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Episode 17: Compatibilism, Part 3 (Semicompatibilism) with Michael McKenna

The Free Will Show

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Defining Reason's Responsiveness in a Frankfort Example

If you take an agent who acted freely in a frankfort example, and you wan to say her freedom consists in her being reasons responsive, that is sensitive to reason. But um, damn it all, that doesn't seem to work in a frank for example because the counterfactual interveners around and different reason are present. So how is i compatibleest going to draw upon the resources of reason's responsiveness to capture the kind of freedom an agent can retain in a Frankfort example? Well, i'm a little worried i'm getting too far into the weeds here, but ete just suggest one or two solutions?"

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