A Better Peace: The War Room Podcast

It was the largest battle in the [Vietnam] war in terms of numbers of casualties, and politically it was the most important On the Anniversary of the start of the Tet Offensive of 1968, A BETTER PEACE welcomes retired U.S. Ambassador Jim Bullington to recount the story of the Battle of Huế in Vietnam which began on January 31, 1968 and lasted nearly a month. In contrast to the Viet Cong's previous strategies of raiding, the Viet Cong occupied Huế and captured thousands of civilians and prisoners of war. Bullington was serving as a Foreign Service Officer at the time, and found himself in Hue in unusual circumstances. In this podcast, Bullington tells both his personal story (a love story in the midst of a war) and about the broader implications of the battle. While historians still debate the impact of the Tet Offensive and the Battle of Hue on the conduct of the American War in Vietnam, this story reminds us of the personal narratives and consequences that are also central to war. A BETTER PEACE Editor Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.     Jim Bullington is a retired U.S. ambassador who served as a foreign service officer in Vietnam during Huế. Jacqueline E. Whitt is the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: Twentieth Century "Angel of Mercy" -- D. R. Howe (Glencoe, MN) treats the wounds of Private First Class D. A. Crum (New Brighton, PA), Company H, 2nd Battalion, Fifth Marine Regiment, during Operation Huế City. Photo Credit: U.S. Marine Corps/Sergeant William F. Dickman, public domain

The relationship is complex because journalists and politicians depend on each other A free and independent media is a hallmark of freedom and provides an important check against government power. Meanwhile, government leaders are invested in pursuing their agenda. This brings about natural tensions between political objectives and the objective truth, and therefore between governments and media. Unfortunately, these tensions can manifest in intimidation and violence against members of the press. To discuss these tensions, and how they can be beneficial or detrimental to both sides, A BETTER PEACE invited War College post-doctoral fellow Amanda Cronkhite to discuss the historical and contemporary challenges of government and the media. A BETTER PEACE Editor Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.     Amanda Cronkhite is a post-doctoral fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: Marine Corps Gen. Joe Dunford tells Thai and U.S. reporters that the military relationship between the two nations is strong and that leaders are planning for decades of cooperation during a news briefing in Bangkok, Thailand in February 2018. Photo Credit: DoD photo by Jim Garamone

As the Campaigns of 1862 move forward, Lee turns to Jackson more and more for counsel A BETTER PEACE continues its Great Captains series with a look at a leadership team, rather than an individual. In this episode, U.S. Army War College Professor of History Christian Keller argues that the strategic teaming of Generals Robert E. Lee and Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson enabled the success of the Confederate Army in 1862-1863. While Lee was a great strategic thinker at all levels of war, Jackson proved to be an exceptional field commander and strategic advisor to Lee. While each independently earned consideration of the title of Great Captain, their symbiotic relationship proved very powerful. That is, until Jackson was killed--a death that greatly affected both Lee and the Confederacy. U.S. Army War College Professor of Strategy Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.     Christian Keller is Professor of History at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense. Image: In 1869, Everett B. D. Julio painted this scene of the Civil War generals and their horses. It depicts their meeting on May 1, 1863, just before the tragic death of Jackson. Image courtesy of Wikimedia Commons, public domain.

The great benefit of looking at John Warden's system is that it [employed] effects-based objectives [for] attacking an enemy A BETTER PEACE continues the Great Strategists series with a look at the systems-based theory of John Warden III, Colonel, U.S. Air Force retired. Out of the emerging theories of airpower and his own experiences in Vietnam, Warden developed the five-ring system model of an enemy force. Using effects-based operations, Warden used the five rings to suggest ways to use air operations to more efficiently influence an enemy force. Attacking targets closer to the center of the rings meant greater effects on the enemy. Presenting the history, concept, and implications of this theory are U.S. Army War College professors Clay Chun and Jacqueline E. Whitt.     Clay Chun is Chair of the Department of the Distance Education at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and is the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Portrait of John Warden, U.S. Air Force photo; Five ring graphic adapted from Warden, John A. "The enemy as a system." Airpower journal 9, no. 1 (1995): 40-55. Image Credit: Composed by Tom Galvin   More podcasts from the "Great Strategists" series: HORSESHOES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND SHARED UNDERSTANDING: CHESTER NIMITZ’S ART OF COMMANDK.M PANIKKAR: INDIAN SCHOLAR, DIPLOMAT, STRATEGIST (GREAT STRATEGISTS)HOW MUCH FOR THE PEN? SCHELLING (GREAT STRATEGISTS)A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO WAR? ANTOINE-HENRI JOMINI (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR — THUCYDIDES (GREAT STRATEGISTS)BEYOND THUCYDIDES: HERODOTUS, XENOPHON & UNDERSTANDING WAR (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN WARDEN AND THE ENEMY AS A SYSTEM (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN BOYD AND THE “OODA” LOOP (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THREE PIONEERS OF AIRPOWER (GREAT STRATEGISTS)MAHAN AND SEA POWER (EPISODE 4) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)KAUTILYA, THE ARTHASHASTRA, AND ANCIENT REALISM (EPISODE 3) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)SUN TZU AND THE ART OF WAR (EPISODE 2) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)ON CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (EPISODE 1) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)

[Kotter's] first step is to establish a sense of urgency. ... But then the question I ask the students is, 'What's the step that leads to figuring out what's urgent?' Why is change hard in military organizations? There's no question that militaries need to change routinely to sustain the ability to fight and win its nation's wars against current and emerging threats. But large, complex organizations face many obstacles and therefore deliberate change efforts need clear vision and direction. Sounds easy, but it isn't. In this episode of A BETTER PEACE, Tom Galvin and Buck Haberichter from the U.S. Army War College's Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, discuss some of the problems of leading change that the popular change management literature doesn't always address. How can leaders craft a coherent and convincing story that motivates both members and stakeholders to pursue change and sustain the organization's competitive advantage? Click here to access the monograph Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders by Tom Galvin. Also click the below links to access the three episodes in a video series on leading change in military organizations: Part 1. How to define and describe a problem Part 2. How to develop a vision and concept Part 3. How to plan, implement, sustain, and terminate the change effort Tom Galvin is Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies and the Director of the Driving Change and Innovation area of concentration at the U.S. Army War College. Buck Haberichter is the Managing Editor of the WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: A U.S. Army infantry squad leader discusses squad movement tactics with Jordanian soldiers during small arms training near Alexandria, Egypt. Photo Credit: U.S. Army/SGT James Lefty

We don't have a sophisticated genre about what do militaries do in the wake of victory What is the role of the military in consolidating victory? This has been a difficult question at least since World War II and is very salient now. A BETTER PEACE explores this topic with the help of Dr. Wayne Lee, the Dowd Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, U.S. Army War College Professor of Strategy. The speakers shows that the transition from conflict to post-conflict depends greatly on the cultures of the combatants involved. The expectations have evolved from pre-industrial times to present, shaping the ends of warfare and therefore the post-conflict roles of the military -- from the traditional taking and holding of territory to something else.     Wayne Lee is the Dowd Distinguished Professor of History at the U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: A crowd, acting as protestors, approaches a simulated United Nations camp at exercise SHANTI PRAYAS III in Nepal, 2017. SHANTI PRAYAS is a multinational U.N. peacekeeping exercise designed to provide pre-deployment training to U.N. partner countries in preparation for real-world peacekeeping operations

Fundamentally in asymmetric conflicts, the struggle is over information that comes from the [local] population. This is different from the traditional 'hearts and minds' view A BETTER PEACE welcomes Jacob Shapiro from Princeton U., co-author of Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict. Conventional wisdom in conflict has been that those combatants bringing greater power, applying it intelligently, and controlling the most territory are more likely to achieve their political outcomes. The asymmetric conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq challenged these conventions and demonstrate that achieve success at a local level is paramount. But then how do strategic leaders roll up hundreds or thousands of local level successes and convert it into political success? WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Andrew A. Hill moderates.     Jacob Shapiro is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Andrew A. Hill is the WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: An Afghan National Army soldier directs perspective cadets to their assigned groups as the day begins at the ANA Academy, Kabul, Afghanistan Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson

The OODA loop kinda represents how ... humans and organizations learn, grow, and survive A BETTER PEACE continues its series on Great Strategists with a look at airpower theorist John Boyd, who conceived of the "OODA" (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop. Originally expressing an approach to tactical engagement, Boyd later expanded the idea to incorporate broad strategic action. How can individuals, organizations, and entire forces use this action-and-feedback mechanism to shape an uncertain environment and outthink the opponent? Discussing Boyd, his legacy, and contemporary views of his theories are U.S. Army War College professors Clay Chun and Jacqueline E. Whitt.     Clay Chun is Chair of the Department of the Distance Education at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and is the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Portrait of John Boyd as a Captain or Major flying as a wingman (U.S. Government photo via Wikimedia Commons, public domain); OODA Loop graphic from Air University (public domain) Image Composed by Tom Galvin   More podcasts from the "Great Strategists" series: HORSESHOES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND SHARED UNDERSTANDING: CHESTER NIMITZ’S ART OF COMMANDK.M PANIKKAR: INDIAN SCHOLAR, DIPLOMAT, STRATEGIST (GREAT STRATEGISTS)HOW MUCH FOR THE PEN? SCHELLING (GREAT STRATEGISTS)A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO WAR? ANTOINE-HENRI JOMINI (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR — THUCYDIDES (GREAT STRATEGISTS)BEYOND THUCYDIDES: HERODOTUS, XENOPHON & UNDERSTANDING WAR (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN WARDEN AND THE ENEMY AS A SYSTEM (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN BOYD AND THE “OODA” LOOP (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THREE PIONEERS OF AIRPOWER (GREAT STRATEGISTS)MAHAN AND SEA POWER (EPISODE 4) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)KAUTILYA, THE ARTHASHASTRA, AND ANCIENT REALISM (EPISODE 3) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)SUN TZU AND THE ART OF WAR (EPISODE 2) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)ON CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (EPISODE 1) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)

You cannot help but approach your sources from your own experiences and backgrounds Our three-part roundtable on the "Lessons" of History concludes as Con Crane, Jacqueline E. Whitt, and Andrew A. Hill discuss the importance of critical thinking for developing historical mindedness. From the subjectivity of first-person accounts to the modern phenomenon of so-called "fake news," what is presented as definitive history is almost assuredly not. How can a historical mindset help individuals sort out what information is valid or not? How can we construct useful and clear understandings of what happened in the past?     Con Crane is a military historian with the Army Heritage and Education Center. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Andrew A. Hill is Chair of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: The first page of the Aesinas manuscript of Tacitus's Germania. View the codex here.

You cannot help but approach your sources from your own experiences and backgrounds Our three-part roundtable on the "Lessons" of History continues as Con Crane, Jacqueline E. Whitt, and Andrew A. Hill discuss the roles of military historians in professional military education and the practical uses of military history in general. If history doesn't teach clear lessons, what use is it to policymakers and leaders? To what extent has military history become insular and disengaged from the policy arena? Have historians ceded the field of practical application to political scientists? And to what extent has the need for novel ideas caused historians to succumb to commercial temptations, rather than clear, critical analysis based on evidence?     Con Crane is a military historian with the Army Heritage and Education Center. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Andrew A. Hill is Chair of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Ulysses Grant reviewing proofs of his memoirs, June 27, 1885, just weeks before his death. Source: Library of Congress.