Fionna S. Cunningham, "Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security" (Princeton UP, 2024)
Jan 9, 2025
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Fionna S. Cunningham is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, with expertise in technology and conflict, particularly regarding China. She discusses China's unique military strategy using information-age weapons to navigate geopolitical tensions without resorting to nuclear war. Key topics include China's approach to limited conflicts, the role of cyber capabilities and precision missiles, and the implications of its evolving military strategies on global security dynamics.
China's strategic substitution theory emphasizes the use of non-nuclear offensive capabilities to exert pressure while mitigating nuclear conflict risks.
The effectiveness of China's information-age weapons in achieving military objectives remains uncertain amid evolving international dynamics and counterstrategies.
Deep dives
China's Limited War Dilemma
The limited war dilemma refers to the challenge faced by nuclear-armed states in using military force while avoiding escalation to nuclear war. Following the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, China realized that any military action regarding Taiwan would likely provoke a U.S. military response. This prompted Chinese leaders to reassess their military strategy, leading them to prepare for limited conflicts rather than life-threatening wars, as was the case during the Cold War. The crisis highlighted the necessity for China to navigate military threats carefully, aware of the potential for catastrophic consequences amid its longstanding political goals concerning Taiwan.
Strategic Substitution as a Response
Strategic substitution presents an innovative solution to the limited war dilemma, focusing on the use of non-nuclear weapons to exert political pressure while maintaining a defensive posture regarding nuclear capabilities. The approach allows a country to threaten escalation through non-nuclear means, potentially provoking adversaries to alter their responses without directly resorting to nuclear options. China has embraced this concept, employing offensive cyber tactics, precision-guided conventional missiles, and counter-space capabilities as tools for coercive leverage. This strategy enables China to participate in conflicts with the possibility of escalation while deferring nuclear engagement, a shift from traditional options of nuclear first use or decisive conventional victory.
Information Age Weapons and Their Impacts
China's focus on information age weapons highlights its strategic shift toward capabilities that can disrupt adversaries' military effectiveness without immediate catastrophic outcomes. These capabilities include precision conventional missiles, offensive cyber tools, and counter-space technologies, all of which exploit dependence on information networks for effectiveness. The strategic substitution theory elucidates how these weapons enable significant military effects while containing the risk of nuclear escalation, positioning China in a more robust military stance with global implications. The integration of these technologies into China's military framework reflects its calculation to maintain credibility and deterrence while mitigating unintended nuclear conflicts.
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Strategic Substitution
The effectiveness of China's strategic substitution approach remains a complex and debated issue within international relations. While it has provided a stopgap response to reduce leverage deficits against adversaries, its long-term success is uncertain due to fast-evolving military dynamics and countermeasures from the U.S. and its allies. Analysis reveals that while conventional missiles have proven effective for coercive leverage, offensive cyber operations have less clear impacts, often depending on perceptions rather than direct outcomes. Consequently, while strategic substitution has created immediate opportunities for leverage, it may not provide sustainable advantages in the broader context of military confrontation.
How can states use military force to achieve their political aims without triggering a catastrophic nuclear war? Among the states facing this dilemma of fighting limited wars, only China has given information-age weapons such a prominent role. While other countries have preferred the traditional options of threatening to use nuclear weapons or fielding capabilities for decisive conventional military victories, China has instead chosen to rely on offensive cyber operations, counter-space capabilities, and precision conventional missiles to coerce its adversaries.
In Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security(Princeton UP, 2024), Fiona Cunningham examines this distinctive aspect of China’s post–Cold War deterrence strategy, developing an original theory of “strategic substitution.” When crises with the United States highlighted the inadequacy of China’s existing military capabilities, Cunningham argues, China pursued information-age weapons that promised to provide credible leverage against adversaries rapidly.
Drawing on hundreds of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with security experts in China, Cunningham provides a rare and candid glimpse from Beijing into the information-age technologies that are reshaping how states gain leverage in the twenty-first century. She offers unprecedented insights into China’s military modernization trajectory as she details the strengths and weaknesses of China’s strategic substitution approach. Under the Nuclear Shadow also looks ahead at the uncertain future of China’s strategic substitution approach and briefly explores too how other states might seize upon the promise of emerging technologies to address weaknesses in their own military strategies.
Our guest today is Fiona S. Cunningham, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania.