Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Jam v. International Finance Corp. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 31, 2018.Decided on Feb 27, 2019. Petitioner: Budha Ismael Jam, et al..Respondent: International Finance Corporation. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for petitioners) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting petitioners) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Budha Ismael Jam and others are Indian fishermen, farmers, and others who live in Gujarat, India. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is an international organization headquartered in Washington, DC, that provides loans in the developing world to projects that are unable to receive private capital.  The IFC loaned $450 million to an Indian company for the construction and operation of the Tata Mundra Plant in Gujarat, India. The loan agreement with the Indian power company included provisions that the company may not cause damage to surrounding communities, and IFC retained supervisory authority and could revoke financial support for the project. The plant’s construction and operation did cause harm to the surrounding communities, as reported in IFC’s own internal audit, in violation of the agreement. However, the IFC did not take any steps to force the loan recipients into compliance. The plaintiff fishermen and farmers brought this lawsuit in federal court in DC seeking damages based largely on tort causes of action. They also raised a claim as an alleged third-party beneficiary of the contract between IFC and the power company. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, finding that IFC was immune from suit under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) and further that the IFC had not waived its immunity to this suit. The relevant part of IOIA provides that international organizations “shall enjoy the same immunity from suit . . . as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b). The president of the United States determines whether an organization is entitled to such immunity, and an executive order in 1956 designated the IFC as entitled to the “privileges, exemptions, and immunities” conferred by the statute. The Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the IFC is immune under IOIA and that it did not waive immunity for this suit. Question Does the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA) give international organizations the immunity that foreign governments enjoyed at the time the law was passed, or the immunity that foreign governments have at present, as described in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976? Conclusion The International Organizations Immunities Act of 1945 (IOIA) affords international organizations the same immunity from suit that foreign governments enjoy today under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), not what they enjoyed when the law was passed. In a 7–1 decision authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the International Finance Corporation, an IOIA international organization, is immune from suit only to the extent that foreign sovereign governments are immune from suit. The Court interpreted the IOIA “same as” language as making international organization immunity and foreign sovereign immunity continuously equivalent. The Court found that this interpretation is bolstered by the “reference canon” of statutory interpretation, which provides that when a statute refers to a general subject, it adopts the law on that subject at the time a question arises, as opposed to when a statute refers to a statute by title, in which case it adopts the law as it existed at the time the statute was enacted. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which he gave greater weight to the IOIA’s “history, its context, its purposes, and its consequences” than to canons of statutory interpretation. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Washington State Department of Licensing v. Cougar Den, Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2018.Decided on Mar 19, 2019. Petitioner: Washington State Department of Licensing.Respondent: Cougar Den, Inc.. Advocates: Noah Purcell (for petitioner) Ann O'Connell Adams (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting petitioner) Adam G. Unikowsky (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Under Article III of the Yakama Nation Treaty of 1855, members of the tribe have "the right, in common with citizens of the United States, to travel upon all public highways." Cougar Den is a Yakama-owned fuel distributor that imports millions of gallons of fuel into the state each year to sell to the public. In December 2013, Cougar Den received an assessment from the Washington State Licensing Department, demanding $3.6 million in unpaid taxes, penalties, and licensing fees for hauling fuel across state lines without a license. Cougar Den protested the assessment, and the Department’s ALJ ruled that the bill was impermissible under the treaty. The director of the Department reversed the ALJ, and Cougar Den then appealed the Department’s order to the Yakima County Superior Court, which reversed the order and ruled that it violated the tribe’s right to travel. The Department sought review by the Washington Supreme Court. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly rejected claims that the treaty provision at issue exempts members from taxes or state fees on commercial activities taking place outside the Yakama Indian Reservation. In the instant case, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a much broader meaning, ruling that this portion of the treaty bars states from taxing "any trade, traveling, and importation" by members of the Yakama tribe “that requires the use of public roads,” even those outside the reservation. Based on this interpretation, the state’s high court held that the treaty preempts the state from requiring Cougar Den to pay wholesale fuel taxes. Question Does the Yakama Treaty of 1855 create a right for tribal members to avoid state taxes on off-reservation commercial activities that make use of public highways? Conclusion The “right to travel” provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 (between the United States and the Yakama Nation of Indians) preempts the state’s fuel tax as applied to Cougar Den’s importation of fuel by public highway for sale within the reservation. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered an opinion in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. For this plurality of the Court, Justice Breyer agreed with the Washington Supreme Court below that a provision of the Yakama Treaty of 1855 that guarantees the Yakama “the right . . . to travel upon all public highways” preempts a state tax triggered when motor fuel “enters into [Washington] state,” a tax exempted only for “bulk transfer,” such as pipeline or ship but not by ground transportation. A key component of the treaty was the right to travel with goods for sale or distribution, and the tax impermissibly burdened that treaty right. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. Justice Gorsuch pointed out that the treaty was drafted by the United States in a language the Yakamas could not read, and the Yakamas relinquished large amounts of territory in exchange for their treaty rights. Under these circumstances, Justice Gorsuch argued, the treaty should be interpreted as the Yakama understood it. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, and Brett Kavanaugh joined. Chief Justice Roberts argued that the tax burdens possession, not travel, and that it would apply regardless of how the fuel entered the state. Under this interpretation, the tax does not impermissibly burden the treaty right. Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the language of the treaty is best interpreted to mean that the Yakamas have the right to travel on public highways equal to the right that other U.S. citizens have. Thus, a state can apply any nondiscriminatory restrictions on travel without unduly burdening the treaty rights.

Garza v. Idaho Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 30, 2018.Decided on Feb 27, 2019. Petitioner: Gilberto Garza, Jr..Respondent: Idaho. Advocates: Amir H. Ali (for petitioner) Kenneth K. Jorgensen (for respondent) Allon Kedem (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae supporting respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On January 23, 2015, Gilberto Garza, Jr. entered an Alford plea—that is, a plea maintaining innocence but conceding that the evidence is likely to convince a jury of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—to aggravated assault. On February 24, 2015, he pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Both plea agreements required Garza to waive his right to appeal. The district court accepted the plea agreements and imposed the sentence in accordance with both of them. Shortly after sentencing, Garza informed his trial counsel that he wished to appeal, but counsel declined to file the appeal, citing Garza's waivers. Four months after he was convicted and sentenced, Garza filed a petition for post-conviction relief in each case, alleging that his trial attorney was ineffective for not filing notices of appeal. Garza’s attorney stated in an affidavit that he did not file an appeal because Garza had waived his right to appeal by accepting the plea agreements. The district court dismissed Garza’s petition to open the appeals period on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to “reasonably effective” legal assistance. A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show: (1) that counsel’s representation was deficient; and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Generally, counsel’s failure to file an appeal at a criminal defendant’s request is professionally unreasonable and therefore deficient, and most federal circuit courts interpret Flores-Ortega to mean that attorneys are ineffective when they do not file an appeal if the clients requested it, regardless of whether the defendants had waived their rights. The Idaho Supreme Court held contrary to the majority of federal circuit courts, finding that Flores-Ortega does not require an automatic “presumption of prejudice” when counsel declines to file an appeal in light of an appeal waiver. Rather, the defendant must still show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Question Is a criminal defendant’s counsel presumptively ineffective if counsel declines to file an appeal of a conviction because the defendant already waived the right to appeal in his plea? Conclusion The presumption of prejudice for Sixth Amendment purposes recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000), applies regardless of whether a defendant has signed an appeal waiver. In a 6–3 opinion authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the Court held that Garza’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to file a notice of appeal despite Garza’s repeated requests. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel must prove (1) “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) that the deficiency was “prejudicial to the defense.” In Flores-Ortega, the Court held that “prejudice is presumed” in certain contexts, including when counsel “deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” Garza’s appeal waivers—and appeal waivers generally—are not an absolute bar to all appellate claims. Indeed, some appeals fall outside the scope of the waiver, and there is always a possibility that the government might forfeit or breach the agreement of which the waiver is part. Given these scenarios, Garza could have pursued an appeal had his trial counsel acceded to his requests and filed a notice of appeal. By failing to do so, Garza’s counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Samuel Alito joined in part. The dissent opined that Garza’s counsel acted reasonably by declining to file an appeal on the grounds that doing so could jeopardize his plea bargain. The dissent characterized the majority’s holding as resulting in a “defendant-always-wins” rule that has no basis in the Court’s precedents or the Constitution.

Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 29, 2018.Decided on Apr 24, 2019. Petitioner: Lamps Plus, Inc., et al..Respondent: Frank Varela. Advocates: Andrew J. Pincus (for petitioners) Michele M. Vercoski (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Frank Varela filed a class action complaint against his employer, Lamps Plus, under theories including negligence, invasion of privacy, and breach of contract after the company released employee personal identifying information in response to a phishing scam. Varela had signed an arbitration agreement as a condition of his employment. After he filed suit, Lamps Plus relied on this agreement as a basis for a motion to compel bilateral arbitration.  The district court found the agreement to be a contract of adhesion and ambiguous as to whether it permitted class arbitration. It construed the ambiguity against the drafter, Lamps Plus, and allowed the arbitration to proceed on a class-wide basis. Lamps Plus appealed, arguing that it had not agreed to class arbitration, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed and ruled that class arbitration could move forward. The appeals court explained that because the agreement was capable of two reasonable interpretations, the district court was correct in finding ambiguity. Under California law it was also proper to construe the ambiguity against the drafter, particularly since it was a contract of adhesion. Further, it was a reasonable interpretation of the agreement to conclude that it covered legal disputes including class-wide claims, not just individual ones. By accepting this interpretation, the district court had found the requisite “contractual basis” for agreement to class arbitration under Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act foreclose a state-law interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration agreements? Conclusion Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), an arbitration agreement that is ambiguous as to the availability of class arbitration does not manifest sufficient consent by the parties to submit to class arbitration. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court held that the arbitration agreement between Varela and his employer, Lamps Plus, which contained only general language commonly used in arbitration agreements, did not provide the necessary contractual basis for compelling class arbitration. The Court first determined that it had jurisdiction to review the lower court’s decision because an order that both compels arbitration and dismisses the underlying claims is a “fundamental” change in the rights of a party and thus qualifies as “a final decision with respect to an arbitration” within the meaning of the statute.  On the merits, the Court first noted that the availability of class arbitration is a matter of consent—that is, all parties must consent to class arbitration for it to be available. Because there are crucial differences between class arbitration and sole arbitration, the Court found utmost importance in giving effect to the intent of the parties. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), the Court held that a contract’s silence toward class arbitration precluded its availability, and the same holds true for ambiguity. The Court rejected the California law that an ambiguous provision of a contract be construed against the drafter, finding that rule preempted by the FAA despite arguments by Varela and the dissenting justices that the law is nondiscriminatory. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority but wrote a separate concurrence expressing that he would not reach consideration of the California law of interpretation. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined, to emphasize that the Court’s decision strays even further from the principle that “arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Justice Ginsburg notes the irony that in contracts between parties with vastly unequal bargaining power, as between employers and employees, an inference that an ambiguous contract requires solo arbitration vests the employer with even greater power of coercion. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion expressing his individual view that both the court of appeals, below, and the Court itself lacked jurisdiction to review the case. Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion to point out that the majority reaches its holding without actually first agreeing that the contract is ambiguous, thereby unnecessarily invading California law by invoking preemption. Justice Elena Kagan wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ginsburg and Breyer join, and in which Justice Sotomayor joins as to Part II. Justice Kagan pointed out that the FAA, while requiring courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, does not federalize contract law. Thus, even under the FAA, state law governs the interpretation of arbitration agreements as long as it treats other types of contracts the same way. In Justice Kagan’s view, this principle should resolve the matter in this case.

Henry Schein Inc. v. Archer and White Sales Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 29, 2018.Decided on Jan 8, 2019. Petitioner: Henry Schein, Inc., et al..Respondent: Archer and White Sales, Inc.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for petitioners) Daniel L. Geyser (for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, Archer & White Sales, Inc.—a distributor, seller, and servicer for multiple dental equipment manufacturers—filed a lawsuit against Henry Schein, Inc. and its parent company—allegedly the largest distributor and manufacturer of dental equipment in the United States. In its lawsuit, Archer alleged violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act. The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge, and Schein moved to compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in a contract (“Dealer Agreement”) between Archer and another distributor who was allegedly Schein’s predecessor in interest. After a hearing, the magistrate judge held (1) the arbitration clause manifested an intent to have an arbitrator decide questions of arbitrability; (2) there is a reasonable construction of the arbitration clause that would call for arbitration in this dispute; and (3) the standard for determining whether equitable estoppel is appropriate requires arbitration against both signatories and non-signatories to the Dealer Agreement. The district court vacated the magistrate judge’s order and held that the court could decide the question of arbitrability, and that the dispute was not arbitrable because the plain language of the arbitration clause expressly excluded suits that involved requests for injunctive relief. The court declined to reach the question of equitable estoppel. Schein appealed to the Fifth Circuit. In the Fifth Circuit, courts must look first to whether the parties “clearly and unmistakably” intended to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator. If they did, “the motion to compel arbitration should be granted in almost all cases,” except where “the argument that the claim at hand is within the scope of the arbitration agreement is ‘wholly groundless.’” This standard requires consideration of whether there is a plausible argument for the arbitrability of the dispute. If there is no such plausible argument, “the district court may decide the ‘gateway’ issue of arbitrability despite a valid delegation clause.’” Reviewing the district court’s determinations de novo, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court. Question Does the Federal Arbitration Act permit a court to decline to enforce an agreement delegating questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator if the court concludes the claim of arbitrability is “wholly groundless”? Conclusion The “wholly groundless” exception to arbitrability is inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act, so the question of arbitrability should be resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court reiterated its prior decisions that parties to a contract have the ultimate say in whether to have an arbitrator or a court resolve disputes—not only the merits of disputes, but also questions of arbitrability. The Court found that in this contract, the parties had delegated to an arbitrator the question of arbitrability, so a court cannot override the contract and resolve such questions. The Court found unpersuasive Archer & White’s arguments to the contrary, holding that neither the text of the Act nor Congress’s intent in designing it supported a reading of the Act that empowers a court to resolve the question of arbitrability against the express wishes of the contracting parties. The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to consider the question whether the contract in fact delegated the arbitrability question to an arbitrator.

Air and Liquid Systems Corp. v. Devries Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2018.Decided on Mar 19, 2019. Petitioner: Air and Liquid Systems Corp., et al..Respondent: Roberta G. Devries, Administratrix of the Estate of John B. DeVries, Deceased, et. al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for petitioners) Thomas C. Goldstein (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Roberta G. Devries and Shirley McAfee are the widows of two US Navy sailors whom they allege developed cancer after they were exposed to asbestos working on Navy ships and in a naval shipyard. They sued multiple defendants, including manufacturers of “bare metal” ship components, or parts that were made and shipped before any asbestos-containing insulation materials were added. The plaintiffs sued in state court under theories of both negligence and strict liability. The defendant manufacturers removed the case to federal court, and moved for summary judgment based on the bare metal defense, arguing that they could not be held liable for the sailors’ injuries because they shipped their products out in bare metal form. The district court granted summary judgment as to both the negligence and strict liability claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Third Circuit remanded with instructions to the district court to more clearly address the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and to explain whether it was applying the bright-line as opposed to the fact-specific rule that can be relevant to the bare metal defense, and regarding which circuits are split. The district court again granted summary judgment on both claims, stating that it was applying the bright line rule.  The plaintiffs appealed again, but the Third Circuit did not consider their strict liability claims on appeal because it considered them abandoned. It therefore affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor of summary judgment for the defendants as to strict liability. The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment ruling on the negligence claim, holding that maritime law principles permit the manufacturer of a bare metal product to be held liable for asbestos-related injuries when they are reasonably foreseeable results of the manufacturer’s actions. In so holding, the appellate court applied the bare metal defense's fact-specific standard rather than the bright-line rule. Question Can products liability defendants be held liable under maritime law for injuries caused by products that they did not make, sell, or distribute? Conclusion Under maritime tort law, a product manufacturer has a duty to warn if its product requires incorporation of a part produced by a third party, the resulting fully incorporated product is likely to be dangerous for its intended uses, and the manufacturer has no reason to believe that the product’s users would be aware of that danger. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the Court held that Air and Liquid Systems owed a duty to warn the plaintiffs about the danger of the ship components even though the Navy, not the manufacturer, added the parts with asbestos. Three approaches have emerged from the duty to exercise reasonable care in warning prospective users of a product that requires later incorporation of a dangerous part for the integrated product to function as intended. Of those three, the Court chose the approach that imposes neither the narrowest nor broadest liability on manufacturers, finding it most appropriate for the maritime context, which recognizes “a special solicitude for the welfare of sailors.” Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined. The dissenters would adopt the bare-metal defense approach, consistent with traditional common law of torts.  

Nielsen v. Preap Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 10, 2018.Decided on Mar 19, 2019. Petitioner: Kirstjen Nielsen, Secretary of Homeland Security, et al..Respondent: Mony Preap, et al.. Advocates: Zachary D. Tripp (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioners) Cecillia D. Wang (for repondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Three lawful permanent residents filed a class action for habeas relief in the US District Court for the Northern District of California when immigration authorities took them into custody and detained them without bond hearings years after they had been released from serving criminal sentences for offenses that could lead to removal. The plaintiffs’ position was that they were not detained “when . . . released” from criminal custody, and thus were not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).  The district court certified the class, which included “[i]ndividuals in the state of California who are or will be subjected to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. section 1226(c) and who were not or will not have been taken into custody by the government immediately upon their release from criminal custody for a Section 1226(c)(1) offense.” The court also issued a preliminary injunction directing the government to provide all class members with a bond hearing pursuant to § 1226(a). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the First Circuit and rejecting reasoning followed in four other circuits, holding that the immigration detention at issue under § 1226(c) must take place promptly upon the noncitizen’s release from criminal custody. The appellate court explained that the statute’s plain language reflected an immediacy with regard to when the immigration detention must take place in relation to the release from custody, and rejected arguments by the government that would allow for detentions to occur following significant delays. Question Does a noncitizen released from criminal custody become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) if, after the noncitizen is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take the noncitizen into immigration custody immediately? Conclusion A noncitizen does not become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) through the failure of the Department of Homeland Security to take him into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody. Justice Samuel Alito delivered the opinion of the 5–4 majority with respect to Parts I, III-A, III-B-1, and IV (joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and Brett Kavanaugh), and an opinion with respect to Parts II and III-B-2 (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh). In Part I, Justice Alito recited the facts and procedural history of the case for the 5–4 majority. In Part II, Justice Alito wrote for a minority addressing four questions regarding the court’s jurisdiction. In Part III-A, the majority looked to the plain text of § 1226(c) and found that the grammar of the provision and the meaning of the term “described” within the provision require reading the statute as meaning that the scope of “the alien” is fixed by the offenses described in subparagraphs (A)–(D), even if they were not arrested “immediately” when they were released from criminal custody. In Part III-B-1, the majority concluded from “textual cues” that even if an alien is not arrested under authority bestowed by subsection (c)(1), he may face mandatory detention under subsection (c)(2). In Part III-B-2, the minority applied a principle for interpreting time limits on statutory mandates to conclude that a statutory rule that officials “shall act within a specified time” does not preclude action later. In Part IV, the majority addressed (and rejected) the respondents’ arguments that the majority’s reading of the statute would (1) render key language superfluous, (2) lead to anomalies, and (3) violate the canon of constitutional avoidance. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion to emphasize the narrowness of the issue before the Court. Justice Kavanaugh pointed out that the case “is not about whether a noncitizen may be removed from the United States on the basis of criminal offenses” nor is it about “whether” or “how long” a noncitizen may be detained” during removal proceedings or before removal. Finally, it is not about whether Congress may mandate that the Executive Branch detain noncitizens during removal proceedings or before removal, as opposed to merely giving it discretion to detain. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that courts lack jurisdiction to decide questions concerning the detention of noncitizens before final orders of removal have been entered. However, notwithstanding his opinion on jurisdiction, given that the Court exercised jurisdiction, Justice Thomas would largely agree with the majority as to the resolution of the merits. Justice Stephen Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the majority’s reading runs counter to the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language, the statute’s structure, and relevant canons of interpretation. Under the majority’s broad interpretation, the statute would forbid bail hearings even for noncitizens whom the Secretary detained many years after their release from prison.

Stokeling v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2018.Decided on Jan 15, 2019. Petitioner: Denard Stokeling.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Brenda G. Bryn (for petitioner) Frederick Liu (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2016, Denard Stokeling pleaded guilty to charges that he was a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He had two previous convictions for robbery in Florida, where an element of that offense was “overcoming victim resistance.” Some state courts have interpreted this offense as requiring only slight force to overcome victim resistance. Stokeling therefore contended that both of his robbery convictions should not qualify as “violent felonies” in the context of enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), because those convictions did not require a violent use of force. The district court agreed with Stokeling as to one of his convictions. The United States appealed to the 11th Circuit, which vacated Stokeling’s sentence and remanded the case for sentencing as an Armed Career Criminal. Question Is a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(b)(i), when that offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance? Conclusion A state robbery offense that has as an element the use of force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) because it necessitates the use of “physical force.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a 5–4 majority. The ACCA’s elements clause covers any offense that has as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.” A majority of states define non-aggravated robbery as requiring a degree of force sufficient only to overcome a victim’s resistance; indeed, even the “slightest offensive touching” constitutes “physical force” in a majority of states. Stokeling’s proposed definition of physical force as force “reasonably expected to cause pain or injury” is inconsistent with the degree of force needed to commit robbery at common law and therefore cannot be adopted. Under the broader interpretation of “physical force,” robbery under Florida law qualifies as an ACCA-predicate offense under the elements clause, so the decision of the Eleventh Circuit below is affirmed. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Elena Kagan and Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined. The dissent opines that in light of the Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), which held that the words “physical force” in the ACCA mean “a heightened degree of force, rather than minimal contact,” a Florida robbery, which can be committed through use of only slight force, should not be a “violent crime” under the ACCA.

United States v. Stitt Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 9, 2018.Decided on Dec 10, 2018. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Victor J. Stitt, II. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (Assistant to the Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2011, Victor Stitt tried to shove a loaded handgun into his girlfriend’s mouth and threatened to kill her. A neighbor called the police, and Stitt fled but later surrendered to police. A jury found Stitt guilty of possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In light of Stitt’s nine prior “violent felony” convictions, the court designated Stitt as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced him accordingly. The ACCA applies to those felons guilty of possessing a firearm who also have at least three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. Stitt appealed the conviction, arguing that none of his nine prior convictions constituted “violent felonies.” The US Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Johnson v. United States invalidated the violent-felony status of three of his prior convictions, leaving only six aggravated-burglary convictions. The Sixth Circuit has held that Tennessee aggravated burglary is a violent felony under the ACCA, so a panel of that court affirmed the sentence. Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit overturned its precedent and held that a conviction for Tennessee aggravated burglary does not qualify as an ACCA violent felony. In a separate case, Jason Sims pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and received an enhanced sentence under the ACCA, based in part on two prior Arkansas residential burglary convictions. Sims appealed his conviction and the Eighth Circuit vacated his sentence and remanded his case for rehearing. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for the purpose of oral argument. At issue in both cases is whether the elements of the state crimes of which the defendants were convicted are “the same as, or narrower than, those of the general offense.” If they are broader than those of the general offense, then they cannot serve as ACCA predicate offenses.   Question Is the crime of residential burglary under Arkansas law, or aggravated burglary under Tennessee law, the same as or narrower than “general burglary” such that convictions for those crimes serve as predicate crimes for the purpose of the enhanced sentencing provision of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984? Conclusion In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) encompasses not just “dwellings” but also any “vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation.” The general definition of burglary is “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” The Court previously recognized that when the ACCA was adopted in 1986, it was intended to reflect the definition of burglary used by most states. Because the statutory word “structure” is broad enough to encompass vehicles, and a majority of states in 1986 included in the definition of burglary vehicles adapted for or customarily used for lodging, the defendants’ state court convictions were for violent crimes within the meaning of the ACCA. The Court reversed the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Stitt, No. 17-765, and vacated the Eighth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Sims, No. 17-766, remanding the case for the lower court to resolve novel state law arguments.

Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 3, 2018.Decided on Jun 21, 2019. Petitioner: Rose Mary Knick.Respondent: Township of Scott, Pennsylvania. Advocates: J. David Breemer (for petitioner) Noel J. Francisco (Solicitor General, US Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting petitioner) Teresa Ficken Sachs (for respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, the Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, passed an ordinance affecting private properties determined to be or contain cemeteries. In relevant part, the ordinance required that “all cemeteries within the Township … be kept open and accessible to the general public during daylight hours” and that no owner could unreasonably restrict nor charge any fee to access the cemetery (the “public-access provision”). Additionally, the ordinance permitted a Township officer to enter any property within the Township to determine whether there is a cemetery on the property, in order to enforce the public-access provision. Rose Mary Knick owns property in the Township of Scott, and in April 2013, a Township officer entered her property without an administrative warrant and identified certain stones as grave markers. The officer cited Knick as violating the ordinance. Knick disputes that a cemetery exists on her property and filed a lawsuit to challenge. Knick challenged the ordinance on several grounds, two of which are most salient. First, she alleges that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained searches of private property in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution. Second, she argues that the ordinance takes private property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Notably, Knick did not initiate an “inverse-condemnation proceeding” against the Township, which is the local administrative process for challenging a taking by the government. The district court dismissed all but two of Knick’s claims with prejudice, and dismissed two of them (described above) without prejudice pending exhaustion of state-law remedies. Knick appealed the dismissal of her claims to the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding that although the ordinance was constitutionally suspect, she lacks Article III standing because she failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and redressability as to her Fourth Amendment claim, and that her Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and been denied just compensation using state inverse-condemnation procedures as required in the US Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City. Question Should the Court affirm or abrogate its holding in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, which requires property owners to exhaust state court remedies before bringing federal Takings Clause claims? Does the ripeness doctrine established in Williamson County apply to takings claims that assert that a law is unconstitutional on its face? Conclusion A government violates the Takings Clause when it takes property without compensation, and a property owner may bring a Fifth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 at that time; the state-litigation requirement set forth in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), is overruled. Chief Justice John Roberts delivered the 5-4 majority opinion for the Court. The Court found that the state-litigation requirement in Williamson County “imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs” and “conflicts with the rest of our takings jurisprudence.” Looking to the text of the Takings Clause, the Court found that the most natural reading of that provision is that the right of compensation arises at the time of the taking. Under Williamson County, the government did not need to compensate in advance or simultaneously with the taking, but only provide a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” mechanism for recovering such compensation after the fact. By forcing plaintiffs to seek compensation after the taking in state court before allowing them to proceed in federal court, Williamson County imposes an “unjustifiable burden” on these plaintiffs. Additionally, the Court expressed concern over the likelihood that a plaintiff would bring a state-court claim, lose, and therefore be precluded from bringing a claim in federal court at all. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate concurrence underscoring his opposition to the position advocated by the township, the United States (as amicus curiae), and the dissent, that there is no constitutional violation as long as there is a mechanism for receiving compensation later. Justice Elena Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Justice Kagan argued that the Takings Clause is at its core (and in its text) different from other constitutional provisions in its qualifying phrase “without just compensation.” Justice Kagan argued that the Clause does not forbid all takings, only those without just compensation, and the majority disregards the text of the Clause in its interpretation requiring compensation at the time of taking. Justice Kagan also dismissed the majority’s concern over the preclusive effect of state-court litigation, arguing that Congress bears the burden of correcting errors that become evident from application of laws. Most importantly, the dissent noted, the majority departs from lost-established precedent and disregards the doctrine of stare decisis.