Ankit Panda, a senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, discusses the looming threat of a new nuclear arms race. He explores the complexities that modern geopolitical tensions, particularly with Russia and China, bring to nuclear deterrence. Panda highlights the risks tied to the potential expiration of the New START Treaty in 2026 and the challenges of misperceptions in nuclear conflicts. The conversation also touches on the paradox of Mutually Assured Destruction and the evolving nature of military strategies involving nuclear options.
Geopolitical tensions, particularly following Russia's actions and China's nuclear expansion, may signal the onset of a new nuclear arms race.
The normalization of lower-yield nuclear weapons could dangerously lower the threshold for nuclear conflict, undermining deterrence principles established during the Cold War.
Deep dives
Nuclear Arms Race and Historical Context
The possibility of a new nuclear arms race is emerging as geopolitics shift, particularly following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. This move signaled a deterioration in relations between Russia and the West, coinciding with China's aggressive expansion of its nuclear capabilities under Xi Jinping. Despite a historic decrease in global nuclear arsenals—from approximately 70,000 during the Cold War to around 12,000 today—there are now nine recognized nuclear states, with North Korea’s increased threats and Iran’s nuclear ambitions contributing to global tensions. The interconnectedness of these geopolitical dynamics suggests that a broader, potentially more dangerous arms race could be imminent, urging countries to reassess their nuclear policies.
Concerns Over Reduced Yields and Nuclear Strategy
While the average yield of nuclear weapons has decreased since the Cold War, concerns arise that this trend may lead military establishments to consider nuclear weapon use less terrifying. Earlier, nuclear weapons had massive yields capable of widespread destruction, but modern lower-yield alternatives might shift perceptions to permit limited nuclear engagement. This idea poses a significant risk, as the normalization of potential nuclear conflict could undermine deterrence principles meant to prevent escalation. The willingness to contemplate limited nuclear strikes might inadvertently lower the threshold for actual nuclear conflict in international tensions.
Technological Advances and Escalation Risks
The evolution of military technology has changed the landscape of nuclear deterrence and escalation. Modern weapons capable of precise targeting now pose a threat to nuclear capabilities, potentially altering the strategic calculations of deterrent forces. Additionally, the introduction of artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities complicates the situation, creating new pathways for miscommunication and escalation. These technological advancements, coupled with traditional missile defense strategies, have introduced complexities that were not present during the Cold War, calling for a reevaluation of current nuclear doctrines.
Diplomacy and the Future of Non-Proliferation
The current state of global non-proliferation is increasingly strained, with concerns about the diminishing consensus among major powers. The Non-Proliferation Treaty has historically played a crucial role in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, but recent geopolitical tensions have started to erode this framework, raising fears that more countries may pursue nuclear capabilities. With nations like Australia moving towards nuclear partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K. through AUKUS, the implications for regional security are profound. The potential for allies like South Korea and Japan to consider developing their nuclear arsenals highlights the fragility of the current non-proliferation regime amid rising global tensions.
After decades of treaties and diplomacy curbing fears over the use of nuclear weaponry, does today’s conflicted world surface the threat of a new nuclear age?
Following the brinkmanship of the Cold War, an era of non-proliferation saw stockpiles of weapons cut dramatically. Yet concerns grow that nuclear arsenals may expand again.
Gavin Esler discusses a potential new arms race with Ankit Panda, Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and hears about the history of non-proliferation from Hans Kristensen, Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists.
Support us on Patreon to keep This Is Not A Drill producing thought-provoking podcasts like this.
Written and presented by Gavin Esler. Produced by Robin Leeburn and Eliza Davis Beard. Original theme music by Paul Hartnoll –https://www.orbitalofficial.com. Executive Producer Martin Bojtos. Group Editor Andrew Harrison. This Is Not A Drill is a Podmasters production.
