Conversations on Strategy Podcast

Commander of the Canadian Army Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright discusses the Canadian Army, modernization, Ukraine, technology, and more. Listen in for insights about the Canadian Army, its mission, its future, and how America’s neighbor to the north partners with the United States.  Keywords: Canada, Arctic, Canadian Army, technology, modernization Stephanie Crider (Host)You are listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.Lieutenant General Michael C. Wright, commander of the Canadian Army, is joining me remotely today. Wright enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 1990 as an infantry officer. He has commanded from platoon to brigade and Joint task force levels. He served in Bosnia, Afghanistan, and the Middle East, as well as in Canada. On promotion to Lieutenant General in July 2024, he was appointed as the commander of the Canadian Army.Welcome to Conversations on Strategy, sir. Thank you for joining me.Lieutenant General Michael C. WrightStephanie, thanks very much for the invitation. [I am] really looking forward to this.HostI'd like to open our discussion with land warfare and modernization. Looking at the last three years of fighting in Ukraine, what are your most important takeaways regarding the evolution of land warfare, and how is the Canadian Army modernizing to meet this moment?WrightThanks, Stephanie.The Canadian Army, like all of our close allies, are paying very close attention to what’s happening on the battlefield in Ukraine. I think I’ll start with three key takeaways and then how it’s shaping what the Canadian Army is doing.The first one is that it has proven that Landpower absolutely matters. Landpower in terms of the conventional large-scale combat operations capability absolutely matters, which is really driving the modernization effort that we’re doing within the Canadian Army. Not only for the capabilities that we’re trying to bring in, but also for the wholesome review of our force structure that we’ve engaged in.The second one—and this is one that I actually spend a lot of time thinking about and, frankly, worrying about—is how rapidly technology is evolving on the battlefield. Just looking at drones, for example, the multiple iterations of drones, how they are used—how they’re use for reconnaissance, how they’re used for strike—has changed so many times over the past three plus years, and knowing the challenges that we have in many of our militaries in keeping up with innovation and procuring the equipment that we need in the right time frame.The third key take away is following on from that rapidly evolving technology, we certainly see the importance of precision, but I always like to remind people that it is not a binary decision between precision or mass. We actually need precision and mass because—I’ll go back to the first part—Landpower matters. And in fact, I think one of the major reasons why we’re seeing this conflict, this war, go on over three years is because that decisive Landpower has not been—certainly in the past year to year and a half—has not been able to be applied at the level that’s required to see a decisive victory by either side.HostThese are big enough challenges in the present, and I know you’re working a lot on modernization and looking into the future. Can you talk a little bit about your vision for the Canadian Army?WrightMy vision of the Canadian Army is really building upon the great work that was done by my predecessors. Immediately before coming into command of the Canadian Army, the focus of my predecessor, Lieutenant General Joe Paul, was very understandably on making the transition from our primary force-generation mission, the multinational brigade in Latvia, setting the conditions to move from the battle group level up to the brigade level. What I’m trying to do is the great work that was done there to ensure that all those capabilities that are being put in place in our mission in Latvia are actually going to be able to be scaled across the Canadian Army.The vision that I’ve laid out is that we need to make sure that we are a credible, interoperable, digitally transformed, modern Army that's capable of offering the government of Canada with agile and scalable options for employment in competition, in crisis, or in conflict. The way that I’ve divided that up in terms of priorities are modernization, reconstitution, and readiness, and it’s a deliberate ordering of those priorities because we need to modernize, and we need to reconstitute our forces both in terms of people and equipment before we can augment our level as readiness.If you want, I can talk a little bit about the modernization effort that we’ve embarked upon.HostI’d love to hear a little bit about that, please.WrightAbsolutely. Certainly, part of our modernization effort is a wholesale modernization of the capabilities we have in the Canadian Army. We are actually going through the largest modernization since the turn of the century, and that modernization that we did at the turn of the century really set the conditions for the decade plus that we spent in the counterinsurgency fight in Afghanistan, and then, certainly, the operations we were involved with in the Middle East. We have 47 major capital projects, but we all know, and you don’t have to learn this at War College, you can’t go around saying, “I have 47 priorities.” So, the way I describe it are there are four plus one, which are incredibly important for the future of the army. Those four are long-range precision strike; this is a capability that Canada has never had. It’s a capability that will, first of all, be incredibly important as part of that NATO mission in Latvia. But, it’s also a capability that has a continental and Canadian Defense nexus to it.The second one is ground-based air defense [GBAD]. This is actually a capability that Canada had, but then we divested earlier this century, and certainly lessons learned from Ukraine show the incredible importance of ground-based air defense. Luckily, there we’re already seeing the fielding of some dismounted systems in Latvia, but we’re moving aggressively to bring both dismounted and mounted systems into Latvia, but then also to field them across the Canadian Army and again including GBAD, being a perfect example of where that has a role in the defense of Canada.The third one is modernization of our indirect fire. So, that’s everything from our mortars up to what is going to be the eventual replacement for our M777 [howitzer 155mm artillery]. I think it’s going to be a self-propelled howitzer. Certainly, as we look at whether it’s the US Army or our closest allies around NATO, they’re all going the self-propelled howitzer route. So, I think that’s where we’ll end up going.The fourth one is actually directly tied to our defense policy update that our government put out last April, Our North, Strong and Free, which really emphasize the importance of the continent, but then [it includes] Canada and the Arctic for our national defense. And so, that’s domestic and Arctic mobility and enhancement, which is basically having the vehicles that allow us to be mobile and survivable in the Arctic.Now, I said “plus one,” and that plus one is making sure—it’s one thing to get all of those capabilities in, but we need to make sure that we have the command, control, and communication systems to allow us to integrate them across the Canadian Army, across our Canadian Armed Forces, and probably most importantly with our allies, whether that’s in a NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], a NATO, or another partnership perspective.HostI’m really glad that you brought up the Arctic. My next question is about America and Canada. We have shared interests in the Arctic, including security and economic development. Tell me a little bit more about the collaborative efforts between our two countries and maybe share your thoughts on them.WrightAbsolutely. And, it’s interesting because I was on a panel earlier today where I was side by side with the commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force. If he was here, he would talk to you about the importance of our binational relationship, really a unique binational relationship that we have with the United States through NORAD. Traditionally, from the Canadian Armed Forces perspective, we’ve looked more at the Air Force, and then, over the past decade, the Navy as well, because it’s not only that aerospace, but also maritime approaches [that we need in the Arctic]. But I think it’s important for me to be able to express to our government the role that the Canadian Army can play in continental defense.I spoke a little bit about some of the capabilities that we’re pursuing and how that will involve the Army more in terms of that homeland defense. It’s also for the Canadian Army right now, we represent the only permanent posture, or the only permanent presence, in the Canadian Arctic with our Rangers [a component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserve]. Now, our Rangers are not like American [US Army ] Rangers or even [the Swedish Army Rangers]. I had the opportunity to visit Sweden last month and saw their Ranger regiment. What our Rangers are a force of 5,000 people who are located in over 200 isolated and coastal communities in the north and the Arctic. And, in fact, 1,800 of them are actually north of the Arctic Circle.What they do provide for us is presence [and] sovereignty. We’re ensuring that we are tying them closer into reporting so we’re able to plug into that domain awareness that we have in the Arctic. But, they’re also incredibly important for us, not only in terms of the relationships they have with the communities in the north and in the Arctic, but also as we send up members of both our regular force and reserve forces to train, we rely a lot on the Canadian Rangers for their knowledge of the land, of the customs, and for how we can not only be able to fight, but to survive in a harsh climate like that.HostYou mentioned a few minutes ago continental defense. How do the United States and Canada work together to defend the continent?WrightThe simplest answer to that is we work together through NORAD, a long existing binational relationship. Again, the Army has not traditionally played a large part in that when you look at the over 300, I believe it is, Canadians who are serving in NORAD. [It is] much more heavily weighted on the Air Force and on the Navy side—particularly the Air Force. But, it’s absolutely an area that as we look at the future of making investments, and I’ll note we’re recording this podcast on the 19th of March, yesterday, in only his fourth full day on the job, our new prime minister, Mark Carney, along with the minister of national defence, and our chief of the defence staff, were up in the Arctic talking about not only investments that are being made in terms of the modernization of the over-the-horizon radar systems, but also giving more opportunities for training that’s being done in the Arctic. That’s where, again, I return to the role of the Canadian Rangers, but also, with us sending up our Arctic response company groups, sending up members of the regular conventional Army to do training up North, and in fact, just over the last month we’ve had two large-scale exercises in the Arctic: Operation NANOOK, which is controlled by our Canadian Joint Operations Command and then NOREX [Northern Exercise], which is an opportunity we have for one of our divisions to exercise their Arctic response company group. Both of those exercises took place with American forces. In one case, the USAF [US Air Force] National Guard and some Navy divers. And, in the other case, the US Army working side by side.We also benefit from a great relationship we have with [11th] Airborne Division in Alaska. We actually have [a] deputy commanding general in the division, who’s a Canadian. And regularly, now, we are sending Canadian elements through JPMRC [Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center] in Alaska, which gives us not only a fantastic training opportunity, but the absolute importance of ensuring that we are well connected and interoperable with our closest ally.HostIn a perfect world, do you see a place where we could do better working together, America and Canada?WrightOf course, there’s always ways that we can improve. I think the area that I’m really looking forward to working [on] with the United States Army is I spoke about the modernization that we’re going through and, particularly when we’re talking about those command, control, communication systems, we want to work hand in hand with the United States Army. Just last week, I was out in Fort Irwin, California, for Project Convergence Capstone 5 [PCC5]. I was excited about going there last week. I can tell you I’m even more excited about [Project Convergence Capstone] PCC6 happening next year because I have a clear vision as to what the areas [are] that I’d like the Canadian Army to bring innovation and experimentation [to] next summer.I spoke a little bit earlier about our force structure review. We do not, in Canada right now, have what, certainly, our American listeners would consider to be a division. We do have four divisions within the Canadian Army, but they’re very much administrative and regionally based and with capabilities such as long-range precision strike. Those are capabilities that are very much going to rest at the division level. So, we are actively going through a holistic review of our structure, with a view to knowing that we need to be able to generate a war-fighting division headquarters. So, my focus for PCC6 is going to be what do we need to do within the Canadian Army to make sure that not only we have the proper technology, the proper procedures to field that division headquarters, but also to make sure it is able to integrate with our allies?HostWe just covered, very broadly, some really big topics. We have a little extra time if there’s anything you'd like to revisit or expand on.WrightYeah. Stephanie, maybe if there’s just a thought I could end off with: It’s great to be down here in Washington [DC]. This is an annual event we have where we celebrate the long-standing partnership and the close relationship that we have with all elements of the United States military and the Department of Defense. I don’t think it’s ever been as important as it is now. Certainly, when we look at the trajectory of the war in Ukraine, when we look at the potential impacts that could have on our mission—Canada’s largest NATO deployment with the forward land forces in Latvia—and that overall collective defense and deterrence on NATO’s eastern flank, it’s incredibly important to maintain the strong military-to-military relationships that we’ve enjoyed for decades. Geography will not change. We remain neighbors and we will remain incredibly close allies between the Canadian Army and the United States Army.HostWhat a great thought to end on. Thank you so much for making time to speak with me today.WrightHey, thank you, Stephanie. It’s been a real pleasure.HostListeners, for more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and a Better Peace.

TranscriptThis podcast was recorded on January 28, 2025, and updated on February 11, 2025.In this episode, Dr. R. Evan Ellis discusses the Panama Canal, including its history and significance to the United States, China’s involvement in the region, and Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Panama in February 2025.Keywords: Panama Canal, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, China, trade, President Jimmy CarterStephanie Crider (Host)You’re listening to Conversations on Strategy. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the guests and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government.I’m happy to be here today with Dr. Evan Ellis. Ellis is a professor of Latin American studies at the Strategic Studies Institute at the United States Army War College.First, I just want to welcome you back. I know that we’ve been talking for a while about recording another podcast. Thank you for making time to join me for another Conversations on Strategy.Dr. Evan EllisStephanie, it’s a pleasure to be part of the program today. Thanks for having me.HostSo, we’re talking about Panama today. I’d like to really dig in and get a better understanding of things here. What did the original agreement regarding the Panama Canal say?EllisWell, by “original agreement,” of course, we’re talking about the agreement on September 7th, 1977, in which President [Jimmy] Carter agreed with President [Martín ] Torrijos of Panama to, essentially, return the Panama Canal and, in turn, Panama agreed to, essentially, defend and maintain and operate the canal. So, there are really two components of this. One, which is the more commonly known Panama Canal Treaty, which made arrangements for the return, again, at the end of December 31st, 1999, although there were different enclaves that the United States was able to hold on to after that point and that one by one [it] released or turned over to Panama in an organized fashion. Panama then, in turn, agreed to defend the canal and to operate the canal. Indeed, Article 4 of the treaty that talks about its obligations for protection and defense is a very important component of that, and that also served [as] the basis for the military coordination that we have today with Panama, in which we not only work with their border service SENAFRONT but also the air and naval service SENAN, international police, and also conduct one of the largest military exercises, multilateral exercises, that we conduct in the hemisphere, which is the two-part PANAMAX exercise.But, it’s also important to note that aside from the Panama Canal Treaty itself, there was a second related treaty invoked the same day—the Neutrality Treaty—and that made provisions that the Panama government would operate this in what was referred to as a just and equal or equitable fashion and at what was called a reasonable fashion from the perspective of rates. In other words, the commitment on the Panamanian side was not only to ensure that all nations, the United States, China, et cetera, had access to it but also that the rates that it would charge would not prejudice one country or another—that even though you could have different rates for different classes of ships at different times—but, essentially, every country would have equal right and prioritization. Now, having said that, there are some important exceptions to that. Number one is pointing out that essentially, US military warships get to go to the head of the queue, and there’s also a separate related Treaty of Montería, which actually gives the Colombian government and the Costa Rican government [the] right to have free access or free use of the canal. So, there’s a number of different little-known details but, really, the bottom line is the turnover of the canal but [also] the corresponding responsibility for neutral operation access for all to use it.HostHow is the canal used today, and how is its use different from America’s original understanding with Panama?EllisThat’s a great question. And, really, even when the Panama Canal was given back by the treaty by President Carter with President Torrijos, the canal’s use was already then evolving. But, when the canal was first built, and as it was used, especially during World War II and in the post-war period, it was initially largely about US commercial movements and military movements between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Now, a couple things have happened since then. First of all, global containerized shipping has become much more important. One of the primary uses back in those earlier days was largely about the Pacific and Atlantic [coasts] of the United States. Today, the Panama Canal has become a global shipping hub. Although the primary traffic is that which goes between the East Coast of the United States and Asia, you also find that traffic going between Asia and Europe has a certain role, also, between various other points that involve the use of the canal.But also, the composition and volume of shipping has increased. First of all, from the time of the signing of the treaty, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of transits. In 2024, there were a total of about 11,240 transits—according to the Panama Canal Authority—a total of 210 million long tons. But also, there have been [an] increase in use by the Panama Canal by larger ships—so, what is now called the Post-Panamax category. And so, you’re looking at 14,500 TEU [twenty-foot equivalent unit] ships in terms of bulk carriers and others, [including] some of the very big LNG [liquified natural gas] carriers that take US LNG from East Coast terminals to Asia to customers that really need that US LNG like Japan and others. And so, those uses are different from what was initially contemplated.Also, beyond just serving as a transit point, Panama itself, through the port of Colón and through logistics staging areas like Panama Pacífico, has become an important logistics hub for companies that want to warehouse and distribute their products from the Panama Canal.Now, finally, [it is] important to note that while there was that initial importance of the military access, especially by the US military to the canal, and while, if there were ever a war in the Pacific, it would be important for the US to get certain smaller or mid-size ships from the Atlantic to the Pacific or, frankly, certain sustainment items or deployment items—especially heavier cargo—through the canal, at the end of the day, certain categories of ships (for example, carriers) do not transit the canal. And also, the deployment concept is arguably somewhat less reliant on the canal than it used to be—although in military terms it is still substantially important, especially as we look at the possibility of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific.HostTell me a little bit more about how the Panama Canal contributes to international trade and economies.EllisFirst, it’s useful to understand that as international shipping has become increasingly globalized, especially containerized shipping, that you have a series of international logistics you’d refer to as hubs or choke points. Of course, one is the Straits of Malacca, just outside of China. One, of course, being the Suez Canal and, of course, Panama, then, being the third of those major three. But, as I noted before, the function of Panama is not just as a logistics choke point but also as a transit hub for the transfer and on loading and offloading of cargo for, again, the warehousing of certain types of cargo for distribution throughout the region. And, beyond its role as a logistics center, [it also has] a role as an international financial center. And oftentimes, the commerce that you find moving through the canal and warehoused there, there’s actually a tie to some of those financial operations of Panama as an international banking center.Again, in terms of overall volume, you can point out that only about 5 percent of all international shipping actually moves through the canal. And yet, at the same time, if you look from a US standpoint, again, about two-thirds of everything that goes through the canal actually either starts at, or ends at, a US port. And so, especially for that traffic going from the East Coast of the United States, and secondarily the East Coast of South America—countries such as Brazil—connecting to Asia, it is substantially important, and any disruption to the canal—as we saw during the period of drought where it had to restrict throughput just last year—any type of restriction has a really adverse impact on those flows [in] which the East Coast of the United States and others rely.HostHow did China enter the picture? I’ve heard comments in the news about China and the Panama Canal.EllisIt’s a great question, and it really occurred in stages. First of all, understanding that as China increasingly engaged as the manufacturing factory floor of the world, especially in the 1990s and expanding in the 2000s with its entry in 2001 in the World Trade Organization, the role of Chinese products needing to access US East Coast and Latin American East Coast destinations were increasingly important. During that period, you had Chinese shipping companies (such as China Shipping and COSCO, which eventually merged) becoming increasingly important as users of the canal behind the United States and in conjunction with other partners such as the Japanese and the Chileans. But, in the context of the turnover of the Panama Canal—again, December 31st, 1999—to Panamanian authorities, so the Panama Canal Authority, the question was as they moved towards that period, well, who would operate ports on the Atlantic and Pacific? Who would get those concessions? And so, there was a deal that was somewhat criticized for a lack of transparency at the time in which Hong Kong–based Hutchison Whampoa [Limited] was given one of what was eventually three ports on the Cristóbal side and one of two on the Balboa side. As Hutchison proceeded through, and in conjunction with, COSCO as a user of the canal, it built a relationship with the Panama Canal Authority, and China increasingly got involved in Panama.Now, it’s also useful to remind the listeners that this was not the first time that ethnic Chinese had been in Panama. Indeed, ethnic Chinese had been brought over to Panama in the mid-nineteenth century to work on the railroads and eventually other projects. But, when we look at the expanding role of China, of course, one of the big moments was in the run-up to the change in recognition. About two years before recognition, there’s a question of allowing yet another Chinese port operator to establish a presence on the Colón side. This was a somewhat shady consortium called [the] China Land Bridge that was coming in to build a new operation, which was going to be called the Panama Colón Container Port. Again, there were a lot of issues involving the way in which the deal was signed and the supporting construction of infrastructure—like an LNG-fired power plant.But, in the context of some of those preliminary agreements, the real takeoff occurred in 2017, when the government of Juan Carlos Varela, who had previously served in a government position working in China and who recognized the power commercially of China for Panama, decided to switch relations from Taiwan to the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. This allowed a dramatic jump in the Chinese commercial role and in engagement in a variety of different areas. Initially, there were 19 nontransparent MOUs [memorandums of understanding] signed between the new PRC government and the Varela government in Panama. And, at the time, it seemed like Chinese activity was just rapidly exploding everywhere. You had the use of a company locally known as China Construction Americas that built a vast, shiny new convention center near Panama City. You had talk of a $4 billion China-built bullet train. You had the Panama Canal container port that I mentioned before. You had a new power plant that was going to be built and the power transmission line (under questionable conditions) to support the new Chinese operations. You had a cruise ship terminal, which was being built up by the Chinese on the Pacific side of the canal [and] which was kind of curious because it was an area where you didn’t have, really, a lot of market things that new cruise ships would actually want to see. And then, you had some symbolically worrisome things such as, for example, the Varela government was going to allow the Chinese to put its new embassy on a hill over what’s known as the Amador Peninsula. Symbolically, that meant that as ships approached the canal from the Pacific, basically looking at the entrance of the canal, the first thing that they would see at the entrance of the canal was a big red Chinese flag on the hill there, over the Amador Peninsula.If you added that to the role of China in purchasing copper from a major new Canadian-run copper mine that was starting up by a company by the name of First Quantum [Minerals Ltd.] and then negotiation by China of a free-trade agreement that also accelerated Chinese companies coming into both Colón and other places like Panama Pacific, you had the Chinese digital technology telecom company Huawei [Telecom Limited] expanding a big distro center on that side. And so, there was a moment in which it seemed that the Chinese presence was taking off.To kind of bring this to a where we’re at today, it’s of use to note that because of the sense that Panama had gotten itself on the bad side of the relations with the United States under the rule of the Varela government, Panama had an election in which voters chose a change. The new government of [Laurentino] “Nito” Courtizo basically gave a new look to a number of Chinese projects. And so, the Panama Colón container port collapsed. The bullet train project went away. The fourth power line was reconsidered. Work on the free-trade agreement was stopped. Although one of the things that did happen is under questionable terms. That lease, which comes to be an important part of the story later—Hutchison’s 25-year operating lease to operate on both sides of the Panama Canal was renewed under questionable conditions. And then, of course, COVID hit about the same time, which slowed the projects down a lot.And so, again, what you really had was an explosion that largely occurred under the Varela administration, which slowed down but did not stop completely under the Cortizo administration. And now, today, with the current government of José Raúl Mulino, you have the relationship continuing to evolve through smart cities, safe cities, projects, and possibly the regeneration of the FTA [free-trade agreement].That’s kind of how we got where we are today in terms of a relatively massive Chinese presence. [There is] a lot of people-to-people contexts that go with that presence, and thus concern over what that all means in terms of China’s position of influence with respect to the Chinese government both in peacetime and if there ever [is] a military conflict in the Indo-Pacific.HostWhat does all of this mean for America, then?EllisThat’s a great question, and as you point out, this is something that often times people misunderstand. And so, what I have long argued is that there are both challenges and implications for the United States and the region in peacetime and if we ever have a war in the Indo-Pacific. Now, the issue in peacetime is the broader context of PRC-based companies as they seek to extend their operations in global logistics and in commercial penetration and capture as much of the value added [as] possible as they extend into Central America, into Mexico, as they extend their construction operations. A lot of those companies are based in Panama or have logistics and distribution hubs in Panama. A number have financial operations in Panama. And so, Panama [is] a base where they have a relatively good relationship with the government, have headquarters operations, a warehousing operation, that really facilitates the broader penetration of Chinese commercial (and with it, related human networks in influence) throughout the hemisphere.At the same time, however, [as the] Department of Defense, and if you look at it from the perspective of US Southern Command (that has responsibility for the area encompassed by Panama and the canal) if we ever found ourselves in a conflict, you have to prepare for what your principal adversary—we have to presume here, that would involve, largely, the People’s Republic of China—might do not just in the in the Indo-Pacific but in other parts of the world to try to impede the US ability to project and sustain power in a fight in the Indo-Pacific. And so, to that end, when you look at a map, you see things that are competent, and often clever adversaries in the People’s Liberation Army might think about [them]. And, one of those things is how, by shutting down the Panama Canal and in [undeniable] ways, you could impede US deployment and sustainment flows in the movement of some forces from the Atlantic to the Pacific in a way that might limit the number of forces or the amount of ammunition to support those forces that could get to support Taiwan in such a fight and, thus, give the PRC an opportunity to push Taiwan to surrender before substantial forces could come.To that end, one of the things that’s most misunderstood is it’s not the control of those two port operations in Cristóbal and Balboa by Hutchison Port Holdings [Trust] that is critical. It is the broader Chinese presence in the region that creates options for the Chinese. And I’ll use a pithy example: During the Second World War when we were fighting Japan, the empire of Japan actually had a crazy program where they were trying to build a huge submarine with an underwater aircraft deck. And, the idea was to have a submarine that could get close enough to the Panama Canal to launch an aircraft that could then launch one bomb that could theoretically shut down the canal.If you think about all the things that the Japanese were willing to do during World War II just to get close enough to have one bomb go against the Panama Canal, think about the fact that Chinese companies not only operate on the port on both sides but have commercial operations in those staging areas, again, in Colón in Panama Pacific, the construction of bridges, et cetera. And so, the danger is that the Chinese today, through their commercial presence, have the operational knowledge plus the physical access that one would need to do any type of deniable, mischievous operations that could at least temporarily shut down the canal. Whether that would be to sink a ship into one of the narrow parts like Culebra Cut or sink a ship or detonate explosives in one of the locks themselves or do a cyberattack against the locks or mine part or all of the canal or even put ships at risk as they’re waiting at the entrance or exit to the canal. The number of things that one could do are numerous but, at the end of the day, the key point is that it’s not the PLA physically being in the canal today, but it is the access that they have through their ample commercial presence that creates those opportunities that they could exploit in wartime, in relatively quick but deniable ways.HostLet’s say that America decides to reclaim the Panama Canal. What would that potentially look like?EllisThat’s a great question, and there are different layers to this, and I would start with the legal issues, military issues, and what I would call negotiations based on the prospect of changing control of the canal. With respect to the legal issues, it really goes back to the question I illustrated before, whether the increase of freight rates Panama Canal authorities engaged in or the types of freight rates that are charged to some of the types of users that use it most, such as those big LNG tankers, and whether the questionable practices of Hutchison Whampoa can be construed to violate Panama’s neutrality commitments. Certainly, lawyers on both sides can argue that issue. There’s the broader question of whether the United States could take military action. We can remember 1989 when we felt that international drug dealer and anti-US populist Manuel Noriega was taking actions that were strategically unacceptable to the United States—to have the canal in control of somebody like Manuel Noriega. You can remember that the US militarily intervened in Panama to remove Manuel Noriega.It’s interesting that today the long-standing, very close US security cooperation with Panama, with their border service SENAFRONT front, with the air and naval service SENAN, with the national police, it’s almost unthinkable in military operation. It’s as if, you know, Big Brother is going to militarily intervene against Little Brother. But, the issue probably would not be a question of could it be done? Certainly, the prospect of [a] military solution grabs everyone’s attention on both sides. But, at the end of the day, what, and again, in my academic judgment, is likely is the talks about what could be really serve as a basis for the Panamanian government to have a discussion about how their operation of the canal and the role of China there possibly could be adjusted to address some of those US policy concerns. And so, that might not be a renegotiation of the treaty.There certainly are things that could be done, [including] potentially the inclusion of the United States under the Treaty of Montería to get it out of paying freight rates for some of its container ships—if that would not be regarded as prejudicial. There is the possibility that, based on the very questionable circumstances in which Hutchison’s Port Holdings [Trust] operations at Cristóbal and Balboa were renewed back in 2021—that what’ literally going on now, which is a detailed audit of Hutchison—could lead the Panamanian government fully within their treaty to [decide] the previous government’s extension of the licenses was fraudulent and null and void, and, thus, possibly to take those operating concessions away from Hutchison and perhaps give them to a more reliable, perhaps US-based operator such as Manzanillo International Terminals, which is there in Colón today.And so, I think at the end of the day, there are probably ways in which, within the context of the treaty and short of military intervention, adjustments can be made or discussed that would address US concerns about both China and the freight rates again, you know, within the legal confines of existing treaty. And so, I think that's probably part of what Secretary [Marco] Rubio’s conversations and those of others with the Panamanian government of José Raúl Molino are probably all about today.HostSecretary Rubio has completed his trip to Panama and the region. What were the key results of and agreements from that visit and what are the implications for China's position in Panama and US-Panama relations going forward?EllisBy all accounts, Secretary Rubio's visit with President Molino was very positive, very cordial, and some of the initial results that came out were, first of all, an offer by President Molino following that trip to pull Panama out of the Belt and Road agreement that its previous president, Juan Carlos Varela, had committed to with China. Now, that is largely symbolic. There is no legal obligation that being part of that treaty puts on Panama to do anything for China, nor does it oblige China to give any type of priority to Panama in terms of its investments, although the investments have been substantial by the PRC. However, the act was an important symbolic gesture of goodwill with respect to the presidency of Molino. And in addition to that, perhaps the more significant offer that was made was [an] independent action by the Molino government to do an audit on the contract that gave Hutchison the authorization to operate the ports in Cristóbal and Balboa on both sides of the canal and the renewal of that contract by Panama Ports in 2021. Now, that renewal was seen as somewhat suspicious by a number of people in that the terms were extremely generous to Hutchison. And, also, there was relatively limited transparency with respect to the criteria with which the negotiations of renewal took place. And so, without violating Panama's commitments under the ND 97 Treaty [the treaty between the United States and Panama that transferred control of the Panama Canal to Panama by the year 2000] or the other commitments that legally it has to administer the canal in [an] equitable fashion, it might create the grounds to find sufficient corruption or wrongdoing in the renewal of Hutchison's license that could be taken away from Hutchison, rebid, and possibly given to another Western company, which would, at least symbolically, allow President Trump and the Trump administration to show a victory and decrease, at least to some degree, China's presence in the region. Although there are a number of other vulnerabilities that would still continue to be there with respect to Costco's regular operation in the canal zone, with respect to the operation of the Chinese companies with construction projects, as well as logistics facilities in Panama Pacifico [a community in Panama] and Colón and other places. However, it seems to be at least a goodwill gesture showing that the Molino government wants to work with [the] Trump administration to try to resolve some of these issues. And perhaps, going forward, also, the commitment that's been shown to work together and to study ways in which some of the US concerns over China's presence can be mitigated. So, it seemed like a good start for the relationship to go forward to address some of those very real concerns that the US and the Trump administration has.HostIn our pre-podcast conversation, you talked about Colombia a little bit. Can you speak to that?EllisAbsolutely. As the listeners will likely be more than familiar with, on the 26th of January, you had [an] explosive diplomatic event. Both under the Biden administration and continuing under the Trump administration, Colombians who were in the United States without proper authorization were being deported, initially through State Department-chartered deportation flights. But then, President Trump authorized the use of military aircraft to supplement those capabilities. Initially, there was pushback by the government of Mexico, Claudia Sheinbaum, over these military flights. But, the real difference was what Gustavo Petro, the president of Colombia, did. The Colombian government had already agreed to the military flight in question to repatriate Colombians to their own country. There’s international legal precedent that a country is responsible or obligated to accept the migrants from their country that are expelled from a country where they do not have legally authorized status. The issue was that when that US military plane had left the ground, left California en route, at that time, probably in order to score political points, President Petro suddenly expressed a concern over the use of military aircraft and, again, in mid-flight when it was already in air, said that he was not going to allow that aircraft to land in Colombia.And so, there was really two different levels. Number one is that the principle of Colombia’s obligation to accept its own nationals being repatriated, that is fundamental to the entire thrust of President Trump’s national security strategy on immigration in general in dealing with Mexicans and dealing with Venezuelans and dealing with all of the other actors in the region. And so, one just can’t allow that precedent. In addition to that, [is] the question of how one would respond, understanding that the world was watching and needing to send a clear message that the US would push back and push back hard. And so, what happened very quickly— and it was interesting that the administration really had a pre-planned set of very significant actions—most significantly, they announced a 25 percent immediate tariff on Colombian exports to the United States. Again, about one-third of Colombia’s exports actually go to the United States, so that’s significant. It was going to go up to 50 percent in the course of a week if the issue was not addressed. And perhaps more subtly, but actually more importantly, there was going to be extra prioritization given to the inspection in customs of Colombian cargo. Now, why is that important? It’s important because although most of Colombia's exports to the United States are oil and minerals and other items of that nature and, of course, coffee, one of Colombia's significant [industries] is the export of flowers. And, as some may know well, the first two weeks of February correspond to something very important in the United States, that being Valentine’s Day. And so, in other words, not only the tariffs but those inspections of cargo given flowers, which literally are perishable (and in heated containers) in a course of hours, that would have decimated at the high point of Colombia’s flower export season—its major export product.That was consequential. There was also the announcement of suspension of visa processing. And so, again, many, many Colombians have legal relationships, come to the United States under all the proper documentation, but you have to apply for the visa. People have aunts and uncles and grandmothers. And so, suddenly, because of what Petro had done, reneging on this previous commitment, Colombians found themselves with their visa applications cancelled, as well as an announcement that those Colombians working for the Colombian government in the United States would also have their visas pulled. So, it was a very hard pushback very quickly, and I think [it] sent the message that President Trump was disposed to push back very hard on those countries that did not behave [consistently] with their international obligations and their previous commitments. And so, again, the outcome in which basically Gustavo Petro backed down, I think, you know, had implications not only for the US-Colombia relationship, but also, as Secretary Rubio is coming to Panama and elsewhere in Central America, and as President Trump engages the region in general, that the US was adopting this policy in which it was going to push back hard against those that challenged US equities as Petro had done.HostThanks, Evan. Do you have any concluding thoughts you’d like to share?EllisJust to really reinforce the fact that, obviously, President Trump has taken policy in a very new direction. At the end of the day, what we see with the Panama Canal, both commercially and strategically, and with a migration issue that we’ve also talked about today, is, I think, a reminder that although oftentimes we focus on other parts of the world, there really is no other region in the world in which US prosperity and US security is, as closely and immediately connected as Panama. And so, what is happening now, having a Secretary of State with Latin American expertise, having a National Security Council Director, Mike Waltz, also with extensive Latin American background, having key presidential appointments such as Mauricio Claver-Carone, basically an ambassador with [a] portfolio, with those type of Latin America contacts, [is that] we’re getting what has been historically unprecedented attention to this region. And, although that is shaking up a lot of trees, I think it also is a welcome reflection of the importance that Latin America has always had for the United States that merits greater thinking and resources from the United States, and that’s the direction we seem to be moving in today.HostIt’s always a pleasure to work with you, Evan. Thank you so much for your time today.EllisPleasure is mine. Thank you, Stephanie. HostFor more Army War College podcasts, check out Decisive Point, SSI Live, CLSC Dialogues, and A Better Peace.

Dr. James D. Scudieri, a senior research historian and author, is joined by Colonel Jon Klug, an associate dean at the US Army War College. They delve into Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson Jr.'s pivotal role during WWII under Admiral Nimitz. The discussion covers Richardson's innovative joint operational strategies and inter-service collaboration. They also touch on a notable civil-military incident highlighting tensions of the time, emphasizing how these historical insights can inform today’s military leadership and education.

This episode’s topic is A Call to Action: Lessons from Ukraine for the Future Force, with Dr. John A. Nagl and Colonel Katie Crombe. They discuss the project’s origins and its goal to extract key lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War for US military strategy. Nagl outlines the collaborative research behind the publication, while Crombe highlights strategic lessons related to US military preparedness. The conversation covers the impact of technology and the necessity of multidomain operations, emphasizing the importance of strong alliances and the need for adaptive training in anticipation of future conflicts. The authors’ insights underscore the critical need for the military to learn from current events to enhance its readiness for tomorrow’s challenges.E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcastKeywords: Russia-Ukraine War, strategy, military preparedness, drone warfare, cyber warfareDownload the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/14/2003583942/-1/-1/0/COS-54-CROMBE-NAGL-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

LTG Ben Hodges, former Commanding General of U.S. Army Europe and NATO's logistics mentor, dives into vital global issues. He analyzes the impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on NATO and the changing dynamics of Eastern Europe. Hodges discusses U.S.-China competition in technology and the Indo-Pacific, while also addressing North Korea's military threats. He touches on the complex immigration crisis from Central and South America, advocating for humane solutions in the face of geopolitical challenges.

This episode delves into the concept of strategic culture and how it influences international relations, military strategy, and deterrence, particularly between the United States, China, and Russia. Dr. Scobell and Dr. Kuznar share insights from their extensive research and highlight the nuances of strategic culture in peacetime, crisis, and conflict scenarios.  Keywords: culture China, Taiwan, strategy, strategic culture  E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast.Download the transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/23/2003569840/-1/-1/0/COS-52_KUZNAR_SCOBELL%20TRANSCRIPT.PDF

In this episode, Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Griffiths, Colonel Todd Schmidt, and Major Brennan Deveraux from the Harding Project and Army University Press discuss the how-to edition of Military Review, including the initiative’s goal to enhance professional military writing by providing essential guidelines and resources for Army units. Griffiths highlights the need for writing support, while Schmidt recounts the collaboration’s origins at a West Point conference. Deveraux shares insights as a guest editor, emphasizing quality in submissions. The episode also spotlights key contributions, including Captain Theo Lipsky’s writing guide and Lieutenant Colonel Max Ferguson’s “Catalyst Papers” for collaborative writing. The episode underscores the initiative’s transformative potential for military discourse and encourages listeners to explore the valuable resources now available to Army units and online. E-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast Keywords: Military Review, Harding Project, professional discourse, professional military writing

This episode will be published soon.

In this episode, Dr. Darrin L. Frye, associate professor of science and technology and innovative futures at the Joint Special Operations University, discusses the profound implications of nanotechnology in modern warfare. He explores the concept of the “resolution revolution,” examining how emerging technologies shift battlefields from traditional domains to the microscopic realms of biology, where threats can operate invisibly at a cellular level. Frye explores the potential of nanoweapons to manipulate human cognition and behavior, raising ethical concerns about their environmental impact and the risk of mass extinction. He emphasizes the urgent need for genetic surveillance to protect against these vulnerabilities and advocates for a strategic approach in preparing for the future of warfare. This conversation serves as a crucial call to action for individuals and policymakers as we face an unprecedented era of conflict intertwined with our very existence.Keywords: nanotechnology, nanobot, resolution revolution, DNA, genetic informationE-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Download the transcript:https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/20/2003551198/-1/-1/0/20240830-FRYE%20TRANSCRIPT.PDFDownload the full transcript: https://media.defense.gov/2024/Oct/02/2003557713/-1/-1/0/COS-50-STRATEGIC%20ESTIMATE-TRANSCRIPT.PDF

In this episode, COL Thomas Spahr and Zach Kallenborn discuss technology and warfare and what practitioners and leaders can learn from America’s past wars and the Russia-Ukraine War. Keywords: Afghanistan, Russia, Ukraine, AI, dronesE-mail usarmy.carlisle.awc.mbx.parameters@army.mil to give feedback on this podcast or the genesis article.Download the transcript:https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/17/2003545729/-1/-1/0/20240917_SPAHR-KALLENBORN_TRANSCRIPT.PDF