SCOTUScast

On December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Harris v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission. In 2012, the Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission redrew the map for the state legislative districts based on the results of the 2010 census. Wesley Harris and other individual voters sued the Commission and alleged that the newly redrawn districts were underpopulated in Democratic-leaning districts and over-populated in Republican-leaning ones, and that the Commission had, therefore, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Commission countered that the population deviations were the result of attempts to comply with the Voting Rights Act. A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the Commission. -- There are two questions before the Supreme Court on appeal: (1) Whether the desire to gain partisan advantage for one political party justifies creating over-populated legislative districts that result in the devaluation of individual votes, violating the one-person, one-vote principle; and (2) whether the desire to obtain favorable preclearance review by the Justice Department permits the creation of legislative districts that deviate from the one-person, one-vote principle, and--even if creating unequal districts to obtain preclearance approval was once justified--whether this remains a legitimate justification after the Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark F. Hearne, II, who is Partner at Arent Fox LLP.

On December 9, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. This is the second time the case has come before the high court. -- Abigail Fisher, a white female, applied for admission to the University of Texas but was denied. Fisher sued the University and argued that the use of race as a consideration in the admissions process violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that the University’s admissions process was constitutional, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The case went to the Supreme Court (Fisher I), which held that the appellate court erred in how it applied the strict scrutiny standard, improperly deferring to the University’s good faith in its use of racial classifications. On remand the Fifth Circuit again ruled in favor of the University, deeming its use of race in the admissions process narrowly tailored to a legitimate interest in achieving “the rich diversity that contributes to its academic mission.” -- The question in this case is whether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher I. -- To discuss the case, we have Joshua P. Thompson who is Principal Attorney at Pacific Legal Foundation.

On December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Evenwel v. Abbott. As required by the Texas Constitution, the Texas legislature reapportioned its senate districts after the publication of the 2010 census, formally adopting an interim plan that had been put in place for the 2012 primaries. Plaintiffs, who are registered Texas voters, sued the Texas governor and secretary of state, asserting that the redistricting plan violated the one-person, one-vote principle of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, by failing to apportion districts to equalize both total population and voter population. A three-judge district court ruled in favor of the state officials. -- On appeal, the question before the Supreme Court is whether the three-judge district court correctly held that the “one-person, one-vote” principle under the Equal Protection Clause allows States to use total population, and does not require States to use voter population when apportioning state legislative districts. -- To discuss the case, we have Andrew Grossman, who is Associate at Baker & Hostetler, and Adjunct Scholar at The Cato Institute.

On November 10, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Tyson Foods v. Bouaphakeo. Peg Bouaphakeo and the rest of the plaintiffs in this class action are current and former employees of Tyson Foods. They claim that Tyson violated the Fair Labor Standards Act by not paying them for time spent putting on and taking off protective clothing at the beginning and end of the work day and before and after lunch. The district court certified the class, and the jury returned a multi-million dollar verdict in their favor. Tyson argued on appeal that certification was improper due to factual differences among plaintiffs, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court. -- The questions before the Supreme Court are twofold: (1) Whether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified under the Fair Labor Standards Act, where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all class members are identical to the average observed in a sample; and (2) whether a class action may be certified or maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), or a collective action certified or maintained under the Fair Labor Standards Act, when the class contains hundreds of members who were not injured and have no legal right to any damages. -- To discuss the case, we have Karen Harned, who is Executive Director of the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Center.

On January 19, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Heffernan v. City of Paterson. Jeffrey Heffernan was a police officer for the City of Paterson, New Jersey. A fellow police officer observed Heffernan picking up a campaign sign for the mayoral candidate running against the incumbent. Although Heffernan disclaimed any political motives and said he was merely picking the sign up for his mother, his supervisor demoted him. Heffernan sued Paterson claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights, but lost on the grounds that, his supervisor’s erroneous belief notwithstanding, the fact that Heffernan was not actually engaged in political activity doomed his claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether the First Amendment bars the government from demoting a public employee based on a supervisor's perception that the employee supports a political candidate. -- To discuss the case, we have Adele Keim, who is counsel at The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.

On January 11, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. Under California law and existing Supreme Court precedent, unions can become the exclusive bargaining representative for the public school employees of their district and establish an “agency shop” arrangement requiring public school employees either to join the union or pay a fee to support the union’s collective bargaining activities. Although the First Amendment prohibits unions from compelling non-members to support activities unrelated to collective bargaining, in California non-members must affirmatively “opt out” to avoid paying for these unrelated or “nonchargeable” expenses. -- Here a group of public school employees sued the California Teachers Association and various other entities, arguing that the agency shop arrangement itself--as well as the opt-out requirement--violated the First Amendment. The district court denied their claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on existing precedent and the 1997 Supreme Court decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. -- The two questions now before the Supreme Court are: (1) Whether the Abood precedent should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment; and (2) whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring that employees affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard A. Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law and Professor Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.

On December 14, 2015, the Supreme Court decided DIRECTV v. Imburgia. This case involves a class action lawsuit against DIRECTV by various California customers. Among other things, the agreement between DIRECTV and its customers contained a waiver of any right by either party to undertake class arbitration, unless “the law of your state” made such waivers unenforceable. At that time class arbitration waivers were unenforceable under California law, but in a subsequent case the United States Supreme Court held that this California rule was preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Concluding that the parties had intended to apply the rule as it existed prior to the Supreme Court decision, California trial and appellate courts refused to enforce the arbitration provision. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the FAA permitted this outcome; namely, the application of state law that had since been preempted by the FAA. -- By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the California Court of Appeals and remanded the case. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that the arbitration provision must be enforced because the California appellate court’s interpretation was preempted by the FAA. -- Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Alito, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Cory Andrews, who is Senior Litigation Counsel at the Washington Legal Foundation.

On December 7, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Dollar General Corporation v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. This case concerns a dispute over tribal court jurisdiction relating to allegations that the non-Indian manager of a Dollar General store on Choctaw tribal land sexually molested an Indian minor who interned at the store. When the minor’s parents sought to hold Dolgencorp--the subsidiary that operated the store--vicariously liable for the manager’s conduct, Dolgencorp petitioned in federal district court for an injunction barring tribal court proceedings, on the grounds that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction. The district court denied relief, concluding that while tribal courts typically lack civil authority over the conduct of non-members on non-Indian land within a reservation, Dolgencorp’s situation fell within a “consensual relationship” exception to the rule. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, and denied rehearing en banc over the dissent of five judges. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether Indian tribal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate civil tort claims against non-members, including as a means of regulating the conduct of non-members who enter into consensual relationships with a tribe or its members. -- To discuss the case, we have Zachary Price, who is Associate Professor of Law at University of California, Hastings College of Law.

On December 8, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Shapiro v. McManus. In this case several Maryland citizens sued state election officials claiming that a 2011 redistricting plan violated their rights to political association and equal representation under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although federal law normally requires such claims to be heard by a three-judge federal court, a single judge dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. -- The question before the Supreme Court was whether a single-judge federal district court may determine that a claim governed by the Three-Judge Court Act is insubstantial, and that three judges therefore are not required--not because it concludes that the complaint is wholly frivolous, but because it concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, holding that the citizens’ redistricting challenge was not so insubstantial that it could be dismissed by a single judge, and should have been considered by a three-judge Court. -- To discuss the case, we have Michael T. Morley, who is Assistant Professor at Barry University School of Law.

On November 2, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins. Robins sued website operator Spokeo, Inc. under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, complaining that Spokeo had published inaccurate personal information about Robins. The district court determined that Robins had failed to allege an injury-in-fact and dismissed the case for lack of standing. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Spokeo’s alleged violations of Robins’ statutory rights constituted sufficient injury, and that Robins satisfied the other requirements for Article III standing. -- The question Spokeo raises before the Supreme Court is whether Congress may confer Article III standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute. -- To discuss the case, we have Erin Hawley, who is Associate Professor of Law at University of Missouri School of Law.