Horns of a Dilemma Conventional Options Theory in the New Nuclear Era
Jan 7, 2026
Tyler Bowen, an Assistant Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and author on nuclear strategy, dives into the complexities of conventional coercion amid modern nuclear threats. He discusses the resurgence of nuclear deterrence influenced by global tensions like Russia's war in Ukraine and China’s military expansion. Bowen elaborates on his 'conventional options theory,' detailing conditions for coercive success and applying historical case studies to extract vital lessons. He emphasizes the balance of conventional threat types and how they shape contemporary military strategies.
AI Snips
Chapters
Books
Transcript
Episode notes
Return To Foundational Deterrence Questions
- Renewed interest in deterrence lets scholars revisit Cold War questions with new data on decision-making.
- Tyler Bowen sees this as an opportunity to test foundational theories about nuclear effects on great-power behavior.
Two Competing Views On Nuclear Effects
- Competing views dispute whether nuclear weapons make conventional victory irrelevant or enable conventional aggression.
- Bowen frames the tension between nuclear-era 'revolutionary' effects and the stability-instability paradox.
Two Conditions For Conventional Coercion
- Conventional Options Theory requires two conditions: an effective limited conventional option and a strong second-strike nuclear capability.
- Together they create credible pressure while raising the cost of adversary escalation.
