#137 – Andreas Mogensen on whether effective altruism is just for consequentialists

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Sep 8, 2022

Andreas Mogensen, a Senior Research Fellow at Oxford's Global Priorities Institute, explores the intersection of effective altruism and various ethical theories. He argues that you don't have to be a utilitarian to embrace effective altruism, detailing his lean towards deontological ethics. The discussion highlights the importance of a 'principle of beneficence' in addressing preventable suffering, and dives into the ethical complexities of moral obligations to future generations versus immediate needs. Mogensen's insights invite listeners to reevaluate their moral reasoning in altruism.

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INSIGHT

Deontology and Effective Altruism

Effective altruism is often associated with consequentialism, but deontology also values doing good.
Deontology emphasizes different moral considerations like rights and duties, not just outcomes.

ANECDOTE

Scope Insensitivity

William Desvouges' study shows scope insensitivity; people's willingness to pay didn't change much despite a 100x increase in birds saved.
This suggests our valuation might be flawed when dealing with large numbers.

INSIGHT

Why Deontology?

Andreas Mogensen prefers deontology because consequentialism can be too permissive.
The 'transplant case' highlights this, where killing one to save five is deemed permissible by utilitarianism, but violates deontological principles of rights.

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Effective altruism, in a slogan, aims to 'do the most good.' Utilitarianism, in a slogan, says we should act to 'produce the greatest good for the greatest number.' It's clear enough why utilitarians should be interested in the project of effective altruism. But what about the many people who reject utilitarianism?

Today's guest, Andreas Mogensen — senior research fellow at Oxford University's Global Priorities Institute — rejects utilitarianism, but as he explains, this does little to dampen his enthusiasm for the project of effective altruism.

Links to learn more, summary and full transcript.

Andreas leans towards 'deontological' or rule-based theories of ethics, rather than 'consequentialist' theories like utilitarianism which look exclusively at the effects of a person's actions.

Like most people involved in effective altruism, he parts ways with utilitarianism in rejecting its maximal level of demandingness, the idea that the ends justify the means, and the notion that the only moral reason for action is to benefit everyone in the world considered impartially.

However, Andreas believes any plausible theory of morality must give some weight to the harms and benefits we provide to other people. If we can improve a stranger's wellbeing enormously at negligible cost to ourselves and without violating any other moral prohibition, that must be at minimum a praiseworthy thing to do.

In a world as full of preventable suffering as our own, this simple 'principle of beneficence' is probably the only premise one needs to grant for the effective altruist project of identifying the most impactful ways to help others to be of great moral interest and importance.

As an illustrative example Andreas refers to the Giving What We Can pledge to donate 10% of one's income to the most impactful charities available, a pledge he took in 2009. Many effective altruism enthusiasts have taken such a pledge, while others spend their careers trying to figure out the most cost-effective places pledgers can give, where they'll get the biggest 'bang for buck'.

For someone living in a world as unequal as our own, this pledge at a very minimum gives an upper-middle class person in a rich country the chance to transfer money to someone living on about 1% as much as they do. The benefit an extremely poor recipient receives from the money is likely far more than the donor could get spending it on themselves.

What arguments could a non-utilitarian moral theory mount against such giving?

Many approaches to morality will say it's permissible not to give away 10% of your income to help others as effectively as is possible. But if they will almost all regard it as praiseworthy to benefit others without giving up something else of equivalent moral value, then Andreas argues they should be enthusiastic about effective altruism as an intellectual and practical project nonetheless.

In this conversation, Andreas and Rob discuss how robust the above line of argument is, and also cover:

• Should we treat thought experiments that feature very large numbers with great suspicion?
• If we had to allow someone to die to avoid preventing the World Cup final from being broadcast to the world, is that permissible?
• What might a virtue ethicist regard as 'doing the most good'?
• If a deontological theory of morality parted ways with common effective altruist practices, how would that likely be?
• If we can explain how we came to hold a view on a moral issue by referring to evolutionary selective pressures, should we disbelieve that view?

Chapters:

Rob’s intro (00:00:00)
The interview begins (00:01:36)
Deontology and effective altruism (00:04:59)
Giving What We Can (00:28:56)
Longtermism without consequentialism (00:38:01)
Further differences between deontologists and consequentialists (00:44:13)
Virtue ethics and effective altruism (01:08:15)
Is Andreas really a deontologist? (01:13:26)
Large number scepticism (01:21:11)
Evolutionary debunking arguments (01:58:48)
How Andreas’s views have changed (02:12:18)
Derek Parfit’s influence on Andreas (02:17:27)

Producer: Keiran Harris
Audio mastering: Ben Cordell and Beppe Rådvik
Transcriptions: Katy Moore