I

don't think the Russian claim makes any sense, because to the extent we are directly involved in this war, we've been directly involved helping Ukraine right from the start. And in the particular thing that's annoyed the Russians, which is allowing storm shadow to be used against targets within Russia. First, storm shadow has been used for some time now, so there's nothing new there. And secondly, Russia is claiming most of the territory upon which this is being used as Russian. So I think what happened was that they were aware of a particular debate going on within the alliance, and in particular within the US, which they were desperately trying to influence, and they failed to influence it. So now they're trying to raise the stakes again. And we've seen how they've tried to do that with showing that they have a new missile that could indeed be used against Western countries. But again, there's nothing new in that. Nobody's been under any illusions that the Russians couldn't hurt European cities if they wish to do so. So I think, like much else of what's going on at the moment, there's a performative element to this and it's waiting for Trump.

Peter, Lawrence is saying that nothing's changed militarily. What about diplomatically? Have the stakes changed there in this attempted escalation? I

think what this decision to allow US and UK longer range missiles to be used by the Ukrainians against targets in Russia, what that has changed is it gets at a rather successful effort that Putin has been making in the last year, really, or more, that it's fine for the Russians to rain down North Korean missiles and Iranian drones on the territory of Ukraine, but somehow it's a reckless escalation for the Ukrainians to use Western-supplied weapons in legitimate targets in Russia. And I think it's undermining that. And the Russians, of course, are showing performative fury, as Lauren says. This is a message intended to intimidate rather than anything else. And so it doesn't, I think, change anything diplomatically. The Russians have felt for two and a half years that they are at full-scale war now with the West. We haven't felt that in the West. I think as the rhetoric and the exchanges have escalated in recent weeks, perhaps Western publics are beginning to feel that this is becoming a serious hostility and that they need to take more notice of it. And Western politicians are having to make that clear. But for the Russians, they've been at some form of war with the West ever since they invaded Ukraine. There's a lot of positioning ahead of the arrival of Trump. Western countries wanting to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position, Russia trying to establish or maintain where he can red lines that get in the way of and complicate Western decision making. But nothing fundamental has changed, no.

Peter, I want to look at the UK for a second, because the involvement of UK supplied weapons towards Russian territory, it wasn't discussed or debated in Parliament prior to the attack. Politically speaking, what kind of issues does that raise within the UK discussion about Ukraine? I

don't think you'd expect a government to bring tactical decisions like that, what range missiles supplied to an ally can be used in. Every time this subject has been discussed in Parliament, both in the Commons and in the Lords, as we did last week, there's been absolute cross-party support for the previous governments and now the current governments' policy of doing everything we can, militarily and economically, to support Ukraine. Lawrence,

you've talked about how a lot of this is looking forward to Trump. It's looking forward to that new US president in January. Some have suggested that Biden is kind of emptying the barrel for Ukraine before he leaves office. What impact is that going to have? Does it sort of affect the strategy of what Trump will come in? Is it going to change anything when his successor is perhaps unpredictable? Well,

I think Biden is trying to get Ukraine in the best possible position that he can get them into. And the problem is not that there aren't funds that can be used to support this, but a lot of the material that Ukraine needs just isn't there. So the main aim of the game at the moment is to keep Ukraine going in a reasonable position when it's under a lot of pressure, especially in the Donbass, so that it's not begging for a deal, if you like, when Trump arrives that it's in a reasonably strong position. They've also got to get through the winter, which is another part of the challenge. If they manage all of that, I think the indications are from the Trump people that this is a serious effort to get a deal, but it's not going to be a deal at any price. It's vital that the Ukrainians show that they can hang in there. And that's what Biden's trying to help them do. Peter,

how do you read the situation? There's some suggestion that Trump could go back on this decision to allow these missiles to be used. What position would that leave Ukraine and the UK and Europe in? Well,

I think part of the intention of the Biden administration is to get as much out of the door as they can and into Ukraine so that they're safely there and Trump can't go back on that. And also, I think to disperse as much as possible of this very large G7, $50 billion secured against the proceeds of frozen Russian assets, get as much of that as possible into Ukrainian bank accounts. But however hard we work to prepare Ukraine, I think it's getting to be almost inevitable that there will be some sort of a negotiation in 2025. And that could go very badly wrong from Western interests. It could involve Putin and Trump getting together to impose a settlement on the Ukrainians. That would be catastrophic for Ukraine, but also for Western solidarity. But if Trump's people can be persuaded that there is a possible deal, it would involve some sort of ceasefire, more or less where forces are, but no concession by Ukraine, that occupied territory is ceded to Russia. And clarity that Ukraine will have discretion over its own security policy in the future and continue to work towards NATO membership, particularly. that could possibly mean that we come out of this in a position where Ukraine has the capacity to grow and to approach the West. In a sense, the madman policy of Trump, which he's often used in the past, of being very unpredictable and very mercurial, might just help because Putin would have to be very careful that he didn't do something which Trump regarded as defiance and suddenly have him coming in and doubling down on support for Ukraine. So I'm not completely pessimistic that a reasonable ceasefire deal could be handed out in the first part of next year. I

think what's quite interesting is that despite the headlines, a lot of people have been quite anxious in the last week. You're both talking very calmly as Russia as a country, not rushing headlong into an escalation, but sort of making calculated decisions about the next couple of months.

who's the person to listen to at the moment because he's Trump's national security advisor designate and doesn't require confirmation by the Senate, has been saying some reasonably calming things, including indicating that he's been talking with the Biden administration, suggesting that they're not going to row back on the decision taken. And in the past, he's taken a reasonably hardline anti-Russian position, while still saying he wants a deal. I think people assume that the problem is Ukraine not wanting a deal. I have seen very little evidence that Putin is ready to make compromises for the sort of deal that Peter outlined, which I think is probably what's in the Trump camp's mind. The problem is for Putin, so long as what's left of Ukraine has sovereignty and can develop security arrangements which satisfy it, then he hasn't won. Then he's left with a very unstable situation. So he's pressed very hard for neutralizing, in every sense of the word, Ukraine. And I don't think the Trump administration will be keen to go along with that. So my assumption is that there will be an attempt to get a deal. I'm not at all convinced that it will succeed. And I think you probably get a better deal if Putin has to come to terms with the fact that this war may go on with more support, maybe even going into Ukraine, but certainly with his own economy deteriorating. Peter,

what do you make to that?

Yes, I mean, that is possible. I mean, the risk then is that Ukraine loses this war slowly, despite all its heroic efforts. The West, especially with less American military and economic support, just can't give them the combat power and the economic resilience they need. And that over time, the Russians grind them down. I think a long conflict plays into Putin's hands. Russia has got greater resilience, greater willingness to take the pain, as it were. And so I think that this would be a dangerous thing. And therefore, if Trump can't be persuaded to keep up the level of American support to allow the Ukrainians to really push back on the Russians, then it seems to me better to be beginning to think about terms for a ceasefire before Ukraine is ground down a lot further. My

assumption is that if it is seen that Putin is the one that's not making the compromises, that Trump will accept that he needs to continue to support Ukraine. Clearly, if there's no more support for Ukraine, then Ukraine's in a pretty dire position because the Europeans are doing more, the Ukrainians are doing more, but they need the American support. But also, let's be clear, the Ukrainians have shown greater resilience. They've been through extraordinary privations and are hanging in there and continuing to fight. And despite all the meat grinder tactics of the Russians, the gains they've made, while significant over the last few months, are still limited. They may end up at some point taking Demets, but there's still some way from it. I think we tend to underestimate the pressures on Putin. But it's obviously right that if Trump abandons Ukraine, then all bets are off. But the sign so far is that's less likely than we feared.

who ends wars, but he also likes to be someone who is looking strong. And I think if we can persuade him that essentially giving in to Putin, accepting a deal on Putin's terms, that's not strength, that's weakness, you know, that's appeasement and surrender. And Trump won't want to look like that. So if we can put in the right elements into his mind about where, how he could come out of a deal looking strong, in other words, ensuring that Ukraine maintains its capacity to make its own decision making and continue to draw closer to the West, while leaving the Europeans carrying more of the burden, then I think we may be in business. The Europeans can't substitute for what American military supplies, but they can produce the bulk of the cash that's going to be needed for the vast reconstruction of Ukraine, which will come once the fighting ebbs away. And there, it seems to me that it's fair enough that Trump should, you know, put more of the burden on the Europeans. So, I mean, that's an area I think where Europe should be getting together now they already are, and thinking about how they can mobilize some really massive resources. Can they use frozen Russian assets, not just the proceeds from them? Where could they find the scale of resources needed? If they do that, perhaps there's a chance of keeping the Americans engaged in military support for Ukraine in the longer term.

It's interesting because we had an interview with David Lammy on the Politics Podcast last week, and he was using Trump's language of he doesn't like to look like a loser, he'll want to win, and sort of echoing it back to Trump and seemingly using those tactics. I wanted to ask, because Le Monde reported on Monday that France and the UK aren't ruling out sending troops and private defence companies to Ukraine. Peter, is that just strong rhetoric echoing back what Russia is doing and sort of like taking a stamp? Or is there any realism in those conversations saying that we're not taking troops off the table?

Well, I don't think there's any question of putting troops into a combat zone. I think let's be clear about that. It's not what the French mean. I'm sure it's not what the British mean. I think they are talking about troops in a training capacity, well behind the front line. We've been doing a great deal of training of Ukrainian forces in the UK. The French have been doing a lot as well. So potentially moving that forward into Ukraine, doing it in the western parts of Ukraine. And I can understand the case for that. But I do not think this is a harbinger to putting British and American troops into combat against Russian forces. That would be extraordinary and certainly not what's intended. I

think there's another possibility, which I agree with that, but I think there's another possibility, which is that in the event of a deal which does not make it possible, and it probably isn't possible in practical terms, for an early entry into NATO, you need some sort of security guarantees. One of those could involve a multinational force being based inside Ukraine after a ceasefire, not to get a ceasefire. The Russians wouldn't like it, but they're the ones bringing North Koreans in to support their territorial integrity. The Ukrainians could do that too. So this would not be done as a NATO force, but as a different sort of force. I think that's a possibility. And just going back to the earlier conversation, one of the things that the Europeans should argue, and it's being argued in the States now, is a victory for Russia would be a victory for Iran, for North Korea, for China. And that really would hurt Trump. I mean, even if he doesn't think Russia's his real enemy, but China is, something that would be seen to be dependent upon the resources that they've handed over to Russia would look like a major defeat. He saw what Afghanistan did to Biden in 2021. I mean, that's when the Biden administration lost a lot of support.