This Means War

Professor Michael Clarke joins Peter to talk about the 10 day old Ukrainian counter offensives against Russia. In proving they can do more than "just not losing a war slowly", the Ukrainian actions in Kherson (a strategic counter offensive), Kharkiv and Izyum (both smaller but important tactical pushes) are posing significant challenges for the Russian military and their political leadership. And this means that the deployment of the Russian Third Army Corps sometime early in 2023 might have to look very different from what Moscow had been planning.

Nick Reynolds has just returned from Ukraine again and talks to Peter about his experiences and insights after 6 months of war with Russia. From the implications of electronic warfare, the training for combined arms manoeuvre (in order to conduct the politically-necessary but militarily-viable offensive), to kill chains, passive drone operations, and information operations, the lessons from this war also cover more traditional – but critically important – facets of conventional combat power: sniping, dismounted close combat skills, and land mine usage. Predictions on the use of biological and chemical weapons by Russian forces in this theatre round out a wide ranging conversation on the trajectory of the war.

Supporting a war conducted by others shouldn’t be measured on financial aid committed. A better metric would actually be the percentage of the requirement actually fulfilled; on that measure, the report card for Western leaders supporting Ukraine is not good. As Ukraine talks up the idea of offensive operations against Russia, Peter talks to Lt Gen (rtd) Ben Hodges about what a counter offensive might look like, whether Western support will endure, and what lessons we should start to be thinking about from the on-going war in Ukraine.

If you look at Russian actions in different regions of the world, their strategies differ considerably. This covers economic policies as well as foreign policy activities and military ones. From Africa to the Rimland, Moscow signals their intentions clearly, watches for reactions and then executes pretty nuanced plans. Nowhere is this clearer than in the different approaches Russia has been taking in the Arctic and Ukraine over the past 15 years. In this episode Peter is joined by Professor Katarzyna Zysk, from Norway’s Institute for Defense Studies in Oslo, to talk about duality, rationality, logic, and pragmatism in Russia’s national security decision-making. While there is an idea of muddling through in the Kremlin there is more depth at the organisational level than Western analysts give credit for. This has significant implications for discussions on things like regime change and ceasefires. Don’t expect Moscow to stop behaving like Russia anytime soon; with or without Vladimir Putin at the helm.

Between 2004 and 2014, NATO armies coerced the militaries and special forces of Georgia and Ukraine into a doctrine and design built around Counter Insurgency and Counter Terrorist operations. When this met the Russians in 2008 and 2014 respectively, these forces failed. Dramatically. Today, Ukraine’s special forces are performing with dogged determination and expertise – in spite of what the West taught them. Dr Sandor Fabian argues that if today’s special forces want to learn about how to conduct successful operations against a larger conventional military power, they need to look to the Taliban, ISIS, Hezbollah, North Korea and Iran for inspiration: Western militaries have been teaching SF from smaller states the wrong stuff, and forcing them into a shape and form that simply won’t work for them. He and Peter discuss the differences in force design that states require, in everything from equipment and training, to education and doctrine.

A now frozen but forgotten conflict in Georgia dating from 2008 was the result of a Russian invasion and occupation of two large regions: it was a stark warning of Moscow’s imperial plans that went ignored by Western leaders. Fourteen years after the ceasefire was established, Russia continues to wage war on Georgia with tools other than uniformed troops and high explosives. Peter talks to Natia Suskuria from the RISS in Tbilisi about what it feels like to live under the threat of renewed invasion from Russian military forces, and what lessons Georgia has learned from recent events in Ukraine. The greatest risk seems to be not from Russia but rather, once again, by Western powers failing to recognise the opportunities and risks of their own actions.

In this discussion, Trent Telenko, a former Department of Defense civil servant and logistics expert based in Dallas, unpacks the outdated logistics system of the Russian military in Ukraine. He explains how their reliance on 19th-century methods has hindered progress. The conversation also highlights the impact of long-range precision weaponry on military planning for both sides. Additionally, Trent contrasts Russian logistics with China's modern practices, revealing key lessons that could reshape future warfare strategies.

As the Iranian proxy in Yemen, the Houthi’s have evolved from a guerrilla organisation to one capable of facing down a first-world military and becoming adept with ballistic missiles, maritime warfare, and influence operations in Western capitals. In this episode, Peter talks to Dr Michael Knights about what an effective – if morally dubious – ‘train and assist’ mission looks like when conducted by an adversary. It’s not just about what you weapons you fight with, it’s about how you fight and who (and how) they support you, ending with the lesson that military power is no absolute; it is only relative to the enemy.

Prof. John Spencer, an expert in Urban Warfare at West Point, shares insights from his recent trip to Ukraine. They dive deep into the Battle of Kyiv, highlighting the unexpected resilience of Ukrainian forces and the importance of urban terrain in military strategy. The discussion reveals the tactical intricacies of Russian withdrawals and the ongoing challenges both sides face amidst artillery superiority. As the war evolves, they emphasize the significance of momentum and resistance in determining future outcomes.

Dr Jack Watling talks to Peter as he returns from his most recent trip to Ukraine. As both Ukrainian and Russian forces reorganise for the next phase, the conflict is poised at a critical moment: one dependent on stockpiles, logistics, resupply, people, leadership and styles of fighting. Whilst Jack brings his latest insights to the listeners, he and Peter have a discussion over the information war and debunk some of the myths and fallacies around the public face of the war. Jack also highlights some of the lessons emerging from the conflict that are likely to endure and apply across other wars. Sobering stuff.