David talks to the historian Richard Evans about the history of cholera epidemics in the 19th century and what they can teach us for today. How did contemporaries understand the spread of the disease? What impact did it have on growing demands for democracy? And who tended to get the blame - foreigners, doctors or politicians? Plus we discuss whether the political changes being driven by the currentpandemic are likely to outlast the disease itself.Talking Points: Massive epidemics are a normal part of human history, even if they are infrequent.You can see this with the Plague, syphilis, and, in the 19th century, cholera.Cholera hit Europe in the beginning of the 1830s, and like many epidemic diseases, it was spread through increased communications.The conquest of North India opened up trade routes, and that’s how cholera traveled.The terrifying thing was the death rate: it was 50%, much much higher than coronavirus. When cholera hit, the response was heavily shaped by knowledge of the plague.‘Quarantine’ comes from 40 days, which is the period of isolation that the medieval Venetians imposed on incoming ships.It took a long time for people to realize that cholera spread through water.Cholera struck the poor. The wealthy lived on higher ground. This led to a lot of moralizing around the disease.Cholera spread through trade. Measures to stop it would also affect trade.Merchants in cities such as Hamburg suppressed the news of the spread of cholera because they were worried about the economic consequences.This is also a period of medicalisation. Doctors go from being on the front lines, politically, to being more or less neutral.What is the relationship between pandemics and xenophobia?The Hamburg cholera epidemic of the late 19th century was clearly brought by migrants, but it didn’t lead to a significant xenophobic or anti-semitic backlash.But in earlier epidemics, this was not the case. For example, conspiracy theories about The Plague led to mass pogroms of Jews.The widespread disease can trigger the possibility of social and political change.In Britain, the spread of cholera led to widespread criticism of the government. But a lot of the impetus for reform was short lived and died away until the next epidemic.The impact of cholera was differential because of wealth. Coronavirus seems to strike the old.The vulnerability of the old is medical.Yet this virus still sparks conspiracy theories.One of the main reasons for serious epidemics is the breakdown of the state, for example, Haiti in 2010.Mentioned in this Episode:Richard’s book, Death in Hamburg: Society and Politics in the Cholera Years, 1830-1910 Richard for The Guardian about the public consequences of epidemic diseasesLucia tells TP about the view from ItalyFurther Learning: Richard’s interview with the New Yorker’s Isaac Chotiner on pandemicsRichard’s lecture about state responsibility and...

This week we try to assess whether the Covid-19 pandemic is driving the world together or pushing it further apart. From US-Chinarelations to tensions within the EU, we discuss how coronavirus is exacerbating existing tensions and how it might overcome them. Are we going to see new forms of international co-operation? What does it mean for globalisation? And is the politics of competence making a comeback? With Helen Thomson and Hans Kundnani from Chatham House.Talking Points:The crucial issue between the US and China right now is supply chains. A huge percentage of antibiotics used in the US involve supply chains that include China. Helen thinks it’s unlikely that we will continue to live in a world in which the production of pharmaceuticals is so integrated.Will interdependence push towards cooperation or conflict?Two big things have changed since 2008: Trump is in the White House, and central relationships (US-China, US-Europe) have deteriorated.There are different degrees of globalization. There is, for example, a more moderate version, and what Dani Rodrik calls ‘hyper-globalization.’If you think of globalization as consisting of movement of goods, capital, and people, you might have different degrees in all three areas.The thing that’s come to a sudden stop in this crisis is the movement of people.China does have a dollar problem. Right now, the Fed has provided swap lines to a number of states, but not the Chinese Central Bank.At the moment there’s no need for it to do so.But this crisis may have opened up a possibility that wasn’t a possibility a month ago.Could that then become a problem for the United States? You would need to think more about exchange rate cooperation.Does Europe need to pick a side between the US and China? We were already moving in this direction already; look at the battles over 5G.The more competition there is over supply chains, the more European countries will have to choose.Transatlantic rifts tend to become intra-European rifts as well.The current crisis is an emphatic demonstration that, in the Eurozone, the coercive power of states remains the prerogative of member states. Different states use power differently. Orban is willing to go much further, for example.If some EU states deal more effectively with this than others, what happens to freedom of movement?Mentioned in this Episode: The Globalization Paradox by Dani RodrikHans’ book, The Paradox of German PowerFurther Learning:Hans’ piece for the Observer, ‘Can a nation be both open and in control? The UK is about to find out.’ The FT on Peter Navarro’s remarks about supply chains and bringing home manufacturingOur most recent episode with Adam ToozeAnd as ever recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

David talks to Lucia Rubinelli, who is locked down in Northern Italy, about what life is like there and what politics is like too. Do people still have faith in the government? What do they think of the British approach? How have attitudes to China switched in recent weeks? Plus: whatever happened to Salvini? More from Lucia soon.

We catch up with Adam on the latest twists in the crisis: from the ECB's change of heart to new threats in emerging markets. What is happening in Germany? How vulnerable is the UK? Can anything shake the hold of the almighty dollar? Much more in the weeks to come.

We talk to Adam Tooze in New York about the possible impact of coronavirus on the global financial and political system. How does this crisis compare to the financial crisis of 2008? What are the implications for the future of the Eurozone? And what have we learned already about the shift in power from the US to China? Plus we talk to Helen Thompson in London about how it intersects with the oil price war between Saudi Arabia and Russia. The first of a series of conversations about the biggest event of our times. **Updated overnight**Talking Points: This crisis has revealed the fundamental weakness in the Eurozone. Lagarde’s initial comments re-exposed this fundamental faultline. The central question facing the ECB is ‘what is its role with regard to spreads?’ But over the course of the day, the panic in the markets seems to have led Frankfurt to reevaluate: they’ve come forward with a remarkable bond buying program steered towards buying both sovereign bonds and corporate debt.The ECB is now saying that it will lift caps if necessary. This is an effort to take the sovereign risk for the Italians out of the equation and also relieve pressure on the French and the Spanish. The fundamental weakness in the Eurozone is one of the continuities, but no one really expected it to be exposed.Italy wasn’t a causal driver of the crisis of 07/08, but it became collateral damage. It has not recovered. That failure is being exposed.There are also novel elements, for example, the explosion of corporate debt since 2008. The Eurozone banks aren’t in great shape, but it’s better than ‘07/’08. The question is whether the Eurozone has the stomach for another round of collective efforts.The inequities in the US health system are severe and will be exposed in this crisis.The current crisis is happening on a much shorter timescale than ‘07/’08.The impact on working life has been even more rapid.The spread of this disease from China is not unusual but the ability of the Chinese government to bend this curve so quickly signals the power of state capacity.Beijing’s fiscal and monetary stimulus in ‘08/09 should have been a wake up call. This was a key turning point.What happened to oil prices? OPEC Plus broke down, in particular, the relationship between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The big question is the politics: the US shale industry can’t cope with prices this low. A lot of things that have been destabilizing over the last decade are crashing into each other right now.Mentioned in this Episode: Adam talks about Crashed with David and Helen (full transcript)Lagarde’s second statementFurther Learning: More on the recently announced ECB bond buying program from the FTAdam on Europe (from January)Adam on the global shutdown Lucia’s piece for the New York Times on Italy and bond spreads

A special extra episode with Rachel Bronson, president of The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, about their decision to move the Doomsday Clock 20 seconds nearer to midnight, closer that it's ever been. She explains why the world is more dangerous now than even at the height of the Cold War and what are the risks that keep her awake at night. How close really are we to the end? Scary but essentiallistening. Recorded at the Cambridge Centre for the Study of Existential Risk.Extra listening: Aaron Rapport on Nuclear Weapons https://play.acast.com/s/talkingpolitics/db9732a4-8e39-4f8f-bb30-cf6f862036cf 

We talk to David Spiegelhalter, Professor of the Public Understanding of Risk, about the science of forecasting. Who or what are the superforecasters? How can they help governments make better decisions? And will intelligent machines ever be able to outdo the humans at seeing into the future?  From Cummings to coronavirus, a conversation about the knowns, unknowns and what lies beyond that.Talking Points: Tetlock discovered that some people make better predictions than others.Some of the qualities that make this possible are deeply human, such as doggedness, determinedness, and openness to new information, but others are mathematical. Superforecasters are highly numerate: they have a sense of magnitude.Good superforecasters isolate themselves emotionally from the problem: you have to be cold about it. Think about George Soros shorting the pound. There’s a difference between having more superforecasting and more superforecasters. How do you integrate people like this into existing institutions?These people are often disruptive. Probabilistic information is finely grained: what does this mean for political decision making?Superforecasters aren’t decision makers: they give you the odds. But they are better than the betting markets.Betting markets reflect what people would like to happen rather than what they should think will happen. They aren’t cold enough.Tetlock’s book places a huge emphasis on human characteristics. Algorithms can do superforecasting only in repetitive, data rich restrictive problemsTetlockian problems are much more complex. People often make a category error when they think about what AI can do. Mentioned in this Episode: Superforecasting, by Philip Tetlock and Dan GardnerDavid’s book, The Art of StatisticsRadical Uncertainty by Mervyn King and John KayThe Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas TalebRisky Talk, David’s podcastFurther Learning: Philip Tetlock’s lunch with the FTDominic Cumming’s review of SuperforecastingAre you a fox or a hedgehog?And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

A special live edition recorded on the morning after Super Tuesday: we try to make sense of where the Democratic race now stands. How did Biden pull it off? Is there a path back for Sanders? And what role was Obama playing behind the scenes? Plus we ask which strategy now makes sense for the general election and whether Trump has got the candidate he wants or the one he fears. With Helen Thompson and Gary Gerstle, recorded at the McCrum Lecture Theatre in Cambridge.Talking PointsBiden, the comeback kid, is now the overwhelming favourite to be the Democratic nominee.Bernie has attracted more young people and Latinos, but does his coalition have a ceiling? Biden’s coalition seems to be bigger than Bernie’s. Turnout was up—for him.People were too quick to write off Biden. He was always going to do well with African Americans in the South.Party discipline kicked in: did the Democrats learn from what the Republicans failed to do with Trump?What was going on behind the scenes? And what has Obama been up to?  There will be bloodletting on the left. If all of Warren’s votes had gone to Bernie, he would have won more states. But Warren is a different kind of candidate than Bernie and her coalition includes a lot of college educated voters who may choose Biden over Bernie. What’s next for Biden?All eyes will be on his VP pick.His campaign was phenomenally weak for a leading candidate. He’s going to get more staff, more money, and more endorsements.Biden’s path to victory runs through suburbanites who can’t stomach voting for Trump, bue he’s also going to have to appeal to the left of the party. Trump does well against establishment politicians, but he also seems to fear Biden.The Hunter Biden story isn’t going away. Mentioned in this Episode:The real clear betting odds The full transcript of the New York Times’ Biden interviewThe Party Decides, by Marty Cohen, David Karol, Hans Noel, and John ZallerJames Carville on Elizabeth Warren, and a lot of other things for VoxCaroline Fraser’s article on Warren and the gender trap for the NYRBFurther Learning: A breakdown of the results from our friends at 538Gary’s guide to the history of monopolies in AmericaMore on Hunter BidenAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

David and Helen catch up on the state of British politics, from Blair's advice to the Labour party on its 120th birthday to growing divisions in Johnson's Tory party. Is there really a liberal progressive coalition in Britain? Can Brexit deliver both free trade and levelling up? And what does Cummings really want? Plus we talk about Helen's lecture on Britain, the EU and geopolitics: Listen here → http://bit.ly/3a25ByaOn the 120th anniversary of the Labour Party, Tony Blair gave a speech encouraging the Labour party to 1) Move away from identity politics 2) Rebuild a progressive-liberal coalition and 3) Work out a plausible account of the future. What is Blair’s interpretation of history? Blair never reimagines the political system itself. A lot of the more compelling visions of the future are coming from the parts of the Labour party that Blair disparages. Blair did not substantially discuss Brexit, but Brexit is the most pressing future questionCan the government really reconfigure the economy? Or is the government at the mercy of forces it cannot control?The UK will have to simultaneously negotiate trade deals with the US and the EU in a moment in which trade is becoming a more geopolitical question.  China has changed things—this is now part of the lens through which the US is thinking about both trade and its relationship with the EU.For the UK, using security as a bargaining chip is a risky strategy.How much leverage does Macron have in the trade negotiations? He’s sounding a lot like De Gaulle, who said no to the UK application to join the EEC. The overall geopolitical context is less advantageous to Europe, including the UK, than it was in the 1960s.Mentioned in this Episode: Helen’s Chatham House lectureTony Blair’s recent speechOur episode with Paul Mason on the futureOur episode with Esther DufloOur most recent episode on French politicsMacron’s interview with the EconomistAdam Tooze on the US vs. ChinaIf you’re in Cambridge next Wednesday, join us for a live recording the morning after the Super Tuesday primaries. Tickets available here.And as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking

A special live edition recorded in front of an audience in Cambridge: David talks to writer, broadcaster, academic and politician Michael Ignatieff about his personal experiences of democratic politics. From his bruising time as Liberal party leader in Canada to his recent confrontations with the Orban government in Hungary, from climate change to populism, from Johnson to Trump, we discuss what's happened to democracy and where he sees the grounds for hope. A wide-ranging conversation about the good and the bad of contemporary politics.Mentioned in this Episode: Michael’s book, Fire and Ashes, Success and Failure in PoliticsOur episode with Roberto Foa on his new report on global satisfaction with democracy Max Weber’s essay, “Politics as a Vocation”Isaiah Berlin, The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and their HistoryFurther Learning:More on Orban and the Central European UniversityMore on the Centre for the Future of DemocracyDavid’s book on political hypocrisyHow wealthy countries export their wasteAnd as ever, recommended reading curated by our friends at the LRB can be found here: lrb.co.uk/talking