China Global

[2:01] China’s Objectives in the Global Media Environment[5:22] Evolution of CCP’s Tactics, and Investments[8:22] Levels and Effectiveness of Chinese Media Influence[18:03] Approaches in Less/Non-Free Countries[20:02] Government, Civil Society, & Journalists’ Resilience[26:29] Erosion of Governance 

[2:21] Shanghai Five and the SCO [6:22] Takeaways from Xi Jinping’s Visit to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan[10:16] Russia-China Dynamic in Central Asia[15:07] Public Attitudes Toward China[17:34] Xinjiang and Government Responses[19:08] China’s Approach to Central Asia’s Energy Resources[21:33] Turkey and Expanding SCO Membership

[1:28] China's Dominance in Global Supply Chains[3:50] Role of China's Industrial Policy[9:08] Implications of Variables Affecting Supply Chains[13:37] US Policy Response and the CHIPS Act[20:36] Made in China 2025[24:54] Economic Coercion, Vulnerabilities, and an Effective Response

[1:38] Beijing's Goals and Signals[5:43] People’s Liberation Army and Advanced Planning[7:20] A New Normal?[11:44] Learning from the Recent Drills[13:58] China’s Interpretation of US Response[16:40] Mobilization, Confidence, and Capabilities[26:43] US Congress’ Taiwan Policy Act and China’s Reactions

[1:51] Beijing’s Objectives[5:43] China’s Vision for the International Order[8:49] GSI’s Relation to US-China Competition[10:45] "Meat and Bones" over Time[14:47] “Indivisible Security”[16:37] India and Others' Perspectives on GSI[21:27] Sino-Russian Alignment: Implications for China’s Global Security Governance Ambitions? 

Episode Highlights:[1:30] Duterte’s China Policy[4:36] Change under the New Marcos Government?[6:53] Philippines’ Relations with the United States[8:45] Public Opinion in the Philippines toward China[14:10] Joint China-Philippines Energy Exploration Talks[17:15] Railway Projects Loan Agreements with China[19:14] Future Developments

China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI) was launched by President Xi Jinping on September 21, 2021. In a speech at the General Debate of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly, Xi stated that, in the face of the severe shocks of the coronavirus pandemic, the world needed to work together to steer global development toward a new stage of balanced, coordinated, and inclusive growth. The GDI was meant to achieve those objectives as well as the United Nations' 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. A Group of Friends of the GDI was launched at the UN in January, and more than 55 countries have joined it to date.In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Dr. Yu Jie to discuss the GDI, which like most PRC initiatives, began as a bumper sticker and was described using vague and abstract language. Dr. Yu is a senior research fellow on China in the Asia-Pacific Program at Chatham House in London.[1:26] Beijing’s Objectives[5:54] GDI's Relation to the BRI[7:34] China's Resources into GDI[10:31] UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development[14:06] Group of Friends of the GDI and Interested Countries[20:04] Origin of the GDI

Lithuania-China relations is an interesting case study for how Beijing deals with small states and how it applies economic pressure on target countries to change policies that it views as damaging to Chinese interests. Tensions in Lithuania-China relations arise from numerous sources, including the decision by Vilnius to withdraw from the 17+1 mechanism between China and Central and Eastern European countries and its agreement to allow Taiwan to establish a representative office in Vilnius under the name Taiwanese Representative Office. In today’s episode of China Global, Bonnie Glaser speaks with Ambassador Diana Mickevičienė to discuss the drivers of the Lithuania-China friction as well as the circumstances surrounding her departure from China. Ambassador Mickevičienė currently serves as the Lithuanian ambassador to China, operating in exile from Vilnius.

On May 26, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken delivered a long-awaited speech on the Biden Administration’s approach to the People’s Republic of China. Separate from the speech itself, there is a China strategy document that remains classified. Blinken’s speech, which did not contain any surprises, introduced a new catchphrase for the Biden administration’s strategy toward China, the only country “with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.” This catchphrase, “invest, align, and compete,” has three key features: invest in American strength at home, align with our network of allies and partners, and rely on these two key assets to compete with China to defend our interests and build our vision for the future. In today’s episode of China Global, Dr. Evan Medeiros joins Bonnie Glaser to discuss the Biden Administration’s strategy toward China. Dr. Medeiros is the Penner Family Chair in Asia Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Cling Family Distinguished Fellow in U.S.-China Studies at Georgetown University. He previously served in the Obama administration, where he served on the staff of the National Security Council as Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia, and then as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia. [1:45] Objectives of the US-China Strategy under the Biden Administration[5:58] Differences between the Biden and the Trump Approach toward China[9:55] Beijing’s Response to Blinken’s May 26 Address and China’s Perception of the US[13:18] Potential Opportunities for Cooperation between the US and China[17:24] Critiques of the Biden Administration’s US-China Strategy[26:21] China’s Strategy toward the United States