Supreme Court Oral Arguments

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: PennEast Pipeline Co. LLC.Respondent: New Jersey, et al.. Advocates: Paul D. Clement (for the Petitioner) Edwin S. Kneedler (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) Jeremy M. Feigenbaum (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The Natural Gas Act (NGA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717Z, permits private companies to exercise the federal government’s power to take property by eminent domain, subject to certain jurisdictional requirements. PennEast Pipeline Co. obtained federal approval to build a pipeline through Pennsylvania and New Jersey and sued under the NGA to gain access to the properties along the pipeline route, of which the State of New Jersey owns 42. New Jersey sought dismissal of PennEast’s lawsuits for lack of jurisdiction based on the state’s sovereign immunity and, separately, because PennEast failed to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the NGA. The district court ruled in favor of PennEast and granted a preliminary injunctive relief for immediate access to the properties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated, finding that while the NGA delegates the federal government’s eminent-domain power, it does not abrogate state sovereign immunity. PennEast’s lawsuits are thus barred by Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Question Does the Natural Gas Act delegate the federal government’s eminent-domain power, and does it abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases? Conclusion Section 717(h) of the Natural Gas Act authorizes the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to delegate to a private company the power to condemn all necessary rights-of-way, whether owned by private parties or states. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. States are generally immune from lawsuits unless they have consented or Congress has abrogated their immunity. With respect to the federal eminent domain power, the states waived their sovereign immunity when they ratified the Constitution. That power carries with it the ability to condemn property in court. Because the Natural Gas Act delegates the federal eminent domain power to private parties, those parties can initiate condemnation proceedings, including against state-owned property. This understanding is consistent with the nation’s history and the Court’s precedents. Thus, PennEast’s condemnation of New Jersey land to build the pipeline does not offend state sovereignty. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Clarence Thomas joined. Joining Justice Barrett’s dissenting opinion in full, Justice Gorsuch added only a clarification that states have two federal-law immunities from suit: structural immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The lower court should consider whether either type of immunity bars the suit. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas, Kagan, and Gorsuch joined. Justice Barrett argued that Congress’s power to strip states of their sovereign immunity is extremely limited, and there is no reason to treat private condemnation actions as within one of those limited exceptions.  

Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 28, 2021.Decided on Jun 23, 2021. Petitioner: Mahanoy Area School District.Respondent: B. L., a Minor, By and Through Her Father, Lawrence Levy, and Her Mother, Betty Lou Levy. Advocates: Lisa S. Blatt (for the Petitioner) Malcolm L. Stewart (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner) David D. Cole (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) B.L., a student at Mahanoy Area High School (MAHS), tried out for and failed to make her high school's varsity cheerleading team, making instead only the junior varsity team. Over a weekend and away from school, she posted a picture of herself on Snapchat with the caption “Fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.” The photo was visible to about 250 people, many of whom were MAHS students and some of whom were cheerleaders. Several students who saw the captioned photo approached the coach and expressed concern that the snap was inappropriate. The coaches decided B.L.’s snap violated team and school rules, which B.L. had acknowledged before joining the team, and she was suspended from the junior varsity team for a year. B.L. sued the school under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging (1) that her suspension from the team violated the First Amendment; (2) that the school and team rules were overbroad and viewpoint discriminatory; and (3) that those rules were unconstitutionally vague. The district court granted summary judgment in B.L.’s favor, ruling that the school had violated her First Amendment rights. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Question Does the First Amendment prohibit public school officials from regulating off-campus student speech? Conclusion The First Amendment limits but does not entirely prohibit regulation of off-campus student speech by public school officials, and, in this case, the school district’s decision to suspend B.L. from the cheerleading team for posting to social media vulgar language and gestures critical of the school violates the First Amendment. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 8-1 majority opinion of the Court. Although public schools may regulate student speech and conduct on campus, the Court’s precedents make clear that students do not “shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression” when they enter campus. The Court has also recognized that schools may regulate student speech in three circumstances: (1) indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech on school grounds, (2) speech promoting illicit drug use during a class trip, and (3) speech that others may reasonably perceive as “bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school,” such as that appearing in a school-sponsored newspaper. Moreover, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Court held that schools may also regulate speech that “materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.” The school’s interests in regulating these types of student speech do not disappear when the speaker is off campus. Three features of off-campus speech diminish the need for First Amendment leeway: (1) off-campus speech normally falls within the zone of parental responsibility, rather than school responsibility, (2) off-campus speech regulations coupled with on-campus speech regulations would mean a student cannot engage in the regulated type of speech at all, and (3) the school itself has an interest in protecting a student’s unpopular off-campus expression because the free marketplace of ideas is a cornerstone of our representative democracy. In this case, B.L. spoke in circumstances where her parents, not the school, had responsibility, and her speech did not cause “substantial disruption” or threaten harm to the rights of others. Thus, her off-campus speech was protected by the First Amendment, and the school’s decision to suspend her violated her First Amendment rights. Justice Samuel Alito authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, explaining his understanding of the Court’s decision. Justice Alito argued that a key takeaway of the Court’s decision is that “the regulation of many types of off-premises student speech raises serious First Amendment concerns, and school officials should proceed cautiously before venturing into this territory.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that schools have historically had the authority to regulate speech when it occurs off campus, so long as it has a proximate tendency to harm the school, its faculty or students, or its programs. Justice Thomas viewed the facts of this case as falling squarely within that rule and thus would have held that the school could properly suspend B.L. for her speech.

HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining LLC v. Renewable Fuels Association Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2021.Decided on Jun 25, 2021. Petitioner: HollyFrontier Cheyenne Refining, LLC, et al..Respondent: Renewable Fuels Association, et al.. Advocates: Peter D. Keisler (for the Petitioners) Christopher G. Michel (for the federal Respondent) Matthew W. Morrison (for the private Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Congress amended the Clean Air Act through the Energy Policy Act of 2005 in an effort to reduce the nation’s dependence on fossil fuels. The legislation set certain targets for replacing fossil fuels with renewable fuels but created several exemptions, including one for small refineries if compliance in a given year would impose disproportionate economic hardship. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated three different orders granting extensions of the small refinery exemption, but these orders were not made publicly available. A group of renewable fuels producers challenged the orders, alleging that the orders exceeded the EPA’s statutory authority. The Tenth Circuit agreed, finding that a small refinery may obtain an exemption only when it had received uninterrupted, continuous extensions of the exemption for every year since 2011. Question To qualify for a hardship exemption under Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) of the Renewable Fuel Standards, must a small refinery have received uninterrupted, continuous hardship exemptions for every year since 2011? Conclusion A small refinery that previously received a hardship exemption may obtain an “extension” under §7545(o)(9)(B)(i) even if it saw a lapse in exemption coverage in a previous year. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion. Although the key term “extension” is not defined in the statute, three textual clues indicate that it means an extension in time. The plain meaning of the word “extension” in a temporal sense does not require unbroken continuity. Without modifiers like “successive” or “consecutive,” nothing in the statute suggests that a lapse in coverage precludes the extension. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Barrett argued that the question before the Court is simply whether the provision limits the EPA to prolonging exemptions currently in place, or instead allows the EPA to provide exemptions to refineries that lack them. Justice Barrett concluded that the text and structure of the statute make clear that the EPA cannot “extend” an exemption that a refinery no longer has.  

United States v. Palomar-Santiago Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 27, 2021.Decided on May 24, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Refugio Palomar-Santiago. Advocates: Erica L. Ross (for the Petitioner) Bradley N. Garcia (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Refugio Palomar-Santiago, a Mexican national, was granted permanent resident status in the United States in 1990. In 1991, he was convicted of a felony DUI in California, and he was subsequently deported because a DUI is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and felony DUI is an aggravated felony for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Three years later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v. Trinidad-Aquino, 259 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2001), that a DUI is not a crime of violence and later held that classification to apply retroactively. United States v. Aguilera-Rios, 769 F.3d 626 (9th Cir. 2013). Palomar-Santiago returned to live in the United States, this time without authorization. He was indicted for illegal reentry after deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. He moved to dismiss the indictment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), which requires a district court to dismiss a § 1326 indictment if the defendant proves (1) he exhausted any administrative remedies that may have been available to seek relief against the order; (2) he was deprived of the opportunity for judicial review at the deportation hearing; and (3) that the deportation order was fundamentally unfair. However, under Ninth Circuit precedent, a defendant does not need to prove the first two elements if he can show the crime underlying the original removal was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and does not need to show the third element if he can show the removal should not have occurred at all. The district court held that Palomar-Santiago met his burden in showing his crime was improperly characterized as an aggravated felony and that he was wrongfully removed from the United States. On appeal, the federal government disputed that circuit precedent required the result the district court reached but argued that the precedent is wrong. Lacking authority to overturn circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit panel affirmed without addressing the merits of the government’s claims. Question Is a defendant who has been charged with unlawful reentry into the United States after removal automatically entitled to the defense of invalid removal if he was removed for a crime that would not be considered a removable offense under current law in that circuit? Conclusion A defendant seeking dismissal of a prior deportation order must prove each statutory requirement for bringing such a collateral attack. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Section 1326(d) requires that defendants charged with unlawful reentry “may not” challenge their underlying removal orders “unless” they “demonstrat[e]” each of three conditions. The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation to the contrary—that the first two elements are not required if the noncitizen was removed for an offense that should not have rendered him removable—is incompatible with the text of that provision. The first element, exhaustion of administrative remedies, exists “precisely so noncitizens can challenge the substance of immigration judges’ decisions.” Additionally, all of the requirements apply regardless of whether the defendant alleges the removal order was procedurally flawed or substantively invalid.

Guam v. United States Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on May 24, 2021. Petitioner: Territory of Guam.Respondent: United States. Advocates: Gregory G. Garre (for the Petitioner) Vivek Suri (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The United States captured the island of Guam from Spain in 1898, during the Spanish-American War. From 1903, the United States maintained military rule until the passage of the Guam Organic Act in 1950, which formally transferred power from the United States to Guam’s newly formed civilian government. Guam remains an “unincorporated territory of the United States.” In the 1940s, the Navy constructed and operated the Ordot Dump for the disposal of municipal and military waste, allegedly including munitions and chemicals such as DDT and Agent Orange, and continued to use the landfill throughout the Korean and Vietnam Wars. The Ordot Dump lacked basic environmental safeguards, and as a result, contaminants were released into the Lonfit River, which ultimately flows into the Pacific Ocean. In 1983, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) added the Ordot Dump to its National Priorities List, and in 1988, it designated the Navy as a potentially responsible party. However, because the Navy had relinquished sovereignty over the island, Guam remained the owner and operator of the Ordot Dump. As such, the EPA repeatedly ordered Guam to propose plans for containing and disposing of waste at the landfill. In 2002, the EPA sued Guam under the Clean Water Act, asking the court to require Guam to comply with the Act, in part by submitting plans and a compliance schedule for a cover system of the Ordot Dump, and by completing construction of the cover system. The EPA and Guam agreed that Guam would pay a civil penalty, close the Ordot Dump, and design a cover system. Guam closed the Ordot Dump in 2011. In 2017, Guam sued the United States, alleging that the Navy was responsible for the Ordot Dump’s contamination and was thus responsible for the costs of closing and remediating the landfill. Guam’s claims rested on two provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). Section 107 allows for a “cost-recovery” action and Section 113(f) allows for a “contribution” action. The statute of limitations for the former action is six years, compared to only three for the latter. The district court concluded that Guam’s agreement with the EPA did not trigger section 113, so Guam could maintain its section 107 claim against the United States. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. Question Can Guam sue the Navy under CERCLA Section 113(f) over its contribution to the environmental hazards arising from the Ordot Dump? Conclusion Guam can pursue its lawsuit against the federal government over the cleaning costs associated with the Ordot Dump. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Subsection 113(f) allows a party to seek contribution “from any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) of CERCLA” and provides that “a person who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . may seek contribution from any person who is not party to a settlement referred to in § 113(F)(2).” The language and structure of this statute support the interpretation that the right of contribution is predicated on CERCLA liability. Because the statutory language is best understood only in reference to CERCLA, the most natural reading of the provision is that a party may seek contribution under CERCLA only after settling a CERCLA-specific liability, not resolving environmental liability under some other law. Thus, the agreement between the EPA and Guam did not trigger the statute of limitations for seeking contribution.

Americans for Prosperity v. Bonta Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 26, 2021.Decided on Jul 1, 2021. Petitioner: Americans for Prosperity Foundation.Respondent: Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California. Advocates: Derek L. Shaffer (for the Petitioners) Elizabeth B. Prelogar (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting vacatur and remand) Aimee A. Feinberg (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The California Attorney General’s office has a policy requiring charities to provide the state, on a confidential basis, information about their major donors, purportedly to help the state protect consumers from fraud and the misuse of their charitable contributions. Petitioner Americans for Prosperity (and the petitioner in the consolidated case, Thomas More Law Center) either failed to file or filed redacted lists of their major donors with the California Attorney General’s office, despite filing complete lists with the federal Internal Revenue Service, as required by federal law. In response to demands by the California Attorney General that they file the lists, the organizations filed a lawsuit alleging that the filing requirement unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right to free association by deterring individuals from financially supporting them. The organizations provided evidence that although the state is required to keep donor names private, the state’s database was vulnerable to hacking, and many donor names were repeatedly released to the public. Based in part on this finding, the district court granted both organizations’ motions for a preliminary injunction and then ultimately found for them after a trial, holding that the organizations and their donors were entitled to First Amendment protection under the principles established in the Supreme Court’s decision in NAACP v. Alabama. In so holding, the court reasoned that the government’s filing demands were not the “least restrictive means” of obtaining the information and thus did not satisfy “strict scrutiny.” A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, based on its conclusion that “exacting scrutiny” rather than “strict scrutiny” was the appropriate standard, and “exacting scrutiny” requires that the government show that the disclosure and reporting requirements are justified by a compelling government interest and that the legislation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for a rehearing en banc. Question Does the policy of the California attorney general’s office requiring charities to disclose the names and addresses of their major donors violate the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution? Conclusion California’s disclosure requirement is facially invalid because it burdens donors’ First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to an important government interest. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the opinion of the Court. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy is a type of restraint on freedom of association. Such a restraint is subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires “a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important governmental interest.” Though the government-mandated disclosure regime need not be the “least restrictive means” of achieving the government’s interest, it must be “narrowly tailored” to achieve it. California’s disclosure requirement is “dramatically mismatch[ed]” to the state’s interest in preventing charitable fraud and self-dealing, imposing an unjustifiable “widespread burden on donors’ associational rights.” Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas would apply strict scrutiny to the disclosure requirement, leading to the same conclusion that it is facially invalid. However, Justice Thomas took issue with the Court’s opinion that the statute is unconstitutional in all applications. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito disagreed with the majority that precedents establish that exacting scrutiny applies in these types of cases. He noted that the outcome is the same under either level of scrutiny, so he would not decide what level of scrutiny applies. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority accepts, without requiring the plaintiffs to show, an actual First Amendment burden. In effect, Justice Sotomayor argued, the majority allows regulated entities to avoid obligations “by vaguely waving toward First Amendment ‘privacy concerns.’”

San Antonio v. Hotels.com, L.P. Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on May 27, 2021. Petitioner: City of San Antonio, Texas, On Behalf of Itself and All Other Similarly Situated Texas Municipalities.Respondent: Hotels.com, L.P., et al.. Advocates: Daniel L. Geyser (for the Petitioner) David B. Salmons (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2006, the City of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class-action lawsuit against various online travel companies (OTCs), such as Hotels.com, Hotwire, Orbitz, and Travelocity, alleging that the service fees those companies charged constitute the “cost of occupancy” and therefore are subject to municipal hotel tax ordinances. After extensive litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the OTCs, reasoning that the hotel occupancy tax applied only to the discounted room rate paid by the OTC to the hotel. Toward the end of litigation, the OTCs moved for "an order entering Final Judgment in favor of the OTCs, releasing all supersedeas bonds, and awarding costs to the OTCs as the prevailing parties." The OTCs’ proposed order stated that "costs shall be taxed against the Cities in favor of the OTCs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and Fed. R. App. P. 39." San Antonio did not object, so the district court entered the OTC’s proposed order. Then the OTCs filed a bill of costs in the district court seeking over $2.3 million, which included over $2 million for “post-judgment interest” and “premiums paid for the supersedeas bonds.” San Antonio objected and asked the district court to refuse to tax, or to substantially reduce, the appeal bond premiums sought by the OTCs. The district court concluded that it lacked the discretion to reduce taxation of the bond premiums. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, despite that every other circuit confronting the question has held the opposite. Question Do district courts have the discretion to deny or reduce appellate costs deemed “taxable” in district court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e)? Conclusion Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 does not permit a district court to alter a court of appeals’ allocation of the costs listed in subdivision (e) of that Rule. Justice Samuel Alito authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. Rule 39 gives the courts of appeals discretion over the allocation of appellate costs, setting default rules that apply unless the court “orders otherwise.” These default rules and the language and structure of Rule 39 suggest that the appeals court makes all determinations as to the costs. This comprehensive scheme leaves no room for the district court to modify the appeals court’s allocation of costs, and indeed to read the Rule as giving the district court such power would undermine the authority of the appeals court to make the determination in the first place.  

Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc. Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 21, 2021.Decided on Jun 29, 2021. Petitioner: Minerva Surgical, Inc..Respondent: Hologic, Inc., et al.. Advocates: Robert N. Hochman (for the Petitioner) Morgan L. Ratner (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting neither party) Matthew M. Wolf (for the Respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Hologic, Inc. and another company sued Minerva Surgical, Inc. for patent infringement (U.S. Patent Nos. 6,872,183 and 9,095,348). The patents relate to procedures and devices for endometrial ablation, which is a treatment involving the destruction of the lining of the uterus in order to treat menorrhagia, or abnormally heavy menstrual bleeding. Both of the patents at issue list as an inventor Csaba Truckai, who assigned his interests in both patents to NovaCept, Inc., a company he co-founded. NovaCept was subsequently acquired by another company, and Hologic acquired that company. Hologic is the current assignee of both patents and sells the resulting NovaSure system throughout the United States. Truckai left NovaCept and, in 2008, founded the accused infringer in this case, Minerva Surgical. Truckai and others at Minerva developed the Endometrial Ablation System (EAS), which received FDA approval in 2015 for the same indication as Hologic’s NovaSure system. In 2015, Hologic sued Minerva alleging that Minerva’s EAS infringed certain claims of its patents. Minerva asserted that the patents were invalid based on lack of enablement and failure to provide an adequate written description, and moreover were not patentable due to prior art. Hologic moved for summary judgment based on the doctrine of assignor estoppel, which bars a patent’s seller from attacking the patent’s validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The court granted the motion as to both patents, based on the relationship between the inventor Truckai and his company Minerva. The court of appeals affirmed as to the infringement. Question May a defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent, or is in privity with an assignor of the patent, have a defense of invalidity heard on the merits? Conclusion A defendant in a patent infringement action who assigned the patent can be barred under the doctrine of assignor estoppel from asserting a defense of invalidity if, and only if, the assignor’s claim of invalidity contradicts explicit or implicit representations the assignor made in assigning the patent. Justice Elena Kagan authored the 5-4 majority opinion of the Court. The doctrine of assignor estoppel dates back to late 18th-century England, and the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized and approved it in American jurisprudence in Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v. Formica Insulation Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924). The doctrine is grounded in a principle of fairness, that an inventor should not be able to assert invalidity of a patent he assigned but can merely argue about how to construe the patent’s claims. The Court refused to abandon the doctrine of assignor estoppel entirely, finding that doing so would have broad effects that contradict many of the Court’s precedents. Moreover, the principle of fairness that originally grounded the doctrine applies equally still. Specifically, when an inventor warrants that a patent claim is valid and then assigns it to another, his denial of the validity violates norms of equitable dealing. However, to fully serve that purpose of fairness, the doctrine has its limits. If the assignor did not make explicit or implicit representations that conflict with the invalidity defense, there is no ground for applying assignor estoppel. In this case, the Federal Circuit erred by not considering whether Hologic’s new claim was materially broader than the ones Truckai had assigned, which would mean that Truckai could not have warranted its validity when making the assignment. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority avoids answering the essential threshold question whether Westinghouse should be overruled and thus cannot answer the question presented in the petition in this case. Justice Alito would therefore dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. Justice Amy Coney Barrett authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that the majority recrafted a rule of assignor estoppel entirely different from that in Westinghouse. Because the Patent Act of 1952 does not incorporate the doctrine of assignor estoppel, Justice Barrett would hold the doctrine no longer applies.

United States v. Gary Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: United States.Respondent: Michael Andrew Gary. Advocates: Jonathan Y. Ellis (for the Petitioner) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2017, Michael Andrew Gary was driving with his cousin when police pulled them over for running a red light. Gary admitted he was driving on a suspended license, so he was placed under arrest. Upon a search of his car, police found a loaded gun. He was charged under state law with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Five months later, Gary had another encounter with police, and upon consenting to a search, police found him in possession of a stolen firearm which Gary admitted was his. Gary was arrested and charged under state law with possession of a stolen firearm. A federal grand jury indicted Gary on two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The state charges were dropped, and Gary pleaded guilty to the two federal charges. The district court advised Gary that if he proceeded to trial, the government would have to prove four elements, but did not mention that the government would also need to prove Gary was aware that he was a felon. Gary agreed with the prosecutor’s summary of the facts and entered a guilty plea. Gary then appealed his sentence but did not challenge the conviction itself. While the appeal was pending, in 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, holding that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. Gary then submitted a letter raising the relevance of the Rehaif decision. After receiving supplemental briefings from the parties on the relevance of Rehaif, the court of appeals vacated Gary’s convictions and remanded to the district court. Because Gary had not challenged the validity of his plea in the district court, the court of appeals reviewed the lower court’s decision for plain error. The court found not only that the error was plain, but also that it was structural and thus necessarily affected the outcome of the proceedings, even without a showing of as much. Question Is a defendant who pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924(a), automatically entitled to plain-error relief if the district court did not advise him that one element of that offense is knowledge of his status as a felon, regardless of whether he can show that the district court’s error affected the outcome of the proceedings? Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion in the consolidated case, Greer v. United States, No. 19-8709.

Greer v. United States Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Apr 20, 2021.Decided on Jun 14, 2021. Petitioner: Gregory Greer.Respondent: United States. Advocates: M. Allison Guagliardo (for the Petitioner) Benjamin W. Snyder (for the Respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2007, Tracy A. Greer pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), along with numerous other charges not directly relevant to this case. In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that Greer was “punishable as an Armed Career Criminal” based on his five prior convictions for aggravated burglary under Ohio law. The district court agreed and sentenced Greer to 272 months’ imprisonment. In 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), and in 2016 it made that invalidation retroactive on collateral review. Greer moved to vacate his sentence, but the district court denied his motion, holding that his convictions qualified under the ACCA’s enumerated-offenses clause, not the residual clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, which held that when a person is charged with possessing a gun while prohibited from doing so under 18 U.S.C. § 922, the prosecution must prove both that the accused knew that they possessed a gun and that they knew they held the relevant status. The Court granted Greer’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment affirming his conviction, and remanded for reconsideration in light of Rehaif. On remand, Greer requested that the Eleventh Circuit vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, grant him a new trial, because the prosecution did not prove, nor was the jury instructed to find, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that although Greer had shown plain error, he could not prove that he was prejudiced by the errors or that they affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of his trial. To reach this conclusion, the court looked at the entire trial record and Greer’s previous convictions, not merely the evidence submitted to the jury. Greer again petitioned the Supreme Court for review. Question May a federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights or impacted the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the trial. Conclusion A federal appellate court reviewing the decision of a lower court for plain error may review matters outside the trial record to determine whether the error affected a defendant’s substantial rights, and an error under Rehaif v. United States, is not a basis for plain-error relief unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument or representation on appeal that he would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact know he was a felon. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion. Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant can preserve a claim of error “by informing the court” of the claimed error when the relevant “court ruling or order is made or sought.” Rule 52(b) allows an appellate court to review for “plain error” “even though it was not brought to the court’s attention” if it “affects substantial rights.” Thus, the defendant must show that, if the district court had correctly instructed the jury on the mental culpability element of a felon-in-possession offense, there is a “reasonable probability” that he would have been acquitted. If the defendant does not dispute the fact of his prior convictions, he has not met this burden. Such is the case here. Further, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Sotomayor noted that the Court’s analysis does not extend to harmless-error review and that the knowledge-of-status element is an element just like any other, which the government must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt, while defendants seeking relief based on Rehaif errors bear must prove only plain error. She joined the majority as to Greer’s case but as to Gary in the consolidated case would vacate the judgment below and remand so the Fourth Circuit below could address the question whether Gary can prove that the error affected his substantial rights.