Brink and Mortars

In *Supreme Command*, Eliot A. Cohen argues that great statesmen do not leave wars entirely to their generals. Instead, they actively engage with military leaders, questioning and driving them to achieve strategic goals. The book explores how these statesmen successfully managed military campaigns by being deeply involved in the details of war planning. Cohen's thesis challenges the traditional view that civilians should step back once military objectives are set, advocating for a more integrated approach to wartime leadership.

Eliot A. Cohen’s book offers a focused account of how to think about strategy and war. It defines strategy as pursuing political purpose through organized force, distinguishing it from broad policy and from planning alone. Cohen emphasizes execution, judgment, adaptation, and the importance of understanding adversaries, context, resources, priorities, sequencing, and theories of victory. He also examines how surprise, groupthink, institutional habits, and human limitations distort strategic decision-making. Drawing on history and professional experience, the book argues that strategic judgment requires humility, practical wisdom, and a broad education in human nature.

In 'Six Days of War', Michael B. Oren provides a detailed narrative of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, exploring both the military strategies and the political dynamics that led to the war. The book examines how the war reshaped the Middle East and influenced global politics. Oren's work is based on extensive research, including top-secret documents and personal interviews, offering a balanced perspective on the conflict.