Supreme Court Oral Arguments

Edwards v. Vannoy Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 2, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: Thedrick Edwards.Respondent: Darrel Vannoy, Warden. Advocates: Andre Belanger (for the petitioner) Elizabeth Murrill (for the respondent) Christopher G. Michel (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Thedrick Edwards was sentenced to life in prison for the commission of several robberies and rape in 2006. At Edwards’s trial, the state used its challenges to exclude all but one African American juror from the jury, and at least one person voted to acquit Edwards, a black man, on each count. At the time, Louisiana permitted conviction by a 10-2 vote, so Edwards’s conviction became final in 2010. On April 20, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts. Edwards argues that he would not have been convicted if he had been prosecuted in one of 48 other states or by the federal government, rather than in Louisiana. Question Does the Court’s decision in Ramos v. Louisiana, holding that the Sixth Amendment establishes a right to a unanimous jury in both federal and state courts, apply retroactively to cases on federal collateral review? Conclusion The jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos v. Louisiana does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the majority opinion of the Court. A decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral (habeas) review. Applying constitutional rules retroactively undermines the principle of finality, which is “critical to the operation of our criminal justice system.” However, two questions are relevant to the consideration whether a rule may be applied retroactively: (1) whether it is a new rule or applies a settled rule, and (2) whether it is a “watershed” procedural rule. New rules, as opposed to application of settled rules, ordinarily do not apply retroactively unless they are “watershed.” The “watershed” exception is “extremely narrow” and applies only when the new rule “alters our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” In fact, the only time the Court has recognized a new rule as being watershed was in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which established the right to counsel. First, the Ramos rule is new because it was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final. Second, Ramos presents none of the considerations for a watershed rule. The situation in Ramos does not support a different outcome from (1) other jury-unanimity cases that the Court did not apply retroactively, (2) other cases decided based on original meaning that the Court did not apply retroactively, and (3) other cases involving race discrimination that the Court did not apply retroactively. As a new rule of criminal procedure, the jury-unanimity rule announced in Ramos does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.  Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Thomas noted that the Court could alternatively have resolved the case by applying the statutory text of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which, in his view, leaves no room for a court to grant relief under the present facts. Justice Gorsuch also filed his own separate concurring opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, arguing that the Court’s decision correctly eliminated the “watershed” exception that was never really an exception at all. Justice Elena Kagan filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor joined. Justice Kagan criticized the majority for not only misapplying the “watershed” exception in this case but also for going further and eliminating the exception altogether, preventing any procedural rule from ever benefiting a defendant on habeas review.

Nestlé USA, Inc. v. Doe I Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: Nestlé USA, Inc..Respondent: John Doe I, et al.. Advocates: Neal Kumar Katyal (on behalf of the petitioners) Curtis E. Gannon (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Paul L. Hoffman (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) The plaintiff/respondents in this case are former enslaved children who were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours without pay. They filed a class-action lawsuit against large manufacturers, purchasers, processors, and retail sellers of cocoa beans, including petitioner Nestle USA (and Cargill Inc., petitioner in a consolidated case). Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., both domestic corporations, effectively control cocoa production in the Ivory Coast and operate “with the unilateral goal of finding the cheapest source of cocoa in the Ivory Coast,” resulting in a “system built on child slavery to depress labor costs.” The respondents allege that the defendants are aware that child slave labor is a problem in the Ivory Coast yet continue to provide financial support and technical farming aid to farmers who use forced child labor. The children filed a proposed class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the defendant companies were liable under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory Coast. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on its conclusion that corporations cannot be sued under the ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that corporations are liable for aiding and abetting slavery, in part because it found that norms that are “universal and absolute” can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a corporation, and the prohibition of slavery is “universal.” It did not address the defendants’ argument that the complaint sought an extraterritorial application of the ATS, which the U.S. Supreme Court had recently proscribed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013). On remand, the district court dismissed the claims alleging aiding and abetting slave labor under the ATS, finding that the complaint sought an impermissible extraterritorial application of the ATS. In the interim, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 584 U.S. __ (2018), holding that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Again the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the holding in Jesner does not disturb its prior holding as to the domestic defendants, Nestle USA, Inc., and Cargill, Inc., and that the specific domestic conduct alleged by the plaintiffs falls within the focus of the ATS and does not require extraterritorial application of that statute. Question 1. May an aiding and abetting claim against a domestic corporation brought under the Alien Tort Statute overcome the extraterritoriality bar where the claim is based on allegations of general corporate activity in the United States and where the plaintiffs cannot trace the alleged harms, which occurred abroad at the hands of unidentified foreign actors, to that activity? 2. Does the judiciary have the authority under the Alien Tort Statute to impose liability on domestic corporations? Conclusion To plead facts sufficient to support a domestic application of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, plaintiffs must allege more domestic conduct than general corporate activity; the Ninth Circuit’s contrary holding is reversed, and the case is remanded. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion in which a majority of the Court concluded that the respondents here improperly seek extraterritorial application of the ATS. The Court’s precedents establish “a two-step framework for analyzing extraterritoriality issues.” First, a court must presume that a statute applies only domestically and ask “whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication” that rebuts this presumption. Second, where the statute does not apply extraterritorially, plaintiffs must establish that “the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States.” The ATS does not rebut the presumption, so the question is whether the relevant conduct occurred in the United States. Nearly all the conduct that the respondents describe as aiding and abetting forced labor—providing training, fertilizer, tools, and cash to overseas farms—occurred in Ivory Coast. As the Court made clear in Kiobel, “mere corporate presence” and activity are not sufficient to support domestic application of the ATS. As such, the respondents did not plead sufficient facts to support domestic application of the ATS. Joined only by Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, Justice Thomas wrote that the respondents’ suit fails for a separate reason: the Court cannot create a cause of action—only Congress may do that. Justice Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, which Justices Alito and Justice Kavanaugh joined in (different) parts. Justice Gorsuch, joined only by Justice Alito, argued that nothing in the ATS supports the notion that corporations are immune from suit. Then, joined only by Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Gorsuch argued that courts lack discretion to create new causes of action under the ATS and should stop doing so. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which Justices Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that Justice Thomas’s interpretation of ATS as limited to the three international law torts that were recognized in 1789 contravenes the Court’s express holding in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), as well as the text and history of the ATS.  Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion arguing that if a particular claim may be brought under the ATS against a natural person who is a United States citizen, a similar claim may be brought against a domestic corporation. 

CIC Services, LLC v. Internal Revenue Service Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Dec 1, 2020.Decided on May 17, 2021. Petitioner: CIC Services, LLC.Respondent: Internal Revenue Service, et al.. Advocates: Cameron T. Norris (for the petitioner) Jonathan C. Bond (for the respondents) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2004, Congress delegated authority to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) to gather information about potential tax shelters, which the IRS does by requiring taxpayers their advisors to maintain and submit records pertaining to any "reportable transactions." IRS regulations define what constitutes reportable transactions. Failure to maintain and submit such records can result in substantial penalties for taxpayers and tax advisors. On November 21, 2016, the IRS published Notice 2016-66, which identified certain “micro-captive transactions” as a subset of reportable transactions. As a result, taxpayers and those advising them who engaged in such transactions were required to report them or else be subject to substantial penalties. On March 27, 2017, Petitioner CIC Services, an advisor to taxpayers engaging in micro-captive transactions, sued the IRS and the Treasury Department in federal court, alleging that the IRS promulgated Notice 2016-66 in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The Petitioner asked the court to stop the IRS from enforcing the Notice. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the federal defendants raised the defense that the lawsuit was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, which divest federal district courts of jurisdiction over suits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Question Does the Anti-Injunction Act’s bar on lawsuits for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes also bar challenges to unlawful regulatory mandates that are not taxes? Conclusion A lawsuit seeking to enjoin IRS Notice 2016–66 as an unlawful regulatory mandate does not trigger the Anti-Injunction Act, even though a violation of the Notice may result in a tax penalty. Justice Elena Kagan authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), bars the filing of lawsuits “for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” CIC’s lawsuit challenged Notice 2016–66’s reporting obligations, which, alone, would place it clearly beyond the scope of the Act. However, a consequence for failing to report as required under the Notice is a tax penalty, which makes the result in this case less clear. However, when considering a “suit[’s] purpose,” a court looks not at the taxpayer’s subjective motive, but at the relief the suit requests. If the relief sought is an injunction against the collection or assessment of a tax, the Act prohibits it. Because CIC’s suit contests the legality of Notice 2016–66, not the statutory tax penalty, it is not prohibited by the Anti-Injunction Act. This conclusion is supported by public policy; allowing the lawsuit to proceed will not open the floodgates to pre-enforcement tax litigation. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court’s conclusion might be different if CIC Services were a taxpayer instead of a tax advisor because of the slightly different role tax penalties play with respect to individual taxpayers. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a concurring opinion observing that, in his view, the Court’s ruling in this case established a rule that pre-enforcement suits challenging regulatory taxes or traditional revenue-raising taxes are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, but pre-enforcement suits challenging regulations backed by tax penalties are not barred, even if those suits might preclude the collection or assessment of a tax. 

Trump v. New York Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020.Decided on Dec 18, 2020. Appellant: Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, et al..Appellee: New York, et al.. Advocates: Jeffrey B. Wall (on behalf of the Appellants) Barbara D. Underwood (on behalf of the State Appellees) Dale E. Ho (on behalf of the private Appellees) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) On July 21, 2020, President Donald Trump announced that the population figures used to determine the apportionment of Congress would, in a reversal of long-standing practice, exclude non-citizens who are not lawfully present in the United States. To implement this new policy, the President ordered the Secretary of Commerce to provide him two sets of numbers for each state. The first number was the total population as determined in the 2020 census and the second, the total population as determined in the 2020 census minus the number of "aliens who are not in a lawful immigration status." The President left it to the Secretary to determine how to calculate the latter figure, but since the 2020 census did not not collect information regarding citizenship status, let alone legal immigration status in this country, it remained unclear how the Secretary would obtain that number. Immediately after the President filed the memorandum, two sets of plaintiffs—a coalition of 22 States and D.C., 15 cities and counties, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors (the "Governmental Plaintiffs"); and a coalition of non-governmental organizations—challenged the decision to exclude illegal aliens from the apportionment base for Congress on the ground that it violates the Constitution, statutes governing the census and apportionment, and other laws. The federal district court found for the plaintiffs, concluding that by directing the Secretary to provide two sets of numbers, one derived from the census and one not, and announcing that it is the policy of the United States to use the latter to apportion the House, the memorandum violated the statutory scheme. In addition, the court concluded that the memorandum violated the statute governing apportionment because, so long as they reside in the United States, illegal aliens qualify as “persons in” a “State” as Congress used those words. Question 1. Does a group of states and local governments have standing under Article III of the Constitution to challenge a July 21, 2020, memorandum by President Donald Trump instructing the secretary of commerce to include in his report on the 2020 census information enabling the president to exclude noncitizens from the base population number for purposes of apportioning seats in the House of Representatives?  2. Is the memorandum is a permissible exercise of the President’s discretion under the provisions of law governing congressional apportionment? Conclusion In a per curiam (unsigned) opinion, the Court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not shown standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. As such, the Court vacated the District Court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. For a federal court to have jurisdiction to hear a case, the plaintiffs must demonstrate they have standing, which requires “an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent rather than conjectural or hypothetical. Further, the case must be “ripe”—that is, it must not depend on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Although the President clearly expressed his desire to exclude unlawfully present noncitizens from the apportionment base “to the extent practicable,” it remains mere conjecture whether and how the Executive Branch might eventually implement this general statement of policy. Moreover, the plaintiffs had suffered no concrete harm from the policy itself, because the policy “does not require them ‘to do anything or to refrain from doing anything.’” As such, the courts lack jurisdiction to hear the case because the plaintiffs have not demonstrated Article III standing or that the case is ripe for review. Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan joined. The dissent argued that the plaintiffs did have standing based on its own precedents in census cases, which have recognized standing based on a substantial risk of anticipated apportionment harm. Justice Breyer also argued that the question is ripe for resolution, and as such, that the plaintiffs should prevail on the merits because “the plain meaning of the governing statutes, decades of historical practice, and uniform interpretations from all three branches of Government demonstrate that aliens without lawful status cannot be excluded from the decennial census solely on account of that status.”

Van Buren v. United States Wikipedia · Justia · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 30, 2020. Petitioner: Nathan Van Buren.Respondent: United States of America. Advocates: Jeffrey L. Fisher (for the petitioner) Eric J. Feigin (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Nathan Van Buren was a sergeant with the Cumming, Georgia, Police Department. In that capacity, he came to know a man named Andrew Albo, who allegedly paid young prostitutes to spend time with him and then accused the women of stealing the money he gave them. Van Buren asked Albo for a loan, falsely claiming that he needed over $15,000 to settle his son’s medical bills. Unbeknownst to Van Buren, Albo recorded the conversation in which Van Buren requested the loan. Albo presented the recording to a detective in the Forsyth County Sheriff’s Office, alleging that Van Buren was “shaking him down for his money.” As a result, the FBI conducted a sting operation to test how far Van Buren was willing to go for money. As part of the sting operation, Albo asked Van Buren to look into a woman Albo named, to see whether she was an undercover officer before he would provide Van Buren with the full amount of money Van Buren requested. Van Buren searched the woman’s information in a government database maintained by the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and the FBI. The next day, FBI and GBI agents confronted Van Buren, and Van Buren admitted to the fake story about his son to get the loan from Albo, his use of the government database to search for the woman Albo mentioned might be an undercover officer, and that he understood the purpose of searching the database was to discover and reveal to Albo whether the woman was an undercover officer. A federal grand jury charged Van Buren with one count of honest-services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1346, and one count of felony computer fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. A jury convicted Van Buren on both counts, and Van Buren appealed his convictions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found the jury instructions as to the honest-services count were fatally flawed and remanded that charge for a new trial. It found no deficiencies in the conviction for computer fraud and affirmed that conviction, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent holding that a person with authority to access a computer can be guilty of computer fraud if that person subsequently misuses the computer.  Question Does a person who is authorized to access information on a computer for certain purposes violate Section 1030(a)(2) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act if he accesses that information for an improper purpose?

California v. Texas Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 10, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: The State of California, et al..Respondent: The State of Texas, et al.. Advocates: Michael J. Mongan (for California, et al.) Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. (for the U.S. House of Representatives) Kyle D. Hawkins (for Texas, et al.) Jeffrey B. Wall (for the United States, et al.) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) against a constitutional challenge by characterizing the penalty for not buying health insurance as a tax, which Congress has the power to impose. In 2017, the Republican-controlled Congress enacted an amendment to the ACA that set the penalty for not buying health insurance to zero, but it left the rest of the ACA in place. Texas and several other states and individuals filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the individual mandate again, arguing that because the penalty was zero, it can no longer be characterized as a tax and is therefore unconstitutional. California and several other states joined the lawsuit to defend the individual mandate. The federal district court held that the individual mandate is now unconstitutional and that as a result, the entire ACA is invalidated because the individual mandate cannot be “severed” from the rest of the Act. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court’s conclusion but remanded the case for reconsideration of whether any part of the ACA survives in the absence of the individual mandate. The Supreme Court granted California’s petition for review, as well as Texas’s cross-petition for review. Question Do the plaintiffs in this case have standing to challenge the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which now has a penalty of zero for not buying health insurance? If the plaintiffs have standing, is the individual mandate unconstitutional? If the individual mandate is unconstitutional, is it severable from the remainder of the ACA? Conclusion The plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the Affordable Care Act’s minimum essential coverage provision. Justice Stephen Breyer authored the 7-2 majority opinion of the Court. To have standing to bring a claim in federal court, a plaintiff must “allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” No plaintiff in this case has shown such an injury. With respect to the individual plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged—past and future payments necessary to carry the minimum essential coverage that §5000A(a) requires—not “fairly traceable” to the allegedly unlawful conduct. There is no penalty for noncompliance, only the statute’s unenforceable language, which alone is insufficient to establish standing. With respect to the state plaintiffs, the Court found the injuries they alleged not traceable to the government’s allegedly unlawful conduct. The state plaintiffs alleged direct and indirect injuries. The states alleged indirect injuries in the form of increased costs to run state-operated medical insurance programs, but they failed to show how an unenforceable mandate would cause state residents to enroll in valuable benefits programs that they would otherwise forgo. The states alleged direct injuries in the form of increased administrative and related expenses, but those expenses are the result of other provisions of the Act, not §5000A(a) and are thus not fairly traceable to the conduct alleged. Justice Clarence Thomas authored a concurring opinion, praising Justice Samuel Alito’s dissent in this case (describing the “epic Affordable Care Act trilogy”) but stopping short of agreeing with his opinion in its entirety because Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that the plaintiffs lack standing in this case. Justice Samuel Alito authored a dissenting opinion, which Justice Neil Gorsuch joined, arguing that Texas and the other state plaintiffs have standing and that because the “tax” imposed by the individual mandate is now $0, the mandate cannot be sustained under the taxing power.  

Niz-Chavez v. Garland Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2020.Decided on Apr 29, 2021. Petitioner: Augusto Niz-Chavez.Respondent: Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General. Advocates: David J. Zimmer (for the petitioner) Anthony A. Yang (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Agusto Niz-Chavez, a Guatemalan native and citizen, came to the United States without inspection in 2005. On March 26, 2013, he was served with a notice to appear before an immigration judge at a date and time to be determined later, and approximately two months later, on May 29, 2013, he received a notice of hearing in removal proceedings. Niz-Chavez made an appearance at the hearing on June 25, 2013, where he conceded removability and stated his intent to seek withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and relief under the Convention Against Torture. After a hearing on the merits, the immigration judge denied both applications, and Niz-Chaves appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. In addition to challenging the immigration judge’s conclusions, Niz-Chavez asked the Board to remand the case in light of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, in which the Court held that a notice to appear that does not include the specific time and place of the noncitizen's removal proceedings does not trigger the stop-time rule under §1229(a) of the INA. Niz-Chavez argued that under Pereira, he was now eligible for cancellation because of the deficiency of the notice to appear he received. The Board affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and denied the motion to remand, finding that Niz-Chavez was not eligible for cancellation under Pereira. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied Niz-Chavez’s petition for review of each of the challenged decisions by the Board. Question Under Section 1229(a), must the government serve a specific document that includes all required information, or may the government serve that information over the course of multiple documents? Conclusion The government must serve a single document that includes all the required information for the notice to appear to trigger the IIRIRA’s stop-time rule. Justice Neil Gorsuch authored the 6-3 majority opinion. Section 1229b(d)(1) states that the stop-time rule is triggered “when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a),” and Section 1229(a) states that “written notice...shall be given...to the alien...specifying” the time and place of his hearing, among other listed items. The singular article “a” (as in “a notice”) means, to an ordinary reader, a single document containing the required information, not a series of such document with the information spread across them. The IIRIRA’s statutory structure confirms this interpretation. For example, it refers to “the Notice” and “the time of the notice” in other nearby provisions (emphasis added). Its history, too, supports this reading. In passing the IIRIRA, the Congress intentionally changed the law from authorizing the government “to specify the time and place for an alien’s hearing ‘in the order to show cause or otherwise’” to requiring that the “time and place information...be included in a notice to appear, not ‘or otherwise.’” Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Samuel Alito, arguing that the government’s provision of notice in two documents, as was the case here, should be sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule.

Brownback v. King Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 9, 2020.Decided on Feb 25, 2021. Petitioner: Douglas Brownback, et al..Respondent: James King. Advocates: Michael R. Huston (for the petitioners) Patrick M. Jaicomo (for the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) Two undercover FBI agents mistakenly identified petitioner James King as a criminal suspect and approached him. The parties differed in their account of the facts as to whether the agents identified themselves as police officers, but King apparently perceived he was being mugged and resisted their attempts to restrain him. A violent fight ensued, in which the officers severely beat King until onlookers called 911 and local police arrived on the scene. The local police officers ordered bystanders to delete video footage of the altercation because the videos could reveal the identities of undercover FBI officers. King was taken to the hospital, where he received medical treatment and was discharged. On his discharge, police arrested him and took him to Kent County Jail, where he spent the weekend in jail before posting bail and visiting another hospital for further examination. Prosecutors pursued charges, but a jury acquitted King of all charges. King then filed a lawsuit against the United States and both FBI agents, alleging that the agents violated his clearly established Fourth Amendment rights by conducting an unreasonable seizure and by using excessive force. In general, the United States and its agents are immune from liability under the principle of sovereign immunity. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives sovereign immunity in specific situations, and the plaintiff bringing an FTCA claim bears the burden of showing his claim falls within such situations. The FTCA also contains a “judgment bar” provision that precludes a plaintiff from bringing additional claims concerning the “same subject matter” as an FTCA claim after a judgment is entered on the FTCA claim. The district court found that King failed to prove one of the six requirements for FTCA to apply, and therefore that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear King’s claim against the United States. The court further held that the defendant agents were entitled to qualified immunity and granted summary judgment in their favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, finding the FTCA judgment bar does not preclude King’s remaining claims because the court did not reach the merits of the FTCA claims and that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity.   Question Does the judgment bar provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) prevent a plaintiff whose FTCA claim against the government failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from filing another action, against the same defendants and arising from the same set of facts and injuries, under Bivens? Conclusion The district court’s order dismissing King’s FTCA claims was a judgment on the merits and thus triggered the Act’s judgment bar to block his Bivens claims. Justice Clarence Thomas authored the unanimous opinion of the Court. The FTCA’s judgment bar was drafted “against the backdrop doctrine of res judicata,” or claim preclusion, and so a judgment on the merits will trigger that bar. A dismissal under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is a “quintessential” merits decision because it signifies that the undisputed facts fail to establish all the elements of the FTCA claims. Although the question is “complicated” by the jurisdictional effect of a failure to state a claim, the Court noted that when the pleading of a claim and the pleading of jurisdiction coincide, as in this case, “a ruling that the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion to note that the Court “does not today decide whether an order resolving the merits of an FTCA claim precludes other claims arising out of the same subject matter in the same suit.

Fulton v. City of Philadelphia Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 4, 2020.Decided on Jun 17, 2021. Petitioner: Sharonell Fulton, et al..Respondent: City of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, et al.. Advocates: Lori H. Windham (for the petitioners) Hashim M. Mooppan (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the petitioners) Neal Kumar Katyal (for respondents Philadelphia et al.) Jeffrey L. Fisher (for respondents Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) In March 2018, the City of Philadelphia barred Catholic Social Services (CSS) from placing children in foster homes because of its policy of not licensing same-sex couples to be foster parents. CSS sued the City of Philadelphia, asking the court to order the city to renew their contract. CSS argued that its right to free exercise of religion and free speech entitled it to reject qualified same-sex couples because they were same-sex couples, rather than for any reason related to their qualifications to care for children. The district court denied CSS’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the City’s non-discrimination policy was a neutral, generally applicable law and that CSS had not demonstrated that the City targeted CSS for its religious beliefs or was motivated by ill will against its religion. Question 1. To succeed on their free exercise claim, must plaintiffs prove that the government would allow the same conduct by someone who held different religious views, or only provide sufficient evidence that a law is not neutral and generally applicable? 2. Should the Court revisit its decision in Employment Division v. Smith? 3. Does the government violate the First Amendment by conditioning a religious agency’s ability to participate in the foster care system on taking actions and making statements that directly contradict the agency’s religious beliefs? Conclusion The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless CSS agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Chief Justice John Roberts authored the majority opinion of the Court. Philadelphia’s actions burdened CSS’s religious exercise by forcing it either to curtail its mission or to certify same-sex couples as foster parents, in violation of its stated religious beliefs. Although the Court held in Employment Division v. Smith that neutral, generally applicable laws may incidentally burden religion, the Philadelphia law was not neutral and generally applicable because it allowed for exceptions to the anti-discrimination requirement at the sole discretion of the Commissioner. Additionally, CSS’s actions do not fall within public accommodations laws because certification as a foster parent is not “made available to the public” in the usual sense of the phrase. Thus, the non-discrimination requirement is subject to strict scrutiny, which requires that the government show the law is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest. The Court pointed out that the question is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. The Court concluded that it did not. Justice Amy Coney Barrett wrote a separate concurring opinion in which Justice Brett Kavanaugh joined and in which Justice Stephen Breyer joined as to all but the first paragraph. Justice Barrett acknowledged strong arguments for overruling Smith but agreed with the majority that the facts of the case did not trigger Smith. Justice Samuel Alito authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch joined. Justice Alito would overrule Smith, replacing it with a rule that any law that burdens religious exercise must be subject to strict scrutiny. Justice Gorsuch authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justices Thomas and Alito joined, criticizing the majority’s circumvention of Smith.

Jones v. Mississippi Wikipedia · Justia (with opinion) · Docket · oyez.org Argued on Nov 3, 2020.Decided on Apr 22, 2021. Petitioner: Brett Jones.Respondent: Mississippi. Advocates: David M. Shapiro (for the petitioner) Krissy C. Nobile (for the respondent) Frederick Liu (for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent) Facts of the case (from oyez.org) When Brett Jones was fifteen years old, he stabbed his grandfather to death. He was convicted of murder, and the Circuit Court of Lee County, Mississippi, imposed a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, and Mississippi law made him ineligible for parole. The appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the Supreme Court of Mississippi ordered that Jones be resentenced after a hearing to determine whether he was entitled to parole eligibility. Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. __ (2016). In Miller, the Court held that mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. And in Montgomery, it clarified that Miller barred life without the possibility of parole “for all but the rarest of juvenile offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.” The circuit court held the hearing weighing the factors laid out in Miller and determined Jones was not entitled to parole eligibility. Question Does the Eighth Amendment require a sentencing authority to find that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before it may impose a sentence of life without the possibility of parole? Conclusion A sentencing authority need not find a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole; a discretionary sentencing system is both constitutionally necessary and constitutionally sufficient to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who committed a homicide when they were under 18. Justice Brett Kavanaugh authored the 6-3 majority opinion. In Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), the Court held that “a sentencer [must] follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.” And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016), the Court stated that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” Taken together, these two cases refute Jones’s argument that a finding of permanent incorrigibility is constitutionally necessary to impose a sentence of life without parole. The Court noted that it expresses neither agreement nor disagreement with Jones’s sentence, and its decision does not preclude states from imposing additional sentencing limits in cases involving juvenile commission of homicide. Justice Clarence Thomas authored an opinion concurring in the judgment, arguing that the Court should have reached the same outcome by declaring that Montgomery was incorrectly decided. Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan joined. Justice Sotomayor argued that the majority effectively circumvents stare decisis by reading Miller to require only “a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth is considered.” Under Montgomery, sentencing discretion is necessary, but under Miller, it is not sufficient. Rather, a sentencer must actually make the judgment that the juvenile is one of those rare children for whom life without parole is a constitutionally permissible sentence.