A Better Peace: The War Room Podcast

[Kotter's] first step is to establish a sense of urgency. ... But then the question I ask the students is, 'What's the step that leads to figuring out what's urgent?' Why is change hard in military organizations? There's no question that militaries need to change routinely to sustain the ability to fight and win its nation's wars against current and emerging threats. But large, complex organizations face many obstacles and therefore deliberate change efforts need clear vision and direction. Sounds easy, but it isn't. In this episode of A BETTER PEACE, Tom Galvin and Buck Haberichter from the U.S. Army War College's Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, discuss some of the problems of leading change that the popular change management literature doesn't always address. How can leaders craft a coherent and convincing story that motivates both members and stakeholders to pursue change and sustain the organization's competitive advantage? Click here to access the monograph Leading Change in Military Organizations: Primer for Senior Leaders by Tom Galvin. Also click the below links to access the three episodes in a video series on leading change in military organizations: Part 1. How to define and describe a problem Part 2. How to develop a vision and concept Part 3. How to plan, implement, sustain, and terminate the change effort Tom Galvin is Assistant Professor of Leadership Studies and the Director of the Driving Change and Innovation area of concentration at the U.S. Army War College. Buck Haberichter is the Managing Editor of the WAR ROOM. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: A U.S. Army infantry squad leader discusses squad movement tactics with Jordanian soldiers during small arms training near Alexandria, Egypt. Photo Credit: U.S. Army/SGT James Lefty

We don't have a sophisticated genre about what do militaries do in the wake of victory What is the role of the military in consolidating victory? This has been a difficult question at least since World War II and is very salient now. A BETTER PEACE explores this topic with the help of Dr. Wayne Lee, the Dowd Distinguished Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, U.S. Army War College Professor of Strategy. The speakers shows that the transition from conflict to post-conflict depends greatly on the cultures of the combatants involved. The expectations have evolved from pre-industrial times to present, shaping the ends of warfare and therefore the post-conflict roles of the military -- from the traditional taking and holding of territory to something else.     Wayne Lee is the Dowd Distinguished Professor of History at the U. of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: A crowd, acting as protestors, approaches a simulated United Nations camp at exercise SHANTI PRAYAS III in Nepal, 2017. SHANTI PRAYAS is a multinational U.N. peacekeeping exercise designed to provide pre-deployment training to U.N. partner countries in preparation for real-world peacekeeping operations

Fundamentally in asymmetric conflicts, the struggle is over information that comes from the [local] population. This is different from the traditional 'hearts and minds' view A BETTER PEACE welcomes Jacob Shapiro from Princeton U., co-author of Small Wars, Big Data: The Information Revolution in Modern Conflict. Conventional wisdom in conflict has been that those combatants bringing greater power, applying it intelligently, and controlling the most territory are more likely to achieve their political outcomes. The asymmetric conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq challenged these conventions and demonstrate that achieve success at a local level is paramount. But then how do strategic leaders roll up hundreds or thousands of local level successes and convert it into political success? WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief Andrew A. Hill moderates.     Jacob Shapiro is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. Andrew A. Hill is the WAR ROOM Editor-in-Chief. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: An Afghan National Army soldier directs perspective cadets to their assigned groups as the day begins at the ANA Academy, Kabul, Afghanistan Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force/Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson

The OODA loop kinda represents how ... humans and organizations learn, grow, and survive A BETTER PEACE continues its series on Great Strategists with a look at airpower theorist John Boyd, who conceived of the "OODA" (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) Loop. Originally expressing an approach to tactical engagement, Boyd later expanded the idea to incorporate broad strategic action. How can individuals, organizations, and entire forces use this action-and-feedback mechanism to shape an uncertain environment and outthink the opponent? Discussing Boyd, his legacy, and contemporary views of his theories are U.S. Army War College professors Clay Chun and Jacqueline E. Whitt.     Clay Chun is Chair of the Department of the Distance Education at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College and is the Editor of A BETTER PEACE. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Portrait of John Boyd as a Captain or Major flying as a wingman (U.S. Government photo via Wikimedia Commons, public domain); OODA Loop graphic from Air University (public domain) Image Composed by Tom Galvin   More podcasts from the "Great Strategists" series: HORSESHOES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND SHARED UNDERSTANDING: CHESTER NIMITZ’S ART OF COMMANDK.M PANIKKAR: INDIAN SCHOLAR, DIPLOMAT, STRATEGIST (GREAT STRATEGISTS)HOW MUCH FOR THE PEN? SCHELLING (GREAT STRATEGISTS)A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO WAR? ANTOINE-HENRI JOMINI (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF WAR — THUCYDIDES (GREAT STRATEGISTS)BEYOND THUCYDIDES: HERODOTUS, XENOPHON & UNDERSTANDING WAR (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN WARDEN AND THE ENEMY AS A SYSTEM (GREAT STRATEGISTS)JOHN BOYD AND THE “OODA” LOOP (GREAT STRATEGISTS)THREE PIONEERS OF AIRPOWER (GREAT STRATEGISTS)MAHAN AND SEA POWER (EPISODE 4) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)KAUTILYA, THE ARTHASHASTRA, AND ANCIENT REALISM (EPISODE 3) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)SUN TZU AND THE ART OF WAR (EPISODE 2) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)ON CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ (EPISODE 1) (GREAT STRATEGISTS)

You cannot help but approach your sources from your own experiences and backgrounds Our three-part roundtable on the "Lessons" of History concludes as Con Crane, Jacqueline E. Whitt, and Andrew A. Hill discuss the importance of critical thinking for developing historical mindedness. From the subjectivity of first-person accounts to the modern phenomenon of so-called "fake news," what is presented as definitive history is almost assuredly not. How can a historical mindset help individuals sort out what information is valid or not? How can we construct useful and clear understandings of what happened in the past?     Con Crane is a military historian with the Army Heritage and Education Center. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Andrew A. Hill is Chair of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: The first page of the Aesinas manuscript of Tacitus's Germania. View the codex here.

You cannot help but approach your sources from your own experiences and backgrounds Our three-part roundtable on the "Lessons" of History continues as Con Crane, Jacqueline E. Whitt, and Andrew A. Hill discuss the roles of military historians in professional military education and the practical uses of military history in general. If history doesn't teach clear lessons, what use is it to policymakers and leaders? To what extent has military history become insular and disengaged from the policy arena? Have historians ceded the field of practical application to political scientists? And to what extent has the need for novel ideas caused historians to succumb to commercial temptations, rather than clear, critical analysis based on evidence?     Con Crane is a military historian with the Army Heritage and Education Center. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Andrew A. Hill is Chair of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Image: Ulysses Grant reviewing proofs of his memoirs, June 27, 1885, just weeks before his death. Source: Library of Congress.

HISTORY IS NOT A BOX OF FACTS, IT IS A STATE OF MIND History teaches us ____________." Many listeners have probably heard that opening a few times, usually followed by a claim that is apparently profound and timely, but also probably poorly supported and problematic. Why does this construction persist, then? Is it because of an innate human quest for simple answers to intractable problems? Or is it because leaders believe that history repeats itself? Is it because we misunderstand how historical thinking should shape contemporary decisions? Misconceptions about the purpose, processes, and even the meaning of the word history abound. The roles and approaches of historians are similarly misunderstood. So what is history and what does it teach us -- or not? U.S. Army War College faculty members Con Crane, Jacqueline E. Whitt, and Andrew A. Hill discuss and critique this very question and what it means to be historically-minded. For one to learn from history, one may have to re-learn what history really is.   Con Crane is a military historian with the Army Heritage and Education Center. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. Andrew A. Hill is Chair of Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: U.S. Army Old Guard Fife and Drum Corps perform during the 2017 Military Appreciation Weekend at Joint Base San Antonio-Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Photo Credit: U.S. Air Force photo by Ismael Ortega

Every major thread in the world's wisdom has some aspect of contemplative practice in it How can senior leaders cope with the overwhelming amount of information and constant high demand for complex decision making and action? A recognized barrier is a natural limitation of a leader's ability to focus on the situation at hand. Instead, the mind wanders. The possible negative effects of distraction are many--from misinterpreting current events to sending non-verbal cues such as disinterest and lack of empathy--and can have a significant impact on senior leader performance. One technique for improving one's abilities in this area is mindfulness training, presented in this podcast by renowned expert Dr. Amishi Jha of the University of Miami. WAR ROOM Social Media editor Buck Haberichter moderates.   Amishi Jha is Associate Professor of Psychology from the University of Miami, Florida. Buck Haberichter is the WAR ROOM Social Media Editor. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo Credit: David Cassalato, via Pexels.com

We definitely want leaders that know how to win A BETTER PEACE welcomes Admiral John Richardson, the 31st Chief of Naval Operations, to present his perspectives on strategic leadership. Admiral Richardson's talk focuses on the qualities necessary to lead in an environment of growing great power competition -- integrity, toughness, accountability, and initiative. How should leader develop these qualities, and what are the roles of military institutions to foster them? WAR ROOM Podcast Editor Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates. Admiral John Richardson is the 31st Chief of Naval Operations. Jacqueline E. Whitt is the WAR ROOM Podcast Editor. The views expressed in this presentation are those of the speakers and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: The Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Mitscher (DDG 57), right, provides a warm welcome to the French tall ship replica the Hermione in the vicinity of the Battle of Virginia Capes off the East Coast of the United States. The original Hermione brought French General Marquis de Lafayette to America in 1780 to inform General Washington of France's alliance and impending support of the American Revolutionary War. Photo Credit: U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Michael Sandberg Other Releases in the Leader Perspectives series: A CONVERSATION WITH THE HONORABLE MELISSA DALTON OF DEFENSE POLICYCAMPAIGNING IN THE PACIFIC: A CONVERSATION WITH GEN FLYNNA TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE ON NATO (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)OBSERVATIONS FROM NATO’S NORTHERN FRONT (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)ALLIES ARE MORE THAN FRIENDS (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)THE CHALLENGES OF KEEPING SPACE SECURE (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)TENSIONS AND PARADOXES FACING SENIOR LEADERS (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)LEADING AND WINNING IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)LEARNING ABOUT LEADERSHIP THROUGH THE CLASSICS (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)WHAT IT TAKES FOR COLONELS TO BE SUCCESSFUL (LEADER PERSPECTIVES)BALANCING BETWEEN CIVILIAN LIFE AND SERVICE IN THE NATIONAL GUARD“WHAT GOT YOU HERE WON’T GET YOU THERE” — AND OTHER CAUTIONARY TALES FOR LEADERSWHEN THE MILITARY IS NOT IN CHARGE: DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIESWHAT DOES ‘SUCCESS’ MEAN AS A STRATEGIC LEADER?STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP AND CHANGING THE US ARMY IN EUROPETHE CHALLENGES OF SENIOR LEADER COMMUNICATIONTHE SENIOR NCO AS A STRATEGIC LEADERSTRATEGIC LEADERSHIP FROM AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVEWHAT DO THE BRITS THINK OF AMERICAN OFFICERS?PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP — GEN. ROBIN RAND, U.S. AIR FORCE GLOBAL STRIKE COMMANDGROWING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPACITY

The Europeans should not be happy about [the US withdrawal] ... even if it is a good thing for the U.S. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (also known as INF) has garnered significant attention in the latter half of 2018 as President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from it. But before then, the INF was rather obscure and not well known. Thus, A BETTER PEACE explores the history of the INF and the controversies and implications of withdrawing from it in a two-part podcast series. In the second release, we welcome Rob Farley, a U.S. Army War College Visiting Professor from the University of Kentucky who is an expert in nuclear matters. He explains the rationale on both sides of the controversy -- why to stay in the treaty and why to withdraw, and how withdrawal could impact other powers such as China and Europe. U.S. Army War College Professor of Strategy Jacqueline E. Whitt moderates.   Rob Farley is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Kentucky and Visiting Professor at the U.S. Army War College. Jacqueline E. Whitt is Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Army War College, U.S. Army, or Department of Defense. Photo: Three single-stage Pershing II missiles prepared for launch at McGregor Range, 1987 Photo Credit: Frank Trevino/Department of Defense/American Forces Information Service, Defense Visual Information Center, public domain