We talk to Shahin Vallee, former economics advisor to Emmanuel Macron, about the state of the Macron presidency: from the gilets jaunes to the pensions protests, from dealing with Merkel to facing off with Putin, and from now to the next presidential election in 2022. Did Macron save the centre of French politics or has he destroyed it? Can he really be sure he'll beat Le Pen next time? And what is his plan to rescue the West? Plus, we discuss what the Griveaux and Mila affairs tell us about the state of French politics. With Helen Thompson.Talking Points:How should we relate the gilets jaunes and the pensions protests? The pensions reform is a more traditional opposition to neoliberal reforms; the gilets jaunes is different and it includes a number of people who do not regularly express themselves politically.The gilets jaunes crystallize a more profound opposition to the French political system.Macron has centralized the French system to a remarkable extent.This is in part because of the collapse of the main parties.But Macron’s majority is composed of people with a limited power base. What you have is a presidential system with a weak cohort of parliamentarians. Macron has also empowered the technocrats.Macron’s claim to competence was that he was going to get reforms done.But the way he won power made it hard to achieve economic reform.Macron forgot the importance of the unions in mediating public opinion.Before Macron’s presidency, the hope was that France could get its house in order in exchange for favours from the EU.But there wasn’t much reason to believe that Europe would budge.Macron lacks a theory of change for Europe.Macron initially presented himself as above political divides, but that didn’t last too long. He chose a right-wing prime minister and then made domestic policy choices that signaled that he was on the right.For example, he ended the State of Emergency law but then brought its provisions into standard legislation.Macron destroyed the centre and divided and conquered the left, but he does have competition from the right. In the next election, left wing voters might abstain rather than vote for Macron. Macron presented himself as order versus chaos. The risk is that he now looks like the source of chaos.Mentioned in this Episode: More on Macron’s Munich speechFurther Learning: Commentary on Macron’s Munich speech from the European Council on Foreign RelationsBackground on pension reform in FranceAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

We talk about two countries going through dramatic democratic change: Ireland, where Sinn Féin came top of the vote in last weekend's general election, and Italy, where the Sardines are the latest movement trying to shake up the system. What does the Irish vote tell us about the collapse of two party politics? Does Sinn Féin's success suggest that the party has changed or that the electorate has changed? And in Italy, who or what now stands between Salvini and power? Plus we discuss whether the age of 'grand coalition' politics is now over. With Niamh Gallagher, Lucia Rubinelli and Chris Bickerton.Talking Points: In 1997 Sinn Féin got only 2% of the vote, in the recent Irish general election they got almost 25%. What explains this shift?In the 90s, the party was still connected to the IRA and the politics of Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin voters today skew young (under 45). Their major concerns are issues such as the cost of living, rent, and healthcare. The party ran and won on a leftist platform.The leadership has also changed. Gerry Adams stepped down in 2018. The new leader, Mary Lou McDonald is less connected to the past.The electoral system also makes a difference. Sinn Féin ‘won’ with 25% of the vote; Labour lost with 40%.Brexit did not feature heavily in this election, even though Leo Varadkar had a ‘good’ Brexit by most accounts.  Meanwhile, in Italy, movements and parties are again in turmoil. Is Five Star done?A movement has less institutional heft than a traditional political party. This is both their strength and their weakness. What about the Sardines? They started as a flash mob in Bologna and call themselves a ‘phenomenon,’ rather than a movement or a party. Their objective is to counter images in the media put forward by Salvini.Meanwhile, Salvini is still inching closer to power on his own. Are we seeing the end of grand coalition politics?Coalitions today tend to destroy one of the partners (for example, the Lib Dems).Sinn Féin certainly doesn’t want to be a junior partner, but it might want to prove that it can be a party of government. Mentioned in this Episode:The David McWilliams PodcastNiamh’s book, Ireland and the Great WarFurther Learning: A profile of the Irish political partiesMore on the SardinesDavid’s lecture, Democracy for Young PeopleAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

We try to peer through the chaos in Iowa to see who won, who lost and what it means for the future of this presidential race and for American democracy. Are we heading towards a Bernie vs Bloomberg showdown? What might happen at a brokered convention? And how much damage has been done to the Democratic party brand? Plus we review Trump's State of the Union address. Great theatre - but was it great politics? With Helen Thompson and Gary Gerstle.There were no winners in Iowa. We still don’t know who actually won.Pete didn’t do well enough to break out. Bernie did well, but not as well as many people thought he would. Warren had a mediocre showing. It was really bad for Biden. It was also a bad night for the Democratic Party itself. Who benefits from Biden’s collapse?Can Mayor Pete hold the center? He would need to win New Hampshire and he probably won’t.Bloomberg is going all in with an unusual strategy: gambling on a brokered convention and focusing on TV spending and mayoral endorsements. His organizational strategy may be clear, but what is his substantive strategy?It looks like Sanders will win the fight for the left.But can he translate this momentum into votes.David thinks that the problem is that there still aren’t enough young people.All the craziness has distracted from the fact that turnout in Iowa was much lower than expected.The Democrats want to frame the election as order versus chaos, but that’s hard to do when the first thing you do is produce chaos.Meanwhile, Trump delivered a fairly conventional State of the Union, the economic numbers are good, and his poll numbers are up.Can Trump stay in order mode for long?Mentioned in this Episode:Democracy for Realists by Christopher Achen and Larry BartelsFurther Learning: The Iowa resultsDavid’s lecture on Democracy for Young PeopleMore on the (absolutely wild) 1924 Democratic Convention And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

We talk to Roberto Foa about some of the findings in his groundbreaking new report 'Global Satisfaction with Democracy'. Where are people most dissatisfied with democracy and why? Is it being driven by economic factors or is something else going on? And why does democratic satisfaction divide Europe north/south and east/west? Plus we talk about what might happen to satisfaction with democracy in the UK post-Brexit. With Helen Thompson.Talking Points: Dissatisfaction with democracy is up by about ten percentage points worldwide.Northern Europe is more satisfied with democracy than Southern Europe.Perhaps more surprising, Eastern Europe is more satisfied with democracy than Western Europe.There has been a meltdown of satisfaction in Southern Europe since the start of the Eurozone crisis. But in Germany, satisfaction levels went up after the crisis.The internal story is more complicated: the German system was responsive to the interests of German banks, but not German savers. Backlash led to the rise of the AfD.The Eurozone constrains the ability of some governments to be responsive to popular demands.Satisfaction with democracy is not the same as belief in liberal democratic principles.People living under populist leaders, for example, in Hungary, report rising satisfaction.The majority is happy but minorities are being oppressed. Satisfaction also rose after the pink tide in Latin America, when popular lefist governments came to power.Is satisfaction a good proxy for democratic health?It can tell us something about the legitimacy of the political system: sustained dissatisfaction appears to be a harbinger of democratic failure.The new report focuses on trends from the mid-1990s to the present day. But what if the 90s are the real outlier? Is this ‘decline’ actually a return to the norm?The biggest concern in the 90s was that too much democracy leads to inflation. But the technocratic systems that emerged in this era are less responsive and create inequality.Mentioned in this Episode: Read the full report hereRoberto and Yascha Mounk’s piece on the report for The AtlanticFurther Learning:From the TP archive… Italy vs. EuropeDavid on How Democracy EndsMore on the Centre for the Future of Democracy and the new reportAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

David and Helen talk to Shashank Joshi, Defence Editor at the Economist, about the fallout from the killing of Soleimani and the future of American power. Is Trump a madman or is he a realist (or is he neither)? What sort of threat does Iran pose to American interests in the region and the wider world? And what has all this got to do with oil and climate change? Plus, in the week Trump's impeachment trial gets underway, we ask who or what can limit the power of the presidency.Talking Points: The narrative on the killing of Soleimani has changed: was this a victory for the United States?The shooting down of the Ukranian plane has put the Iranian leadership on the back foot and constrained their ability to weaponise the outrage against the United States.But when the dust settles, it might not play to America’s advantage.The Quds Force will carry on.There is a tension between the need to reassert American power in the region and the problem of Iraq.The Americans may be more disliked in Iraq now than the Iranians.The Americans are playing with a handicap; the Iraqi political class shields Iran, but not the U.S.Iran will always be in the region; America won’t be there forever. If the U.S. does withdraw, the Chinese and the Russians will get more involved. Trump wants to get out, but the collapse of the Iran Deal is pulling him back in.This is not unfamiliar: Obama wanted to pivot to Asia and get out of the Middle East, but he couldn’t do it.Americans have been obsessed with the Persian Gulf for decades.Executive power vs. American power: which one dominates?Executive power enables this kind of American power. Bush, Clinton, and Obama have all increased executive power.A key difference is that in the Trump administration there are fewer checks on the use of this power within the executive branch. Mentioned in this Episode: Helen’s piece in The New Statesman. The William Barr profile in The New YorkerThe Atlantic on ObamaThe Macron interview with The EconomistThe Economist briefing on aircraft carriersThe 2017 National Security Strategy And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

An extra episode with Azeem Azhar, tech entrepreneur and host of the Exponential View podcast and newsletter. We talk about Azeem's predictions for what will shape politics and technology over the next decade, from climate change to artificial intelligence. Plus we discuss the Dominic Cummings agenda: will the UK government really be able to harness the dynamism of the tech start-up mindset within the hidebound structures of Whitehall? This is the first of a two part special - you can find the other half of this conversation in a couple of days at https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/exponential-view-with-azeem-azhar/id1172218725 Azeem's newsletter is here: https://www.exponentialview.co/ and the blog by Dominic cummings here: https://dominiccummings.com/

We are back for 2020 to talk about Labour's future after Corbyn. How can the party move the argument beyond Brexit? Does the voting system help or hinder Labour's chances of returning to power? And what to do about Scotland? Plus, we ask how much damage would be done if the next leader turns out to be the only man in the field. With Helen Thompson, Chris Brooke and Chris Bickerton.Talking Points: Electoral Reform seems to be a perennial issue for the Labour Party.Starmer says he wants to win a majority—but it’s hard to see how. Would electoral reform get Labour any closer to winning? In 1987, Tony Blair pointed out that there is a real risk of collapse for centre-left parties under proportional representation systems.We often think of alliance politics as being anti-Tory, but look at 2010: sometimes it works the other way.First Past the Post keeps Labour in place as the only alternative government.Is England a broadly conservative country or an anti-conservative country whose electoral system doesn’t reflect society?It’s hard to know—there does seem to be a core conservative voting bloc. One reason that pessimism isn’t evenly distributed in the Labour party despite the defeat is that people think the biggest problem was fighting an election with an unpopular leader.Corbyn and Brexit may have been sufficient conditions for a Labour defeat.Would Labour fare better with a different leader?The generational divide poses a challenge—how can Labour appeal to over 65’s without alienating young people.The leadership election appears to be Keir Starmer’s to lose.Will the fact that he’s facing three women be a problem?Rebecca Long-Bailey has a lot of prominent support, but she’s not a great media performer.Mentioned in this Episode:Tony Blair for The New Statesman in 1987Daniel Finkelstein’s column on Keir StarmerThe YouGov poll on the next Labour leaderThe 2019 election, broken down by ageFurther Learning: David’s lecture on the generational divide in politicsOur YouTube video on Labour leadershipAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

 In the final episode of our American Histories series, Sarah Churchwell tells the incredible story of the politics of abortion during the 1970s. How did evangelicals go from supporting abortion to being its die-hard opponents, what did the switch have to do with the politics of race and what have been the lasting consequences for American democracy?Talking Points: A lot of people think that the U.S. abortion debate started in 1973 with Roe v. Wade, and that evangelical republicans have always been anti-abortion. Both assumptions are wrong.There weren’t many laws against abortion in the United States until after the Civil War. After the Civil War there were large waves of migration. This led to a rise of nativism. Many early abortion laws were rooted in scientific racism and anxieties over ‘race suicide.’Initially, the Democrats pandered to the Catholics by taking on a more pro-life position.Evangelicals were not particularly politically active (with a brief exception in the 1920s and 30s). Republicans wanted to change this.Roe v. Wade was fought on a right to privacy issue. Abortion was seen as a thing that white, middle class people did in their home.Evangelical Christian magazines, even in the years immediately after Roe, tended to characterize abortion as a question of indiivdual health, family welfare, and social responsibility. Yet by 1978, this had completely flipped. What happened?After Brown v. Board desegregated schools, a bunch of white Christians created whites-only Christian academies and claimed tax-exempt status. Anxiety about the federal government interfering in Christian life got caught up in itself. Abortion for many became a proxy issue: it was easier (and more politically acceptable) to oppose abortion than integration.Today the battlelines feel entrenched and we could be moving towards the repeal of Roe v. Wade.But these are not immutable dividing lines in American politics. This doesn’t mean that abortion isn’t extremely important to many evangelicals: it is. But it’s important to recognize the contingency in what questions are politically central. Further Learning: Sue Halpern on how Republicans became anti-choiceMore on the origins of the religious rightNPR ‘Throughline’ podcast issue on evangelicals and abortionAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

Gary Gerstle explores the forgotten history of Mexican deportations from the southern United States in the 1930's and asks how it fits into the longer story of US immigration policy up until today. From open borders to 'Build That Wall': what's next?Talking Points: Immigrant labour has always been vital to U.S. economic development.The United States presented itself as being a different kind of society. This was partially ideological, and partially a labour imperative.In the early 20th century, the labour imperative became less acute. America still thought of itself as a Protestant society.In this period, the United States implemented draconian immigration restrictions, including racialized quotas.The fear of revolutionary organized labour also affected quotas. The Jews and the Italians were targeted due to anxiety over communism and anarchism.Immigration from Mexico has always been a slightly different story.The restrictive immigration laws of the 1920s excluded the western hemisphere. Mexicans were still coming in large numbers because agricultural corporate interests needed Mexican migrant labour. But because this was land-based immigration, there was more flow back and forth. Much of this migration was temporary, or at least the powers that be thought that it could be.In the 1930s, over 500,000 Mexicans were deported, mostly by state and local governments.This was mass expulsion with little due process.The idea was that Meixcan labour was driving down wages; but the forces at work were much greater than immigration, and deportation didn’t solve the agricultural crisis.The ongoing need for labour led to the creation of the first guest workers’ program in the 1940s (the Bracero Program). The United States was still treating Mexico as a controllable surplus labour pool, but there has always been seepage.In the 1960s, the immigration system was overhauled again to make things more egalitarian: but this disadvantaged Mexicans.There’s another key overhaul in the 1980s to allow for the right to asylum. If Trumpism continues, these laws will likely be reversed.Further Learning: America’s forgotten history of Mexican-American ‘Repatriation’More on illegal deportations in American historyThe archives of the Bracero program, the first Mexican guest workers systemAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

Sarah Churchwell tells the tortured history of the campaign to secure votes for women and how it was tied up with another campaign to suppress votes for black Americans. From the 15th amendment in 1870 to the 19th amendment in 1920: why the promise of enfranchisement is often not what it seems.Talking Points: The struggle for votes for women and votes for black people have been linked from the beginning.Some activists wanted to do both at once, but slavery was deemed more urgent. Of course, in practice, white lawmakers soon stripped the 15th amendment of its practical power by passing laws such as poll taxes and grandfather clauses.Many suffragettes believed that if they supported the 15th amendment, Republicans would turn around and recognize their claims, and that black legislators in particular would argue for rights for women.It didn’t work out that way.Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Antony felt that they had been betrayed by the Republican cause.The 19th amendment is explicitly modeled on the 15th amendment.But it passes in part because people are convinced (correctly in the short term) that it won’t lead to the enforcement of the 15th amendment.Another thing that happens in this moment is the 18th amendment, or prohibition. Temperance was extremely important to many politically active women at the time.At the time, women had no rights within marriage, and no redress against domestic violence or poverty.But it was also about nativism. Drinking was associated with certain immigrant cultures, especially catholic cultures. Temperance gains traction in part as a way of criminalizing suspicious foreign conduct.Further Learning:How racism almost killed women’s right to voteBrent Staples op ed on the rift between white and black women going back to the suffrage fightsInterview with Lori Ginzberg in NPR about her biography of Elizabeth Cady StantonMore on African American women and voting rightsAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking