Processing Plotinus: A Bergsonian Reading

I was joined again by Pedro Brea (we discussed Bergson and Whitehead a few weeks ago) and now also by Jack Bagby (a colleague of mine at CIIS). We discussed Jack’s translation of Bergson’s lectures on Plotinus (1898-99). We also discussed an essay by Wayne J. Hankey on Bergson and Plotinus.

Although I had previously known Plotinus influenced Bergson, our discussion highlighted how profoundly Bergson resonated with Plotinus’ psychology. Bergson emphasizes that, for Plotinus, consciousness arises as a kind of diminution or limitation, contrasting sharply with modern conceptions of consciousness as an epiphenomenon added onto neural activity.

Pedro raised several intriguing points, including Bergson’s notion of matter as an ever-renewing present, the active role of intelligence in shaping perception, and the place of mysticism in Bergson’s thought. We agreed that mysticism serves as a foundational philosophical insight for both Plotinus and Bergson.

We discussed the challenge of determinism, with Jack noting Bergson’s criticism of Plotinus and Leibniz as implying that the future is fully predetermined within monads or intelligibles. I agreed, highlighting Leibniz’s monads as pre-established harmonies containing all their representations, which contrasts dramatically with Bergson’s and Whitehead’s metaphysics of creativity.

Pedro drew connections between Nietzsche’s will to power and Plotinus’s metaphysics. We reflected on how Nietzsche might have misunderstood or caricatured Plotinus as overly life-denying. Jack and I both suggested a more nuanced reading: although Plotinus does see embodiment as a limitation, he still dignifies embodied experience as valuable, even if subordinate to contemplation.

A significant part of our discussion involved examining Bergson’s metaphysics of matter and memory and its relationship to Plotinus’s concepts of soul and body. I argued there is a crucial parallel between Plotinus’s conception of matter as the unlimited lower principle and the One as the unlimited higher principle, suggesting a possible reconciliation of matter and spirit. Pedro connected this to Simone Weil’s Pythagorean idea of matter as simultaneously barrier and connection between the soul and the One.

We expanded on Bergson’s notion of the élan vital, relating it to Plotinus’s Logos as a dynamic, generative principle of life and intuitive thought. We discussed the Stoic roots of this idea, agreeing that for both Plotinus and Bergson, reality is fundamentally dynamic and relational.

I raised questions about terminology, particularly Bergson’s translation referencing Plotinus’s notion of the “audacity” of the soul, speculating that the Greek root might imply something closer to hubris or an act of individuation against divine unity.

Jack clarified some misconceptions about Aristotle’s concept of matter (hyle), emphasizing that Aristotle’s matter is never simply passive, but dynamic, forceful, and full of potentialities, akin to Bergson’s vision of materiality. I compared this to Plato’s concept of the receptacle in the Timaeus, suggesting Plato may also grant matter a more active and vibratory role than is often recognized.

Video of our dialogue:

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