The Safety of Work

Russell is a safety practitioner based in New Zealand. He joins us to tell us about his work and together we wonder if safety and design processes change the design itself. Topics:Is safety and design effective?Risk shuffling.Russell’s key findings.The hierarchy of controls.The proper use of safety and design.Evaluating design to minimize risk.Practical advice from Russell. Quotes:“We don’t always have opportunities in safety science to get some objective artifacts…”“I’ve never heard of a designer saying they’ve got plenty of time and a ton of budget, so let’s, you know, get down and optimize for safety.”“And if we start by listing the operations before we list the hazards or risks, then we’re going to be in a much better place.” Resources:Russell McMullan on LinkedInFeedback@safetyofwork.com

The discussion dives into the looming crisis surrounding safety cases and their effectiveness. Topics include the burden of proof shifting and the paradox of identifying hazards. The podcast explores data-sharing challenges and the significance of turning motivations into testable theories. Collaboration is highlighted as essential for improving safety processes, while the need for rigorous research methods is emphasized. Ultimately, it questions if safety cases enhance safety or lead to overconfidence in hazardous industries.

The podcast explores the importance of constructive dialogue in safety theory debates. It discusses finding original sources, understanding context, and the balance between old and new safety ideas. Emphasizes the need to move debates forward with knowledge and evidence, avoiding dismissing entire fields or theories.

The final chapters cover such issues as creating functional reporting systems and the pitfalls in creating such systems. Topics:Creating a solid reporting system.At what point does something become an incident?Voluntary vs. mandatory reporting.When your organization is facing prosecution.How reporting gets stifled.The problem with penalties.Looking after all parties involved in incidents.The outcomes safety professionals want.Practical takeaways. Quotes:“I think this is the struggle with those sort of systems, is that if they are used frequently, then it becomes a very normal thing...but that means that people are using that channel instead of using the line management as their channel…”“I think unless we work for a regulator, we need to remind ourselves that it’s not actually our job, either, to run the prosecution or even to help the prosecution.”“If you think your system is fair, then you should be proud of explaining to people exactly how it works.” Resources:Just CultureFeedback@safetyofwork.com

In this installment, we cover more chapters from Sidney Dekker’s book about just culture. Last week we covered the core ideas of just culture. This week, we go over retributive and restorative culture and the impetus behind rule-breaking. Topics:The problem with rewarding good behavior.How a retributive system functions.The standard for risk assessment.How restorative culture functions.Why sharing experiences is key.What is expected under a solid restorative justice system.Understanding rule-breakers.How the book fails to properly dissect rule-breaking.Practical takeaways. Quotes:“If our purpose is to make a better workplace, then we need a system that for most people, most of the time, it’s doing a good job.”“When we talk about safety, we’re not talking about elements of a typical criminal offense; we’re talking about things that in the criminal courts would be talking about negligence. Which is all about meeting acceptable standards.”“Sidney emphasizes a lot the importance of all stakeholders to share their stories with each other.” Resources:Just CultureFeedback@safetyofwork.com

For the next few weeks, we are going to cover ‘just culture’ and focus mainly on Sidney Dekker’s book of the same name.The laws currently on the books encourage businesses to focus on liability instead of actual safety. By focusing on culpability for an accident, this is a way for businesses to get out of compensating the worker for injury. This is just some of what we will discuss today. Topics:Safety theory vs. safety practice.Safety culture and the Swiss Cheese Model.Updates in the third edition.The definition of just culture.To whom you apply the process and why it’s important.Listening and actually hearing.Systemic and individual action.Can an individual be too much of a danger?Preventing unnecessary blame.What to expect from this series of episodes.Practical takeaways. Quotes:“We both know that Dekker a bit of a problem...a bit of a habit of being pretty harsh about how he characterizes some of the older safety practices.”“The ability of people to tell their stories and have those stories heard by all the other stakeholders, is a key part of restorative justice.”“We’re all in the same boat, we’re all, after that accident, have an individual responsibility to stop this happening again by making the system better.” Resources:Just CultureFeedback@safetyofwork.com

As risk assessment is such a central topic in the world of safety science, we thought we would dedicate another episode to discussing a facet of this subject. We loop back to risk matrices and determine how to score risks.Join us as we try to determine the subjectivity of risk assessment and the pitfalls of such an endeavor. Topics:Risk matrices.Why the paper we reference is a trustworthy source.Scoring risks.How objective are we?How to interpret risk scores.What the risk-rating is dependent upon.Practical takeaways. Quotes:“The difference between an enumeration and a quantitative value is that enumeration has an order attached to it. So it let’s us say that ‘this thing is more than that thing.’ ““I think this was a good way of seeing whether the differences or alignment happened in familiar activities or unfamiliar activities. Because then you can sort of get an idea into the process, as well as the shared knowledge of the group…”“So, what we see is, if you stick to a single organization and eliminate the outliers, you’ve still got a wide spread of scores on every project.”“We’re already trying pretty hard and if we’re still not converging on a common answer, then I think we need to rethink the original assumption that there is a common answer that can be found…” Resources:Are We Objective?Risk Perceptions & Decision-Making in the Water IndustryFeedback@safetyofwork.com

It’s difficult to give an introduction to this topic, given that a JSA is such an amorphous topic. Generally speaking, we’re talking about job or task-hazard analysis; the idea behind task-hazard analysis is that you break the task down into steps and figure out what controls are necessary to keep the task safe.Tune in to hear us clarify the idea of and benefits from job safety analysis. Topics:The lack of standard terminology.Why some claims from JSA’s are implausible.The structure of the study covered in the paper.Why the analysis in the study is more of a comparison.The overconfident optimism of the researchers.How JSA’s clarify worker’s duties.Who makes the decisions.Hazard awareness.Loss prevention.Practical takeaways. Quotes:“I think it would be fair to say that I’ve never yet met a method of risk assessment that I fell in love with.”“The researchers are too optimistic about how much the documented JSA’s reflect what actually went on.”“Ultimately, in high risk work, the immediate hazard awareness of people is important for safety.” Resources:The Application and Benefits of Job Safety AnalysisFeedback@safetyofwork.com

The article we reference provides a historical account of the “Swiss Cheese Model”. Since there are many versions of this same diagram, we thought it best to look back through time and see the evolution of this particular safety model. Topics:Why the model represents the presence of folklore in safety.The methods used in Good and Bad Reasons.The cognitive processes that lead to errors.Whether the model represents accident causation appropriately.A defense of the model. Quotes:“He’s just trying to understand this broad range of errors and sort of work with the assumption that there must be different cognitive processes.”“It was initially, sort of, only published once in a medical journal as an oversimplification of his own diagram.”“The other critique is that the model lacks guidance.”“ ‘I never intended to produce a scientific model’ is the worst excuse possible that an academic can give in defense of their own model.” Resources:Good and Bad Reasons: The Swiss Cheese Model and its CriticsFeedback@safetyofwork.com

In this episode, the hosts discuss the practical implications of Safety II for safety professionals. They explore the shift from centralized control to guided adaptability in safety theories. They also highlight the importance of understanding technical specialists and integrating effective safety practices across the organization. Other topics include generating operational scenarios, facilitating task level hazard analysis, and the differences between Safety I and Safety II approaches.