Abishek Choutagunta on Federalism, President’s Rule, and Constitutional Design
Oct 31, 2024
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Abishek Choutagunta, a PhD in economics and an Emergent Ventures India Fellow, delves into Indian federalism and constitutional design. He discusses the controversial use of President's Rule, highlighting its misuse as a political tool. The conversation explores the complexities of local governance, issues of authority delegation, and the impact of centripetal federalism on state autonomy. Additionally, Abishek addresses the challenges of coalition governments and the implications of the SR Bommai case on political dynamics, revealing deep insights into India's governance structure.
The invocation of President's Rule, often motivated by political interests, reveals a troubling pattern of central government overreach in state governance.
Analysis of historical data indicates that weakened party representation in state assemblies significantly increases the likelihood of central intervention through President's Rule.
Centripetal federalism in India has undermined local governance by consolidating power at the center, leaving local bodies without adequate authority or resources.
Deep dives
Understanding President's Rule in India
President's Rule, derived from Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, grants the central government the authority to dismiss state governments it deems unable to maintain constitutional governance. This provision was established against a backdrop of colonial history and concerns about law and order, with past instances often rooted in political motivations rather than genuine emergencies. The central government exercised this power frequently throughout India's history for political opportunism, leading to questions about the legitimacy behind its application. The discussion highlights the need for establishing clearer criteria for invoking this power to prevent political misuse.
Data Analysis and Methodology
The research employs an extensive dataset covering instances of President's Rule from 1952 to 2019, merged with legislative positions, coalition dynamics, and incidents of communal riots and natural disasters. This comprehensive analysis aims to reveal patterns and predictors for the imposition of President's Rule. By using a conditional logic model, the study assesses political variables such as coalition strength and seat shares, alongside emergency situations to determine their correlation with the invocation of President's Rule. The findings indicate that certain political factors, rather than genuine emergencies, predominantly influence this decision.
Findings on Political Opportunism
The study uncovers significant findings regarding the factors influencing the likelihood of imposing President's Rule. It shows that a smaller seat share of the ruling party in a state government correlates with a higher probability of central intervention, suggesting that weaker state governments are more prone to dismissal. Moreover, coalition governments experience a threefold increase in likelihood of President's Rule compared to single-party states, indicating that political fragmentation increases vulnerability. Conversely, major emergencies such as communal riots or natural disasters did not predict the use of President’s Rule, reinforcing the narrative of political opportunism.
Impact of the S.R. Bommai Judgment
The S.R. Bommai judgment of 1994 significantly altered the political landscape related to President's Rule, mandating that state governments prove their majority in the assembly before dismissal. Post this ruling, the likelihood of President's Rule being invoked dramatically decreased for all but the death of a state chief minister, which remains a major triggering factor. This judicial intervention has made the invocation of President's Rule a more costly and scrutinized decision for the central government. It emphasizes a shift towards greater accountability in employing emergency powers as a tool for political maneuvering.
Centripetal Federalism and Local Governance
Centripetal federalism in India has led to a concentration of power at the central level, adversely affecting local governance. Despite the introduction of the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments, local governments have been stripped of genuine power and autonomy, rendering them ineffective in addressing community needs. Local bodies are often burdened with responsibilities without the requisite authority or financial resources, resulting in poor service delivery. The systemic issues of governance, manifested in areas such as infrastructure maintenance, reveal the broader implications of a top-heavy governmental structure that hinders local problem-solving.
I spoke with Abishek Choutagunta, who received his PhD in economics from the Institute of Law and Economics, University of Hamburg. He is also an EV India fellow at the Mercatus Center. We discussed his paper “President’s Rule in India: State Emergency or Political Capture?” with Christian Bjørnskov, Stefan Voigt, and myself, yes you heard that right. We talked about the Centripetal Federalism in India, state and local government finances, emergency powers, SR Bommai, constitutional design, and much more.