The Efficiency of a Paid Organ Market

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The concept of buying and selling organs could greatly increase the supply of kidneys. Just like other goods, organs could be bought and sold to meet the demand. Despite existing supply and demand for kidneys, the absence of legal trade leads to a shortage. People's moral objections to paying for organs do not align with economic principles, and there are many markets where the idea of putting a price on something is resisted.

There are tons of markets that don't exist because people just don't want to allow a market – for whatever reason, people feel icky about putting a price on something. For example: Surrogacy is a legal industry in parts of the United States, but not in much of the rest of the world. Assisted end-of-life is a legal medical transaction in some states, but is illegal in others.

When we have those knee-jerk reactions and our gut repels us from considering something apparently icky, economics asks us to look a little more closely.

Today on the show, we have three recommendations of things that may feel kinda wrong but economics suggests may actually be the better way. First: Could the matching process of organ donation be more efficient if people could buy and sell organs? Then: Should women seek revenge more often in the workplace? And finally, what if insider trading is actually useful?

This episode was hosted by Mary Childs and Greg Rosalsky. It was produced by Willa Rubin and edited by Jess Jiang. It was engineered by Cena Loffredo. Fact-checking by Sierra Juarez. Alex Goldmark is Planet Money's executive producer.

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