Supreme Court Oral Arguments

New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2018.Decided on Jan 15, 2019. Petitioner: New Prime Inc..Respondent: Dominic Oliveira. Advocates: Theodore J. Boutrous Jr. (for petitioner) Jennifer D. Bennett (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dominic Oliveira completed an apprenticeship program offered by New Prime Inc. (Prime), an interstate trucking company. After Oliveira graduated from the program, Prime representatives advised Oliveira to set up a limited liability company and work for Prime as an independent contractor, as manifested by an independent contractor operating agreement signed by Oliveira on behalf of his new LLC. Oliveira alleges that Prime exercised significant control over his work, inconsistent with his status as an independent contractor. Oliveira terminated his contractor relationship with Prime and began working as an employee of Prime, where his job responsibilities were “substantially identical” to those he had as an independent contractor. Oliveira then brought a class-action lawsuit against Prime, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a state minimum-wage statute, among other claims. Prime filed a motion to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which Oliveira opposed on the grounds that the contract is exempted under Section 1 of the FAA and that anyway, the question of applicability of the Section 1 exemption was one for the court to decide. The district court concluded that the question of applicability of Section 1 of the FAA was for the court to decide, and it then held that “contracts of employment of transportation workers” does not extend to independent contractors. Having reached this conclusion, the district court ordered additional discovery on the issue of whether Oliveira was an employee or an independent contractor in order to be able to decide whether the contract was a contract of employment under Section 1. The district court thus denied Prime’s motion to compel arbitration. The US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, finding that the applicability of the FAA is a threshold question for the court to determine. The appellate court then held that Section 1 does apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship. Question In a dispute over the whether a contract falls within the exemptions in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), must a court determine whether the FAA applies, or is that for the arbitrator to decide? Does the Section 1 of the FAA, which exempts “contracts of employment” in certain industries, apply to agreements that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship? Conclusion In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court held that a court should determine whether the FAA applies and that “contracts of employment” include those that purport to establish an independent-contractor relationship. Looking to the language and structure of the FAA, the Court reasoned that courts may compel arbitration only in arbitration agreements involving commerce or maritime transactions. Thus, a court must make the threshold determination whether the FAA applies to the contract at issue, notwithstanding any delegation clause. As to the meaning of “contracts of employment,” the Court looked to the original meaning and evolution of the phrase, finding that it was not a term of art that referred only to contracts that created an employer-employee relationship, but instead broadly meant “work agreements.” Using this definition of “contracts of employment,” the Court held that Oliveira’s agreement with New Prime falls within Section 1’s exception. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion to clarify that while she would reach the same outcome, the meanings of terms or phrases can and do sometimes evolve, and courts must interpret them flexibly.

Gundy v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 2, 2018.Decided on Jun 20, 2019. Petitioner: Herman Avery Gundy.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Sarah Baumgartel (for petitioner) Jeffrey B. Wall (Principal Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Herman Avery Gundy was convicted of committing sexual assault in Maryland while on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After serving his sentence for the Maryland sex offense, Gundy was to be transferred to federal custody to serve his sentence for violating his supervised release. As a part of this transfer, Gundy received permission to travel unsupervised by bus from Pennsylvania to New York. Gundy made the trip, but did not register as a sex offender in either Maryland or New York as required by state law. In January 2013, Gundy was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250, the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act (SORNA), for traveling from Pennsylvania to New York and then staying in New York without registering as a sex offender. He was convicted and sentenced to time served, along with five years of supervised release.  The 2nd Circuit affirmed this judgment on appeal. Gundy then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review his case, which it agreed to do only as to the question of whether SORNA unlawfully delegates authority to the U.S. Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 to impose the law’s registration requirements upon offenders who were convicted before the statute was enacted. Question Does the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violate the nondelegation doctrine? Conclusion The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)’s delegation of authority to the U.S. Attorney General to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. Justice Elena Kagan authored an opinion for the four-justice plurality. The plurality first noted that the Court had previously interpreted this provision of SORNA in Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432 (2012), to require the attorney general to apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as feasible. In light of this prior interpretation and the context of the provision and the statutory purpose, the plurality found unpersuasive Gundy’s argument that the provision gives the attorney general discretion to do whatever he wants as to pre-Act offenders. The nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress may not transfer to another branch “powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative” but may delegate on executive agencies discretion to implement and enforce laws, so long as Congress has provided an “intelligible principle” to which the agency must conform. The Court’s decision in Reynolds makes clear that § 16913(d) contains an “intelligible principle”—namely, that the attorney general apply SORNA to all pre-Act offenders as soon as possible—and thus the provision does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. The plurality also noted that no attorney general has used the provision in a more expansive way. Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment, expressing that he would like to revisit the Court’s approach to nondelegation. However, under the Court’s present jurisprudence, he finds no reason to invalidate SORNA’s delegation of authority in this provision. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Unlike Justice Alito, the dissent would use this case to change its approach to the nondelegation doctrine. The dissent expresses concern that SORNA gives the attorney general “the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.” Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Madison v. Alabama Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 2, 2018.Decided on Feb 27, 2019. Petitioner: Vernon Madison.Respondent: State of Alabama. Advocates: Bryan A. Stevenson (for petitioner) Thomas R. Govan, Jr. (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Vernon Madison has been on death row in Alabama for over 30 years and has had several serious strokes, rendering him unable to remember committing the crime for which he is to be executed. He also exhibits other symptoms of brain damage, including slurred speech, blindness, inability to walk independently, and urinary incontinence. Madison was originally scheduled to be executed in May 2016, and he challenged his competency in state court. The court denied his claim, and Madison then sought habeas corpus relief in federal court. The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that he was incompetent to be executed. In November 2017, the US Supreme Court reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief in Dunn v. Madison, finding that the state court’s determinations of law and fact were “not so lacking in justification” as to give rise to error “beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement” as required under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Madison was rescheduled for execution for January 2018, and he again petitioned state court for relief, this time with new evidence that the court-appointed expert upon whose testimony the prior courts relied had been suspended from the practice of psychology. The court again denied his petition, finding Madison competent to be executed. Madison then sought asked the US Supreme Court to consider the constitutional issues underlying his claim, rather than the AEDPA ones it ruled on earlier. Question Does the Eighth Amendment and the Court’s jurisprudence prohibit a state from executing a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of the commission of the capital offense? Does the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment preclude a state from executing a prisoner who suffers from severe cognitive dysfunction such that he cannot remember the crime for which he was convicted or understand the circumstances of his scheduled execution? Conclusion The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a state from executing a prisoner who cannot remember committing his crime, but it does prohibit executing a prisoner who cannot rationally understand the reasons for his execution, whether that inability is due to psychosis or dementia. In a 5-3 opinion authored by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court reviewed its precedents on the scope of the Eighth Amendment as applied to mentally incompetent death row prisoners. In 1986, the Court held in Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits execution of a prisoner who has “lost his sanity” after sentencing, relying on a “moral intuition” that “killing one who has no capacity” to understand his crime or punishment “simply offends humanity.” In Ford, the Court also pointed out that there is no “retributive value” in executing a person who has no comprehension of the sentence. In 2007, the Court in Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, provided more specific criteria for how to identify prisoners ineligible for execution, identifying the “critical question” as whether a “‘prisoner’s mental state is so distorted by a mental illness’ that he lacks a ‘rational understanding’ of ‘the State’s rationale for [his] execution.’” Although the parties disputed in the lower courts whether the lack of memory of commiting the crime, alone, disqualified a prisoner from execution, Madison accepted Alabama’s position that it does not, under Panetti. Likewise, the parties disputed in the lower courts whether Panetti applies only to prisoners suffering from psychosis, and categorically excludes those suffering from dementia, and Alabama accepted Madison’s position that it does not. The remaining issue, then, is whether the prisoner is unable to rationally understand the reasons for his sentence; if so, the Eighth Amendment forbids his execution. This is a question for the lower court on remand. Justice Samuel Alito filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. The dissent would not have reached the second question, opining that Madison presented only the first question in its petition and that Madison’s counsel raised the other question only after concluding that the first argument was unlikely to prevail. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Weyerhaeuser Company v. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 1, 2018.Decided on Nov 27, 2018. Petitioner: Weyerhaeuser Company.Respondent: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al.. Advocates: Timothy S. Bishop (for petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (Deputy Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2010, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) included a privately owned parcel of land (“Unit 1”) in Louisiana in an expanded designation of critical habitat for the dusky gopher frog. Though these endangered frogs had not inhabited Unit 1 for decades, the land contained historic breeding sites. Other necessary features would need to be restored however. The landowners, Weyerhaeuser Company and two other entities (collectively, the “Landowners”), intended to use the land for residential and commercial development, as well as timber operations. They brought suit against the FWS in federal district court, challenging Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. All parties filed cross motions for summary judgment, and the district court ruled in favor of the agency on the merits.  A divided 5th Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling, upholding Unit 1’s designation as critical habitat. The court rejected the Landowners’ argument that the FWS had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in making this designation on the theory that Unit 1 was not presently habitable nor essential to species conservation. Explaining that land need not be habitable to be considered “essential” under 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii) of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the court deferred to the agency’s interpretation of that term. The majority also held that the FWS had not acted unreasonably in interpreting the ESA to not contain a requirement that land be “currently” habitable by a species to be designated as critical habitat. The 5th Circuit also held that the FWS had not made an arbitrary and capricious decision under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) in not excluding Unit 1 from the critical habitat based on economic impacts, and that this determination was not reviewable in federal court.  Question Does the Endangered Species Act prohibit designation of privately owned land as unoccupied critical habitat that is neither habitat nor essential to species conservation? Is an agency determination not to exclude an area from critical habitat due to the economic impact of designation subject to judicial review? Conclusion In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held as to the first question presented that to be designated a "critical habitat" under the Endangered Species Act, the land must also be habitat for the species. The Court found unpersuasive FWS's argument that habitat can include areas that, like Unit 1, would require modification to support a given species but which do not currently serve as habitat for the species. The statute provides that when the Secretary lists a species as endangered he must also "designate any habitat of such species which is then considered to be critical habitat." That language on its face requires that only "habitat" of an endangered species is eligible for designation as "critical habitat." Thus, even if if an area otherwise meets the statutory definition of "unoccupied critical habitat," Section 4(a)(3)(A)(i) does not authorize the agency to designate the area as critical habitat unless it is also habitat for the species. As to the second question, the Court held that the agency's determination is subject to judicial review. The Administrative Procedure Act creates a presumption that agency determinations are subject to judicial review that may be rebutted only if the relevant statute precludes review or the action is specifically granted by law to the agency's discretion. Here, the Court found neither. Although the second sentence of Section 4(b)(2) states the Secretary "may" exclude an area from critical habitat, that section requires the Secretary to consider economic impact and relative benefits before deciding whether to exclude an area from critical habitat or to proceed with designation. Because the statute articulates a meaningful standard against which to judge the Secretary's exercise of discretion, the agency's determination is not beyond judicial review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 1, 2018.Decided on Nov 6, 2018. Petitioner: Mount Lemmon Fire District.Respondent: John Guido, et al.. Advocates: E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents) Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2000, John Guido and Dennis Rankin were hired by the Mount Lemmon Fire District, a political subdivision of the State of Arizona. They were full-time firefighter captains, and at ages 46 and 54, respectively, were the two oldest full-time employees at the Fire District when they were terminated in 2009. Guido and Rankin filed age discrimination charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which found reasonable cause to believe that the Fire District had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34. Guido and Rankin subsequently filed suit against the Fire District. The Fire District sought summary judgment on the basis that it was not an “employer” within the meaning of the ADEA, and the district court agreed. A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed. Ruling counter to what other circuits have concluded, the appellate court stated that a political subdivision of a state does not need to have 20 or more employees, as private sector employers do, in order to be covered by the ADEA.  Question Under the ADEA, does the same twenty-employee minimum that applies to private employers also apply to political subdivisions of a state, as the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held, or does the ADEA apply instead to all state political subdivisions of any size, as the Ninth Circuit held in this case? Conclusion In a unanimous (8–0) opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that the ADEA applies to all state political subdivisions, regardless of the number of employees.  The Court first looked to the plain language of the statute, finding the two-sentence delineation in the definitional provision § 630(b), coupled with the expression “also means” at the start of §630(b)’s second sentence, establish two separate categories: persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce with 20 or more employees; and states or political subdivisions. The latter category has no numerosity limitation. For this reason, the Court found that Mount Lemmon Fire District was subject to the ADEA despite the number of full-time employees there. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.