In Moscow's Shadows

There may be a little schadenfreude as America abandons Afghanistan and the Taliban sweep into Kabul, but Moscow is worried, above all about the country's three traditions exports: terror, refugees and opium.The fate of the Afghan regime - and the way the 1991 August Coup caught the West by surprise - are also reminders of the problems in trying to predict the future...especially when it comes to Russia.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

The Kremlin's evolving stance on the Communist Party raises questions about its role as an opposition force. Internal tensions and external pressures challenge the party's political effectiveness. Meanwhile, new leftist coalitions present alternatives for disillusioned voters, hinting at potential unrest. Occultism and mysticism weave their way into Russian politics, with psychic influencers increasingly affecting narratives. This unique blend of ideology and mysticism adds depth to the understanding of contemporary political strategies.

Is PM Mikhail Mishustin thinking long-term? His vision for Russia seems to be technocratic, maybe even techno-authoritarian, but it is interesting - and maybe implicitly subversive.In the second half, I look at Russian-Ukrainian relations over the Donbas, public lunacy and private pragmatism. There's all kinds of silliness - including a case Moscow is taking to the European Court of Human Rights - but maybe the very tone actually reflects the resigned pragmatism new Donbas 'curator' Dmitry Kozak is bringing to freezing the conflict.The Fabian Burkhardt article I mention is here, and my previous podcast on Putin's Ukrainian article is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

Another short, single-segment episode, this time looking at 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,' Putin's latest venture into the role of amateur historian (available in English here). Equal parts history, polemic and paranoia, it says more about VVP's state of mind than anything else, in my opinion.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

A brief, single-segment podcast on the distinctive roles of sport for today's Kremlin. Not a topic that I'd usually expect to discuss...The journal article I mentioned on RT is ‘Russia isn’t a country of Putins!’: How RT bridged the credibility gap in Russian public diplomacy during the 2018 FIFA World Cup' by Rhys Crilley et al, here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

The main reasons for the annual ritual of Putin's Direct Line phone-in encounter with the Russian people is to allow him to present himself as the caring father of the nation, savvy chief executive and watchful tsar. However, there is also a less-understood dimension: how the Kremlin uses it to gauge the mood of the masses. If it leads to genuine concerns being addressed, even in the name of keeping an authoritarian kleptocracy in power, is that a bad thing?In the second part, I briefly draw some comparisons - differences but also similarities - between the Soviet and US/Coalition wars in Afghanistan.The Raam op Rusland article I mentioned is here. The podcast which talks about polling by the FSO is here. For more on my research on Afghanistan, the book of the PhD is Afghanistan - the Soviet Union's last war (Routledge)You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

The Geneva Summit: frankly, as good as one could expect, with Biden offering a shrewd carrot and stick - Russia can feel itself more like a great power, if it plays more by the rules. No step-change breakthrough, but a decent start.Worse news about the spread of COVID-19 in Russia, and again Putin and the government has gone AWOL, forcing Moscow mayor Sobyanin to take the lead. Why does this happen?The Baunov article I mentioned is here; you can also read something I wrote about the importance of emotions in handling Putin (I should take full credit for everything that went well in Geneva...) here and an encouraged after-action report by Anna Arutunyan here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

A bit of a grab-bag: what to make of the continuing crackdown in Russia, is there scope to undermine the cohesion of the security forces in Belarus, should HMS Defender be heading into the Black Sea, and, in the second half, thoughts about the upcoming Geneva Summit between Biden and Putin.The article by Josh Huminski I mention is here.You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

A spur-of-the-moment, off-the-top-of-my-head take on what's going (wr)on(g) in Belarus: the Russian connection or rather the absence of any evidence of one, Lukashenko's motivations, and above all what can be done. We need a strategy, a sense of what we want, and above all to realise that we cannot force change on Belarus but should rather help the Belarusian people generate it.The article by Leonid Ragozin I mention is here.  For a general take of mine from August of last year that I think still broadly holds up. see here.  On Vakulchik and general Belarusian security politics, I note a short cellcast of mine here.  You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show

Is the Russian Orthodox Church a spiritual community, a political institution, or a business empire? The truth of the matter is that it has become all three, and I toy with the idea that we should think of it as FGUP RosBog, Federal State Unitary Enterprise 'Russian God'...In the second half, I note that most of Russia's security chiefs are in their late 60s. Are they going to be allowed to leave when they hit the compulsory retirement age of 70, or will Putin seek to hold onto them? Either has distinct political implications.The other podcast episodes I mention are: on Naryshkin here, on Putin's reluctance to let people go here, and on Sergei Korolev here (see also this article) You can also follow my blog, In Moscow's Shadows, and become one of the podcast's supporting Patrons and gain question-asking rights and access to exclusive extra materials right here. Support the show