The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War

The month of August 1942 has had its ups and downs so far as the campaign for Guadalcanal is concerned. The invasion of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Tanambogo and other outlying islands in the area initially went very well. Marines occupied the islands rather quickly and eliminated Japanese resistance to a man in most places.  On August 21, Marines from the 1st Marine Regiment utterly destroyed the first major Japanese counter strike on land at the Tenaru River.  On land, the campaign was succeeding.  At sea, however, it was not. The debacle at Savo Island, the worst defeat in US Navy history, left a bitter taste in the mouths of every person in and around the seas of Guadalcanal that wore an American or allied uniform.   Because of the defeat at Savo, among other reasons, Admiral Fletcher pulled his precious carriers away from the immediate vicinity of Guadalcanal to preserve their ever so valuable flight decks.  However, because of the Tenaru battle, Fletcher was compelled to reverse course and send his flattops back to the waters of Guadalcanal to protect and support the Marines against any further Japanese efforts ashore.    Unbeknownst to Fletcher, the Japanese had deployed a strong naval force under the command of Chuichi Nagumo, of Midway fame, to support Japanese land efforts and destroy any US ships in the area.  Over the next few days, that being August 24, 1942, the US fleet and the Japanese fleet groped for each other, and eventually became entangled in the third carrier battle of 1942, what history would call, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons. Talking Points: Japanese Intentions:For the most part, Japanese counteroffensives ashore at Guadalcanal, were almost always tag-teamed with a naval supporting operation.  This is the first “significant” Japanese effort to eliminate the Marines ashore and the USN offshore by a combined arms operation.The Japanese had sent another troop convoy under Admiral Tanaka towards Guadalcanal with the remainder of Colonel Ichiki’s 2nd echelon.  We will hear from them again at Edson’s Ridge…The deployed Japanese fleet would both protect the convoy and destroy any American shipping in the area. Yamamoto knew that US carriers were in the area supporting the Guadalcanal landings, he did not know specifically where they were, but he figured that they had to be in the area. As a result, he deployed the two fleet carriers at his disposal, Pearl Harbor and Coral sea veterans Shokaku and Zuikaku as well as a light carrier Ryujo.Aside from the CVs, which were the long ranged striking arm, the fleet that was deployed consisted of two other task forces.The Advanced Force under Admiral Nobutake Kondo had 5 CAs, 1 CL, 8 DDs and 1 BB.The Vanguard Force under Admiral Hiroaki Abe consisted of 2 BBs, 3 CAs, 1 CL, and 6 DDs.The Japanese actually sent Ryujo ahead of the main striking force as a screen.   Yamamoto’s plan called for the destruction of the American CVs that he figured to be in the region thereby allowing the Japanese naval forces the ability to destroy any other US and Allied shipping in the area and isolate and destroy the Marines ashore. Again, like at Midway and Coral Sea, the Japanese divided their forces thereby spreading their AA capabilities, which were not that great anyway, thin. The advantage of spreading their forces, at least here, is that as we shall see, not all of the coveted targets were sighted or attacked by American aircraft. The Japanese forces were laid out as such: Japanese transports were supposed to land reinforcements on August 24  US disposition:To counter any Japanese move in the area, the US had at its disposal, essentially, the same force that it had at the outset of WATCHTOWER, minus the cruisers sunk at Savo of course.Just before the battle, the US had 3 CVs at sea.  CV6, CV3, and CV7.On August 23, Fletcher detached USS Wasp, as she was critically low on fuel , and because of this, she missed the battle The US forces were split into two Task Forces, all under Fletcher’s command. TF11 centered around CV3 and included an escort of 2 CAs and 5 DDs. TF16, under the command of Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, centered around CV6 with an escort consisting of 1 CA, 1 CL (AA CL Atlanta), and 6 DDs. A conspicuous presence amongst this TF was the new fast battleship USS North Carolina (BB-55)This was the first time a fast battleship would operate with US CVs in a battle, and as such would also be the first time one of the new fast battleships would unleash their vast array of anti-aircraft weaponry, which would go on to play a vital role in the upcoming battle. August 24 Beginning on August 22, both US and Japanese forces started sending out search aircraft in order to locate one another.USN PBY Catalinas had reported on incoming Japanese warships, and spotted the incoming light carrier Ryujo   By morning, Fletcher was getting itchy.  He was aware that Japanese forces were in the area, but as yet, had not spotted them himself having relied on PBY contacts.   Around 1240, CV6 launched 22 sets of scouts in a fan shaped pattern that covered a 180 degree area north of Fletcher’s flattops to visually sight Ryujo and the other fleet carriers Fletcher knew would be there as well One of those pilots was a gentleman named Birney Strong.Strong was an SBD pilot from VS5 aboard CV6 and was scheduled to scout the area 320-340 degrees from Big E.Like most Naval aviators, Birney Strong was confident in his abilities.  As he reached the flight deck, he told his rear seat gunner, “It’s our job to find the japs, and I know exactly where they are. We are going to get there, circle them, and report on their position before they find us.”Strong was a VS5 vet, having flown from CV5 in the hit and run raids as well as Coral Sea Fletcher, keenly aware of his mistake at Coral Sea, when he sent a deckload strike from 2 CVs at Shoho, decided to hold CV3’s deckload until the distance closed and the location of the enemy was fixed. Thinking he had been sighted by the numerous Japanese snoopers that had been shot down all day (he had not), he finally elected to launch CV3 strike at 1340, despite not knowing a fixed position on Ryujo, or knowing if more Japanese CVs were present. CDR Don Felt aboard CV3 was launched at 1340, however, on the last known sighting of the only Japanese CV spotted thus far, Ryujo.His strike was 29 SBDs, 8 TBFs, and no fighter escortThe fighters were being held back as CAP against a possible Japanese strike. Enterprise searchers had been groping for the target for over an hour when at 1440 hours, just as he had predicted, Birney Strong visually sighted the carrier Ryujo in the 330-340 degree sector of the search grid. Strong approached to within five miles of Ryujo and ordered his contact report sent.  It was an agonizing six minutes before Enterprise acknowledged the sighting, leaving Strong and his wingman to circle the enemy that entire time.Curiously, he neglected to attack the enemy ship At 1510, another CV6 scout, piloted by Yogi Jorgenson of VS5 spotted Ryujo again, elected to attack but were driven off by Japanese CAP.  As the Americans departed the area, they ran into CV3’s strike group under CDR Felt and radioed them their newest, hottest location on Ryujo. Finally, around 1500, a VB6 scout piloted by CO Ray Davis spotted the fleet carrier Shokaku.  Radioing its position, he and his wingman elected to attack the big flattop below.Both he and his wingman, Robert Shaw, missed their target by a mere 30 feet as Shokaku was twisting and turning violently to avoid them.Davis’ contact report was never heard as there apparently reception was poor this day.Thus, the strike from CV6 that Fletcher had been saving for just this moment, was wasted. What neither pilot knew was that Shokaku had just launched a deckload strike at the last location of Enterprise, having just learned of her location.  RyujoFelt’s group closed to within visual range of Ryujo and coordinated their attack at 1536 The poor radio reception that plagued the CV6 airmen all day also plagued Felt, as he did not hear the radio report of Shokaku’s sighting just minutes before. Coral Sea all over againFelt sent 21 SBDs to hit Ryujo along with the 8 TBFs that were also a part of the strike.The first fist full of SBDs missed the rapidly turning carrier, but a 1,000 pounder dropped by Jim Sauer hit her on the stern.Syd Bottomly, of Midway fame, noticed that Ryujo seemed to be getting away and redirected his strike back towards the carrier.Bottomly, among the last group to dive on Ryujo chased the ship to almost suicidal low altitude before he dropped his bombHis bomb, hit dead center of Ryujo’s deck and exploded…a killing blow.Roy Isaman, another Midway vet hit her again, as did CDR Felt. Ryujo was afire and smoking from under her flight deck when VT-8 approached in their TBFs.Bert Earnest, also a Midway veteran, approached Ryujo from her starboard side with 3 other TBFs and dropped his fish under intense AAA fireNo one knows exactly who hit Ryujo, but Japanese records state that one torpedo hit and exploded on the starboard side, and one passed under the starboard stern and failed to explode.The one that did hit, wrecked her engine room and steering and essentially killed the carrier.Last seen by American eyes, she had drifted to a stop, was afire from stem to stern and had a 25 degree list to starboard.She was the sixth Japanese CV sunk in 42, and would be the last sunk until 1944 Task Force 16 At 1632 radar aboard CV3 reports, “Many bogies range 88 miles bearing 320”CV6 and CV3 launch every fighter available to repel the attack they know is inbound55 F4F Wildcats are aloft to repel the attack, that now appears to be heading directly for the Big E.  CV6 is also screened by 2 cruisers, 6 DDs and BB-55 At 1700 hours the bogies are now bandits and are headed for CV6CAP attempts to intercept, but AGAIN, radio issues force them to scatterFDOs have too many contact reports and the fighter pilots are chattering wildly, thus blocking the FDO from issuing vector orders  Despite having an overwhelming CAP, most of them do not engage, but what CAP does engage, absolutely wreck the JapaneseAs the Vals from Shokaku arrived over CV6, they are engaged by VF6 CAP that chase them down through their divesVF6 pilot Don Runyan attacked and downed 3 Vals and a Zero, chased another 2 Vals away and damaged another, in mere minutes.CAP claims 44 kills against 5 losses.  Actual numbers are 25 shot downA 43% loss rate As CV6’s CAP engages, the Japanese do slip some Vals through the fighter umbrella and they approach CV6 and her escortsIt is at this time that the value of the fast battleships that will be arriving soon comes into view…Gliding along at the rear of the formation is North Carolina.  She is making 27 knots and grinding for anything extra she can get.  The massive ship is kicking up a rooster tail as she pours on the power to keep up with CV6 that is hauling ass at 30 knots.When the Japanese strike force appears overhead, North Carolina prepares to fire…Her AA power is awesome.  No other word can describe it.LCDR John Kirkpatrick is the AA gunnery officer and at his fingertips are:40 50 cal machine guns40 20mm Oerlikons4 quad 1.1 inch mounts20 5 inch dual purpose mounts As the Japanese line up over CV6, BB-55 cuts loose…At Kirkpatrick’s order to commence firing, all AAA mounts aboard BB-55 open fire simultaneouslyThe noise, smoke, flame and sheer chaos unleashed actually rattles the gunnery officer who briefly thought his guns had set his ship afireTF16 CO Admiral Kinkaid radioed North Carolina to ask, “Are you afire?”The volume of AAA fire by “The Showboat” rattles the Japanese as they line up on CV6 shooting down a great number, and causing many to miss in their dives Despite the CAP and the screening vessels AAA fire, Vals appeared over CV6 and broke into their divesVals came down on CV6 at 7 second intervalsCaptain Arthur Davis maneuvered his ship brilliantly, causing many bombs to splash into the sea behind the great shipAt 1714 a 500 pound bomb crashed through Enterprise’s flight deck near her after elevatorIt punched through five decks before exploding, killing 35 men immediately30 seconds later, another bomb hit Enterprise, only 15 feet from the first strike, exploding in the starboard 5 inch gun gallery wiping out the crewmen stationed there, burning them to a cinder at their gun positions, killing all 38 men in a blinding flashEnterprise, like her sister Yorktown, was a tough girl allowing CAPT Davis to continue to maneuver her at high speed despite the 2 heavy hits she had taken and throwing up an impressive AA screen of her ownSome 14,000 rounds of ammunition were fired by Enterprise in that strike alone2 minutes after the first two bombs hit, a third hit the Big E up forward, doing minimal damage. Enterprise is hurt, but far from deadShe retires to Pearl for damage repairs and buries her dead, some 78 KIA and a further 90 woundedWe will see the Big in the seas around Guadalcanal again End of day/end of battle By the end of the day, after word finally reached Fletcher of the whereabouts of Shokaku, it is too late to launch a strike, especially with CV6 hurt. The Japanese think (naturally) that they have heavily damaged or sunk 2 US CVs, when they only attacked 1 Aware of their high casualties from attacking the US fleet, and the loss of Ryujo, compels the Japanese under Nagumo to retire The incoming troop convoy under Tanaka is seemingly left to its own devices and it comes under heavy air attack from Henderson Field the following day 1 DD is sunk, another is damaged, a cruiser is heavily damaged, a transport is sunk and another (or 2) are damaged forcing Tanaka to turn his convoy around and NOT reinforce the island Because of this action, and the fact that the Ryujo was sunk at no US shipping losses, Eastern Solomons is seen as a US strategic and tactical victory. Though a victory, it had little in terms of long reaching effects on the Guadalcanal campaign, which is why it is probably the least known carrier battle of 1942

Prewar US Navy and IJN surface doctrineUS Navy surface battle doctrine assumed, and planned for any major surface action against an enemy, specifically the Japanese, would be fought in broad daylight, in perfect weather, near the Philippines and at extreme range of the rifles of the US Navy’s battleship, battle line.  While night training did occur for the USN, it was not something that was practiced regularly, nor was it something that was hammered into the sailor’s heads. For example, the USS Vincennes, a heavy cruiser that took an unfortunate part in Savo, last practiced night firing in February 1941. The prewar doctrine was based on arrogance.  Arrogance in that it was just presumed that the hapless and half-witted Japanese would openly present their own battle fleet, which was thought to be heavily outnumbered by US battleships, for extreme destruction because…well…that’s what they were supposed to do. The Japanese on the other hand, were extremely well trained in night fighting.     Sailors were selected for scouting positions aboard ships because of their night vision abilities.While the Japanese also believed in the decisive battle theory, they differed in that they intended to whittle the US fleet down before the big showdown ever came to fruit.Subs, DDs and CAs were expected to make slashing, surprise night attacks to whittle the US fleet down.Great emphasis was put on torpedoes within the IJN, as opposed to the USN.       It was expected that torpedo attacks, at night, would be the major ship killers before the BBs would finish off what was left.The IJN already had great success in nocturnal torpedo attacks before WWII.  During the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-06, the IJN employed nighttime torpedo attacks successfully.  Advances in weaponry and technologyDue to the emphasis within the IJN on night time torpedo attacks, the development of ship killing torpedoes was of utter importance.The Type 93 Long Lance torpedo was developed in the early 30’sNearly wakelessOxygen fueled1,090 pound warhead with a range of 22,000 yards and a speed of 49 knotsSuperior night optics as well as flash less powder were also a Japanese superiorityThe USN preferred the naval rifle over the torpedo and as such, did not sufficiently develop a torpedo and they placed more emphasis on movement and range placement of ships for gun fire purposes as opposed to torpedo attacks. The Japanese respond to the American landingsThe first major Japanese response to the landings at Tulagi and Guadalcanal was launched by Admiral Mikawa at 0830 on August 7. His orders were to assemble his cruiser division (CruDiv 6) and prepare for a night attack on the American fleet now known to be off Guadalcanal.Mikawa’s orders to his force were intercepted by American analysts but the message was not decoded until August 23.By around 1100 hours on August 8, Mikawa’s force had been assembled and was at sea, bound for GuadalcanalHe launched scout planes to determine the Allied strength before he got into the areaOne of Aoba’s scout planes found the US fleet off Gcanal and Tulagi and reported it as:4 CAs, 7 DDs, and 1 phantom BB off Lunga Point2 CAs, 12 DDs and 3 transports off TulagiWith this information Mikawa knew that his enemy was divided in strengthMikawa’s plan was to penetrate the sound south of Savo, torpedo the US ships there and then engage the Tulagi force with gunfire and torpedoes after which he would withdraw northwards Allied preparationAmerican air searches located Mikawa’s force as it was moving southFirst found by B-17s raiding Rabaul and ID’d as 4 CAs and 1 DD heading westSeen again by another B-17 and reported as 6 unidentified ships heading SEUS Sub S-38 reported DDs passing overhead at very high speed and 3 CAs on a course of 140 degreesS-38’s report carried the most weight but was dismissed by Richmond Kelly Turner under the assumption that a large enemy surface force would be seen by search planes first.Search planes (PBYs) did not pick up the forcer on the 8th  as they slipped through the aerial net.Fletcher requested another aerial search but McCain and his staff failed to complySighting reports by Lockheed Hudsons of Mikawa’s force, and then plotted by Turner allowed Turner to assume that the Japanese ships spotted (which were erroneously stated as being sea plane tenders) made Turner assume that tenders could not reach the area in time to render any sort of attack.  The second sighting report stated that the Japanese ships were making 15 knots and could not arrive in time for a night battle.Turner believed the Japanese were setting up another sea plane base at Rekata Bay, notcoming south at flank speed to kick his ass. British Admiral Crutchley, the senior Allied officer afloat off GCanal, decided to split his forces for defense.  He reasoned that there were two areas that enemy ships could slip into the sound without being detected, and by splitting his forces, one was bound to intercept a force moving in at night.The southern group consisted of the CAs Australia, Canberra, and Chicago along with DDs Bagley and PattersonThe northern group consisted of CAs Vincennes, Quincy, Astoria with DDs Helm and Wilson.A picket line consisting of 2 DDs, Talbot and Blue were to utilize radar to detect any incoming ships Crutchley’s plan for defense had several gaping holes, including a lack of clear orders for a night time defense and an assumption that everybody knew what everyone else was doing, when in fact, no one did. Also, there were no flag officers aboard any of the US ships in the northern groupA Captain can’t fight his ship and command a TF at the same time… The battle begins (South of Savo)At 2312 Mikawa sent cruiser search planes aloft to illuminate the shipping with flares.Float planes reported 3 CAs off Savo2400 Mikawa formed his ships and increased speed to 26 knotsAt 0050 Savo was sighted and 3 minutes later Mikawa’s lookouts sighted the picket DD Blue and evaded herMikawa’s entire force slipped past the picket DDs without being seen Lookouts aboard the CA Chokai sighted 3 CAs off the starboard bowMikawa ordered his ships to “independently fire”At 0138 4 long lances were launched at the same time lookouts spotted Vincennes visually at a range of 18,000 yardsAt 0143Chokai opened fire with her main battery on the HMAS CanberraShortly before Chokai opened fire, Canberra’s lookouts spotted the enemy at 4500 yards dead aheadCanberra was put into a turn as to allow her main battery to fire, but before her main battery was even manned, she was hit by over 24 8 inch shells fired from 4 Japanese heavy cruisers.By 0150 Canberra slowed to a stop and was burning amidships Aboard USS Chicago, flashes were seen as torpedoes were launched as well as aircraft flares and Canberra swinging out of line to presumably open fireAstoundingly, none of this was put together as an enemy threatChicago’s CO Bode reached the bridge shortly before his ship was struck by a torpedo.Seemingly blind to the gunfire erupting around him, Bode could not find anything to shoot at initiallyHer secondary battery opened fire and hit at least one ship, TenryuBode immediately withdrew westwards, leaving the transports he was assigned to protect wide open to any enemy attack.Worse yet, he neglected to report his contact with the enemyThis is inexcusable and without doubt, caused the deaths of hundreds of Americans and resulted in the sinking of another 3 CAs The one bright spot, if there is one here, is that the DD Patterson, whose skipper, CDR Frank Walker was keenly aware of Japanese ships in the area, fought like a lion.Patterson tried to warn Canberra and Chicago of the Japanese ships by blinker light but it apparently went unseenWalker himself issued warnings over TBS but they were either ignored or unheardPatterson engaged in a gun duel with Tenryu and Yubari, illuminating them and zig zagging to avoid their fire.Patterson took a hit that disabled her after 5 inch guns, but returned to the fight hitting a Japanese CA.  Finally receiving orders to withdraw and cover the transports, only then did Patterson give up the fight The Northern debacleMikawa turns north and heads for the northern group of heavy cruisers after destroying the southern group in a span of 7 minutesAstonishingly, the Northern group STILL does not know that the enemy is closing USS Vincennes under the command of CAPT Riefkohl is leading the groupRiefkohl has his ship at condition 2, not GQ, he himself is asleep as are all of the CAPT aboard the CAsRiefkohl supposedly believed that the Japanese would attack that night but failed to share his thoughts with the other CAPTs.  As CO of the Northern Group, he is at fault for this lack of preparedness At 0144, watches aboard all CAs felt underwater explosions (Japanese torpedoes exploding on Southern Group), but assumed them to be anti-sub opsAt 0145 watches saw gunfire and flares from the south but failed to put two and two together Riefkohl is summoned to the bridge but due to rain and mist, could not see the southern group or what was happeningNo contact reports were given to himAt 0150 searchlights illuminated his 3 CAsHe thought this was the southern group and did nothing to counterAt 0151 the Japanese opened fire on Astoria, followed by Vincennes and Quincy, which was the first ship hit.     Aboard Astoria, the ship was not at GQ, but the gunnery officer, after having witnessed shell fire and flashes, ordered the main battery to commence firing.CAPT Greenman arrived on the bridge, ordered cease fire and then resumed fire.  Astoria was quickly hit in the hangar and the fire that started made her a beacon for Japanese gunfireFor ten (ish) minutes, Astoria was the focus of Aoba, Kinugasa, and Chokai’s main batteryMost of Asty’s guns were disabled, her comms was wiped out and fires were all over the shipAsty fired one last salvo that knocked out Chokai’s forward main battery turretAstoria then she slid to a halt afire from stem to stern Aboard Quincy fires were seen to the south, gunfire was heard and her radr picked up Japanese ships.  CAPT Moore ordered the main battery to open fire, but they were not readyHit by several shells, Quincy was afire due to her SOC airplanes and avgas in her hangar.As a result, she was bracketed and caught in a crossfire and veered out of lineAt 0204 she was hit by 2 torpedoes on the port sideAt 0216, with her CAPT dead and most of her bridge crew dead, she was hit by another torpedo and began to sink Aboard Vincennes, Riefkohl, now finally alert to the situation, ordered open fire, but his ship was hit in the hangar, and it too like her sisters served as a flaming beacon for Japanese gunnersVincennes was hit by a torpedo, then another and a third, killing everyone in the #1 fireroom and opening the ship’s bottom up The battle endsBy 0216 Mikawa’s victory was complete, and fear of American airpower caused Mikawa to turn tail and leave the area without engaging (and destroying) the transports nearby ADM Turner stopped unloading the transports at 0145, but stayed another day (WITHOUT AIR COVER) to finish what he could before he had to withdraw the transports Turner requested air cover from Fletcher who was still running away at 0641 and received his answer in a roundabout way when he intercepted a message from Fletcher to Ghormley essentially saying that Fletcher was out and Turner was now the force commander around GCanal.Pitiful Mikawa had utterly destroyed the Allied fleet in a stunning and aggressive actionHis victory was flawed in that had he attacked and sank the transports, which he easily could have, the Guadalcanal campaign would have been OVER right then.What could have been… 1,077 Allied sailors were killed, a further 700 were wounded with the loss of 4 heavy cruisersJapanese casualties were 129 killed, and 85 wounded, no sinkings The US concealed the defeat from the public until October Implications on the campign…

H-Hour Guadalcanal American intel assumed that the bulk of the Japanese were on Guadalcanal, specifically along Lunga PointEstimated 5,000 men5th Marines secured the beachhead, 1st Marines passed through them and headed for “Grassy Knoll”It was assumed there would be heavy defensive fire on the beachesThe landing on Guadalcanal could not have gone any better, as virtually no opposition was encounteredThe beach head was a jumbled mess of supplies as there were not enough marines nearby, or sailors, to unload the supplies.Marines pressed inland and encountered the jungle for the first time TulagiAbout 2 miles long ½ mile wide.  Japanese garrison was the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, about 350 menMarines that assaulted Tulagi, Florida, Gavutu/Tanambogo were:1st Raiders1/22/51st Parachute Btln.The first boots on the ground belonged to 1/2 who landed at Florida island. Initially, resistance was nill until the Raiders hit phase line A where they ran into stiff defenses. Japanese embedded themselves in cavesHarbinger of future defensive efforts throughout the PacificThe night of August 7-8, the Japanese counterattacked on Tulagi, breaking marine lines in one point.By morning, those Japanese had all been killed Good personal stories of the Raiders? Gavutu/TanambogoAssigned to the 1st Parachute Battalion, numbering some 397 menFacing the Paras were over 500 JapaneseHeavy Japanese resistance caused many casualties among the ParasBy nightfall, neither island had been secured and Marine casualties had been very heavyParas requested reinforcements for morning assaultReinforcements sent in, but the landing was a failure because of enemy fireLanded near the causeway insteadLike on Tulagi, the Japanese holed up in caves and had to be blasted outTalk about Angus Goss (An explosion was the sweetest music conceivable)Talk about Harry TorgersonBlew up caves using dynamiteOne blast was so close that it blew the majority of his pants off of his body, exposing most of his ass surrounded by shredded pants.Hence the name “Raggedy Assed Marines”The conversation supposedly went, “Captain you done tore your pants!”  “Screw the pants!  Get me more dynamite!”Awarded a Silver Star for this actionThe islands were finally captured, most Japanese were killed at the loss of 70 KIA and 87 WIATotal casualties for Tulagi, Gavutu and Tanambogo were 122 KIA for USMC and 863 KIA for the Japanese Air RaidOnce the landings were revealed to be an invasion and not a raid, Yamamoto ordered a “decisive counterattack”While the IJN would respond off Savo within 24 hours, the first “decisive counterattack” came by air53 aircraft were involved in the initial air attackMixture of Betty’s, Zeroes and ValsOnly 12 F4Fs were aloft to intercept the incoming raidersSaburo SakaiAttacked SBDs from CV6Got creased in the head from a rear seat gunner in one of the SBDsThe wound left Sakai blind in his right eye, his left side was paralyzed, and his Zero was shot to piecesSakai losing blood quickly, fought off death by punching himself in his wound to stay conscious, and managed to steer his crippled airplane the 565 miles back to Rabaul The raid achieved nothing in terms of stopping the landing, but it did deprive the Americans of most of their fighter contingent from the CVs, thus compelling Fletcher to pull his CVs back away from Canal as he did not have the fighter capability to withstand another attack by torpedo carrying Betty’s (or so he thought anyway) Pulling his CVs back put them out of reach for proper patrols the next day, which could have spotted Mikawa’s force coming south to destroy the Allied force in what would be Savo Island TenaruBy the time the Tenaru battle unfolded, the Marines had been ashore for 3 weeksNo serious Japanese counterattacks had yet been made against CanalOn August 10, plans had been drawn up to send forces to Guadalcanal to expel the invadersOne of the units selected was the 28th Infantry Regiment, under COL Kiyoano IchikiDue to poor intel, a lack of Allied naval activity or aerial presence on Guadalcanal, the Japanese thought that the majority of Americans had been withdrawn from GuadalcanalWho was Ichiki?Known expert in infantry tacticsCommanded rifle units in ChinaHis actions are said to have started the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, often marked as the beginning of WWIIVery headstrong, was slated to land at MidwayBelieved that the sword and night tactics of traditional Japanese infantry could and would best any defensive positions he may encounter Ichiki Detachment numbered some 900 men The Battle begins2/1 had set up their positions in the days before the attack Myth says that they set up their positions only hours before the attack because of Jacob Vouza’s warningDispel the myth of Vouza here Dug in MG positions manned by H/2/1 and rifle positions manned by G/2/1 stretched from the ocean front down “stream” on the west bank of the river Marines had 1917 water cooled MGs, some 50 caliber weapons, and several 37mm anti-tank weapons, at least two of which were supplied with canister shot Ichiki’s plan was to essentially march down the beach, and assault the Marine positions, eventually capturing the airfield and a further position around Lunga Attack and AnnihilationInitial contact was made shortly after midnight, with scattered rifle shots between Marine Ops and Ichiki’s van Around 0200 the first wave of Japanese troops came crashing across the sand bar This wave was met by strong defensive fire from MGs, 37s, and artilleryWave was essentially wiped out after a few broke through into Marine lines and engaged in hand to handAt least three more waves of attackers hit the Marine lines only to be slaughtered by withering fireJohnny Rivers, Diamond and Al SchmidFrank Pomroy Marine artillery walked itself down the Japanese side of the river and collected in a grove where it presumably broke up another potential assault.Following this, the Japanese holed up on their side of the river and a firefight ensued all night longThe following morning, elements of 1/1 crossed the river and flanked what was left of Ichiki’s unitSlowly, the Marines closed the trap around Ichiki, forcing the survivors to dart across the coconut grove or into the sea where they were killed by riflemen M3 tanks under the command of Lt Leo Case crossed the sand bar and turned into the coconut grove eliminating what was left of the enemy Over 777 dead Japanese littered the field of battle 1 surrendered, and 12 wounded were taken prisoner Marine losses were around 44 KIA and 71 WIA Implications on the CampaignJapanese refusal to surrender informed the Marines how the war would be fought from here on Wounded Japanese tried to kill those attempting to help themRather die than surrender CLOSER:1st Mar Div report of Tulagi Operation:“The combat assumed the nature of a storming operation from the outset, a soldier’s battle, unremitting and relentless, to be decided only by the extermination of one or the other of the adversaries engaged.” 

A Rush to Action the beginnings of a “plan”On July 3, just after WATCHTOWER is approved (but not by the Joint Chiefs) King flies to Frisco to brief NimitzRichmond Kelly Turner was told that 3 CVs would support the operation (CV3, CV6 and CV7)The name Guadalcanal had not yet been added to the operation list as a target as of July 3On June 27, to follow King’s initial order to prepare to seize Tulagi, Nimitz ordered Tulagi to be captured and the “seizure of an airfield” adjacent to Tulagi as well…but specified no exact location.On July 5 it was reported that the Japanese had landed airfield construction troops and equipment on Guadalcanal, only then was Guadalcanal added as a target.Also on July 5, the new target received its code name…Cactus Why Guadalcanal and Tulagi?Once the Japanese established a seaplane base at Tulagi in May, that base could disrupt the sealanes between the US, HI, Fiji, Samoa and most importantly, AustraliaIt was feared that the establishment of a larger airfield on neighboring islands (Canal) would further inhibit shipping and cede control of those waterways to the Japanese. Questionable from the start:Admiral Robert L Ghormley had just recently assumed duties as COMSOPAC and as such, WATCHTOWER would fall under his purview.Those under his command would be: 1st Mar Div, 3 CV groups under the command of Vice ADM Frank Jack Fletcher, as well as South Pacific Amphib Forces under Rear Adm Richmond Kelly Turner.All of these forces would be (theoretically) supported by land-based air under RADM McCain, Allied Air Forces SWPAC under MacArthur and GEN KenneyUpon receiving orders to seize “Tulagi and adjacent positions” Ghormley immediately showed what would be his calling card…pessimism. Ghormley immediately concluded that he and his people were nowhere near ready to tackle such an operationIn a way, he was correct.  He had exactly 1 Marine on his staff that had any experience in amphibious operations, and he had very, very little.Comms to and from Ghormley’s staff and HQ were hours and sometimes DAYS late in arriving or being sentIntel on the area was virtually NILL.Charts of the GCanal and Tulagi area were woefully outdated.Any actual intel, of which there was essentially none, came from coastwatchers or aerial photosMaps of Guadalcanal were from 1910 charts that were “corrected” by aerial photography Air Power, or lack thereof, was a major concern before the operation even beganThere were no land bases close to the target area from which air support missions could be flown and the aircraft on hand were too old and too few in realityADM McCain’s considerable number of aircraft on hand (282) was deceivingMost of the aircraft were obsolete, and even if they weren’t, such as the case with the F4Fs, P39s and P400s under his command, they did not have the range to support an operation over 590 and 715 miles from the only US bases in the area Espirtu Santo and Efate, respectively that had decently sized airfields. On July 8, Ghormley flew to Melbourne and spoke with MacArthur.  The problems outlined by the GEN and the ADM were:Gaining and maintaining air superiority over the islands, the beaches and assault shipsIn a surprising moment of clarity and truthfulness, MacArthur admitted that his air forces probably could not interdict incoming Japanese air raids from RabaulThe protection of the islands and beaches and the like would fall upon Nimitz’s CVsThis could/would be problematic in that the CVs could and would be pulled out due to any threat that may arise, therefore leaving the transport group and the beachhead itself totally without air support The basics of any amphibious operation were already less than stellar before the operation ever launched.The US would have air cover only as long as the CVs were presentAnd that depended on the situation which would be very, very fluid There would be no US land-based air cover until a unit, or units, could be deployed to Guadalcanal, and who knew how long that would take The allied naval force would more than likely have to fight off a Japanese counterattack, probably at night, when the allied forces had little to no night fighting experience The assault troops would have to be properly trained for not only an opposed amphibious landing, but a sustained occupation and defense with the prospect of little to no reinforcement immediately coming Intelligence on enemy troops ashore, their number and strength was severely lacking. Intel on enemy air power as well as naval units was also severely lacking For all intents and purposes, the US and her allies were going into the operation blind and with one, or damn near both, hands tied behind their back.  The Old Breed Assault troops would be the 1st Marine DivisionUnder the command of a brand-new MAJ GEN, Alexander Archer Vandegrift.57 Years Old, 34 years a MarineWickedly smart and intuitive, could grasp a situation and its necessities within seconds and make the right callExcellent judge of character and men, much like Nimitz, he was a quiet leader who always seemed to be optimistic about everything. 1st Mar Div was a brand-new unit, just recently formed, the division would be hamstrung by only having 2 of its 3 infantry regiments available for the initial assault1st and 5th Marines.  The 7th Marines were garrisoning Samoa at the time. On May 1, five days after the 7th sailed for Samoa, the 1st Mar Div was ordered to New Zealand to prepare to be the Landing Force of the SoPac Amphib ForceVandegrift’s regiments were NOT ready for action.5th Marines had been stripped of cadre and experienced men during the constitution of the 1st Raider BTLN.1st Marines were even less prepared although they had strong BTLN level leadershipThe bright spot for 1st Mar Div was the divisional artillery, the 11th Marines.Highly proficient, the 11th Marines fielded a wide variety of the newest artillery available…they would be needed…many many times over The vast majority of Marines assigned to the 1st Mar Div were young, very young.Average age was 19 years oldPost Pearl Harbor enlistees who believed in the Corps’ motto of First to Fight The division got the name Old Breed due to its cadre, which admittedly was small, but legendarySome WWI combat vets, recruiters, veterans of the banana wars, China Marines The division arrived in New Zealand on June 14On June 26, Vandegrift was told by Ghormley that his division would assault Tulagi and Guadalcanal on August 1 Due to a longshoreman’s strike in Wellington, the 1st Mar Div had to combat load their ships themselves, a task for which they were not skilled, nor had the proper time to complete.This would be HUGE later on… The PlanD-Day was set for August 1, for a variety of reasons D-Day would actually be August 71st and 5th Marines would assault Guadalcanal, while at the same time 4 rifle battalions, most Raiders, would assault and capture TulagiD-Day objective for Guadalcanal was the airfield and the “grassy knoll” (Mt Austen)The Navy would supply:Combat Group:3 CVs1 fast BB (BB55)9 CAs2 AA CLs31 DDs2 Royal Australian CAs and 1 CLAmphib Group13 transports6 cargo ships4 APDs5 Oilers The JapaneseAfter the defeat at Midway, the Japanese realized that strengthening their outer ring of defenses was now imperative.On May 28, several Japanese landed on Guadalcanal to inspect the areaShortly after that, and after Midway, the Japanese authorized Operation SN, which was to strengthen their outer perimeter of their advance by constructing airfields at key strategic points in Papua, the Louisades and the Solomons. On June 13, the Naval General Staff selected Guadalcanal as an air baseOn July 6, the first Japanese construction forces landed, and on the 20th, work began on the airfield The Japanese did not believe that the Allies could or would mount an offensive until 1943 at the earliestJapanese ADM Mikawa believed that the US would assault and occupy Guadalcanal before the Japanese could complete the airfield.His ideas were scoffed at Focus for the IJA and IJN lay on Port Moresby and the assault over the Owen Stanley Mountains, not the CanalFocus shifted back to Guadalcanal on July 31, when for a week, B-17s bombed Guadalcanal almost daily suggesting a pre-invasion bombardment Japanese did not believe, as a group, that Guadalcanal would be attacked.Their defensive forces were meager:Only 3457 men were on both Tulagi and Guadalcanal2571 were on GuadalcanalThey were almost as unprepared as was the US in terms of a ground attack or defenseThe IJN was significantly more prepared howeverBecause of Rabaul and its distance from Canal, the Japanese could and would attack the island and the ships offshore with long range medium bombers (Bettys) and Zero fighters The kickoffOn July 26, the fleet rendezvoused off Koro in the FijisThat afternoon McCain, Turner, Crutchley and Vandegrift all met aboard CV3Conspicuously absent was the overall CO, Ghormley who elected to not go to the meeting and therefore was deprived of any real operational plans of the overall operation until SEPTEMBERFletcher led the meetingVandegrift stated later that Fletcher seemed nervous, and was also “disconcertingly uninformed” about the landing plans Fletcher stated to all his subordinates that he felt that the plan would fail and blamed Turner who Fletcher said had no combat experience and as a result would hinder the operation to the extent of failure. Fletcher asked Turner how long it would take to unload the transports to which he replied 5 days.  Fletcher abruptly stated that he would pull his CVs after 2 days. He later said 3 days. After being given the context of the “meeting” by his aide Daniel Callahan, Ghormley essentially ignored the warnings that Fletcher seemed “scared” and proposed a faulty air support op from Efate that would never work and never was tried. Regardless of the inauspicious start, plans, intel, etc the operation was underway. CLOSER: Official USMC history states regarding the beginnings of WATCHTOWER, “Seldom has an operation been begun under more disadvantageous circumstances.”

Fleet Admiral Ernest King was Commander-in-Chief Fleet, or COMINCH, during most of World War II, and in 1942 assigned to also serve as Chief of Naval Operations or CNO.  As CNO he managed the Navy Staff, called OPNAV then (and still is), which allowed him to manage, among other things, all Navy investments in ships and aircraft, as well as all senior Navy officer assignments.  A funny aside before we jump in.  For some inexplicable reason, prior to King’s appointment, the Commander-in-Chief, US Fleet acronym was CinC-US, pronounced “sink-us.”  When King was appointed he thought the sink-us title was stupid, so he changed the acronym to COMINCH for Commander-in-Chief.   Although that acronym was better, President Franklin Roosevelt actually tried to talk King out of calling himself a “commander-in-chief,” saying the constitution only provided for one commander-in-chief and that was the president.  King said if he was ordered to change the title he would, but Roosevelt was reluctant to make a change like this as we were just entering the war.  So the commander-in-chief title stuck for Navy commanders, that is until Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld finally killed it in 2002 during the George W. Bush administration.   But getting back to World War II, it was King’s CNO job, not his COMINCH job, that gave him the authority, for example, over Navy administrative matters, such as the assignment of Admirals Spruance and Halsey to command 5th and 3rd Fleets respectively.  The CNO job also gave him a seat at the table with the Joint Chiefs of Staff or JCS, along with Generals Marshall, Arnold, and Admiral Stark, as well as the Combined Chiefs of Staff with our British allies.   The JCS was the body that approved the initiation of campaigns such as Guadalcanal. But it was the COMINCH job and not the CNO job that allowed King to actually command Navy and Marine forces during campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, with Admiral Chester Nimitz as his surrogate as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas. King was noteworthy for some personality traits as well.  One he was famous for was his legendary temper.General Eisenhower, for example, mostly known as an even-tempered man, once said, “Admiral King is an arbitrary, stubborn type with too much brain and a tendency toward bullying his juniors! But I think he wants to fight, which is vastly encouraging.”  But King was also known as someone who was not a fan of Great Britain.  Once President Roosevelt adopted a “Europe-First” policy, it was King’s job to divert naval forces preferentially to Eisenhower’s theater of operations.  But as King perceived the United Kingdom as dragging its feet in offensive operations in Europe, King took every opportunity to divert naval forces to the Pacific theater.  After all, in King’s mind it was Japan that attacked the US, and he realized that the longer we waited to neutralize the Japanese threat in the Pacific, the more entrenched and difficult to defeat they would become.  And so, the very first major amphibious landing in World War II was not North Africa as many people think, but Guadalcanal in the Pacific.  And that campaign was King’s idea.But King’s intransigence when it came to Europe led to another famous Eisenhower quote, where he says: “One thing that might help win this war is to get someone to shoot King. He's the antithesis of cooperation — a deliberately rude person —which means he's a mental bully.”Even King’s own daughter joined the chorus of opinion about her father.  When asked about King’s unpredictable personality, she said, “He is the most even tempered person in the United States Navy. He is always in a rage.”But personality foibles aside, in my view King gets a bad rap.  He was the main strategist for the Pacific war, and with Nimitz, for the island-hopping campaign that eventually won the war against Japan.  In that regard, at least when it comes to the Pacific theater of Operations, as we say in the title of this episode, history has shown that King was right about almost everything. Seth, we don’t want to do a biography here, but maybe a few things about King’s background: As did everyone, went to AnnapolisWas a surface officerInauspicious career early onPart of the Asiatic fleet as a LieutenantReturned to his ship the Cincinnati one day drunk & disorderly, his captain recorded it in his personnel record.  The Asiatic fleet commander at one time was Admiral Charles B. McVay, Jr, the father of the man who would become the skipper of USS Indianapolis cruiser during World War II.  But King’s behavior problems in the Asiatic are what led to the untrue rumor that King had a vendetta against Admiral McVay, that would cause him decades later to want to court-martial Captain McVay after the Indy was sunk, all despite the fact that when King got in trouble it was actually Admiral Henry Wilson in command of the fleet.  He went to submarine school as a captain in a class full of ensigns.  Nevertheless, unlike Chester Nimitz, King never finished his submarine qualification hence was never eligible to wear the highly sought after submarine dolphin insignia.At the age of 49, King later goes to flight training because he wants to understand this new device the airplane.  “Aviation is the coming thing in Navy.”  Pilots who went through late career flight training were referred to as “Johnny come lately’s” by aviators who spent their entire career in aviation.  Earned his wings, but then never again piloted an airplane alone.  But King does eventually command an aircraft carrier, the Lexington.“The damnest party man in the place.” Jumping to the war:Had been Atlantic fleetNamed COMINCH right after Pearl Harbor attackNamed CNO in March 1942With Nimitz, author of the island-hopping campaignWhen Briton dragged feet on North Africa landing, diverted naval forces to land in Guadalcanal, first major amphibious landing of the warCoral Sea and Guadalcanal personally selected by him to neutralize Japan’s thrust southKing would select strategic objectives, and initially King would get involved at the operational level “how to do it.”  Nimitz was selected by Roosevelt not King.  King didn’t trust him—referred to him as a “fixer”—until after Midway.After Midway, he would generally leave Nimitz to do the campaign and battle plans.  Nimitz would often bound the plan off of King before the plan was putting into effect. King’s responsibility spanned both Atlantic and Pacific, so it was a good thing when he decided he could trust NimitzKing had the notion that each successive thrust need to move the US closer and closer to mainland Japan, with engagements aimed at Japanese centers of gravity.  To that end, he supported an attack against Japanese forces in Formosa (Taiwan), not Philippines, because Taiwan enabled more direct strikes at the Japanese mainland and would shorten the path to victory.  The only reason to go back to Philippines was emotional—MacArthur’s “I shall return” declaration.MacArthur won the argument partly through a veiled threat that Roosevelt’s electability might suffer if he failed to retake the Philippines.  In any case, history has likely proven King to be right.Triple objectives: neutralize Japanese Navy through carrier warfare, isolate and strangle mainland Japan through submarine warfare, and seize islands that would enable the strategic bombing campaign to put pressure on mainland Japan.The island-hopping campaign eventually worked.   What was King wrong about?He supported Forrestal’s decision to court-martial Charles B. McVay.  This was a grave error that would haunt the Navy for 50+ years.

Briefly describe the actions of June 6 Discuss the attempted salvage and eventual sinking of Yorktown    -How does this sinking lay on the future plans for the war -Discuss why the perception exists that Spruance won the battle when Fletcher was the commander. Let’s talk about Mitscher and his cover up… -Discuss the Army’s claims and propaganda that they won the battle  -Discuss King’s reluctance to play the Navy’s story up -Let's talk about the overall implications of the battle:    -What does Midway actually allow the US to do now? -What does the loss of the battle mean to the Japanese in terms of plans and future strategy? -What does the defeat do to Yamamoto personally and professionally? -Why is Midway NOT the turning point of the war?

Aboard the Japanese CVsWhat is the morning looking like at this point aboard the CVs?What are the Japanese briefed about?When do they launch?Who is the strike leader?Talk about the flight into Midway…Aboard the American CVsReveille for US aircrews is at 0300, breakfast at 0400, ready rooms shortly after thatTalk about the anticipation in the ready roomsNervous energy Aboard Midway islandSearch planes take off around 0415Americans prepare for the battle they know is coming todayPlanes fueled and armedBert Earnest and his two dollar bill At 0545 a search plane sees the incoming strike and radios “Many Planes Heading Midway” PBY search planes sight Japanese CVs at 0552 Because of incoming aircraft and CV sighting, Midway scrambles damn near everything with wings by 0600 Japanese Midway strikeGive us the run-down of the Japanese attack on the island and the aerial encounters with the American fightersBill Brooks and his Brewster engage Japanese as they come into the island around 0616What are the effects of the Japanese strike on the island?Who decides another strike is needed?Why?When does Nagumo get word of another strike being needed?Take us through his decision making here Aboard the American CVs0645 Pilots Man Your Planes!Dusty KleissDon HoffSpruance on orders from Fletcher decides to launch at 0700CV6 launches and orbits the TF awaiting CV5 and her birdsUS CV strike launch is discombobulated and unorganized (clusterfuck is a good term but we shouldn’t say that)“Proceed on mission assigned” flashed to McCluskyHornet’s strikeStanhope Ring versus John Waldron As the American CVs strike is being launched, the first attackers from Midway see the Japanese CVs…Bert Earnest and Harry Ferrier in 8-T-1 attack HiryuThe B26s attack Akagi at almost the same timeTalk about the near miss by the B26 on Akagi’s bridge0800 VMSB-241 attacks Japanese fleetJapanese CAP proves to be incredibly deadly to these attacks While the Midway based aircraft are attacking the fleet, the Japanese are also attacked by a submarine Talk about the effects that the Nautilus attack on the fleet have as far as timing is concerned, and what do the Japanese do Nautilus’ attack, while not successful, is HUGE when it comes to the events that soon followArashi… Around 0840 the American attacks ceaseTalk about Nagumo’s timetable…What does it look like inside the hangar decks of the Japanese CVs right now?US VT attacks on Kido ButaiVT8 and VT6 shortly afterwards Let’s once and for all dispel the George Gay myth… The Flight to NowhereWhere the hell is HAG?What happens to them?Could they have helped?Tease the cover up by Mitscher for Ring to be discussed at length in the next episode EAG flight and McClusky’s decisionTalk about what is happening in the air right now What is McClusky thinkingWhat is happening to the SBD formation?McClusky’s decision to continue the searchSeeing Arashi…Set up the attack of EAG on Kaga and Akagi from Japanese and US sidesWhat is going on aboard the Japanese CVs right now?PLANES ON THE FLIGHT DECKS MYTH!Flash warning to KagaMcClusky breaks doctrine and attacks Kaga Attack on Kaga and AkagiEarl GallaherDusty KleissDon HoffAboard KagaBriefly discuss attacks on SoryuTalk about the damage done to Kaga, Akagi and SoryuJust how bad is it? Discuss the Hiryu strikes on CV5 Afternoon strike on HiryuLots of AAA this time and CAPDusty KleissDon Hoff Wrap up June 4 and tease the next episodeJapanese lossesUS losses

Talking Points: Sit Rep late May 1942What does the Pacific War look like right now?Any major changes?Doolittle RaidWhat is the reasoning behind the raid?What happens (briefly)What effects does the Doolittle Raid have…On the targets (actual combat results of the raid)On US plans and opsUS CVs high-tail it after launch to get back to PearlOn Japanese plans and ops… Japanese PlansBecause of the Doolittle Raid and the CV raids of Feb and March, what are the Japanese thinking at this time?What is Yamamoto’s conceived plan for the Midway Operation?What is the reasoning behind the plan…the ultimate goalWhy is the plan so complex and so reliant on timingLiterally everything had to go exactly according to plan for the Japanese plan to work as Yamamoto had it in his headDo you think that at this time the Japanese had brushed off the US as a second or even third-rate adversary?Was there a situational arrogance on the part of the Japanese?Why? Why not?Aside from Shokaku and Zuikaku not being able to take part in Midway, did Coral Sea and the efforts of the US CV pilots not kick off a light bulb in the collective Japanese heads in regard to the USN Nav Av prowess and abilities? Code BreakingWe have already done an episode on HYPO, but this period is really where they shine…Intel effects on Coral Sea“AF” and HYPO’s role in figuring out the target is indeed MidwayLet’s talk briefly on the whole AF water condenser myth, the reality, of course, was to convince DC, not the Japanese.King is barely convinced and allows Nimitz to do what he needs/wants to do US Preparations for battleNimitz throws everything but the kitchen sink at MidwayWhat units are on MidwayWhat forces does Nimitz send to Midway?Nimitz pays the atoll a visit before the battleWhile Midway’s defenses are, on paper, strong…are they really?Why not?What are the aces up Nimitz’s sleeve?CV6, CV5, and CV8Talk about the combat experience of Enterprise Air Group, Yorktown Air Group and Hornet Air GroupWho are the CAGs for each AG?McCluskyLeslieRingOne of Nimitz’s Aces, CV5, is damaged…The 72 hour repair myth Japanese Preparations for battleWhat forces do the Japanese plan to send to the fight?Who are the aviators aboard the CVs?Just how good are these people?Japanese attack on the AleutiansThe myth is that this was supposed to be a diversion…Of course it was not…but what exactly was it and why was it executed at this time?What were the goals of the Aleutians Op? US Plans for the Ambush What does the intel from HYPO and Layton tell Nimitz?What does he want to do?Point LuckHow will he and the US CVs go about ambushing Kido Butai?Midway’s role…The US CVs depart Pearl…Before CV6 leaves, Nimitz attends an awards ceremony on May 27 aboard The Big E.  He hands out decorations for Pearl Harbor and the carrier raidsIn handing a DFC to VF-6 pilot Roger Mehle, Nimitz tells him “I think you’ll have a chance to win yourself another medal in the next several days.”That very day, May 27, Nimitz executed OpPlan 29-42 which declared a state of “Fleet opposed Invasion”Nimitz’s OpPlan was devastatingly accurateA testament to HYPO and Layton’s diligence Night of June 3 Aboard MidwayLast minute preparationsBill BrooksBert EarnestLeon WilliamsonAboard the US CVsSleepless nightDusty KleissBud MerrillFred BergeronDon Hoff

While the hit and run carrier raids of February and March tested American carrier doctrine to an extent, and the Pearl Harbor raid as well as Indian Ocean raids tested Imperial Navy doctrine also to an extent, this is the very first time that both navies tested each other’s way of doing things, and in the process found things that worked, and things that well…didn’t work.  Let’s dig into it…Talking Points:• What sets off the battle of Coral Sea?o Outline Japanese plans for Operation MO Japanese wanted to seize Port Moresby and all of New Guinea.  By doing this, it would provide Japan with both a way to isolate Australia as well as New Zealand from allied supply lines, specifically American supply lines.  • Why Rabaul (Opeation R) wasn’t good enough This was to be prefaced by the Japanese capture of Tulagi, which is an island we will hear a lot about in the near future.  By capturing Tulagi, in the Solomons, the Japanese could patrol the area and the sea lanes to Port Moresby so as to allow their invasion force a free hand. As part of the Port Moresby invasion attempt, the invasion group was to be covered by two separate carrier groups, one which centered around the light carrier Shoho, and another which centered around the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.o US intel at Station HYPO and fleet radio unit Melbourne, or FRUMEL decrypt Japanese messages to an extent, and in turn believe that the Japanese will strike the area of Port Moresby, or the northern coast of Australia on or about the first week of May. As a result of this intel, Nimitz deploys the only two carrier task forces at his disposal at this time, those centered around USS Lexington, and USS Yorktown, TF 11 and TF 17 respectively, to stand by the area of the Coral Sea with designs to intercept and destroy the incoming Japanese invasion and support fleets.• On May 1 the two US CV TFs unite under the command of ADM Fletchero May 4, Fletcher detaches CV5 to attack recent Japanese positions on Tulagi CV5’s attacks are relatively successful, with damage inflicted on enemy positions and shipping in and around the harbor of Tulagi• US losses are minimal• By May 6, Fletcher is aware that Japanese CVs are in the area, and the Japanese invasion fleet is not far behind.  As a result, he detaches ADM Crace’s cruisers WITHOUT air cover to block the invasion force.o This is potentially a critical blunder by Fletcher.  Crace’s CAs could have been blown out of the water by Japanese CVs, as it was, they were attacked three times by Japanese aircraft and once by MacArthur’s B17s.   Japanese reports stated that they had sunk a BB, damaged a second BB and a CA.  Japanese sent no further attacks towards Crace.  His vessels survived due to poor Japanese (and American) accuracy as well as his skillful maneuvering.   The sighting of the supposed BBs by the Japanese informed the invasion fleet to reverse course Still a horrible decision by Fletcher• First day of the carrier battle May 7• Early on the morning of the 7th, Japanese launch searches to find US CVso Japanese scout planes from Shokaku find US ships and radio ADM Tagaki of 1 CV, 1 CA, and 3 DD. What the Japanese actually sight is the detached oiler Neosho and her escort DD Sims.  • How did the Japanese pilot screw this up this bad?• Japanese arrive over oiler and DD, realize their mistake and continue their search, they return and attack and sink Sims and force Neosho to be abandonned• At 0815 a CV5 SBD piloted by John Nielsen finds the Japanese screening force under ADM Goto, which includes light carrier Shoho.  o An error in Nielsen’s coding made the message read 2 Japanese CVs instead of 1.• Fletcher loses his mind on Nielsen when he lands and clarifies his message Believing this to be the main Japanese CV force, Fletcher launches everything he has.  • 93 aircraft are flung at Shohoo 18 F4Fs, 53 SBDs, 22 TBDs from CV2 and CV5• Lexington Air Group, under Bill Ault arrive over Shoho firsto The SBDs attack first, and score at least 2 bomb hits and the TBDs score 5 torpedo hits This is the only real successful TBD attack of WW2• Lex AG executes a hammer and anvil attack and leave Shoho a wreck Talk about Walt Nelson and Ted Wiebe• Yorktown Air Group arrive next and continue to pummel Shoho.o Estimated 11 bombs and 2 more torpedoeso She is barely afloat as US aircraft leave and is gone by 1135• Lexington VB2 CO, Bob Dixon sent a prearranged radio signal back to Fletcher that simply said, “Scratch One Flattop”• Second day of the carrier battle May 8• Both Japanese and US locate each other almost simultaneouslyo US launch first at 0900, Japanese at 0915 Opposing forces actually pass each other on the way to their targets• US attack Japanese firsto The well-coordinated attack of May 7 gives way to the mess of May 8 US aircraft have trouble finding the targets due to squally weather• When they do find them, they can’t coordinate their attacks as the previous day Yorktown aircraft under Bill Burch find and attack Shokaku.• The ship is moving radically but is still hit with 2 1,000 pound bombs which puts her flight deck out of action.• Lex Air Group attacks and half of her SBDs find Shokaku and attack, hitting her once, the other half of the attackers from Lex can’t find the ship.• All TBD torpedo attacks by both Air Groups miss their targets or the weapons fail to explode• Japanese attack on US fleet• Enemy is picked up 68 nautical miles away by US radaro Poorly executed fighter direction operations positioned the US CAP too low to intercept the incoming enemy strike.• One of the stranger aspects of Coral Sea is that SBDs were utilized as anti-torpedo plane CAPo The assumption was that the Japanese Kate was as slow and sluggish as the TBD, which was obviously false One of the anti-VT pilots was Swede Vejtasa• Talk about Swede’s dogfight against Zuikaku aircraft• Despite the best efforts of the US CAP, the Japanese break througho The Kates attack CV5 and miss, yet a hammer and anvil attack against CV2 succeeds CV2 turned like a whale and could not evade the torpedoes.  • She takes two on her port side, one ruptures her avgas tanks, which eventually seal her fateo The Vals attack Lex and hit her twiceo The Vals attack Yorktown and hit her severely damaging her as well• Lexington goes downo Avgas fumes spread throughout the ship, it is thought that a spark from a DC powered motor ignited the fumes which eviscerated the internals of the ship, starting uncontrollable fires. The first major explosion kills Lex’s main DC party IF WE HAVE THE TIME, LET’S GO THROUGH LEX’S DEATH• Outcomeo Coral sea is technically a draw Seen as US strategic victory in that it is the first time the Japanese are stopped• Port Moresby is not invaded, and the Japanese expansion, at least for now, is checked Tactical defeat for the US Navy• Losing Lex in exchange for Shoho is not acceptable in any wayo Poor FDO operations stationing CAP too low and out of place contributed to losing Lexo Poor design (prewar design) heavily contributed to Lex’s losso Poor US coordination on the morning attack against Shokaku and Zuikaku allowed both to escape the battle Sho and Zui would be unavailable for the Midway operation• Sho due to damage and Zui due to heavy aircrew losseso What lessons do we learn regarding future operations?

If Seth and I were to define the two main thrusts of our podcast “The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War,” it would be (1) to correct some of the mythology that has emerged over decades, and (2) to see what lessons might be gleaned that could be important were war to break out in the Pacific again.In my view, our subject for today falls into the second category, because it’s about the impact of strategic alignment and chains of command on operational success.Station Hypo was one of three main stations the Navy used to listen to and break Japanese naval codes.  Hypo was the phonetic word for the letter “H,” which stood for Hawaii since Station Hypo was the code breaking office located in the basement of the Hawaii Naval District commander’s building in Pearl Harbor.  As an aside, I visited those rooms when I was commodore in Pearl, and they were being used to store furniture for the Pearl Harbor shipyard headquarters building, but we will leave that for another potential future discussion on what’s happened to all these historic sites over the decades.But germane to this conversation, in the early months of the war the Naval District Hawaii commander reported, not to Admiral Nimitz, but to Admiral King directly.  That would be corrected in the coming months, but since Station Hypo supported combat operations in the Pacific, Admiral Nimitz certainly thought of it as one of his assets, while Admiral King’s staff in Washington saw it as solely and completely theirs, to include Station Hypo’s brilliant leader, Commander Joe Rochefort.This led to a chain of command problem that would ultimately lead to Rochefort’s dismissal as head of Station Hypo, even after his incredible success leading to our victory at Midway.To help us unpack all of this, to include how Station Hypo fed both King’s and Nimitz’s strategic picture, we are proud to host the chief historian of the Navy and Director of Naval History and Heritage Command, retired Rear Admiral Sam Cox.Admiral Cox, welcome. Station HYPO:What was HYPO?Initially known as Fleet Radio Unit Pacific, or FRUPACHawaii location for the Navy’s cryptanalysts who monitored radio intel of the Japanese.HYPO was one of two major stations for Allied radio intel, the other being in Melbourne, Australia.Under the command of DC, not Nimitz, or Kimmel for that matter.Conspiracy theory that HYPO never had a PURPLE machine, and therefore was unable to read Japanese traffic pre-Pearl Harbor.NOT TRUE.  Purple was the diplomatic code, not the Naval code so HYPO had no reason to have the PURPLE machine in the first place.  It would not have helped them in any way. HYPO’s mission after Pearl Harbor, was to decipher the Japanese JN-25 code. Prior to Pearl, HYPO was to decipher flag officer’s code and weather codesWashington worked on JN25 initiallyHow much of the code was readable? Prior to Pearl, they had successfully broken a part of the code, only 10% before the attack.  Who was HYPO’s CO and what kind of a man was he?Joseph Rochefort was a Naval enlistee, who never graduated high school.  He enlisted in 1918, lied about his age and was later commissioned an Ensign in 1919.  Spent several years at sea as well as a year in Tokyo as a language officer.He began work in Cryptanalysis in 1926Rochefort was assigned as head of HYPO in March 1941 by Intel officer Laurance Safford.Brilliant man who had a knack for solving crossword puzzles and figuring out different types of word puzzles.WAS NOT an eccentric as has been shown in movies.YES, he wore a smoking jacket while at work, only because it had pockets for his pipe and tobaccoYES, he wore slippers at work because the concrete floors of the “dungeon” hurt his feet while he paced around trying to figure out messages.HYPO was different than most Naval assignments of the era…how so?Many of the staff of codebreakers were handpicked men by RochefortNot much in the way of military disciplineThere was no real system of work, the men were allowed to play their hunches in order to decrypt the information and if that included throwing false messages around to confirm something so be it.There was quite a bit of guesswork involved.Men worked round the clock.  Rochefort himself rarely went home, often slept on a cot in his office.  Most men worked 12 hour shifts, 7 days a week. How was the JN25 code eventually “broken” what was the process?There were over 50,000 five-digit numeral groups to decipherCodebreakers didn’t necessarily break the code as they actually started to see patterns in the messages and began to plug and play if you will, the different patterns together until something began to take shape.LCDR Thomas Dyer had an uncanny knack for seeing patterns in messages, he said, “if you observe something long enough, you’ll see something peculiar. If you can’t see something peculiar, if ou stare at it long enough, that in itself is peculiar.  And then you try to explain the peculiarity.” Traffic analysis           Traffic analysis played a large part in the “codebreaking”Reading and noticing a pick up Japanese traffic in certain areas of the Pacific would help determine where and how large of an enemy activity was planned or taking shape.This very trick allowed the Hit and Run Raids on the Marshalls on Feb 1 to take placeCryptanalysts got to where they could tell which Japanese radioman sent which message, and in turn could decipher which ship, or station had sent the message, thereby allowing the intel group to piece together the information that could lead to Rochefort’s team saying whether or not a carrier group was deploying under which admiral and from where. Was the information provided trusted?Initially, no.  Admirals like King, specifically King, did not initially trust cryptanalysis.Most of the info they were providing seemed to be guessworkAdmiral Nimitz, however, DID trust the intel, and specifically trusted Rochefort and Edwin Layton.This of course, proved very fruitful…