Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 8, 2019.Decided on Mar 4, 2019. Petitioner: Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation.Respondent: Wall-Street.com, LLC, et al.. Advocates: Aaron M. Panner (for the petitioner) Peter K. Stris (for the respondents) Jonathan Y. Ellis (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is a news organization that produces online journalism and licenses articles to websites while retaining the copyright to the articles. Wall-Street.com obtained licenses to several articles produced by Fourth Estate, and under the license agreement, Wall-Street was required to remove all of the content produced by Fourth Estate from its website before cancelling its account. However, when Wall-Street cancelled its account, it continued to display the articles produced by Fourth Estate. Fourth Estate filed a lawsuit for copyright infringement, although it filed an application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights and the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The district court dismissed the action, finding “registration” under Section 411 of the Copyright Act required that the register of copyrights “register the claim,” and that step had not occurred. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.   Question Is “registration of [a] copyright claim” complete under 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) when the copyright holder delivers the required application, fees, and materials to the copyright office, or only once the copyright office has acted on that application? Conclusion Registration of a copyright claim “has been made” not when an application for registration is filed, but only after the copyright office has processed the application and registered the copyright. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that Fourth Estate’s application to register its allegedly infringed copyrights was not yet complete for the purposes of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) because the copyright office had not yet registered its claims. The Court looked to the language of the first two sentences of § 411(a) and found that under Fourth Estate’s proposed interpretation of the statute—that application alone would constitute registration—the second sentence would be made superfluous. Canons of statutory construction caution against such interpretations. The Court found that the more plausible interpretation—that registration occurs only when the copyright office finishes processing the application—is consistent with other provisions of the Copyright Act, as well.

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2019.Decided on May 20, 2019. Petitioner: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp..Respondent: Doris Albrecht, et al.. Advocates: Shay Dvoretzky (for the petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) David C. Frederick (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Beginning in 2010, hundreds of plaintiffs around the country filed personal injury lawsuits against drug manufacturer Merck Sharp & Dohme (“Merck”), claiming that the osteoporosis drug Fosamax had caused them to suffer severe thigh bone fractures. Under state tort law, each plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Merck’s Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved drug label failed to include an adequate warning regarding the risk of femur fractures. In 2011 the cases were consolidated as a multi-district litigation action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The cases subsequently grew to include over 1,000 plaintiffs. After discovery and a bellwether trial, the district court ruled in favor of Merck on a summary judgment motion, dismissing all of the plaintiffs’ claims on the basis that they were preempted by federal law under Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), which held that state-law failure-to-warn claims are preempted in the event that there is “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the warning that a plaintiff claims was necessary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated and remanded the district court’s ruling, holding that preemption was an affirmative defense, and that Merck had not sufficiently proven that it was entitled to that defense as a matter of law. Under Wyeth’s demanding “clear evidence” standard, the appellate court found that the plaintiffs had produced adequate evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the FDA would have approved an appropriately worded warning about the risk of femur fractures, or at least that the chances of FDA rejection were not highly probable. Pursuant to Wyeth and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, this showing was sufficient to defeat summary judgment and move forward to trial. Question Is a state-law failure-to-warn claim preempted when the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) rejected the drug manufacturer’s proposal to warn about the risk after being provided with the relevant scientific data, or must such a case go to a jury for conjecture as to why the FDA rejected the proposed warning? Conclusion Whether the FDA’s rejection of a proposed drug label preempts state-law failure-to-warn claims requires “clear evidence” that the drug manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law and that the FDA informed the drug manufacturer that it would not approve that change and is primarily a legal question that must be resolved by a judge, not a factual question to be resolved by a jury. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the Opinion of the Court (6-3 in its reasoning, but 9-0 in the judgment). Under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal law preempts state law when it is “impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal requirements.” Here, the state law at issue is state common law or statutes that require drug manufacturers to warn drug consumers of the risks associated with a particular drug. The federal law at issue is the statutory and regulatory scheme by which the FDA regulates the labels of brand-name prescription drugs. In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Court held that “absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” to the label, the Court could not conclude that it was impossible to comply with both federal and state labeling requirements.” Applied to the facts of that case, that the state-law claims were preempted by federal law only if the drug manufacturer showed it “fully informed” the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state law, and also that the FDA then informed the drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s label to include that warning. Justice Breyer clarified that “clear evidence” is not a heightened evidentiary standard but a requirement that the court consider “whether the relevant federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflic[t].’” It is not enough that the FDA simply act. It must act pursuant to its congressionally delegated authority, as preemption only occurs when federal law—not all agency action—conflicts with state law. The question whether the FDA’s disapproval of the proposed label is primarily one of law and thus better suited for judges, not juries, to resolve. Judge are “better equipped” than juries “to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s determination...and to interpret agency decisions in light of the governing statutory and regulatory context.” Thus, the Third Circuit erred in treating the preemption question as one of fact, not law. Justice Clarence Thomas joined the majority and wrote separate concurring opinion to explain his understanding of preemption doctrine. Justice Thomas argued that the FDA’s response letter in this case “was not a final agency action with the force of law,” and thus could not preempt under the original meaning of the Supremacy Clause. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring only in the judgment of the Court, in which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined. Justice Alito agreed with the majority that the question of preemption in this case is a question of law, but he declined to join the majority because of concern that its discussion of the law and facts may be misleading on remand. Justice Alito argued that a standard of proof like “clear evidence” has “no place in the resolution of this question of law” and that notwithstanding the majority’s suggestion to the contrary, there are other ways in which a drug manufacturer may change a label without prior FDA approval.

Obduskey v. McCarthy & Holthus LLP Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Jan 7, 2019.Decided on Mar 20, 2019. Petitioner: Dennis Obduskey.Respondent: McCarthy & Holthus LLP, et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the petitioner) Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the respondent) Jonathan C. Bond (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Dennis Obduskey obtained a mortgage loan for $329,940 in 2007. The loan was serviced by Wells Fargo. Obduskey defaulted on the loan in 2009. Over the next six years foreclosure proceedings were initiated several times, but never completed. Obduskey’s loan remained in default, and in 2014 the bank hired the law firm of McCarthy & Holthus LLP to pursue non-judicial foreclosure proceedings against him. McCarthy sent Obduskey a letter informing him that it had been instructed to begin foreclosure proceedings, and Obduskey responded to the letter disputing the debt. The firm initiated a foreclosure action in May 2015. Obduskey sued McCarthy and Wells Fargo, alleging, among other things, a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss on all claims, and noted disagreement among courts as to whether the FDCPA applied to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.  Upon Obduskey’s appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the appellate court held that based on the statute’s plain language as well as policy considerations, the FDCPA did not apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings in Colorado. It agreed with the district court’s finding that Wells Fargo was not a debt collector because Obduskey was not in default when it began servicing the loan. It also held that McCarthy was not a debt collector under the FDCPA because attempting to enforce a security interest was not the same as attempting to collect a money debt. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit, and ruled in conflict with the outcomes reached on this topic in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits. Obduskey petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari, and will consider whether the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act applies to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. This is the same question presented in Greer v. Green Tree Servicing LLC. Question Does the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act apply to non-judicial foreclosure proceedings? Conclusion A business engaged in no more than non-judicial foreclosure proceedings is not a “debt collector” under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), except for the limited purpose of § 1692f(6). In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Stephen Breyer, the Court held that law firm McCarthy & Holthus LLP was not a “debt collector” within the meaning of the FDCPA when it merely initiated a nonjudicial foreclosure action. The Court first looked to the primary definition of “debt collector” under the FDCPA, which is “any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is to collect, directly or indirectly, debts.” The Act then provides a limited-purpose definition that a debt collector “also includes any person . . . in any business the principal purpose of which is the enforcement of security interests.” The Court found the language “also includes” strongly suggests that the limited-purpose security enforcers do not fall within the scope of the primary definition. This reading gives effect to every word of the definition. The Court then found that the purpose (to treat security-interest enforcement differently from ordinary debt collection so as to avoid conflicts with state non-judicial foreclosure schemes) and legislative history of the FDCPA (the language ultimately used in the Act was a compromise between competing versions of the bill that treated security-interest enforcement vastly differently) support this interpretation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion in which she emphasizes how complex the statute is and calls upon Congress to clarify the statute if it feels the Court (understandably, given the statute’s complexity) interpreted it incorrectly. She also notes that the Court “rightly cabins its holding to the kinds of good-faith actions presented here” and does not suggest that “pursuing nonjudicial foreclosure is a license to engage in abusive debt collection practices.”

Gamble v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 6, 2018.Decided on Jun 17, 2019. Petitioner: Terance Martez Gamble.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Louis A. Chaiten (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Kyle D. Hawkins (Texas Solicitor General, for Texas et al. as amicus curiae, in support of affirmance) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Terance Martez Gamble was convicted for possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He argues that the district court erred in concluding that Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the federal government from prosecuting Gamble for the same conduct for which he had been prosecuted and sentenced for by the State of Alabama. The US Supreme Court held in Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959), that prosecution in federal and state court for the same conduct does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the state and federal governments are separate sovereigns (the so-called “separate sovereigns” exception). Under this binding precedent, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court. Question Should the Court overrule the “separate sovereigns” exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment? Conclusion In a 7-2 opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Court declined to overturn the dual-sovereignty doctrine. The Court first clarified that the dual-sovereignty doctrine is not an exception to the right against double jeopardy, but a corollary to the text of the Fifth Amendment. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits individuals from being “twice put in jeopardy . . . for the same offence.” Because an “offence” is determined by law, and laws are determined by a sovereign (the federal or state government), the laws of two sovereigns create two “offences.” The Court found unpersuasive Gamble’s arguments that precedents should be abandoned, including his claim that the incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states eroded the theoretical foundation for the dual-sovereignty rule. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he argued for his originalist view that the proper role of stare decisis is subordinate to the text of the Constitution and other duly enacted federal law. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause should bar “successive prosecutions for the same offense by parts of the whole USA” and that the separate-sovereigns doctrine is based upon a mere “metaphysical subtlety.” Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion arguing that “[a] free society does not allow its government to try the same individual for the same crime until it’s happy with the result,” yet “the Court today endorses a colossal exception to this ancient rule against double jeopardy.” Justice Gorsuch pointed out the “separate sovereigns” doctrine appears nowhere in the text of the Fifth Amendment and violates the very essence of the right against double jeopardy.

Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2018.Decided on Jan 22, 2019. Petitioner: Helsinn Healthcare S.A..Respondent: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) William M. Jay (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Helsinn owns four patents describing intravenous formulations of palonosetron for reducing the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting (“CINV”). All four claim priority to a provisional patent application filed on January 30, 2003. The critical date for the on-sale bar is one year earlier, January 30, 2002, which means the sale of the invention before that date can invalidate the patent. In its defense, Teva argued that the asserted claims were invalid under the on-sale bar provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102. The sale referenced by Teva in its defense was an exclusive supply and purchase agreement between Helsinn and MGI Pharma. Everything about the agreement except the terms and price was publicly disclosed. The district court upheld as valid Helsinn’s patents and rejected Teva’s “on sale” defense. The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the patents were subject to an invalidating contract for sale prior to the critical date of January 30, 2002, The court also noted that the evidence that the formulation was ready for patenting before the critical date was “overwhelming.”   Question Does an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualify as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention? Conclusion An inventor’s sale to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential constitutes invalidating prior art. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the opinion for a unanimous (9–0) Court. The patent statute in force immediately before the America Invents Act (AIA) contained an “on-sale bar” which invalidated patents that had been on sale. Applying the presumption that when Congress reenacts the same language, it adopts the earlier judicial construction of the phrase, the Court found that the AIA consequently prohibits patents that had previously been on sale. Therefore, the commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential falls within the on-sale bar of the AIA and invalidates the patent.

Biestek v. Berryhill Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 4, 2018.Decided on Apr 1, 2019. Petitioner: Michael J. Biestek.Respondent: Nancy A. Berryhill, Deputy Commissioner for Operations, Social Security Administration. Advocates: Ishan Bhabha (for the petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Michael Biestek worked for most of his life as a carpenter and a construction laborer. He stopped working in June 2005 due to a degenerative disc disease, Hepatitis C, and depression. He applied for SSI and SSDI benefits in March 2010, alleging a disability onset date of October 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his application in August 2010, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied his application, and the Social Security Administration Appeals Council denied review. Biestek timely appealed, and the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s finding that the ALJ had not obtained necessary medical-expert testimony and did not pose a sufficiently specific hypothetical to the vocational expert. On remand, the ALJ found that Biestek was disabled from May 4, 2013, but not before. Biestek appealed the ALJ’s determination, and the district court affirmed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that Biestek did not meet the back-pain-related impairment requirement and that the ALJ properly evaluated the testimony of medical experts and a vocational expert. Question During an application for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits, does a vocational expert’s testimony count as “substantial evidence” of “other work” if the expert does not provide the underlying data on which that testimony is premised? Conclusion A vocational expert’s refusal to provide the underlying private data during a Social Security disability benefits hearing does not categorically preclude the testimony from counting as “substantial evidence” in federal court. In a 6–3 opinion by Justice Elena Kagan, the Court held that whether testimony amounts to “substantial evidence” requires a case-by-case determination and cannot be subject to a categorical rule as Biestek proposed in this case. “Substantial evidence” is anything more than “a mere scintilla.” Under the categorical approach proposed by Biestek, the testimony of a vocational expert who refuses a request for supporting data would never constitute substantial evidence, which is an illogical result. If there is no demand for underlying data, the vocational expert’s testimony may count as substantial evidence even without supporting data. The mere addition of a request for that data should not render the expert’s testimony categorically inadequate. Justice Sonia Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that the question presented in the case required considering not only the propriety of a categorical rule but also the narrower circumstances of Biestek’s case. In this case, Justice Sotomayor argued that the expert provided only conclusory testimony that cannot alone constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusions. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg joined, arguing that the expert’s bottom-line testimony fails to satisfy the government’s statutory burden of substantial evidence. Justice Gorsuch argued that if “clearly mistaken evidence, fake evidence, speculative evidence, and conclusory evidence aren’t substantial evidence [and federal appellate jurisprudence says they are not], the evidence here shouldn’t be either.”

Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2018.Decided on Mar 27, 2019. Petitioner: Francis V. Lorenzo.Respondent: Securities and Exchange Commission. Advocates: Robert Heim (for the petitioner) Christopher G. Michel (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Francis Lorenzo was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer. Lorenzo’s only investment-banking client at the relevant time was a start-up company named Waste2Energy Holdings (W2E). W2E claimed to have developed an innovative technology, and its valuation was entirely dependent on realization of that technology. The technology never materialized, and W2E sought to avoid complete financial ruin by offering up to $15 million in “debentures”—which is debt secured only by the debtor’s earning power, rather than by a lien on a tangible asset. At the time, W2E’s most recent SEC filing did not indicate the possible devaluation of the company’s intangible assets and stated only that they were worth over $10 million. After an audit, W2E filed a Form 8-K reporting total impairment of its intangible assets and valuing its total assets at $370,552. Lorenzo’s secretary alerted him via email about the amended filings, and Lorenzo contacted the Charles Vista brokers about them. Nearly two weeks later, Lorenzo emailed two potential investors “several key points” about W2E’s pending debenture offering, but rather than even mentioning the devaluation of W2E’s intangible assets, he assured both that the offering came with “3 layers of protection,” which were: $10 million in “confirmed assets”; purchase orders and LOIs for “over $43 [million] in orders”; and Charles Vista has agreed to raise additional monies to repay the debenture holders if necessary. One of these emails stated it had been sent “at the request of [Lorenzo’s boss]” and the other stated it was sent “at the request of [another broker with the firm].” Lorenzo’s name and title were at the bottom of both emails. The SEC charged Lorenzo, his boss, and Charles Vista with violating three securities-fraud provisions: Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933; Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5. Lorenzo’s boss and Charles Vista settled the charges against them, but Lorenzo proceeded to resolution before the agency. An ALJ found that Lorenzo had willfully violated all three provisions of the Securities and Exchange Acts by his misrepresentations to investors. On review, the full Commission sustained the ALQ’s decision, and Lorenzo appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which upheld the Commission’s findings as to two of the provisions, but reversed as to its finding that he violated Rule 10b-5(b). That provision prohibits the making of materially false statements in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. A majority of the DC Circuit panel found that because Lorenzo’s boss, not Lorenzo himself, retained “ultimate authority” over the statements, Lorenzo did not violate that provision, under the US Supreme Court’s definition of “maker” of false statements in Janus Capital Group., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011). Question Does a false statement by someone who does not retain “ultimate authority” over the statement nevertheless subject the person to a fraudulent-scheme claim under Securities Exchange Act Rule 10b-5? Conclusion Dissemination of false or misleading statements with intent to defraud falls within the scope of Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements as defined by the Court’s precedent. Justice Stephen Breyer delivered the 6–2 majority opinion of the Court. Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful “(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact…, or (c) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit...in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), the Court held that the “maker” of a statement under subsection (b) is the person with “ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it.” However, one does not need to be the “maker” of a statement to be subject to subsections (a) and (b) of this rule. The Court looked to the ordinary meaning of the terms in both subsections and found that Lorenzo’s actions fall well within those subsections notwithstanding the fact that he did not “make” the statements under subsection (b). Moreover, Lorenzo’s actions are a “paradigmatic example” of securities fraud that the rule contemplates and forbids. Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas argued that the majority “eviscerate[d]” the distinction between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases and “misconstrue[d]” the securities laws and the Court’s precedent. Justice Brett Kavanaugh took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Dawson v. Steager Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 3, 2018.Decided on Feb 20, 2019. Petitioner: James Dawson, et ux..Respondent: Dale W. Steager, West Virginia State Tax Commissioner. Advocates: Lawrence D. Rosenberg (for the petitioners) Michael R. Huston (Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Lindsay S. See (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) West Virginia Code 11-21-12(c)(6) (“Section 12(c)(6)”) exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals. Plaintiffs James and Elaine Dawson allege that this differential treatment is proscribed by 4 U.S.C. § 111, which allows for state taxes on federal retirement benefits only if “the taxation does not discriminate...because of the source of the pay or compensation.” James Dawson spent most of his career with the US Marshal Service and retired in 2008. Dawson and his wife sought to exempt Dawson’s federal retirement income from his state income tax, but the tax commissioner refused to allow the exemption. The Office of Tax Appeals affirmed the tax commissioner’s denial of the Dawsons’ 12(c)(6) exemption, and the Dawsons timely appealed. The Circuit Court of Mercer County found that the tax scheme does violated 4 U.S.C. § 111 and reversed the Office of Tax Appeals. The tax commissioner appealed the circuit court’s decision, and on appeal, the state supreme court reversed. Question Does the provision of the West Virginia Code that exempts from state taxation the retirement income of many state and local firefighters and law enforcement officers, but not federal marshals, violate 4 U.S.C. § 111? Conclusion The West Virginia law that taxes the retirement income of federal marshal but exempts from taxation state and local law enforcement officers unlawfully discriminates against federal employees, in violation of 4 U.S.C. § 111. In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Neil Gorsuch, the Court found that the state law confers a benefit to state and local retirees that federal retirees cannot receive and that there are no “significant differences between the two classes” of employees that justify differential treatment. The Court found unpersuasive the state’s arguments that the law affects too few people to meaningfully interfere with federal government operations and that the statute is not intended to harm federal retirees. The prohibition on discrimination, 4 U.S.C. § 111, applies to any state tax, not only those that are cumbersome, and the state’s purpose in adopting the discriminatory tax is irrelevant. With no meaningful distinction between retired federal marshals and state law enforcement retirees, the state cannot treat the two classes of retirees differently for purposes of taxation.

Timbs v. Indiana Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 28, 2018.Decided on Feb 20, 2019. Petitioner: Tyson Timbs.Respondent: Indiana. Advocates: Wesley P. Hottot (for the Petitioner) Thomas M. Fisher (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Tyson Timbs purchased a Land Rover for approximately $42,000 in January 2013 using the proceeds from his father’s life insurance policy. During the following four months, Timbs used the vehicle for multiple trips within Indiana to transport heroin. After a series of controlled purchases involving a confidential informant, Timbs was arrested at a traffic stop. At the time of his arrest in May, the Land Rover had approximately 15,000 more miles on it than when he purchased it in January. The state charged Timbs with two charges of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft. He later pleaded guilty to one charge of felony dealing and one charge of conspiracy to commit theft in exchange for the state dismissing the remaining charge. After accepting the plea, the trial court sentenced Timbs to six years, five of which were to be suspended. Timbs also agreed to pay fees and costs totaling approximately $1200. In addition, the state sought to forfeit Timbs’ Land Rover. The trial court denied the state’s action, ruling that the forfeiture would be an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment, characterizing it as grossly disproportional to the seriousness of the offense. The court also noted that the maximum statutory fine for Timbs’ felony dealing charge was $10,000, and the vehicle was worth roughly four times that amount when Timbs purchased it. The trial court ordered the state to release the vehicle immediately. The court of appeals affirmed. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the U.S. Supreme Court had never clearly incorporated the Eighth Amendment against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court also ruled that the state had proven its entitlement to forfeit the Land Rover under state law. Question Has the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause been incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment? Conclusion The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is an incorporated protection applicable to the states. In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court found that the Excessive Fines Clause finds its origins in the Magna Carta, the historic English Bill of Rights, and state constitutions from the colonial era to the present day. As such, it is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” As such, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporates the Clause against—that is, applies to—the states with equal force as against the federal government. Justice Neil Gorsuch filed a concurring opinion to acknowledge that, in his opinion, the appropriate vehicle for incorporation is the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, rather than its Due Process Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment but expressly disagreeing with the majority’s use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to incorporate, instead finding that the Clause must be incorporated by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Carpenter v. Murphy Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 27, 2018. Petitioner: Mike Carpenter, Interim Warden.Respondent: Patrick Dwayne Murphy. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Ian H. Gershengorn (for the Respondent) Riyaz A. Kanji (as amicus curiae, supporting the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Patrick Dwayne Murphy, a member of the Creek Nation, was convicted in Oklahoma state court and sentenced to death for the 1999 murder of George Jacobs, who was a member of the same nation. Murphy’s conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Murphy then sought post-conviction relief on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), gave the federal government exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute murders committed by Indians in Indian Country, a term defined under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities.  The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) ultimately rejected Murphy’s jurisdictional argument, ruling that the state’s jurisdiction was proper because the land where the crime occurred was not an allotment, and because Murphy had offered insufficient evidence that the land was part of a reservation or dependent Indian community. The OCCA acknowledged authority from the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals stating that the Creek Reservation still existed but reserving the matter of whether its 1866 boundaries remained intact, and declined to make a finding on the boundary question if the federal courts had not done so.  Murphy then sought habeas relief in federal district court, challenging Oklahoma’s jurisdiction on the theory that the crime had occurred in Indian Country because the land at issue was part of the Creek Reservation under § 1151(a), and because the land was an Indian allotment under § 1151(c). The district court rejected his claims, and Murphy appealed to the 10th Circuit. The federal appeals court reversed, ruling that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation, and that the Oklahoma state courts lacked jurisdiction. As an initial matter, the court found that under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the OCCA’s decisions in Murphy’s case were contrary to clearly established law, which was provided by Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984). Next, applying Solem’s three-part test, the court concluded that Congress had not disestablished the Creek Reservation. The crime had therefore occurred in Indian country under § 1151(a), meaning that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction and Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction under § 1153(a). The court remanded the case with instructions to grant Murphy’s application for habeas relief under § 2254. Question Do the 1866 territorial boundaries of the Creek Nation within the former Indian Territory of eastern Oklahoma constitute an “Indian reservation” today under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)?