Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Borden v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2020.Decided on Jun 10, 2021. Petitioner: Charles Borden, Jr..Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Kannon K. Shanmugam (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Police caught Charles Borden, Jr., with a pistol during a traffic stop in April 2017, and he subsequently pleaded guilty possessing that firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government recommended sentencing Borden as an armed career criminal, under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on three prior Tennessee aggravated assault convictions. Borden objected, arguing that one of his prior convictions—reckless aggravated assault—did not qualify as a “violent felony” under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA. Borden argued that reckless aggravated assault requires only a mental state of recklessness, and reckless use of force does not amount to a crime of violence under the ACCA. Retroactively applying Sixth Circuit precedent holding that reckless aggravated assault does constitute a violent felony under the “use of force” clause of the ACCA, the district court held that all three of Borden’s aggravated assault victims constituted “crime[s] of violence” under the ACCA and designated him as an armed career criminal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Question Does the “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act encompass crimes with an intent requirement of mere recklessness? Conclusion The “use of force” clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) does not encompass reckless aggravated assault. Justice Elena Kagan authored the four-justice plurality opinion. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment to reverse and remand the case. The elements clause of the ACCA defines “violent felony” as an offense requiring the “use of physical force against the person of another.” According to the plurality, the phrase “against another” requires conduct directed at another individual. Recklessness, which is the disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, cannot be directed at another individual and so cannot meet the definition of a violent felony. Justice Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, reasoning that reckless aggravated assault is not a violent felony under the ACCA because the “use of physical force...has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm.” Justice Thomas argued that the reckless conduct at issue in this case falls within the ACCA’s residual clause, which the Court (erroneously, in his view) struck down. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito and Amy Coney Barrett. Justice Kavanaugh argued that the plurality “disregards bedrock principles and longstanding terminology of criminal law, misconstrues ACCA’s text,” and “overrides Congress’s judgment about the danger posed by recidivist violent felons.”

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service v. Sierra Club Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2020.Decided on Mar 4, 2021. Petitioner: United States Fish and Wildlife Service, et al..Respondent: Sierra Club, Inc.. Advocates: Matthew Guarnieri (for the petitioners) Sanjay Narayan (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Industrial facilities, power plants, and other manufacturing complexes use water from lakes, rivers, estuaries, and oceans to cool their facilities through cooling water intake structures. Because these structures potentially cause significant harm to aquatic life, Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate their design and operation. In April 2011, the EPA proposed new regulations for cooling water intake structures. As part of the rule-making process and required by Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, in 2012, the EPA consulted with the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service about the potential impacts of the regulations and produced a written biological opinion on the impacts of the proposed agency action. The Sierra Club made a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records generated during the EPA’s rule-making process, including the documents generated as part of the consultation with the Services. The Services withheld some of the requested records, citing Exemption 5 of FOIA, which shields from disclosure documents subject to the “deliberative process privilege.” The district court determined that 12 of the 16 requested records were not protected to the privilege and ordered disclosure. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s order to disclose some of the records but reversed as to two of the records. Question Does Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act, by incorporating the deliberative process privilege, protect against compelled disclosure of a federal agency’s draft documents that were prepared as part of a formal interagency consultation process under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and that concerned a proposed agency action that was later modified in the consultation process? Conclusion The deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) an agency’s in-house draft biological opinions that are both predecisional and deliberative, even if the drafts reflect the agencies’ last views about a proposal. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored the 7-2 majority opinion. The deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5 of FOIA protects from disclosure “documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.” The rationale behind the exemption is to encourage officials to communicate candidly with each other during the deliberative process. However, it does not apply to documents reflecting the final agency decision. Documents are “predecisional” if they were generated before the agency’s final decision on the matter and “deliberative” if prepared to help the agency formulate its position. The documents at issue in this case were drafts of biological opinions because “more work needed to be done.” As such, they could not have been generated before the agency’s final decision had been made. That the recommendations ultimately proved to be the last word does not affect their status as “predecisional.” Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Breyer argued that in the specific context of the rulemaking processes of the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service, so-called Draft Biological Opinions reflect “final” decisions regarding the “jeopardy” the EPA’s then-proposed actions would have caused, and as such, would normally fall outside, not within, Exemption 5.

Salinas v. United States Railroad Retirement Board Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 2, 2020.Decided on Feb 3, 2021. Petitioner: Manfredo Salinas.Respondent: United States Railroad Retirement Board. Advocates: Sarah M. Harris (for the petitioner) Austin L. Raynor (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2006, Petitioner Manfredo M. Salinas applied for a disability annuity under the Railroad Retirement Act, but the U.S. Railroad Retirement Board (“the Board”) denied his application. After the filing period had expired, Salinas sought reconsideration, which the Board also denied, based on its conclusion that Salinas had not shown good cause for missing the deadline. Salinas did not pursue any further action on his application, so the Board’s denial became a final decision on February 9, 2007. Nearly seven years later, in 2013, Salinas filed a new application for a disability annuity. The Board granted him an annuity, but Salinas appealed the annuity's beginning date and amount. During that appeal, Salinas asked the Board to reopen all its decisions on his prior applications, including the decision denying his 2006 application. After a hearing, a Board hearing officer concluded that Salinas's 2006 application was beyond the four-year timeframe for reopening based on new and material evidence or administrative error under the Board's regulations. Salinas then asked the U.S. Court of Appeals to review the Board's decision not to reopen his 2006 application. Following its own binding precedent holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review a Board decision declining to reopen a prior benefits claim, the Fifth Circuit dismissed Salinas’s petition. Question Does a decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim constitute a “final decision” subject to judicial review? Conclusion A decision by the Railroad Retirement Board denying a request to reopen a prior benefits claim is subject to judicial review. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the 5-4 majority opinion. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974 (RRA) “makes judicial review under the RRA available to the same extent that review is available” under the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act (RUIA). The RUIA allows any person “aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c) of this section” to “obtain a review of any final decision of the Board.” Because Salinas’s 2006 application was the “terminal event” in the Board’s administrative review process and substantively affected Salinas’s benefits and the Board’s obligations under RRA, the denial was a “final decision of the Board” under RUIA and thus subject to judicial review. This conclusion is bolstered by the plain text of § 335(f), which authorizes judicial review of “any” final decision, and even if the text were ambiguous, there is a “strong presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action.” Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett joined. Justice Thomas argued that while the majority may correctly interpret RUIA, the RRA’s provision is critically different. RUIA explains how to obtain judicial review, but RRA separately defines what may be reviewed. The dissent argued that the statutory language of RRA limits judicial review to Board decisions determining rights or liabilities, so its denial of Salinas’s claim was outside the scope of review.

Pereida v. Wilkinson Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2020.Decided on Mar 4, 2021. Petitioner: Clemente Avelino Pereida.Respondent: Robert M. Wilkinson, Acting Attorney General. Advocates: Brian P. Goldman (for the Petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Clemente Avelino Pereida, a native and citizen of Mexico, pleaded no contest to a criminal charge in Nebraska, arising from his attempt to use a fraudulent social security card to obtain employment. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against Pereida, and Pereida sought cancellation of the removal application. At issue is whether Pereida's criminal attempt conviction qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude; if so, under the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pereida would be ineligible for cancellation of removal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that it was Pereida’s burden to establish his eligibility for cancellation of removal. However, the court determined that it was not possible to ascertain which statutory subsection formed the basis for Pereida's conviction, so Pereida failed to meet his burden. Because Pereida did not establish that he was eligible for cancellation of removal, the court upheld the Board of Immigration Appeals’ determination that he did not show such eligibility and denied Pereida’s petition for review. Question Does a criminal conviction bar a noncitizen from applying for relief from removal when the record of conviction is ambiguous as to whether it corresponds to an offense listed in the Immigration and Nationality Act? Conclusion A nonpermanent resident seeking to cancel a lawful removal order must show that he has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense when the statutory conviction on his record is ambiguous regarding whether a disqualifying offense formed the basis of his conviction. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 5-3 majority opinion. The Court first looked to the text of the relevant provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), which states that “an alien applying for relief or protection from removal has the burden of proof to establish” that he “satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements” and thus deserves a favorable exercise of discretion to cancel the removal order. One of these requirements is that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense, such as crimes involving “moral turpitude.” Failure to show even one of these requirements is a failure to meet one’s burden, so Pereida’s failure to prove that the basis of his conviction was not a crime involving moral turpitude meant he failed to meet his burden. This interpretation is supported as well by the context of the INA and a similar requirement of noncitizens who seek admission. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Breyer argued that the Court should apply the so-called “categorical approach” to determine the nature of a crime that a noncitizen was convicted of committing—an approach the Court has “clearly and repeatedly” embraced in the INA context. That approach would require a judge to look only at certain specified documents, and unless those documents show the crime of conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude, the judge must find the conviction was not such a crime. Following that approach in this case would result in a finding that Pereida was not convicted for a disqualifying crime. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Torres v. Madrid Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 14, 2020.Decided on Mar 25, 2021. Petitioner: Roxanne Torres.Respondent: Janice Madrid, et al.. Advocates: Kelsi B. Corkran (for the Petitioner) Rebecca Taibleson (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Mark D. Standridge (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, Roxanne Torres was involved in an incident with police officers in which she was operating a vehicle under the influence of methamphetamine and in the process of trying to get away, endangered the two officers pursuing her. In the process, one of the officers shot and injured her. Torres pleaded no contest to three crimes: (1) aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, (2) assault on a police officer, and (3) unlawfully taking a motor vehicle. In October 2016, she filed a civil-rights complaint in federal court against the two officers, alleging claims including excessive force and conspiracy to engage in excessive force. Construing Torres’s complaint as asserting the excessive-force claims under the Fourth Amendment, the court concluded that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. In the court’s view, the officers had not seized Torres at the time of the shooting, and without a seizure, there could be no Fourth Amendment violation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Question Must physical force used to detain a suspect be successful to constitute a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment? Conclusion The application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion. Under the Court’s precedents, common law arrests are considered seizures under the Fourth Amendment, and the application of force to the body of a person with intent to restrain constitutes an arrest even if the arrestee escapes. The use of a device, here, a gun, to effect the arrest, makes no difference in the outcome; it is still a seizure. There is no reason to draw an “artificial line” between grasping an arrestee with a hand and using some other means of applying physical force to effect an arrest. The key consideration is whether the conduct objectively manifests the intent to restrain; subjective perceptions are irrelevant. Additionally, the requirement of intent to restrain lasts only as long as the application of force. In this case, the officers’ conduct clearly manifested intent to restrain Torres and was thus a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito joined, arguing that “neither the Constitution nor common sense” support the majority’s definition of a seizure.  

City of Chicago v. Fulton Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2020.Decided on Jan 14, 2021. Petitioner: City of Chicago, Illinois.Respondent: Robbin L. Fulton, et al.. Advocates: Craig Goldblatt (for the petitioner) Colleen E. Roh Sinzdak (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioner) Eugene R. Wedoff (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The City of Chicago towed and impounded the Robbin Fulton’s vehicle for a prior citation of driving on a suspended license. Fulton filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action treating the City as an unsecured creditor. The City filed an unsecured proof of claim, and the bankruptcy court confirmed Fulton’s plan. The City then amended its proof of claim and asserted its status as a secured creditor. It refused to return Fulton’s vehicle, and Fulton filed a motion for sanctions against the City. The bankruptcy court held that the City was obligated to return the vehicle under Thompson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009), a binding case in which the Seventh Circuit had held that a creditor must comply with the automatic stay and return a debtor’s vehicle upon her filing of a bankruptcy petition. The City moved to stay the order in federal district court, and the court denied its request. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s judgment denying the City's request. Question Does the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C § 362, require that an entity that is passively retaining possession of property in which a bankruptcy estate has an interest return that property to the debtor or trustee immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition? Conclusion The Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 prohibits only affirmative acts that would disturb the status quo of estate property at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, not the mere passive retention of possession of the debtor’s property. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous (8-0) opinion of the Court. Section 362(a)(3) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a “stay” of “any act” to “exercise control” over the property of the estate. The most natural understanding of that language is that it prohibits affirmative acts that would affect the estate property. To read it as the Respondents propose would render superfluous the § 542’s “central command”—that an entity in possession of certain estate property “shall deliver to the trustee … such property.” Additionally, the Respondents’ proposed interpretation would mean that § 362(a)(3) required turnover at the same time that § 542 exempted it. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

United States v. Briggs Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 13, 2020.Decided on Dec 10, 2020. Petitioner: United States of America.Respondent: Michael J.D. Briggs. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (for the petitioner) Stephen I. Vladeck (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2014, a general court-martial composed of a military judge alone found Michael Briggs guilty of rape in violation of Article 120(a), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2000), for conduct that occurred nine years earlier, in 2005. The UCMJ allows for a military offense that is punishable by death to be “tried and punished at any time without limitation.” In contrast, other military offenses are subject to a five-year statute of limitations. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), which held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited a death sentence for rape of an adult woman, Briggs argued on appeal that rape was not “punishable by death” and thus was subject to the five-year statute of limitations for non-capital crimes. The United States Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals (AFCCA) rejected his challenge because Briggs had not raised the statute of limitations claim at trial. The court therefore affirmed the finding and sentence of the judge below. Briggs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Reviewing for plain error, the C.A.A.F. reversed the lower court, finding that the Rules for Courts-Martial R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(B) requires the military judge to inform the accused of the right to assert the statute of limitations. As such, the court found that if the military judge had informed Briggs of a possible statute of limitations defense, he would have sought dismissal. Question Did the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces err in concluding—contrary to its own longstanding precedent—that the Uniform Code of Military Justice allows prosecution of a rape that occurred between 1986 and 2006 only if it was discovered and charged within five years? Conclusion The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces erred in concluding that the five-year statute of limitations applies to the prosecution of rape. Justice Samuel Alito authored the opinion on behalf of a unanimous (8-0) Court. The UCMJ exempts offenses “punishable by death” from the statute of limitations for prosecutions. Even though the offense of rape is no longer punishable by death, the context of that phrase implies that the offense itself is still not subject to the statute of limitations that applies to other offenses. First, the UCMJ is a “uniform” code, which means that it generally refers only to other provisions within the UCMJ itself, rather than external sources of law. The “most natural place” to determine whether rape was “punishable by death” and thus exempt from the statute of limitations is the UCMJ itself. Second, statutes of limitations are intended to provide clarity, and having to consider “all applicable law” to determine whether an offense is punishable by death obscures, rather than clarifies, the filing deadline. Finally, it is “unlikely” that lawmakers would want a statute of limitations to refer to judicial interpretations of such provisions, given that the purposes of statutes of limitations differ from the ends served courts’ Eighth Amendment analysis. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion to opine that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals directly from the CAAF but expressing agreement with the majority on the merits. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2020.Decided on Apr 5, 2021. Petitioner: Google LLC.Respondent: Oracle America, Inc.. Advocates: Thomas C. Goldstein (for the petitioner) E. Joshua Rosenkranz (for the respondent) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) When Google implemented its Android Operating System (Android OS), it wrote its own programming language based on Java, which is owned by Oracle. To facilitate developers writing their own programs for Android OS, Google’s version used the same names, organization, and functionality as Java's Application Programming Interfaces (APIs). Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement, but the federal district judge held that APIs are not subject to copyright because permitting a private entity to own the copyright to a programming language would stifle innovation and collaboration, contrary to the goals of copyright. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court, finding that the Java APIs are copyrightable but leaving open the possibility of a fair use defense. The U.S. Supreme Court denied Google’s petition for certiorari. Upon remand to the district court, a jury found that Google's use of the Java API was fair use. Oracle appealed, and the Federal Circuit again reversed the lower court. The Federal Circuit held that Google's use was not fair as a matter of law. Question 1. Does copyright protection extend to a software interface? 2. If so, does the petitioner’s use of a software interface in the context of creating a new computer program constitute fair use? Conclusion Assuming a software interface may be subject to copyright protection, Google’s limited copying of the Java SE Application Programming Interface constituted a fair use of that material under copyright law. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 6-2 majority opinion. Copyright law aims to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by simultaneously granting creators exclusive copyrights and limiting the scope of such rights through the fair use doctrine. To decide no more than necessary to resolve the case, the Court assumed that software code is subject to copyright protection. Courts consider four statutory factors in evaluating whether a secondary use is fair. First, Google’s use of the Java APIs is transformative. Google copied only what was necessary to allow programmers to work in a different computing environment but with a familiar programming language. Second, the copied lines are “inherently bound together with uncopyrightable ideas,” suggesting that the application of fair use to this context is unlikely to undermine the general copyright protection that Congress provided for computer programs. Third, Google copied only .4% of the entire API, weighing in favor of fair use. Finally, the record shows that Google’s new smartphone platform is not a market substitute for Java SE. Because all four factors support a finding of fair use, Google’s limited copying constituted fair use. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Samuel Alito joined, arguing that the Court should have addressed the question whether Oracle’s code is copyrightable. Justice Thomas would have concluded that it is, and then he would have found that Google’s use of that copyrighted code was not fair. By copying Oracle’s code, Google “erased 97.5% of the value of Oracle’s partnership with Amazon, made tens of billions of dollars, and established its position as the owner of the largest mobile operating system in the world.”  Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 7, 2020.Decided on Mar 25, 2021. Petitioner: Ford Motor Company.Respondent: Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, et al.. Advocates: Sean Marotta (for the petitioner) Deepak Gupta (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2015, Markkaya Jean Gullett, a Montana resident, was driving a Ford Explorer on a Montana highway when the tread on one of her tires separated. She lost control of the vehicle and died as a result of the vehicle rolling into a ditch. The personal representative of Gullett’s estate sued Ford Motor Co. in Montana state court, alleging design-defect, failure-to-warn, and negligence claims. Ford moved to dismiss the claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. For a state court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause requires that the court have either general personal jurisdiction or specific personal jurisdiction. A court has general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the defendant’s headquarters are within the state or if it is incorporated in the state. A court has specific personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant if the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s activities within the state. Ford Motor Co. has its headquarters in Michigan and is incorporated in Delaware. Ford assembled the vehicle in Kentucky and first sold it to a dealership in Washington State. The dealership then sold it to an Oregon resident, who later sold the vehicle to a purchaser who brought it to Montana. The district court denied Ford’s motion to dismiss, finding a “connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.” The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that by advertising and selling parts within the state of Montana, Ford had availed itself of the privilege of doing business in that state and was therefore subject to specific jurisdiction there. This case is consolidated with Ford Motor Company v. Bandemer, No. 19-369, which arises in Minnesota but presents the same legal question. Question May a state court, consistent with the Due Process Clause, exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when none of the defendant’s contacts with that state caused the plaintiff’s claims? Conclusion The state courts in this case properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant because of the connection between plaintiffs’ product-liability claims arising from car accidents occurring in each plaintiff’s state of residence and Ford’s activities in those states. Justice Elena Kagan authored the majority opinion. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits a state court’s power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Such exercise requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state that the maintenance of a suit there is reasonable. Despite Ford’s argument to the contrary, this requirement establishes no “causation” requirement. That is, for jurisdiction to attach, it is not necessary that the defendant’s forum conduct gave rise to the plaintiff’s claims. Rather, the Court’s precedents require only that the suit “arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.” Ford’s substantial presence in the states (advertising, selling, and servicing those two car models, even if not the two specific vehicles involved in this case) establishes minimum contacts, and it does not matter that those contacts did not cause the plaintiffs’ injuries. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court need not focus on the words “relate to” as an independent basis for specific jurisdiction, and that doing so “risks needless complications.” Justice Neil Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Justice Gorsuch argued against the majority’s focus on the phrase “relate to” and elaborated on the “needless complications” referenced by Justice Alito in his concurrence.

Tanzin v. Tanvir Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Oct 6, 2020.Decided on Dec 10, 2020. Petitioner: FNU Tanzin, et al..Respondent: Muhammad Tanvir, et al.. Advocates: Edwin S. Kneedler (for the petitioners) Ramzi Kassem (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The plaintiffs, Muslim men born outside of the U.S. but living lawfully inside the country, allege that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) placed their names on the national “No Fly List,” despite posing no threat to aviation, in retaliation for their refusal to become FBI informants reporting on fellow Muslims. They sued the agents in their official and individual capacities in U.S. federal court under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the RFRA. They claim that the listing of their names substantially burdened their exercise of religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), because their refusal was compelled by Muslim tenets. Under RFRA, “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government.”  The U.S. District Court dismissed the claims against the agents in Appeals for the Second Circuit, a panel of which reversed the lower court. One of the agents, Tanzin, moved for rehearing en banc, which the court denied, over the dissent of several judges. Question Does the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, permit lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal employees? Conclusion The express remedies of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) permit litigants to obtain money damages against federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Clarence Thomas delivered the opinion of the unanimous (8-0) Court. RFRA states that persons may sue and “obtain appropriate relief against a government,” including officials of the United States. In using this language, RFRA adopts a meaning of the word “government” different from its ordinary meaning—one that encompasses individual officials. The phrase “appropriate relief” is “open-ended,” and monetary damages have long been awarded as an appropriate form of relief. Thus, the best understanding of RFRA is that it permits lawsuits seeking money damages against individual federal officials. Justice Amy Coney Barrett took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.