BlueDot Narrated

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses. Original text: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK614029/ Author(s): Aishani Aatresh, Nicole Lurie, and Richard Hatchett. A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses. Original Text: https://press.asimov.com/articles/antiviralsAuthor(s): Brian WangA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.DNA synthesis represents the primary interface between the digital and physical worlds when it comes to synthetic biology - the point at which potentially hazardous information could become an actually dangerous piece of biological material. No national government legally mandates the screening of DNA synthesis orders, although members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium voluntarily screen DNA synthesis orders and customers. This article briefly summarises the problem and recommends five potential policy areas for regulation.Original text: https://ifp.org/preventing-the-misuse-of-dna-synthesis/Author(s): Bridget Williams and Rowan KaneA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.This article proposes four key actions that can be taken to prevent outbreaks from zoonotic spillover: protecting tropical forests, regulating or banning live wildlife markets, improving biosecurity for farmed animals, and improving health and economic security, particularly in hotspots for disease emergence. For those digging deeper into zoonotic spillover for this week's exercise, you will find the original paper in the optional resources section.Original text: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-022-01312-y#:~:text=faces%20another%20pandemic.-,Four%20actions,-The%20risk%20ofAuthor(s): Neil M. Vora, Lee Hannah and Susan Lieberman et al.A podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.This page gives a brief overview of the NIH's framework for guiding funding decisions on potentially risky research involving enhanced potential pandemic pathogens (ePPPs). Following the release of a report, 'Proposed Biosecurity Oversight Framework For The Future of Science' in early 2023, the US Government is reviewing the process for the oversight of ePPP research. This report and a response to it can be found in the optional resources section.Original text:https://www.nih.gov/news-events/research-involving-potential-pandemic-pathogensAuthor(s):National Institutes of HealthA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.This Wikipedia article provides an overview of the Biological Weapons Convention, a disarmament treaty that bans the development, production, acquisition, transfer, stockpiling and use of biological weapons. Despite 185 states being party to the treaty, there are substantial challenges including a lack of funding and difficulty verifying compliance.Original text:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_Weapons_ConventionAuthor(s): WikipediaA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.This paper proposes two categories of AI models that could have impacts on biosecurity in different ways: large language models (LLMs) and biological design tools (BDTs). Overall, the author suggests that LLMs could lower barriers to biological misuse, while BDTs could expand the capabilities of sophisticated actors to create pandemic pathogens worse than anything seen to date. The paper also provides suggestions for mitigating these risks.Original text:https://arxiv.org/abs/2306.13952Author(s):Jonas B. SandbrinkA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.There is a tension in the life sciences between scientific transparency and the need for secrecy to protect national or global security. This report introduces the term 'dual-use research of concern (DURC)' and covers debates from the last two decades over what information should be published.Original text:https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK458495/Author(s): US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and MedicineA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.This article introduces a range of strategies to reduce pandemic risk whilst drawing parallels to fire-fighting interventions. It argues that pandemic prevention, like fire-fighting, needs a comprehensive approach that includes prevention, early detection, and both passive and active protection. It underscores that proactive pandemic preparedness measures are significantly less costly, both in financial terms and lives lost, compared to reactive responses. It's worth highlighting the need for global cooperation to implement suggested interventions, given the rapid and borderless nature of pandemics.Original text:https://worksinprogress.co/issue/pandemic-prevention-as-fire-fightingAuthor(s):Richard WilliamsonA podcast by BlueDot Impact.

Audio versions of blogs and papers from BlueDot courses.As synthetic biology techniques develop and the barriers to entry become lower, we are increasingly seeing the development of privately-operated biological labs. These often enforce less stringent safety standards than those in academia, and can fall through the cracks of regulatory oversight. This article focuses on a recent example in California, emphasising the need for a unified regulatory system and increased federal oversight for these labs, especially those working with dangerous pathogens.Original text:https://time.com/6309643/invisible-biolabs/Author(s):Dan Greene and Jassi Pannu and Allison BerkeA podcast by BlueDot Impact.