SCOTUScast

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States Army Corps of Engineers v. Hawkes Co., Inc. Hawkes Co. (Hawkes) applied to the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) for a Clean Water Act permit to begin extracting peat from wetlands in northern Minnesota it was preparing to purchase. After attempting to discourage the purchase, and initiating various administrative processes, the Corps ultimately issued an Approved Jurisdictional Determination (Approved JD) asserting that the wetland contained waters of the United States, thereby creating a substantial barrier to development by Hawkes. Hawkes filed suit in federal district court to challenge the Approved JD, arguing that it conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. The district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that the Approved JD was not a “final agency action” as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore not yet subject to judicial review. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that judgment and remanded the case, holding that an Approved JD did constitute final agency action ripe for judicial review. -- The question before the Supreme Court is whether the United States Army Corps of Engineers’ determination that the property at issue contains “waters of the United States” protected by the Clean Water Act, constitutes “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court," and is, therefore, subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. -- To discuss the case, we have Mark Miller, who is Managing Attorney, Atlantic Center, Pacific Legal Foundation.

On March 23, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell, the lead case in a consolidated series, with the other petitioners including Priests for Life, Southern Nazarene University, Geneva College, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, East Texas Baptist University, and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged. -- The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) requires that group health plans and health insurance issuers provide coverage for women’s “preventative care,” or face financial penalties. Although the ACA does not define preventative care, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), relying on the Institute of Medicine, determined that the term encompassed, among other things, all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, including drugs and devices that could induce an abortion. Although the government exempted “religious employers” from this mandate, the exemption was narrowly defined and did not extend to petitioners. The government did, however, offer non-profit entities such as petitioners an “accommodation.” -- Under the accommodation, which was modified in the course of litigation, an objecting religious nonprofit entity complies if it provides the government with a notice that includes “the name of the eligible organization,” its “plan name and type,” and the name and contact information for any of the plan’s third-party administrators (TPAs) and health insurance issuers. Upon receiving the notice, the government notifies the objecting entity’s insurance company or TPA, which then must provide payments for the requisite contraceptive products and services. A number of objecting non-profits sought relief in various federal courts, arguing that the accommodation violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993. The resulting litigation produced a series of fractured opinions and a split in the Courts of Appeals, with non-profit religious organizations prevailing in the Eighth Circuit but losing in a number of others. -- After imposing a brief injunction on enforcement against petitioners while it considered various petitions for certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a number of petitions and consolidated the cases for oral argument on the following question: whether the HHS Mandate and its “accommodation” violate RFRA by forcing religious nonprofits to act in violation of their sincerely held religious beliefs, when the Government has not proven that this compulsion is the least restrictive means of advancing any compelling interest. On March 29, the Court also issued a detailed order requiring the parties to brief “whether and how contraceptive coverage may be obtained by petitioners'’ employees through petitioners’ insurance companies, but in a way that does not require any involvement of petitioners beyond their own decision to provide health insurance without contraceptive coverage to their employees.” -- To discuss the case, we have Roger Severino, who is Director, DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society, The Heritage Foundation.

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Caetano v. Massachusetts without oral argument. -- Jamie Caetano was convicted of violating a Massachusetts law prohibiting possession of stun guns. On appeal, she claimed this law violated the Second Amendment, by infringing her right to possess a stun gun in public for the purpose of self-defense from an abusive ex-boyfriend. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed Caetano’s conviction, ruling that stun guns are not eligible for Second Amendment protection. -- By a vote of 8-0, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion vacating the judgment of the Massachusetts court and remanding the case. Citing its 2008 precedent District of Columbia v. Heller, and its 2010 precedent McDonald v. Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Massachusetts court’s decision as contradictory of Supreme Court precedent. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Nelson Lund, who is University Professor at George Mason University School of Law.

On March 29, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association. A group of public school employees sued the California Teachers Association and various other entities, arguing that the agency shop arrangement itself--as well as the opt-out requirement--violated the First Amendment. The district court denied their claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed based on existing precedent and the 1997 Supreme Court decision Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. The two questions before the Supreme Court were (1) whether the Abood precedent should be overruled and public-sector “agency shop” arrangements invalidated under the First Amendment; and (2) whether it violates the First Amendment to require that public employees affirmatively object to subsidizing nonchargeable speech by public-sector unions, rather than requiring that employees affirmatively consent to subsidizing such speech. -- In a one-sentence per curiam opinion, the judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, a 4-4 split. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard A. Epstein, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, New York University School of Law and Professor Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.

On March 21, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. The European Community. The European Community and 26 of its member states sued RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging that RJR conducted a global money-laundering enterprise in violation of several laws, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a federal statute. The alleged RICO enterprise involved the importation of illegal drugs into European countries by Colombian and Russian criminal organizations, with RJR helping to launder their drug money through a cigarette import-purchase scheme. Applying a presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law, the district court dismissed The European Community’s civil RICO claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated that judgment and reinstated the RICO claim, however, concluding that various alleged predicates for RICO liability had been intended by Congress to apply extraterritorially and that other offenses asserted sufficiently important domestic activity to come within RICO’s coverage. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted RJR’s subsequent petition for writ of certiorari on the following question: whether, or to what extent, RICO applies extraterritorially. -- To discuss the case, we have Richard A. Samp, who is Chief Counsel at Washington Legal Foundation.

On March 28, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Betterman v. Montana. Brandon Thomas Betterman pled to and was sentenced for the offense of bail-jumping. He argued on appeal that a 14-month delay between the entry of his guilty plea and his sentencing violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court of Montana affirmed Betterman’s conviction and sentence, holding that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not extend from conviction to sentencing. A criminal defendant still retains, the court concluded, a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to have sentence imposed in a timely manner, without unreasonable delay--and the delay in this case was unacceptable--but any resulting prejudice to Betterman was speculative and not substantial and demonstrable. -- The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari on the following issue: whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case. -- To discuss the case, we have Anthony Johnstone, who is Associate Professor at University of Montana Alexander Blewett III School of Law.

On April 4, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Nichols v. United States. Petitioner Nichols, a registered sex offender who moved from Kansas to the Philippines without updating his registration, was arrested, escorted to the United States, and charged with violating the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). SORNA makes it a federal crime for certain sex offenders to “knowingly fai[l] to register or update a registration,” and requires that offenders who move to a different State “shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status,” inform in person “at least 1 jurisdiction involved . . . of all changes” to required information. After conditionally pleading guilty, Nichols argued on appeal that SORNA did not require him to update his registration in Kansas. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed his conviction. -- By a vote of 8-0 the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, holding that SORNA did not require Nichols to update his registration in Kansas once he departed the State. Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. -- To discuss the case, we have James Barta, who is an Associate at MoloLamken LLP.

On March 30, 2016, the Supreme Court decided Luis v. U.S. In 2012, a grand jury indicted Luis for a variety of crimes relating to health care fraud. The government contended that she had fraudulently obtained some $45 million, and had spent all except $2 million of it. The government then initiated a civil proceeding to freeze Luis’ remaining assets, including those not traceable to the alleged fraud, to preserve them for payment of restitution and criminal penalties if she was convicted. Luis objected that the freeze violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel, by precluding her from using her own untainted funds--those not connected with the alleged crime--to hire counsel to defend her in her criminal case. The district court acknowledged that Luis might be unable to hire counsel of her choice but rejected her Sixth Amendment claim, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. -- By a vote of 5-3, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the 11th Circuit and remanded the case. No single rationale, however, attracted the votes of five justices. Writing for a plurality, Justice Breyer delivered an opinion arguing, based on the nature of competing considerations, relevant legal tradition, and practical concerns, that Luis had a Sixth Amendment right to use her own “innocent” property to pay a reasonable fee for the assistance of counsel. The opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment of the Court--thereby providing a fifth vote to vacate and remand--but he did not agree with the plurality’s balancing approach and instead rested strictly on the Sixth Amendment’s text and common-law backdrop. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have John Malcolm, who is Director of the Edwin Meese III Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, and the Ed Gilbertson and Sherry Lindberg Gilbertson Senior Legal Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

On February 22, 2016, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC. In 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a sexual harassment suit against CRST Van Expedited (CRST) on behalf of approximately 270 female employees. When a number failed to appear for depositions, however, the district court barred the EEOC from pursuing their claims as a discovery sanction. The remaining claims were dismissed on various other grounds, including 67 claims that the district court dismissed for failure of the EEOC to separately investigate, find reasonable cause for, or attempt to conciliate them. In addition, the court awarded CRST some $4.46 million in attorney’s fees and expenses, on the basis that the claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. On appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all but two claims, vacated the award of fees and costs, and remanded the case. On remand, one of the remaining claims was withdrawn and the other settled. CRST renewed its petition for fees, costs, and expenses, and the district court again awarded it approximately $4.6 million. -- On a second appeal the Eighth Circuit again reversed the award, finding that claims which had been dismissed for the EEOC’s failure to meet presuit obligations could not serve as grounds for an award, and remanding for an individualized determination as to whether other claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. -- The Supreme Court granted CRST’s subsequent petition for certiorari on the following question: whether a dismissal of a Title VII case, based on the EEOC’s total failure to satisfy its pre-suit investigation, reasonable cause, and conciliation obligations, can form the basis of an attorney’s fee award to the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). -- To discuss the case, we have Kenton J. Skarin, who is an Associate at Jones Day.

On March 7, 2016, the Supreme Court decided V.L. v. E.L., a case involving an interstate dispute over custody of a child raised by a same-sex couple. A Georgia court entered a final judgment of adoption making petitioner V. L. a legal parent of the children that she and respondent E. L., her same-sex partner, had raised together from birth. V. L. and E. L. later separated while living in Alabama. V. L. asked the Alabama courts to enforce the Georgia judgment and grant her custody or visitation rights. The Alabama Supreme Court refused, holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution did not require the Alabama courts to respect the Georgia judgment. -- By a vote of 8-0 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court and remanded the case, holding in a per curiam opinion that the Alabama Supreme Court erred in refusing to grant the Georgia adoption judgment full faith and credit. -- To discuss the case, we have Robin Fretwell Wilson, who is the Roger and Stephany Joslin Professor of Law and Director of the Program in Family Law and Policy at University of Illinois College of Law.