How Russia is bringing the cost of global sabotage to zero
Feb 6, 2025
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In this discussion, Daniela Richterova, a Senior Lecturer in Intelligence Studies at King's College London, delves into Russia's evolving approach to sabotage. She reveals how the gig economy model enables Russia to recruit agents at minimal costs, highlighting the historical continuity in tactics from the KGB to today’s FSB. Daniela explains the implications of decentralized operations and cryptocurrencies for accountability. She also addresses the unexpected challenges for Western nations in adapting to this chaotic espionage landscape, raising crucial questions about security strategies.
Russia's decentralized sabotage model effectively utilizes gig economy networks to enhance deniability and lower operational costs significantly.
Despite technological advancements, the essence of Russia's sabotage tactics remains rooted in Cold War strategies targeting critical infrastructures to disrupt adversaries.
Deep dives
Decentralization of Sabotage Operations
Russia's approach to conducting sabotage operations has shifted notably towards a decentralized model, utilizing gig economy networks to carry out activities for minimal compensation. This transition allows for a wider pool of agents who may not have formal training or a deep understanding of the tasks they are performing, which can lead to amateurish results. These decentralized agents are often recruited online, enabling the Russian state to exploit a larger number of individuals willing to engage in covert operations without the traditional risks associated with direct recruitment of trained operatives. This strategy not only reduces costs significantly but also enhances deniability for the Russian state in terms of responsibility for any actions taken.
Historical Continuities in Sabotage Doctrine
A notable continuity exists in Russia's sabotage operations from the Cold War era to present-day practices, particularly regarding target selection and operational tactics. Historical documents reveal that Russia has consistently aimed to disrupt adversary military and political activities by targeting critical infrastructures such as energy supplies and communication lines. Current operations mirror those objectives, focusing on countries that provide military support to Ukraine, suggesting a deliberate alignment with historical tactics of sowing discord among Western nations. This connection between past and present highlights the enduring strategies employed by Russian intelligence services, reaffirming that while methods may evolve, the underlying goals remain consistent.
The Role of Technology in Modern Operations
The integration of technology has transformed the landscape of sabotage operations, allowing for easier recruitment and coordination through online platforms. Individuals can now offer their services similarly to gig economy jobs, often without fully understanding the implications of their actions or the true purpose behind them. This model has created a new dynamic where the speed and scale of operations have increased, despite many participants lacking the requisite skills and training. The reliance on technology not only facilitates the execution of such operations but also presents challenges for accountability and surveillance, as the actions of these low-cost operatives can be harder to trace back to the Russian state.
Implications for Future Conflict and Security
The evolving model of decentralized sabotage raises significant concerns regarding international security and the potential for increased chaos in geopolitical conflicts. As Russia adapts its tactics, there is an expectation that other states may follow suit, leading to more widespread use of non-state actors in conflicts. This not only blurs the lines of warfare but also complicates traditional security measures, making it challenging for countries to respond effectively to these unconventional threats. Ultimately, the ongoing evolution of these tactics reflects a deeper change in warfare paradigms, necessitating a reevaluation of how states protect their interests in increasingly chaotic environments.
When Russia launched its war on Ukraine in early 2022, it became the first land battle on European soil since World War II. Warfare has changed dramatically since then — from first-person view drones to AI-mediated strategic communications, as well as intelligence gathering and operations — and yet, critical continuities remain between Russia’s present and past strategies and tactics.
To learn more, Riskgaming host Danny Crichton interviewed Daniela Richterova, who is Senior Lecturer in Intelligence Studies at the Department of War Studies, King's College London. She has been researching the history and contemporary practices of Russia’s overseas intelligence missions and recently co-authored a paper on how Russia is using a gig-economy model to hire agent-saboteurs in the field, sometimes for as little as a few hundred dollars. This new operational model has allowed Russia to dramatically scale up its attacks on infrastructure and other high-priority targets at minimal cost despite overseas sanctions.
Daniela discusses the continuities in doctrine between the KGB and today’s Russian FSB, how agent training has evolved over the decades, why the gig economy has been so effective for Russia, what Russia seeks to target and why, and finally, the risk calculus and cultural differences between Russian political and espionage leaders and those of other nations.