The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

Mark Linsenmayer, Wes Alwan, Seth Paskin, Dylan Casey
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Aug 12, 2019 • 50min

Ep. 223: Guest Ned Block on Consciousness (Part One)

The climax and denouement of our summer philosophy of mind series: Ned Block visits to fill in the gaps about functionalism and attributing consciousness to machines and discuss essays from Blockheads (2019), focusing here on Brian McLaughlin’s “Could an Android be Sentient?” Please support PEL!
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Aug 5, 2019 • 52min

Ep. 222: Debating Functionalism (Block, Chalmers) (Part Two)

Continuing on Ned Block's "Troubles with Functionalism" (1978) and David Chalmers's "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" (1995). What would it be like to be halfway between person and machine? If you think the machine can't have consciousness, then Chalmers thinks that there's no sensible way to describe such an experience, ergo the machine (if functionally equivalent to the person) must have consciousness after all. Listen to part one first, or get the unbroken, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL! End song: "Machine" by Helen Money as interviewed on Nakedly Examined Music #101.  
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Jul 29, 2019 • 49min

Ep. 222: Debating Functionalism (Block, Chalmers) (Part One)

On Ned Block's "Troubles with Functionalism" (1978) and David Chalmers's "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" (1995). If mental states are functional states, there couldn't be zombies. Yet Block claims that there could be zombies: for example, a functional duplicate of you whose components are actually citizens of China obeying algorithmic rules. Even if the resulting system acts like you, it obviously isn't conscious. Chalmers argues that you'd then need to explain the experiences of a creature half way between you and the zombie, but you can't, so Block's argument doesn't work and functionalism is left standing. What do you think? Do you hate weird thought experiments like these? Please support PEL!  
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Jul 23, 2019 • 1h 14min

PEL Presents PMP#3: CONFORM w/ Yakov Smirnoff

Is media trying to brainwash us into being ALL THE SAME? Are the excesses of the mob scaring us into conformity? Mark, Erica, and Brian muse on cultural homogenization and are joined by comedian Dr. Yakov Smirnoff to talk about growing up in a repressive society and the shadow of political correctness over comedy. For more about this podcast, see prettymuchpop.com. Hear bonus content for this episode, and more episodes in advance, at patreon.com/prettymuchpop. This podcast is curated by openculture.com and The Partially Examined Life Podcast Network.
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Jul 22, 2019 • 1h 10min

Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part Two)

Continuing on functionalism with David M. Armstrong’s "The Causal Theory of the Mind" (1981). Your four hosts start afresh the day after Part One on Putnam to discuss this version of functionalism that is supposed to clear the way for the scientific identification of mental states with brain states. Mental states are defined by their causal relations with other states and with behavior, and the content of a mental state is exhausted by its intentional object, e.g. the content of a perception is the thing you're perceiving which (normally) causes the perception. So what about things like colors and sounds that aren't really out in the world? Can functionalism explain how these seem to us? Listen to part one first or get the full, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL! End song: "Pain Makes You Beautiful" by Jeff Heiskell's JudyBats, as featured on Nakedly Examined Music #5.
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Jul 15, 2019 • 50min

Ep. 221: Functionalist Theories of Mind (Putnam, Armstrong) (Part One)

On Hilary Putnam's "The Nature of Mental States" (1973). What is the mind? Functionalist theories identify the mental with not with the brain exactly, but with something the brain does. So some other creature without a brain (maybe a computer) might be able to do that same thing if it could duplicate the structure of what our brains do. Is this a satisfying account of the mind? Please support PEL!
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Jul 9, 2019 • 44min

PEL Presents PMP#1: Pop Culture vs. High Culture

What is pop culture? Does it make sense to distinguish it from high culture, or can something be both? Welcome to this new pop culture podcast hosted by Mark Linsenmayer, Erica Spyres, and Brian Hirt. This episode also features Tyler Hislop, our editor. For more, see prettymuchpop.com. Get involved from the start at patreon.com/prettymuchpop. We'll solicit your input for our episodes, release them early for supporters, and provide bonus content with every episode; there's already some waiting for you now. Presented by openculture.com and the Partially Examined Life podcast network. End song: "High Rollin' Cult" written by Mark just for this release, featuring Erica. Theme music by Mark and Erica. PMP logo by Ken Gerber.  
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Jul 5, 2019 • 1h 2min

Ep. 220: 10-Year Retrospective of The Partially Examined Life

Mark, Seth, Dylan, and Wes reflect on the changing state of podcasting and public philosophy over the last decade, how our goals and interests have changed since we started we started. Why don't colleges pay their faculty to educate the public through regular, broadcasted conversations like ours? If you think we're snarky, take a look at actual philosophy faculty! Should we continue to do more literature, poetry, and other topics that are not strictly philosophy? Also, the stalled state of the PEL book. Thanks so much to each and every Partially Examined Life listener for making it worth our time to do this! End song: "High Rollin' Cult" by Mark Lint with Erica Spyres, celebrating a new attempt to capture the fun of the beginning of PEL: Pretty Much Pop.
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Jul 1, 2019 • 1h 23min

Ep. 219: The Harder Problem of Consciousness (Block & Papineau)

On Ned Block's "The Harder Problem of Consciousness" (2002) and David Papineau's "Could There Be a Science of Consciousness?" (2003). What would give us sufficient reason to believe that a non-human was conscious? Block thinks this is a harder problem that we might suspect. We can't know for sure exactly what consciousness in us is, so we can't know for sure what such a being might require (a brain? certain patterns of behavior?) for them to be enough like us that we could safely apply our own experience of our own conscious states to them. Papineau diagnoses this as a fundamental vagueness in the concepts we use to describe our conscious states. This conversation continues from ep. 218, with guest Gregory Miller from the Panpsycast still with us.  End song: "Mindreader" by Phil Judd as interviewed on Nakedly Examined Music #98.
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Jun 24, 2019 • 50min

Ep. 218: The Hard Problem of Consciousness (Chalmers et al) (Part Two)

Continuing on "Consciousness and Its Place in Nature" by David Chalmers (2003). We finish Chalmers's account of the types of physicialism, then move on to dualism (including epiphenomenalism), and finally dally with panpsychism, the specialty of our guest, Gregory Miller from the Panpsycast. Listen to part 1 first or listen to the unbroken, ad-free Citizen Edition. Please support PEL! End song: "Georgia Hard" by Robbie Fulks, as interviewed on Nakedly Examined Music #36.

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