SCOTUScast

On January 9, 2017, the Supreme Court decided White v. Pauly, a petition involving a denial of qualified immunity to law enforcement officers in a civil rights dispute. In October 2011, officers Kevin Truesdale and Michael Mariscal went to the home of Daniel and Samuel Pauly to investigate a complaint made by several drivers that Daniel had been driving erratically that evening. The officers entered the Pauly property while a third officer, Ray White, remained near the highway in case Daniel returned there. Truesdale and Mariscal did not find Daniel’s truck, but they did notice lights on in one of two houses on the property. Upon approaching the building covertly they spotted two men moving around inside, and then requested that Officer White join them. When the Paulys became aware that strangers were present outside there was a verbal confrontation; according to the officers, the officers self-identified as police and threatened to enter the house if the brothers did not come out. It appears however, that neither Pauly heard the self-identification. Just as White was arriving the brothers warned that they had firearms. Upon hearing the warning, White took cover behind a stone wall fifty feet from the house. Daniel then fired two shotgun blasts out the back door and when Samuel pointed a handgun out the window in White’s direction, Mariscal fired at him but missed. Several seconds later White also fired and hit Samuel, killing him. Samuel Pauly’s estate and Daniel Pauly sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied qualified immunity to the officers and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The majority reasoned that, taking the plaintiffs’ version of the facts as true, a reasonable person in the position of Officers Mariscal and Truesdale should have understood that their conduct might cause the Paulys to use deadly force in defense of their home. As to Officer White, the majority concluded that while he did not participate in much of the lead up to the shootout, a reasonable officer in his position would have believed a verbal warning was required given that the stone wall afforded him secure cover. -- The Supreme Court granted the officers’ petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Tenth Circuit, and remanded the case. Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” On the record described by the Tenth Circuit, the Supreme Court held, Officer White did not violate clearly established law. But because the parties disputed whether White actually arrived on the scene several minutes before the shooting started and should have known that the other officers had not properly identified themselves, the Court left this potential alternative ground for affirmance--as well as whether Truesdale and Mariscal were entitled to qualified immunity in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling--for further consideration by the Tenth Circuit on remand. Justice Ginsburg issued a concurring opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Josh Skinner, Of Counsel with Fanning, Harper, Martinson, Brandt & Kutchin, P.C.

In June, the Supreme Court issued per curiam opinions in two habeas cases: Jenkins v. Hutton and Virginia v. LeBlanc. In today’s episode, we will be discussing the opinions in both cases. -- Jenkins v. Hutton -- More than thirty years ago, an Ohio jury convicted Percy Hutton of aggravated murder, attempted murder, and kidnaping. The jury findings included aggravating circumstances that permitted imposition of the death penalty or life imprisonment. During the penalty phase of the proceedings, the jury was instructed that it could recommend a death sentence only if it unanimously found that the State had “prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances, of which [Hutton] was found guilty, outweigh[ed] the [mitigating factors].” The jury recommended death, the trial court accepted that recommendation, and Hutton’s death sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. He eventually filed a habeas petition, arguing that the trial court denied him due process because it failed to tell the penalty phase jurors that, when weighing aggravating mitigating factors, they could consider only the two aggravating factors they had found during the guilt phase of the trial. As Hutton had not objected to the jury instructions at trial or raised this issue on direct appeal, the district court dismissed his habeas petition on grounds of procedural default. A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, however, concluding that it could excuse the procedural default in the interests of avoiding a miscarriage of justice. Hutton, the Sixth Circuit argued, had “show[n] by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable jury would have found [him] eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law.” -- In a per curiam opinion issued on June 19, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. The Sixth Circuit erred in reaching the merits of Hutton’s claim, the Court concluded, because to overcome a procedural default on fundamental miscarriage of justice grounds the focus should be on whether a properly instructed jury could have recommended death, not simply whether any alleged error might have affected the jury’s verdict. -- Virginia v. LeBlanc -- In 1999, Dennis LeBlanc, who was then 16, raped a 62-year-old woman and was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2003 by a Virginia court. Although Virginia had abolished parole, the state had replaced it with a “geriatric release” program for the conditional release of older inmates under some circumstances. In 2010, however, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida that the Eighth Amendment prohibits juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses from being sentenced to life without parole. Although states would not be required to guarantee eventual freedom to nonhomicide juvenile inmates, the Court explained, they must still offer juvenile offenders “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Invoking the Graham decision, LeBlanc filed a motion in Virginia state court to vacate his sentence. The state court denied relief, relying upon the Virginia Supreme Court’s prior decision in Angel v. Commonwealth, which had concluded that Virginia’s geriatric release program satisfied Graham’s parole requirement for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The Virginia Supreme Court declined review of LeBlanc’s case and he then filed a federal habeas petition arguing that the Virginia courts’ position regarding geriatric release and Graham had fundamentally misapplied federal law. The district court agreed and granted relief. A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, and Virginia sought certiorari. -- In a per curiam opinion issued on June 12, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit, concluding that the Virginia courts had not applied the Graham rule unreasonably. To satisfy the habeas standard, the Supreme Court noted, the ruling in question must be “objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” And it was not objectively unreasonable, the Court indicated, for the state courts to conclude that, because the geriatric release program employed normal parole factors, it satisfied Graham’s requirement that juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide crime have a meaningful opportunity to receive parole. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion. -- And now, to discuss the cases, we have Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney for the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.

On April 3, 2017, the Supreme Court decided McLane Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. In 2008, Damiana Ochoa filed a sex discrimination charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against her former employer McLane Co., Inc., a supply-chain services company, when she failed a physical evaluation three times after returning from maternity leave. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) launched an investigation into Ochoa’s charge, but McLane declined the EEOC’s request for “pedigree information,” meaning names, Social Security numbers, addresses, and telephone numbers of those employees who had taken the physical evaluation. The EEOC then expanded its investigation into McLane’s operations nationwide and possible age discrimination, issuing subpoenas to McLane for pedigree information regarding these matters too. McLane refused to provide this information as well, and the EEOC then filed actions in federal district court to enforce the subpoenas issued regarding both Ochoa’s charge and the EEOC’s own age discrimination charge. The District Court quashed the subpoenas, finding the pedigree information irrelevant to the charges, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying a plenary or “de novo” standard of review, reversed. Other U.S. Courts of Appeals, however, apply a more deferential “abuse of discretion” standard in such situations, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split among the Courts of Appeals. -- By a vote of 7-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, the court held that a district court’s decision whether to enforce or quash a subpoena issued by the EEOC should be reviewed for abuse of discretion, not de novo. Justice Sotomayor’s opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kagan, Kennedy, and Thomas. Justice Ginsburg filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Ellen Springer, an Associate at Baker Botts, LLP.

In June 2017, the Supreme Court decided two cases involving habeas corpus petitions filed by state prisoners challenging the validity of their convictions and/or sentences: Davila v. Davis and McWilliams v. Dunn. -- The petition in Davila v. Davis involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Erick Davila was convicted in a Texas court of capital murder. Although his trial attorney had objected to one of the court’s jury instructions on intent, the court had overruled the objection. On direct appeal his appellate counsel raised various claims, but did not challenge the jury instruction ruling. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the state’s highest criminal court, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. Davila then initiated a collateral attack on his conviction: he sought habeas relief in state court, but his attorney challenged neither the jury instruction ruling nor the failure of his appellate counsel to raise the alleged instructional error on direct appeal. Texas’ highest criminal court ultimately denied relief and the U.S. Supreme Court again denied cert. Davila next raised a habeas claim in federal court, alleging that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the allegedly erroneous jury instruction on direct appeal. Although his failure to have raised that claim in his state habeas petition ordinarily constituted a fatal procedural default, Davila argued for an exception on the grounds that the failure was itself the result of ineffective assistance by his state habeas counsel. The federal district court denied Davila’s petition and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability for further review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, to consider whether the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel provided cause to excuse the procedural default. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel does not provide cause to excuse the procedural default of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Justice Thomas’ majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. -- The petition in McWilliams v. Dunn involved the scope of a state’s duty, identified by the Supreme Court in its 1985 decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, to provide an indigent defendant with access to a mental health expert who is sufficiently available to the defense, and independent from the prosecution, to effectively “assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” In 1986, James McWilliams, Jr. was convicted by an Alabama jury of capital murder. Although a state commission, convened after McWilliams’s counsel requested a psychiatric evaluation, found that he was competent to stand trial and had not been suffering from mental illness at the time of his alleged crime, his counsel had also asked for neurological and neuropsychological testing while the parties awaited sentencing. The examining doctor concluded that McWilliams had some genuine neuropsychological problems, and his attorney also received various updated mental health records just before the sentencing hearing convened. Although the attorney sought a continuance and the assistance of someone with psychological expertise to evaluate this new material, the trial court denied those requests and sentenced McWilliams to death. Alabama’s appellate courts affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal, and his effort to obtain state postconviction relief also failed. On federal habeas review, the district court found that the requirements described in Ake had been satisfied and denied McWilliams relief. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals’ determination that McWilliams got all the assistance to which Ake entitled him was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” under the federal habeas statute. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court indicated that “Alabama’s provision of mental health assistance fell [] dramatically short of what Ake requires” and therefore concluded that the Alabama court decision affirming McWilliams’s conviction and sentence was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Although the Eleventh Circuit had alternatively held that any error by the Alabama courts lacked the “substantial and injurious effect or influence” required to warrant a grant of habeas relief, the Supreme Court indicated that the Eleventh Circuit should reconsider on remand “whether access to the type of meaningful assistance in evaluating, preparing, and presenting the defense that Ake requires would have mattered” to the outcome of McWilliams’s case. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined. -- And now, to discuss the cases, we have Joseph Tartakovsy, Deputy Solicitor General for the State of Nevada.

On June 5, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Kokesh v. Securities and Exchange Commission. In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) alleged that Charles Kokesh had violated various securities laws by concealing the misappropriation of roughly $35 million in various development ventures dating back as far as 1995. Since the 1970s, the SEC has ordered disgorgement in addition to monetary civil penalties in its enforcement proceedings. In effect, the violator must not only pay monetary civil penalties, but also “disgorge” the profit he or she gained by the unlawful action. Under 28 U. S. C. §2462, however, a five-year limitations period applies to “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty or forfeiture” when the SEC seeks monetary civil penalties. In Kokesh’s case, the District Court concluded that the five-year limitations period did not apply to disgorgement. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that disgorgement was neither a penalty nor a forfeiture within the meaning of section 2462. As a result Kokesh could be required to disgorge the full $35 million, with interest. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tenth Circuit. In an opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, a unanimous Court held that disgorgement, as it is applied in SEC enforcement proceedings, operates as a penalty under section 2462. Thus, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Janet Galeria, who is Senior Counsel for Litigation for the US Chamber Litigation Center at the US Chamber of Commerce.

On May 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC, a dispute over the proper venue for a patent infringement suit. Section 1400(b) of the patent venue statute states in relevant part that a civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district “where the defendant resides.” In the 1957 case Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of section 1400(b) a domestic corporation “resides” only in its State of incorporation--a narrower understanding of corporate “residence” than that applicable under section 1391 of the general venue statute. Under section 1391, a corporate defendant is typically deemed to reside in any judicial district where it is subject to the court’s “personal jurisdiction” with respect to the civil action in question. -- TC Heartland LLC (Heartland) is organized under Indiana law and headquartered there. Kraft Food Brands LLC (Kraft) sued Heartland in federal district court in Delaware (where Kraft is organized), alleging that products Heartland shipped to Delaware infringed on Kraft’s patents for similar products. Heartland moved to dismiss the claim or transfer venue to Indiana, arguing that it did not reside in Delaware for purposes of section 1400(b). The district court rejected these arguments and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied mandamus relief, because its circuit precedent had concluded that more recent statutory amendments to section 1391 had effectively superseded the Fourco interpretation of “reside” in section 1400(b) and thus the broader understanding expressed in section 1391 now applied to section 1400(b) too. -- By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the amendments to section 1391 did not modify the meaning of section 1400(b) as interpreted in Fourco; as applied to domestic corporations, “residence” for purposes of section 1400(b) still refers only to the state of incorporation. All other members of the Court joined in Justice Thomas’ opinion except Justice Gorsuch, who took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have J. Devlin Hartline, who is Director, Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) and Adjunct Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University.

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 (BPCIA) provides an abbreviated pathway for obtaining Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of a drug that is biosimilar to an already licensed biological product. Among other things, BPCIA provisions require applicants for approval of a new biosimilar to provide the manufacturer of the already licensed product with a notice of commercial marketing and certain information about the biosimilar. Failure to comply permits the manufacturer to pursue infringement litigation against the applicant on an accelerated basis. -- Amgen claims to hold patents on methods of manufacturing and using filgrastim--a biologic used to stimulate the production of white blood cells--and markets one such product, Neupogen. Sandoz sought FDA approval to market a biosimilar called Zarxio. When the FDA accepted Sandoz’s application for review, Sandoz notified Amgen that Sandoz intended to market Zarxio upon receipt of FDA approval. Sandoz also indicated that it would not share with Amgen the relevant application and manufacturing information as required by the BPCIA and invited Amgen immediately to sue for infringement. Amgen did so, and further asserted claims for “unlawful” conduct in violation of California’s unfair competition law. The basis for the latter claims was Sandoz’s alleged failure to comply with the BPCIA requirements that Sandoz (a) share the application and manufacturing information pertaining to Zarxio, and (b) provide a notice of commercial marketing prior to obtaining FDA licensure. Amgen sought injunctive relief in federal district court to enforce both requirements against Sandoz, which counterclaimed for declaratory judgments that Amgen’s patent was invalid and not infringed, and that Sandoz had not violated the BPCIA. -- While the litigation was pending, the FDA licensed Zarxio, and Sandoz provided Amgen with further notice of commercial marketing. The district court thereafter granted partial judgment in favor of Sandoz on its BPCIA counterclaims and dismissed Amgen’s unfair competition claims with prejudice. A divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the case. The Federal Circuit held that Sandoz had not violated the BPCIA disclosure requirements and that Amgen could not pursue state law remedies to enforce the BPCIA. The court also held that an applicant may provide effective notice of commercial market only after FDA licensure and therefore enjoined Sandoz from marketing Zarxio until 180 days passed after Sandoz’s second notice. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court unanimously vacated in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Federal Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the BPCIA’s requirement on sharing application and marketing information is not enforceable by an injunction under federal law, but that the Federal Circuit should determine on remand whether a state-law injunction is available. The Supreme Court further held that an applicant may provide the requisite notice of commercial marketing before obtaining FDA licensure; therefore Sandoz fully complied with this requirement through its initial notice, the Federal Circuit erred in enjoining Sandoz from marketing Zarxio on this basis, and Amgen’s state law unfair competition claim predicated on the view that the BPCIA forbids pre-licensure notice must fail. Justice Breyer issued a concurring opinion. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Erika Lietzan, who is Associate Professor of Law at the University of Missouri School of Law.

On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court decided California Public Employees’ Retirement System v. ANZ Securities. Between 2007 and 2008, Lehman Brothers Holdings raised capital through a number of public securities offerings. California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) purchased some of these securities. In 2008, a putative class action alleging federal securities law violations was filed against respondents--various financial firms involved in underwriting the offerings--in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Because the complaint was filed on behalf of all persons who purchased the identified securities, petitioner CalPERS fell within the putative class. In 2011, however, CalPERS filed a separate action, alleging identical violations against respondent firms in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. That suit was then transferred and consolidated with other related litigation in the Southern District of New York. The New York class action then settled, but CalPERS opted out of the settlement. Respondents thereafter moved to dismiss CalPERS’ separate suit based on Securities Act language providing that “[i]n no event shall any such action be brought … more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public,” the CalPERS suit having fallen outside the three-year limit. CalPERS argued that the time limit was equitably tolled during the pendency of the class action, but the district court rejected the claim and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. -- By a vote of 5-4, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that CalPERS’ untimely filing of its individual complaint more than three years after the relevant securities offering was grounds for dismissal. The three-year limitation in the Securities Act, the Court indicated, is a “statute of repose” and therefore not subject to equitable tolling. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Mark Chenoweth, who is General Counsel for the Washington Legal Foundation.

On June 12, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, formerly known as Lynch v. Morales-Santana. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides for derivative acquisition of U.S. citizenship from birth, by a child born abroad, when one parent is a U.S. citizen and the other is not. At the relevant time here, the INA required the U.S.-citizen parent to have ten years’ physical presence in the United States prior to the child’s birth, at least five of which were after attaining age 14. Although the rule applies in full to unwed U.S.-citizen fathers, there is an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother, whose citizenship can be transmitted to a child born abroad if she has lived continuously in the United States for just one year prior to the child’s birth. -- Morales-Santana, who was born in the Dominican Republic, asserted U.S. citizenship from birth based on the citizenship of his father--but his father had fallen 20 days short of satisfying the requirement of five years’ physical presence after attaining age 14. In 2000, the government sought to remove Morales-Santana as a result of several criminal convictions, classifying him as alien rather than citizen because of his father’s failure to satisfy the full physical presence requirement. The immigration judge rejected Morales-Santana’s citizenship claim and ordered him removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his subsequent motion to reopen proceedings on the claim that the INA’s gender-based rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause--but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding the differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers unconstitutional and acknowledging Morales-Santana’s U.S. citizenship. -- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and by a vote of 8-0, affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Second Circuit, and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that (1) the gender line Congress drew in the INA, creating an exception for an unwed U.S.-citizen mother but not for such a father, to the physical-presence requirement, violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause as the Second Circuit had determined; but (2) the remedial course that Congress would most likely have chosen if apprised of this constitutional infirmity would have been not a broader application of the one-year exception but rather preservation of the five-year general rule; thus the Court cannot grant the relief Morales-Santana seeks. Going forward it falls to Congress to select a uniform prescription that neither favors nor disadvantages any person on the basis of gender, but in the interim the five-year requirement applies prospectively to children of unwed U.S.-citizen mothers just as with such fathers. -- Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part, in which Justice Alito joined. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Curt Levey, who is President, Committee for Justice; Legal Affairs Fellow, Freedom Works.

On June 22, 2017, the Supreme Court decided Maslenjak v. United States. At the close of the Bosnian civil war, Divna Maslenjak sought refugee status for herself and her family in the U.S. due to fear of persecution regarding their Serbian identity in modern-day Bosnia and the threat of reprisal against her husband, who she claimed had evaded military conscription in the Bosnian Serb militia. After the family was granted refugee status and Maslenjak became a U.S. citizen, a U.S. court convicted Maslenjak’s husband, Ratko, on two counts of falsifying claims regarding Serbian military service on U.S. government documents, since Ratko had in fact served in the Serbian military. When Ratko applied for asylum to avoid deportation, Divna Maslenjak admitted to lying about her husband’s military service and was charged with two counts of naturalization fraud. At her trial, jurors were told that a naturalization fraud conviction could be carried out for false claims in Maslenjak’s application process, even if the claims did not affect whether she was approved. Convicted on both counts, Divna Maslenjack was stripped of her citizenship. The Sixth Circuit affirmed her conviction. -- By a vote of 9-0, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court held that (1) the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1425(a) -- which prohibits "procur[ing], contrary to law, the naturalization of any person" -- makes clear that, to secure a conviction, the federal government must establish that the defendant's illegal act played a role in her acquisition of citizenship; (2) when the underlying illegality alleged in a Section 1425(a) prosecution is a false statement to government officials, a jury must decide whether the false statement so altered the naturalization process as to have influenced an award of citizenship; and (3) measured against this analysis, the jury instructions in this case were in error, and the government's assertion that any instructional error was harmless if left for resolution on remand. Justice Kagan’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. Justice Gorsuch filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Thomas joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. -- And now, to discuss the case, we have Vikrant P. Reddy, who is Senior Research Fellow at the Charles Koch Institute.