Controversy & Clarity

In this episode, we discuss: *Col Glantz’s Vietnam service *How his experiences in Vietnam influenced him as a military historian and researcher *What led him to study the Nazi-Soviet War *The Army’s Art of War Symposia from 1984-1987   *How the Soviet Army and US Army defined doctrine (move???)   *The case for an operational level of war   *The introduction of the operational level of war to US Army doctrine   *The origins of the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine   *The 11 January 1976 Incident   *The evolution of Soviet operational mobile groups, tank corps, tank armies, and mechanized corps *The concept of lessons learned and Col Glantz’s critique of it   *The Soviet approach to lessons learned, including the practice of Socialist Criticism *The effect Stalin’s purges on the officer corps had on the Soviet military’s performance in World War II   *Col Glantz’s thoughts on why the Soviets didn’t march on Berlin in February 1945   *Comparing and Contrasting Zhukov and Rokossovsky   *How and why Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, failed   *Turning points of the Eastern Front   *Forgotten battles of the war   *Major myths of the war   *Correlation of forces   *Initiative and risk-taking in the Red Army   *Improvements in Soviet training   *German and Soviet penal battalions   *The work of Jack Radey and Charles Sharp   *Notable Soviet and German amphibious operations   *Some of the discoveries Col Glantz made in writing his trilogy on Stalingrad   *Similarities between the Soviet storm groups and the German stormtrooper units of WWII   *The 7th and 8th Guards Tank Armies as a potential “pocket force” at the end of WWII   *The relative levels of military-theoretical development the Soviets and Western Allies had reached by May 1945   *The Russian-language military history websites Col Glantz uses for research   *The movies Enemy at the Gates and Stalingrad The founding of The Journal of Soviet Military Studies, now The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and some of its more noteworthy pieces   *Persistent errors, misconceptions, and faulty interpretations in the literature of the Nazi-Soviet war   *Col Glantz’s advice to young scholars of the Soviet-Nazi War   *What service members can learn from the Eastern Front today, and Col Glantz’s advice on studying the war   *Areas of the Nazi-Soviet War we know relatively little about and where Col Glantz would like to see research done   *Col Glantz’s current projects   *His thoughts on the war in Ukraine Errata *Col Glantz states that Hermann Balck was the commander of 48th Panzer Corps during the German relief attempt of the Stalingrad Pocket. Balck, however, was the commander of 11th Panzer Division, a subordinate formation of 48th Panzer Corps. Links Col Glantz’s Amazon page   Col Glantz’s website for his self-published atlases and works   When Titans Clashed by Col David Glantz   Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat by Col David Glantz   The Soviet-German War: Myths and Realities by Col David Glantz   Commanding the Red Army's Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza   Fighting for the Soviet Motherland: Recollections from the Eastern Front by Dmitriy Loza   The Defense of Moscow 1941: The Northern Flank by Jack Radey and Charles Sharp   Kharkov 1942: Anatomy of a Military Disaster Through Soviet Eyes by Col David Glantz Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War II by Col David Glantz

In this episode, we discuss the following topics.   *What drew Kendrick to study military innovation   *How he defines military innovation   *What conventional wisdom says about military innovation   *How innovation differs from adaption   *Some recent historical examples of military innovation   *Whether military innovation fails more often than it succeeds   *Popular instances of military innovation in the West   *Kendrick’s essay “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness”    *What drives innovation in military organizations   *Warped innovation   *Incremental vs. radical innovation    *What drew Kendrick to studying British armored warfare innovation during the Interwar Period and the British Army’s experiences in North Africa as a case of military innovation   *The US Army’s Pentomic Divisions    *Guarding or hedging against dangerous innovations   *The claim that the character of war is changing rapidly   *Force Design 2030 *Communication strategies in support of military innovation efforts   *The innovator's dilemma as it applies to the military innovator   *Innovation and adaptation in Ukraine    *Recommended books on military innovation and military effectiveness   *Defining and measuring military effectiveness   *The prospect of the US forces fighting another counterinsurgency war or low-intensity conflict    *Kendrick’s upcoming articles Links “Dangerous Changes: When Military Innovation Harms Combat Effectiveness,” by Kendrick Kuo, International Security https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/47/2/48/113546/Dangerous-Changes-When-Military-Innovation-Harms   “The Future of Military Innovation Studies” by Adam Grissom, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390600901067?journalCode=fjss20   “What is a Military Innovation and Why It Matters” by Michael Horowitz and Shira Pindyck, Journal of Strategic Studies (paywall) https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2022.2038572   “Aircraft Carriers Versus Battleships in War and Myth” with James R. FitzSimonds, YouTube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hD43yEnbfL4   “Future Visions and Planned Obsolescence: Implementing 30-Year Horizons in Defense Planning” by Travis Reese and Dylan Phillips-Levine, CIMSEC https://cimsec.org/future-visions-and-planned-obsolescence-implementing-30-year-horizons-in-defense-planning/   Steve Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military https://a.co/d/88ckH5T   Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (revised edition) edited by Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett  https://a.co/d/1gUNGcc   The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars by Barry Posen https://a.co/d/dEJSypm   Technological Change and the Future of Warfare by Michael O’Hanlon https://a.co/d/5NBsZl6   The Innovation Delusion: How Our Obsession with the New Has Disrupted the Work That Matters Most by Lee Vinsel and Andrew Russell  https://a.co/d/gFFzzHH   The Shock Of The Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 by David Edgerton https://a.co/d/6oaUtZk   “Superiority,” a short story by Arthur C. Clarke https://www.baen.com/Chapters/1439133476/1439133476___5.htm

Please visit: www.oarfoundation.org   In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *Aaron’s thoughts on the two-year anniversary of Copperhead Company’s arrival at HKIA *His experiences as a rifle platoon commander with the 26th MEU and combat advisor with TF Southwest and how these influenced the way he led at HKIA   *C/1/8’s deployment with the 24th MEU prior to heading to HKIA   *The company’s training and preparations for the NEO   *TDGs and the benefits they provide for learning ROEs   *How TDGs translated to real-world application at HKIA   *When C/1/8 first got news it was heading to Kabul for sure and the reaction of the Marines   *Aaron’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA   *C/1/8’s first day there, 15 August   *The company’s role in the fight for the airfield and perimeter security   *1/8’s employment of maneuver warfare concepts and tools   *Aaron’s reaction to the National Strike Unit’s clearing of the airfield    *Instances where Coppehead Company came under fire   *Concerns that Coalition forces might have to carry out an “Alamo” operation in northern HKIA   *Aaron’s reaction to the news that Coalition forces would work with the Taliban   *Charlie Company’s opening of North and East Gates as evacuation control centers   *A detailed summary of events and commentary on gate operations at East Gate   *What it was like working with the Taliban   *The need to become emotionally hardened while working with the crowds    *How these crowds could quickly become the enemy in situations   *Charlie Company’s fight to provide and maintain a sense of calm, order, and process for the crowd   *The appearance of the NSU at East Gate   *The concepts of unity of command and battlespace and their application at East Gate   *Special operators and special missions and the effects these had on gate operations    *The decision to give up the picket line at East Gate   *The continued relevance of MCDP-1 Warfighting   *What C/1/8 was doing on 26 August, the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing, and how it responded to the situation   *The company’s actions between 27 August and its departure from HKIA   *The rules of engagement at HKIA   *What Aaron observed in himself and his Marines your Marines in the aftermath of the mission     *His advice for future leaders on talking to their people about going through situations like HKIA   *The role of mental health checks, mental services, and other kinds of support   *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune   *The influence and role of cell phones at HKIA   *The demil efforts   *The order to clean up trash   *The ROEs at HKIA   *Aaron’s interactions with the State Department   *Support provided by the BLT’s engineer platoon   *The MEU’s Female Search Team?   *Creating and maintaining a culture of discipline within Charlie Company   *The roles that exhaustion and discipline played at HKIA   *The actions of Coppehead Company that make Aaron proudest    *His self-assessment as a leader and decision-maker at HKIA   *The lessons he took away from HKIA, including those with potential implications for FD 2030   *Operating in a way that accounts for long-term implications of decisions   *The one thing Aaron would like Marines and other service members to know about what C/1/8 did at HKIA

Link to Operation Allies Refuge (OAR) Foundation   OAR Foundation’s Instagram handle: OARfoundation   Lee’s Instagram handle: Leer_Bow   In this episode, we discuss the following topics.   *The skills and missions of EOD Marines   *How Lee’s previous five deployments shaped the way he led and made decisions at HKIA   *The people and organization of Blackbeard's EOD Section   *What Lee’s 2021 deployment with the 24th MEU looked like before heading to HKIA   *The section’s preparation for HKIA   *Lee’s preparations for the mission  *Lee’s understanding of the situation on the ground before getting to HKIA   *Working with other US EOD teams   *The inherently joint nature of the NEO   *The missions of the Blackbeard teams that did not make it to HKIA *The fall of the US embassy in Kabul   *Some of the challenges posed by the geometries of fire at HKIA   *Lee’s participation in trying to clear the runway   *His advice to service members who might find themselves in similar situations   *Lee’s reaction to Coalition forces partnering with the Taliban   *What Lee’s teams did 20-22 August   *His involvement in an incident where civilians risked overrunning the Military Terminal   *Widespread failures to inform refugees about each step of the evacuation process   *The value of Afghan refugees who spoke English and could serve as interpreters   *The atrophy of electronic countermeasure skills in the Marine Corps   *Finding large caches of weapons and ammo aboard HKIA   *The two holding areas at the airport   *Lee’s tour of the gates   *The frustration Lee felt as pressure built to evacuate as many refugees as possible while also conducting a joint tactical exfiltration    *Being told by the JTF-CR staff that controlled detonations of gear and weapons were prohibited    *The JTF’s decision to bury ammo and arms   *An incident involving friendly fire between 1/8 Marines and the NSU   *Blackbeard’s actions on the day of the Abbey Gate Bombing    *Lee’s participation in a post-blast analysis at Abbey Gate    *The performance of the units Blackbeard supported   *What Blackbeard’s teams did on 27-28 August   *Returning to Kuwait and what Lee observed in his Marines   *Lee’s advice to leaders on talking to their teammates about situations as harrowing as HKIA   *The role mental health checks, mental health services, and other kinds of support should play in the lives of HKIA veterans   *What it was like returning home to Camp Lejeune   *The influence of cell phones on operations at HKIA   *The demilitarization process   *Maneuver warfare concepts and tools used during the NEO   *Lee’s approach to leading Marines   *The command relationships at HKIA   *Serving alongside EOD techs from other countries   *The MEU’s Female Search Team   *The 2nd Recon element at HKIA   *Preserving the capacity of Blackbeard's section   *Logistical challenges during the NEO   *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the mission at HKIA   *The actions of Lee’s Marines at HKIA that make him proudest   *Lee's most challenging decision at HKIA   *Where he thinks he performed well as a leader and decision-maker and where he could have done better   *The lessons Lee took away from HKIA and how these might apply to the Marine Corps in the future in the context of FD 2030   *Lee’s thoughts on the role and value of decision games based on HKIA   *How well the Marine Corps has studied and learned from the Kabul NEO and, more generally, its experiences in Afghanistan   *Lee’s thoughts on the other Voices of HKIA podcasts    *The one thing Lee would like Marines and other service members to know about what Blackbeard's section did at HKIA   *The Operation Allies Refuge Foundation

Erik's Social Media Links Twitter: https://twitter.com/Erikhistorian Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/erikthehistorian LinkedIn: ⁠https://www.linkedin.com/in/erikvillard/⁠ In this episode, we discuss the following topics. *How Erik became a military historian   *Roleplaying games as training for military historians   *Which military historians influenced Erik most   *Becoming a digital military historian   *The creation of Vietnamwarhistoryorg   *What Erik’s ideal training for future military historians would look like   *Making military history useful to operational commands   *The US Army’s History and Heritage efforts   *Those Center for Military History (CMH) projects Erik finds most rewarding *The challenges of writing official military history   *The monograph review process at CMH   *How studying military history provides literacy in evaluating sources   *The claim that military history is under siege in US universities   *Some of the giants of Vietnam War historiography in the English-speaking world   *Historical works that Erik recommends for US small unit leaders   *Small unit military history   *Unit historians (“5X” in the US Army)   *General William Westmoreland’s strategy in Vietnam   *Friction between Army and Marine Corps commands   *The controversy of Westmoreland’s single air manager concept   *1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division units in the Battle for Hue   *The possibility of North Vietnam capitulating   *Whether or not the US lost any battles during the war   *Why the Army lost the lessons of Vietnam   *Requests for historical materials in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom   *The poor state of record keeping in US commands during the Global War on Terror   *Some of Erik’s solutions to that problem Links Combat Operations: Staying the Course, October 1967 to September 1968 by Erik Villard The 1968 Tet Offensive Battles of Quang Tri City and Hue City by Erik Villard U.S. Army Center of Military History

In this episode, we discuss: *Hayden’s experiences in 2/10 before joining the 24th MEU   *Becoming a battery XO as a second lieutenant    *Easy Battery’s experiences with the 24th MEU prior to HKIA   *Initial indicators that the MEU might head to HKIA   *Easy Battery’s training and preparations for HKIA   *The challenge of knowing when to “flip the switch” of aggression and when to turn it off   *Assuming command of Easy Battery   *Hayden's understanding of the situation at HKIA before arriving   *The decision to leave the battery’s howitzers behind   *The influence of Marine Major Zach Schwartz on Hayden’s professional development   *Hayden’s first day at HKIA   *Easy Battery’s first mission   *Hayden’s initial observations of conditions at North Gate   *Turning over the battery’s positions to the 82nd Airborne   *Easy Battery’s occupation of the holding area   *The trying conditions of the holding area   *Managing 5,000 refugees with 99 Marines   *Handling riots   *The mental and emotional toll of working in the holding area   *The concept of surfaces and gaps at HKIA   *An incident involving suspected enemy artillery    *Hayden’s experiences at Abbey Gate   *Easy Company’s activities before departing HKIA   *What Hayden observed in himself and his Marines while in Kuwait   *Hayden’s advice for small unit leaders on talking about traumatic events with their Marines   *The role of mental health support for veterans   *The role of cell phones and Signal Chat at HKIA   *The role of discipline   *The role of exhaustion and the need for tough, realistic training   *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of Hayden’s time at HKIA   *Hayden’s self-assessment as a leader during the evacuation   *His lessons learned from the operation

In this episode, we discuss: -What drew Col Reynolds to studying history    -The value of history for the military professional   -Avoiding traps and pitfalls in studying and using history   -Studying at Oxford   -German General Ludwig Beck   -Doctrine in the German army (1914-1945)   -How the Marine Corps used history while Col Reynolds was a company-grade officer   -His time as a student at The Basic School (TBS)   -The state of the Marine Corps in the mid to late 1970s   -The decision to leave the Marine Corps and transitioning   -Col Reynold’s time in the Central Intelligence Agency   -His experiences at TBS as an individual mobilization augmentee   -How TBS had changed since his time as a student   -Tactical decision games (TDGs) and sand table exercises as intellectual revelations   -Writing good TDGs   -Col Reynold’s contest-winning article, “Turn on Your Lights!”   -Criticisms of studying and drawing from the 20th-century German military tradition -Researching and writing Just Cause and A Skillful Show of Strength   -Serving as the officer-in-charge of Marine Corps Field History in Operation Iraqi Freedom-I   -Interviewing Marine and Coalition leaders in Iraq   -Writing Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond   -Areas where Marine forces in Iraq could have improved   -The relief of Colonel Joe Dowdy, the commander of Regimental Combat Team-1   -The turnover of Tikrit from Task Force Tripoli to the US Army’s 4th Infantry Division   -The U.S. failure to adequately prepare for Phase IV (stability) operations   -How Marine Corps historians seem less critical of Marine leaders compared to Army historians writing about Army generals   -The controversy and conversation surrounding Force Design 2030  Links Colonel Reynold's website: https://www.nicholasreynoldsauthor.com   "Turn on Your Lights!" by Major Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR, Proceedings, November 1991 Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 by Martin van Creveld   Just Cause: Marine Operations in Panama, 1988-1990 by Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR A Skillful Show of Strength: US Marines in the Caribbean, 1991-1996 by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR   U.S. Marines in Iraq, 2003: Basrah, Baghdad, and Beyond by Colonel Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMCR (Rett)   Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway's Secret Adventures, 1935-1961 by Nicholas Reynolds Need to Know: World War II and the Rise of American Intelligence by Nicholas Reynolds

In this episode, we discuss: -Tanner getting assigned his squad before deploying with the 24th MEU   -What the deployment looked like before heading to HKIA   -His reaction to the news that the MEU would deploy to Kabul     -His understanding of the situation in Kabul before touching ground in HKIA   -Tanner’s first days at HKIA   -Clearing the airport of civilians    -Working with the Taliban   -Gate operations and the challenges they presented   -The role of exhaustion in operations   -Using maneuver warfare concepts and tools    -The Abbey Gate Bombing   -Tanner’s experiences between the bombing and before his unit departed HKIA   -What he observed in his fellow Marines and himself in Kuwait following the NEO   -His experience of returning to Camp Lejeune   -The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the HKIA mission   -The presence of personal cell phones and computers at HKIA   -Tanner’s appraisal of his performance at HKIA   -The supposed animosity between 1/8 and 2/1   -Tanner’s advice for Marines transitioning into civilian life 

In this episode, we discuss the following:   -Ben’s forthcoming book on modern ground combat   -The lack of definitions of the terms “character of war” and “nature of war”   -The “debate” on FD 2030   -The supposed massive changes touted in modern warfare, like drones   -Ben's research methods and case sample set   -Coding cases   -The problem with how the US military records modern cases of military operations   -The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale -Cases of armor operating independently successfully   -Learning about modern combat from the Syrian Civil War   -The claim that urban warfare is costlier than other types of warfare   -Modern amphibious operations   -How military professionals can become less ignorant of modern warfare   -How professional military education could benefit from Ben’s work   -The 3:1 ratio in military offensive operations   -The Value of detailed small unit operational accounts   -The ideal organization for conducting research like Ben’s   -The practical and ethical challenges inherent to primary source research of modern combat   -Ben’s work on the will to fight   -The uses and limits of wargames    -How Ben got into wargaming   -The Marine Corps Wargaming Center   -Open-source reporting on Ukraine   -What surprised Ben about Russian and Ukrainian combat performance   -Irregular vs. regular warfare   -Ben’s experiences as a doctoral student at King’s College London Links Will to Fight: Returning to the Human Fundamentals of War by Ben Connable, Michael J. McNerney, William Marcellino, Aaron B. Frank, Henry Hargrove, Marek N. Posard, S. Rebecca Zimmerman, Natasha Lander, Jasen J. Castillo, James Sladden, et al.

In this episode, we discuss: *What an infantry battalion operations officer does *How Jordan’s experiences at 2nd LAR, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island, and 1/8 influenced how he fought the battalion prior to HKIA *The 24th MEU's deployment prior to heading to HKIA *The exercises done in preparation for HKIA  *The original plan to conduct the NEO *Where Jordan thinks he could have done a better job of preparing the BLT for HKIA *Communications challenges between the BLT and supporting units  *Leaving for HKIA *What HKIA was like on the first day *Jordan’s reading of the terrain around HKIA *The organization of the joint operations center *The fight for the airfield  *Learning the Taliban would assist with the evacuation  *Operations at the gates *Sending rejected Afghan families back outside *The 82nd Airborne Division at HKIA *How 1/8 Marines used maneuver warfare concepts and tool *Responding to the Abbey Gate bombing *Returning to Kuwait, observations of the Marines, and coping in the aftermath *Coming home to Camp Lejeune *Command relationships at HKIA  *The presence and effect of cell phones and computers among 1/8 Marines at HKIA *The most frustrating and rewarding aspects of the NEO *What Jordan learned from the HKIA mission *Using decision games as tools to prepare for a mission like HKIA *The supposed animosity between members of 1/8 and 2/1 *The one thing Marines and other servicemembers should know about 1/8’s time at HKIA Links Escape from Kabul HBO Documentary https://www.hbo.com/movies/escape-from-kabul   “U.S. Central Command Report on Fatal Afghanistan Airport Attack,” USNI News https://news.usni.org/2022/02/08/u-s-central-command-report-on-fatal-afghanistan-airport-attack