceived as a clarion call of apologists for racists defending the propagation of racism. The concurrent unwillingness of free speech advocates to acknowledge and reflect on their failure to win the hearts and minds of many sections of minority communities, provides a useful basis for this perception, and is rarely scrutinised. This paper seeks to highlight contradictions in the UK public space on issues related to British Muslims, by considering free speech considerations across a series of case studies: 1. The government’s Prevent policy, which has become a duty for specified public institutions. 2. The response to the definition of Islamophobia and the definition of anti-Semitism. 3. The advocacy of conservative practices. 4. Racism and lack of diversity within mainstream media. This paper will argue that a consistent approach to free speech, supporting and strengthening the speech of minority communities, is necessary for a healthy democracy, and a pre-requisite for more challenging free speech arguments to gain traction.

This presentation will review recent calls within the UK for government-backed definitions of Islamophobia, while considering the unanticipated consequences of such proposals, as well as the convergence of the discussion around defining antisemitism with defining anti-Muslim racism. I focus on the definition of Islamophobia which is being proposed for adoption by government and a range of civil society organisations, and compare and contrast that definition with other ways of understanding anti-Muslim racism. To the extent that a definition of Islamophobia will fail to address the government’s role in propagating Islamophobia through ill-considered legislation that conflates Islamist discourse with hate speech, the proposal for a government-backed definition of Islamophobia should not be regarded favourably. We can also learn from the lessons of the negative effects of the government's adoption of the IHRA definition of antisemitism. Alongside opposing government attempts to define Islamophobia (and Islam), I argue that advocacy efforts should instead focus on disambiguating government counter-terrorism initiatives from the government management of controversies within Islam.