Lawfare Daily: Steve Coll on Saddam Hussein and the Limits of American Power in the Middle East
Sep 26, 2024
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Steve Coll, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author, delves into his latest work focused on Saddam Hussein and the convoluted U.S.-Iraq relationship. He reveals how Saddam’s belief in America's omnipotence led to his downfall when his fictitious WMD program became a justification for invasion. The discussion dives into the complexities of intelligence ties, highlighting how the CIA’s early support played a role in building Saddam's paranoia. Coll emphasizes the importance of understanding historical perspectives to avoid repeating past mistakes in U.S. foreign policy.
Saddam Hussein's decisions were often driven by a desire to maintain power, despite the risks they posed to his regime.
The U.S. intelligence community's misinterpretations and shifting strategies led to a flawed understanding of Iraq and contributed to the invasion.
Establishing credible deterrence requires consistent communication and engagement, highlighting the importance of nuanced diplomacy with authoritarian regimes.
Deep dives
Understanding Saddam's Strategic Choices
Saddam Hussein's leadership was characterized by a complex interplay of personal motivations and geopolitical pressures. He frequently made strategic decisions aimed at preserving his power, even if they appeared detrimental to his regime in the long run. For instance, his insistence on maintaining a façade of possessing weapons of mass destruction stemmed from a desire to leverage international sanctions while avoiding humiliation from inspections. This paradox shaped his calculations, as he sought to mitigate both external and internal pressures in a landscape fraught with risk.
The Role of Intelligence Failures
The intelligence community's understanding of Saddam and Iraq significantly influenced U.S. foreign policy decisions in the decades leading up to the invasion. Initial cooperation between the CIA and Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War exemplified how intelligence needs could complicate future relations. However, post-Gulf War misinterpretations led to a series of covert actions that failed to effect change, ultimately contributing to the perception of an unyielding threat from Iraq. This evolution revealed a troubling disconnect between intelligence assessments and actual on-the-ground realities in Iraq.
Deterrence and its Limitations
Deterrence strategies during Saddam's regime demonstrated that clear communication of red lines could influence decision-making, yet these strategies were inconsistently applied. For example, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, U.S. leaders sent a strong deterrent message regarding the use of chemical weapons, which Saddam heeded. However, the lack of sustained engagement before this crisis led to failures to deter his initial aggression. This inconsistency highlights the necessity of establishing credible deterrence through ongoing diplomatic channels and clarity in messaging.
Complexities in U.S.-Iraq Relations
The historical context of U.S. dealings with Iraq illustrates a complicated relationship shaped by shifting interests and perceptions. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. leaders oscillated between containment and covert action against Saddam, influenced by political pressures and domestic sentiments. The Clinton administration's reluctance to engage directly with Saddam, out of fear of political backlash, limited opportunities to fully understand his motivations and objectives. This pattern of suspicion and misunderstanding ultimately fueled the drive toward an invasion in 2003.
Lessons for Future Engagement
The experiences with Saddam Hussein and Iraq offer critical lessons for navigating relationships with authoritarian regimes. A pluralistic approach that combines respect for the complexities of other nations with the establishment of open lines of communication proves vital. Understanding that leaders, even those seen as irrational, operate within self-interested frameworks can guide more effective foreign policy. These insights advocate for a nuanced engagement strategy that seeks to balance deterrence with dialogue to better manage global challenges.
Steve Coll’s latest book, “The Achilles Trap: Saddam Hussein, the C.I.A., and the Origins of America’s Invasion of Iraq,” seeks to explain why Saddam Hussein would put his regime at risk over weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that didn’t exist. Saddam ultimately lost his regime, and his life, in part because he saw America as an omniscient puppeteer seeking to dominate the Middle East. The United States put thousands of troops in harm’s way in pursuit of a rogue WMD program that turned out to be a fiction. Were these outcomes inevitable?
Lawfare Student Contributor Preston Marquis sat down with Coll, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and author, to explore this question. “The Achilles Trap” is unique in that it relies on Saddam’s secret tapes and archives to unpack twists and turns in the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship dating back to the Cold War. The full review is available on the Lawfare website.