Incentive for Information Creation

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The paper argues against the belief in informationally efficient markets, highlighting the flaw that if markets efficiently transmit all information, there would be no incentive to collect information. The concern is raised about entities like Google and AI scraping information without contributing to its creation, potentially reducing incentives for others to produce valuable information.

Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz joined Tyler for a discussion that weaves through Joe’s career and key contributions, including what he learned from giving an 8-lecture in Japan, how being a debater influenced his intellectual development, why he tried to abolish fraternities at Amherst, how studying Kenyan sharecropping led to one of his most influential papers, what he thinks today of Georgism and the YIMBY movement, why he was too right-wing for Cambridge, why he left Gary, Indiana, his current views on high trading volumes and liquidity, the biggest difference between him and Paul Krugman, what working in Washington, DC taught him about hierarchies, what he’ll do next, and more.

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Recorded April 22nd, 2024.

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