SCOTUScast

On December 4, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. This case arose out of a dispute over the validity of a patent covering a product used to reduce the likelihood of chemotherapy-induced nausea and vomiting. At issue in this case is whether agreements entered into by Helsinn more than one year prior to filing for patent protection put the invention “on sale” and thus would invalidate the patent. Although the meaning of “on sale” in the Patent Act was long believed to be settled, the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA) made changes to the statutory provisions that include the “on sale” bar. The question for the Supreme Court is whether these changes to the statute change the previous understanding of the term “on sale.”In April 2001, Helsinn entered into two agreements with MGI Pharma. Although these agreements were announced in a press release, specific information about the products, like dosing formulations, were omitted. In 2003, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application covering the product. Three patents arose from this provisional patent application prior to the enactment of the AIA; however, one patent was subject to the new provisions of the AIA.In 2011, Teva sought FDA approval to make a generic version of the patented product. Helsinn sued Teva for patent infringement based on this ANDA filing. Teva argued that the patent was invalid because Helsinn’s agreements with MGI put the product “on sale” before the relevant date. The district court rejected Teva’s argument, concluding that the AIA had changed the meaning of “on sale” to require the invention be made public by the sale. Because the dosing information was not provided in the press release regarding the agreements, the district court concluded the agreements did not make the invention public and there was no “on sale” bar. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that inventions are made available to the public whenever there is a commercial offer for sale and that the sale is public even when the details of the invention are not disclosed to the public by the sale. Thus, the “on sale” bar applied to Helsinn’s patent. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether under the AIA, an inventor’s sale of an invention to a third party that is obligated to keep the invention confidential qualifies as prior art for purposes of determining the patentability of the invention.To the discuss the case, we have Kristen Osenga, Professor of Law at University of Richmond School of Law.

On November 28, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Timbs v. Indiana, a case involving the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the concept of “incorporation” against the states.In May 2013, Tyson Timbs was apprehended en route to a controlled drug purchase, having previously purchased about $400 worth of heroin from undercover police officers. He ultimately pled guilty to felony counts of drug dealing and conspiracy to commit theft, and was sentenced to six years of imprisonment (with five suspended to probation). Timbs also had to pay roughly $1,200 in police costs and related fees. The State of Indiana then sought forfeiture of Timbs’ Land Rover, which he had used $42,000 of his late father’s life insurance proceeds to purchase, but had driven to buy and transport heroin. Lower courts ordered the vehicle released to Timbs, concluding that forfeiture of the Land Rover would impose an excessive fine in violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, reinstated the forfeiture on the grounds that the U.S. Supreme Court had never incorporated the excessive fine clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.The U.S. Supreme Court thereafter granted certiorari to address that issue: whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.To the discuss the case, we have Christopher Green, Associate Professor of Law and H.L.A. Hart Scholar in Law and Philosophy at University of Mississippi School of Law.

On October 9, 2018, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Stokeling v. United States and the consolidated cases United States v. Stitt and United States v. Sims, all disputes that involve the federal Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).ACCA imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum prison sentence on any federal firearms offender who has three or more convictions for a “violent” felony or serious drug offense. In determining whether any given predicate felony conviction qualifies as “violent,” federal courts apply a “categorical” approach that looks only to the elements of the predicate offense and not the underlying facts. If the elements include “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” the conviction qualifies as a violent felony.In Stokeling v. United States, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Stokeling’s Florida conviction for “robbery by sudden snatching” categorically qualified as a violent felony. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether that analysis holds when the state offense includes as an element the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance,” and state appellate courts have required only slight force to satisfy that element.In United States v. Stitt, consolidated with United States v. Sims, both defendants persuaded federal courts of appeals--the Sixth Circuit for Stitt and the Eighth Circuit for Sims--that their sentences were improperly enhanced because predicate burglary convictions under the laws of Tennessee and Arkansas, respectively, involved elements categorically broader than the generic burglary encompassed by ACCA. ACCA deems burglary a violent felony, but takes a generic view of burglary that may be narrower than some state burglary laws. The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases and granted certiorari to consider whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” for purposes of ACCA.To the discuss the case, we have Luke Milligan, Professor of Law at the University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.

On October 31, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Jam v. International Finance Corporation, a case involving the scope of the International Organizations Immunities Act.The International Finance Group (IFC) is an international organization which provides loans to projects in developing countries that do not have the necessary private capital for projects. Under the International Organizations Immunities Act (IOIA), the IFC is an organization designated to “enjoy the same immunity from suit … as is enjoyed by foreign governments, except to the extent that such organizations may expressly waive their immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.” The IFC funded the construction of the Tata Mundra Power Plant in Gujarat, India, with a proviso that the plant had to follow an Environmental and Social Action Plan to protect the surrounding community; failure to follow the Plan would result in a loss of financial support. The power plant did not follow the Plan, but the IFC did not revoke funding. Members of the surrounding community sued the IFC in district court, claiming that the IFC is responsible for their injuries because it continued funding the project despite the plant’s clear failure to follow the Environmental and Social Action Plan. The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the IFC was immune from suit. The petitioners appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, which agreed with the district court. The US Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the International Organizations Immunities Act—which affords international organizations the “same immunity” from suit that foreign governments have, 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b)—confers the same immunity on such organizations as foreign governments have under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11.To the discuss the case, we have Mike Ramsey, Professor of Law at University of San Diego School of Law.

On October 10, 2018, the Supreme Court heard argument in Nielsen v. Preap, a case involving the exemption of a criminal alien from mandatory detention without bond due to a delay in arrest after release from criminal custody. As codified, § 1226(c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”) provides for the mandatory detention of criminal aliens “when [they are] released” from criminal custody, and for the holding of these aliens without bond. The three plaintiffs in this case are lawful permanent residents who have committed crimes that could lead to their removal from the United States but after serving their criminal sentence were released and returned to their families and communities in the United States; however, years later, each was arrested by immigration authorities and detained without bond hearings under § 1226(c). The plaintiffs filed a class action petition for habeas relief in district court arguing that since they were not detained “when...released” from criminal custody, they are not subject to mandatory detention under § 1226(c). The district court granted their motion for class certification, issued a preliminary injunction requiring the government to provide all class members with bond hearings under § 1226(a), and concluded that under § 1226(c) aliens can be held without bound only if taken into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody, not if there is a lengthy gap after their release. The government appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the statute “does not suggest that immigration officials lose authority if they delay.” The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s class certification order and preliminary injunction, and held that the mandatory detention provision of § 1226(c) applies only to those criminal aliens detained promptly after their release from criminal custody, not to those detained long after. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether a criminal alien becomes exempt from mandatory detention under § 1226(c) if, after the alien is released from criminal custody, the Department of Homeland Security does not take him into immigration custody immediately. To the discuss the case, we have Kent Scheidegger, Legal Director & General Counsel, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation. As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues. All opinions are those of the speaker.

On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case considering the forced subsidizing of unions by public employees, even if they choose not to join the union or strongly disagree with many positions the union takes in collective bargaining. Under Illinois law, public employees are permitted to unionize; and if a majority of employees in a particular bargaining union vote to unionize, then that union is designated as the exclusive representative of all the employees in collective bargaining, even those members who choose not to join the union. Non-members are required to pay an “agency fee,” which is a percentage of the full union dues and covers union expenses “germane” to the union’s collective bargaining activities, but cannot cover any political or ideological projects sponsored by the union. Mark Janus works at the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. The employees in his unit are represented by American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31 (“the union”). Janus did not join the union because he opposes many of its positions, including those taken in collective bargaining, but was required to pay 78.06% of full union dues as an “agency fee”--a fee resulting in a payment of $44.58 per month, and about $535 per year. Janus and two other state employees joined a lawsuit brought by the Governor of Illinois against the union in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the statutory imposition of agency fees was unconstitutional. The District Court dismissed the Governor for lack of standing, but proceeded to reject the claims of Janus and the other employees on the merits, finding their challenge foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconsider whether public-sector agency-fee arrangements are constitutional. By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Alito, the Court overruled Abood and held that state extraction of agency fees from nonconsenting public-sector employees violates the First Amendment; thus states and public-sector unions may no longer extract agency fees from nonconsenting employees. Justice Alito’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Gorsuch. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan also filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor. To discuss the case, we have Raymond LaJeunesse, Vice President & Legal Director, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, FL, a case involving a claim of retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment. Fane Lozman moved to Riviera Beach, FL in 2006, where he lived on a floating home in the Riviera Beach Marina--a part of the city designated for redevelopment under the City’s new redevelopment plan that would use eminent domain to revitalize the waterfront. After hearing news of the plan, Lozman became an “outspoken critic,” and filed suit against the City in June 2006 after a special City Council emergency meeting to push through the redevelopment plan before the Governor of Florida signed a bill into law that would prohibit the use of eminent domain for private development. Later at a public City Council meeting in November 2006, Lozman began to discuss the arrest of a former county official during the public comments portion of the meeting. He was interrupted by a member of the City Council, who, after exchanging words with Lozman, called a city police officer to dismiss Lozman from the podium. Lozman refused to leave the podium without finishing his comments, the police officer warned him that he would be arrested if he did not comply, and, upon the continuance of his comments, Lozman was arrested for disorderly conduct and resisting arrest without violence (charges later dismissed). In 2008, Lozman filed suit in federal district court against the City of Riviera Beach, claiming that his arrest had constituted unlawful retaliation by the City due to Lozman’s earlier opposition to the redevelopment plan. The jury found that the arrest had been supported by probable cause, which the District Court concluded must defeat Lozman’s First Amendment claim of retaliatory arrest. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that judgment, but the Supreme Court then granted certiorari to address whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment claim for retaliatory arrest.By a vote of 8-1, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that the existence of probable cause for Lozman’s arrest for disrupting a city council meeting did not bar his First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim under the circumstances of this case. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion. To discuss the case, we have Lisa Soronen, Executive Director of the State & Local Legal Center.

On June 11, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Washington v. United States, a case considering off-reservation fishing rights of multiple Native American Tribes in the State of Washington. The 1854-1855 Stevens Treaties were a series of treaties between several Native American Tribes and the State of Washington. As part of these treaties, the Tribes relinquished land, watersheds, and offshore waters adjacent to a particular area, “Case Area,” in exchange for guaranteed off-reservation fishing rights. In 2001, twenty-one tribes and the United States complained in federal district court that the State had been building and maintaining culverts that impeded the transit of mature and juvenile salmon between the sea and their spawning grounds. In 2007, the district court issued an injunction requiring the State to correct these culverts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address (1) whether a treaty “right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations ... in common with all citizens” guaranteed “that the number of fish would always be sufficient to provide a ‘moderate living’ to the tribes”; (2) whether the district court erred in dismissing the state's equitable defenses against the federal government where the federal government signed these treaties in the 1850s, for decades told the state to design culverts a particular way, and then filed suit in 2001 claiming that the culvert design it provided violates the treaties it signed; and (3) whether the district court’s injunction violates federalism and comity principles by requiring Washington to replace hundreds of culverts, at a cost of several billion dollars, when many of the replacements will have no impact on salmon, and plaintiffs showed no clear connection between culvert replacement and tribal fisheries.In a per curiam opinion, an equally divided Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit. To discuss the case, we have Lance Sorenson, Olin-Darling Fellow in Constitutional Law at Stanford Law School.

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court decided Gill v. Whitford, a case considering claims of partisan gerrymandering. In Wisconsin’s 2010 elections, Republicans won the governorship and acquired control of the state senate. In 2011, pursuant to the state constitution’s requirement that the legislature must redraw the boundaries of its districts following each census, the Wisconsin legislature adopted a redistricting plan, Act 43, for state legislative districts. With Act 43 in effect Republicans expanded their legislative control in subsequent elections, reportedly winning 60 of 99 seats in the State Assembly with 48.6% of the statewide two-party vote in 2012, and 63 of 99 seats with 52% of the statewide two-party vote in 2014. In 2015 twelve Wisconsin voters sued in federal court, alleging that Act 43 constituted a statewide partisan gerrymander in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment were denied, and following trial a divided three-judge district court panel invalidated Act 43 statewide. Act 43, the majority concluded, impermissibly burdened the representational rights of Democratic voters by impeding their ability to translate their votes into legislative seats even when Republicans were in an electoral minority. The court enjoined further use of Act 43 and ordered that a remedial redistricting plan be enacted, but the United States Supreme Court stayed that judgment pending resolution of this appeal.By a vote of 9-0, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that the plaintiffs--Wisconsin Democratic voters who rested their claim of unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering on statewide injury--had failed to demonstrate Article III standing. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined except as to Part III. Justice Kagan filed a concurring opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, which was joined by Justice Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have David Casazza, Associate at Gibson Dunn.

On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court decided McCoy v. Louisiana, a case considering whether defense counsel may--against the defendant’s express wishes--concede his client’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty.In 2008, Robert McCoy was indicted on three counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of the mother, stepfather, and son of his estranged wife. McCoy pleaded not guilty, maintaining that he was out of state at the time of the murder. In 2010, his relationship with the court-appointed public defender broke down, and in March 2010 Larry English became McCoy’s defense attorney. English concluded that the evidence against McCoy was overwhelming and told McCoy that he would concede McCoy’s guilt in an effort to avoid the death penalty; McCoy adamantly opposed English’s strategy. At trial, English nevertheless indicated repeatedly to the jury that McCoy had caused the victims’ deaths and pleaded for mercy. McCoy protested unsuccessfully to the trial judge and was permitted to testify to his innocence, but was ultimately convicted and sentenced to death. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that defense counsel had authority to concede guilt over McCoy’s objection as a strategy to avoid a death sentence. In light of a division of opinion among state courts of last resort on whether it is unconstitutional to allow defense counsel to concede guilt over the defendant’s intransigent and unambiguous objection, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. By a vote of 6-3, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Louisiana Supreme Court and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose the fundamental objective of his defense and insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experience-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the Chief Justice, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch. To discuss the case, we have Jay Schweikert, Policy Analyst with the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.