ChinaTalk CCP Bureaucracies in War
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Nov 2, 2025 
Tyler Jost, a Brown University professor and author of *Bureaucracies at War*, explores how leaders misjudge foreign policy despite expert advice. He reveals how Mao’s early successes weakened his decision-making and discusses the dangerous echo chambers formed within bureaucracies. Jost dives into Deng’s miscalculation in Vietnam, highlighting the role of succession pressures. He also examines LBJ’s strategic blunders, shaped by loyalty over expertise, and draws parallels to Xi Jinping’s current governance challenges, stressing the need for improved communication to avoid past mistakes.
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Leader Overconfidence Shapes Decision Styles
- Leaders often arrive in power with a ‘hot hand’ confidence that biases them toward trusting gut over data.
- This psychological overconfidence can systematically shape how they interact with and discount expert advice.
Mao's Early Institutional Advantage
- Early Mao inherited an integrated bureaucracy with strong diplomatic and military channels feeding him information.
- That connective tissue allowed candid debate and better-calibrated foreign policy choices in the 1950s–early 1960s.
Diplomacy Averted Escalation In 1962
- In 1962 Mao used both military mobilization and diplomatic channels to avert a Taiwan crisis.
- The foreign ministry’s reporting and Warsaw channel crucially corrected Mao’s initial threat perception.
