Chris Anderson, former DoD program manager and COO at Troika Solutions, shares his insights on the evolution of military drone technology, especially the Switchblade kamikaze drone. He discusses the birth of the U.S. Army Asymmetric Warfare Group and the challenges faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. The conversation highlights the differences in drone use between Ukraine and the Indo-Pacific, and critiques the military's cautious approach to adopting risky technologies, underscoring the need for flexible strategies in asymmetric warfare.
The establishment of the Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) revolutionized military procurement by enabling rapid adaptation to evolving battlefield challenges.
The effectiveness of the Switchblade drone in Ukraine highlights the importance of innovation and precision in modern military strategy against asymmetric threats.
Deep dives
Development of the Switchblade Kamikaze Drone
The Switchblade drone, also known as a loitering munition, represents a significant evolution in battlefield technology as the first tactical-level drone deployed by the U.S. military. Unlike traditional drones, the Switchblade is designed for one-way missions where it loiters over a target area before being directed to strike. This system allows soldiers to deploy precise, one-time attacks without needing to request fire clearance, streamlining the military response during combat. Chris Anderson emphasizes that this drone serves to adapt to rapidly changing battlefield conditions, showcasing the U.S. military's focus on innovation in response to asymmetric threats.
The Asymmetric Warfare Group's Role in Rapid Procurement
The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) was established to respond quickly to battlefield needs by circumventing traditional bureaucratic procurement processes. Recognizing that soldiers faced unique challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan, the AWG aimed to understand and adapt to enemy tactics while rapidly equipping U.S. forces. This group was integral in adjusting the military acquisition system, allowing for faster decision-making and implementation of new gear, such as uniforms and lighter equipment. The creation of the AWG and the Rapid Equipping Force allowed military leaders to sidestep red tape and get critical resources to frontline troops without lengthy delays.
Asymmetrical Warfare Tactics and Countermeasures
During the conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces faced asymmetric warfare tactics that exploited their predictability and adherence to rules of engagement. Enemy combatants effectively utilized improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and unconventional tactics, forcing U.S. soldiers to adapt their strategies on the ground. The use of unmanned aerial systems like the Switchblade allowed for more flexibility and response capability against these insurgent tactics by enabling soldiers to engage targets with precision and minimal collateral damage. This shift in military strategy highlights the need for constant adaptation in the face of evolving threats.
Lessons Learned from Current Conflicts and Future Implications
Recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine, have underscored the effectiveness of unmanned systems and loitering munitions like the Switchblade in modern warfare. Observations from these engagements reveal that small, nimble teams armed with advanced drone technology can significantly impact the battlefield dynamics. Anderson notes that these experiences will likely influence how future conflicts, including potential tensions in Taiwan, are approached strategically by U.S. forces. The ongoing need for innovation in military technology and adaptability in tactics is critical to maintaining combat effectiveness in diverse operational environments.
Today’s interviewee is Chris Anderson. Anderson’s a former DoD program manager who served in a unique organization called the US Army Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG). Anderson is currently the Chief Operating Officer at Troika Solutions, a defense consulting firm based in Virginia.
We discussed:
The birth of the Asymmetric Warfare Group
Why American troops in Afghanistan couldn’t strike Taliban operatives
Why the military avoids risky technology, even when it would save lives
What we’ve learned about drones from Ukraine
The difference between drone use in Ukraine and in the Indo-Pacific
You can read the full interview transcript and find sources at www.statecraft.pub.
This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.statecraft.pub
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