Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss: *The experimental and intellectual predecessors of FD 2030 *The frequency of structural change in the Marine Corps *General Neller's dislike of the term “near-peer” *Vertical vs. horizontal structural cuts within organizations *The removal of scout snipers from infantry battalions *His views on the debate on Force Design 2030  *Stand-in forces *The role of air, sea, and land access in FD 2030 *The general’s thoughts on the war in Ukraine and the future of war 

Amazon link to Richard's book: https://amzn.to/42bM9Lx In this episode, we discuss: *Where the idea of Soviet high commands came from *How they were structured *The commanders who led them *The role and influence of commissars in the high commands *The Soviet capture of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island *The high commands post-World War II *The relationship between Soviet naval forces and the high commands *What Richard found new and surprising in his research *What today’s military professionals can learn from studying the Soviet high commands *Which Soviet high commander Richard would like to see a book written about

-Dean’s experiences as a student at The Basic School (TBS) and Infantry Officer Course (IOC) -His time as a platoon commander and executive officer with 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines -Dean’s deployment to Afghanistan -How the enemy in Afghanistan differed from those in Iraq -Some of his leadership failures and successes -When people reach their breaking points on deployment -Serving with then-Capt Jonathan Frerichs -His advice for current and future platoon commanders on preparing for and winning in combat -Serving as a company executive officer (XO) and his advice for current and future XOs -Dean’s time as an instructor at TBS and IOC -What drew Dean to decision-forcing cases (DFCs) -Dean’s process of developing DFCs -His thoughts on teaching cases involving large formations to junior leaders and Marines -Some of the facilitation techniques he uses -Why he prefers DFC featuring large formations vs small units -His time as a company commander in 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines -His advice for company commanders for training in Hawaii -Serving with the Marine Detachment Fort Benning

*Where Dean’s interests in military matters come from *How well the Marine Corps excites and educates Marines in military history, specifically Marine Corps history *How to interest Marines in military history *What led Dean to join the Marine Corps and serve in the infantry *Where Dean first learned about the 9/11 attacks *Dean’s time serving at Marine Barracks Washington (MBW) *His advice to first-term infantry Marines at MBW *Dean’s time in 3/4 including the First Battle of Fallujah *His advice for team and squad leaders *Dean’s experiences with A/1/8 and fighting the Second Battle of Fallujah *Serving with Elliot Ackerman *Dean’s decision to stay in Iraq to rejoin 3/4 on its return deployment *Working with the Iraqi military *Seeing the war evolve over 20 months *What the best small unit leaders do

In this episode, we discuss: *Connor’s Marine Corps career before joining the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit *What his deployment was like prior to the HKIA mission *The training Connor received in preparation for HKIA *The organization of CLB 24 *Connor’s reaction to learning about the HKIA mission *His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at the airport *Connor’s first day at HKIA *His reaction to learning that the Marines were working with the Taliban *Processing evacuees and the challenges that arose therein *Running logistics for the evacuation *Leading Marines during the operation *The role Connor’s leaders played at HKIA *What Connor’s platoon was doing August 20-22, when the gates to the airport were closed *The bombing at Abbey Gate *Connor’s reaction to the death of Sergeant Nicole Gee *The operations of Connor’s unit before it departed HKIA *What Connor observed in his Marines after HKIA *His advice to future NCOs on talking with and supporting their Marines after a mission as intense as HKIA *The nations Connor served alongside at HKIA and how these interactions generally went *Connor’s experience returning to Camp Lejeune *Working with the State Department *The MEU’s Female Search Team *The effects of allowing Marines to keep their personal cell phones computers during the HKIA mission *The roles that discipline and exhaustion played in the evacuation *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission *The actions of Connor’s platoon and CLB 24 that he’s proudest of *The toughest decisions Connor made at HKIA *Where he thinks he excelled as a leader and decision maker and where he fell short *The lessons Connor learned from the mission *Connor’s thoughts on the experiences of Dustin Casey, his cousin, at HKIA *The one thing he wants Marines and other service members to know about CLB 24's actions at HKIA *Connor’s advice for Marines transitioning back to the civilian world Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021"

In this episode, we discuss:  *Bravo Company’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA  *Its training and preparation for the HKIA NEO  *The company’s reaction to hearing it would go to HKIA  *Nick’s understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA  *Bravo Company’s first day at HKIA *Its role in clearing the airfield of civilians  *The enemy fire 1/8 received *Nick’s reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist in the evacuation  *Bravo Company’s experience manning the North Gate  *The role of trust and intent in Bravo’s efforts at HKIA  *What the company was doing on 20-22 August  *The enemy threat at HKIA  *Bravo’s operations on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate bombing  *Bravo’s operations between 26 August and its departure from HKIA  *What Nick observed in himself and his Marines in the aftermath of the mission  *His advice to future leaders whose unit members have gone through something as horrific as the HKIA mission  *Nick’s homecoming to Camp Lejeune  *The friendly nation forces Bravo served alongside at HKIA  *The US Army elements Bravo worked with  *Bravo’s interactions with the State Department at HKIA  *The role of outside entities requesting special evacuations of personnel at HKIA  *Bravo’s interactions with the MEU’s Female Search Team  *The roles of discipline and exhaustion during the evacuation  *Those actions of Bravo Company that make Nick proudest  *The one thing Nick would like Marines and other service members to know about what Bravo Company did at HKIA  Links  US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021"

In this episode, we discuss: *What the Infantry Battalion-Experiment (IBX) is *Alpha Company’s structure and rank-billet requirements *How the company is supposed to conduct Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations *Grumbling from some of the enlisted leaders over the new rank-billet requirements *Lt Carreiro’s experience in A/1/2 so far including what’s surprised him most *What it’s like having Sgt fire team leaders and SSgt squad leaders *The expanded platoon and company headquarters elements *The rifle squads’ two-fire team construct *Advice for future platoon commanders who might serve in an IBX-like unit *Gunny Baker’s experiences in the company so far, including what it’s like being a platoon sergeant again *His advice for future gunny platoon sergeants *The data being collected on A/1/2 *The drones in A/1/2 *The Arms Room concept *Logistics in A/1/2 *The Infantry Marine Course *The criticism that the IBX, in its current form, is trying to replicate a Ranger battalion with a portion of the gear and none (or comparatively very little) of the training *How A/1/2 would have operated in places like Iraq or Afghanistan and in a counterinsurgency more generally *What's been most surprising about the new kinds of equipment the unit is using or has experimented with *A/1/2’s relationship with the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab *Some of the training exercises and experiments A/1/2 has conducted *The role of security clearances in the new technology available to A/1/2 *Where the company has failed *The role of PME in the company *Where IBX should go from here *How the war in Ukraine is influencing A/1/2 *The one thing each guest would like the audience to take from what they’re doing in Alpha Company and the IBX Links "2nd Marine Division | Infantry Battalion Experiment," Defense Flash News "2030 Infantry Battalions," Headquarters Marine Corps

In this episode, we discuss: *Dustin's deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training he received in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation there (NEO) *His reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA *His understanding of the situation at the airport before arriving  *A/1/8’s first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021 *The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8’s struggle to clear the airfield of civilians *Dustin's reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation  *A/1/8’s time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like *Dustin's squad, platoon, and company leadership leadership at HKIA *Some of the concepts and tools found in MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that A/1/8 used during the evacuation *A/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August *The VBIED threat at HKIA *What Dustin was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber *A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left HKIA *What Dustin observed in his fellow Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina *Working with the MEU's female search teams *The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations at HKIA *The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO *What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back through the North Gate *Working with other nations' armed forces and the US Army *Those actions of A/1/8 that make Dustin proudest *The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO *The one thing Dustin would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021"

In this episode, we discuss: *Alpha/1/8’s deployment prior to heading to Hamid Karzai International Airport (HKIA) including the training it did in preparation for the non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) *Sam’s reaction to the news that his company was heading to HKIA and how his Marines were informed *Sam’s use of TDGs set at HKIA in preparation of the NEO *His understanding of the situation on the ground before arriving at HKIA *A/1/8’s first day at HKIA, 14 August 2021 *The events of 15-16 August and A/1/8’s struggle to clear the airfield of civilians *Sam’s reaction to learning that the Taliban would assist with the evacuation and how he messaged this news to his Marines *The mental, moral, and physical state and morale of the company around this time *A/1/8’s time manning the North Gate and what gate operations looked like *Some of the concepts and tools from MCDP-1 and MCDP 1-3 that Sam used during the evacuation  *Alpha/1/8's operations at HKIA from 20-22 August *The VBIED threat at HKIA *What A/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day G/2/1 got hit by a suicide bomber *A/1/8's operations after the bombing and before it left the airport *What Sam observed in his Marines after leaving HKIA and his advice to leaders on helping their teammates deal with severe trauma *What it was like returning to Camp Lejeune, North Carolina *The effect that Marines' personal cell phones and access to social media had on operations at HKIA *The role of discipline in A/1/8's operations and how Sam and his leaders sought to maintain it *The role exhaustion played during the NEO and how A/1/8's leaders sought to overcome or mitigate it *A/1/8's logistics during the NEO *The most rewarding aspect of the NEO *What it was like watching Marines bring rejected civilians back out to the crowd *Those actions of Sam's Marines that make him proudest *The role and value of decision games in training and preparing for missions like the HKIA NEO *The Marine Corps History Division's interviews of BLT 1/8 Marines about HKIA *The one thing Sam would like Marines and other US service members to know about what A/1/8 did at HKIA Links US Central Command's "Findings and Recommendations—Attack Against U.S. Forces Conducting NEO at Hamid Karzai International Airport on 26 August 2021"

*The battalion commanders Clardy had as a company and field-grade officer and how they influenced him on how he views and practiced battalion command *What makes an ideal battalion commander. What makes a battalion commander from hell *The single most important thing battalion commanders do or should do for their unit *How Clardy’s time teaching at The Basic School and Infantry Officer Course influenced his preparations for and practice of battalion command *What a light armored reconnaissance (LAR) battalion is and how it differs from an infantry battalion *Clardy’s reaction to being selected for command of an LAR battalion *The steps he took to prepare for battalion command *Some of the inherent weaknesses of an LAR battalion and how he sought to overcome these *His advice to future LAR battalion commanders *His philosophy of command *What excited him most about being a battalion commander. What concerned him most *What the battalion commander’s relationship to the battalion’s staff sections should be *Clardy's professional military education efforts within the battalion *The one thing he wish he had known about his battalion before his assumed command of it *His efforts in preparing his battalion for Operation Iraqi Freedom-I (OIF-I) *A deep dive into the battalion's operations during OIF-I, including its role in Task Force Tripoli *Clardy's experiences commanding Regimental Combat Team-2, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Command, and 3rd Marine Division *Characteristics of the best and worst battalions he’s seen *His thoughts on Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluations and Integrated Training Exercises *Common mistakes he's seen new battalion commanders make *What battalion command might look like in the context of Force Design 2030 Links Common Sense Training: A Working Philosophy for Leaders by LtGen Arthur S. Collins Jr. Company Command: The Bottom Line by Major General John G. Meyer and Major Spencer Beatty  Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by Bernard E. Trainor and Michael R. Gordon