Majesty of Reason Philosophy Podcast

Can the God of classical theism extrinsically change? If not, does this pose problems for classical theism? Dr. Ryan Mullins joins me for an illuminating discussion on these (and many more) questions.   Outline   1. Defining terms (classical theism, relation (medieval and contemporary understandings), real/logical relations, intrinsic/extrinsic properties, extrinsic change)  2. Can the God of classical theism extrinsically change? Hear what scholars (new and old) have to say on extrinsic change, the No Real Relations Doctrine, Divine Timelessness, and much more. Among such scholars are: Paul Helm, Bill Craig, JP Moreland, Lombard, Aquinas, Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm.  -----2.1 Zimmerman & Chisholm on Anselm and Cambridge change  -----2.2 Extrinsic change entails temporality  3. Does denial of extrinsic change pose problems for classical theism?  -----3.1 Relational (accidental) properties like Lord, Redeemer, Creator  -----3.2 The tension between (i) timelessness & (ii) omniscience and presentism -----3.3 Impossibility of God’s being in a personal relationship with you  -----3.4 Incarnation   Curious to learn more about our work? Check these out:   Reluctant Theologian Podcast: https://www.rtmullins.com/podcast   Ryan's book on timelessness: https://www.amazon.com/Timeless-Oxfor...   Joe's book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...   Joe's website: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/  * No, I'm not Dr. Schmid. Please don't sue me. It's a meme, bruv! In all likelihood, I'll be Dr. Schmid in about 8(ish) years. Stay tuned!

Cosmological arguments aim to arrive at some uncaused cause or necessary being. But why think this necessary being is God?  In this episode, we explore some potential paths.  Buckle up for some philosophy.   Here's the Pruss-Koons paper we referenced: https://link.springer.com/epdf/10.100...    Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason... Website: https://www.majestyofreason.wordpress...

Isn’t Neo-classical theism silly? Not so fast. In this video, Dr. Ryan Mullins, Micah Edvenson, and I discuss prominent classical theist objections to Neo-classical theism (“Theistic Personalism” as some folk call it).   Here are the criticisms we cover: 1. Prisoner of Time objection (against Divine temporality)  2. Aseity entails DDS  3. Composition entails causal dependence              3a. The argument from this-such-ness (Nemes, Vallicella)               3b. Feser’s Neo-Platonic proof                 3c. Thomistic essence-existence argument  4. Neo-CT entails God is a creature              4a. Anthropomorphism  5. Biblical arguments for CT  6. Simplicity is necessary to rule out polytheism (Feser)  7. Platonic argument from perfection  8. Problems for passibility               8a. Horny God objection                8b. Interminable suffering and hell Abbreviation key:   CT: Classical Theism  Neo-CT: Neo-Classical Theism  DDS: Doctrine of Divine Simplicity   Curious to learn more about CT, Neo-CT, and the work of those features in the discussion? Check these out:   Ryan’s podcast: https://www.rtmullins.com/podcast   Micah’s channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC5PC...   My blog post on CT: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com...   My book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...   Here’s a special link to our show notes:  https://docs.google.com/document/d/19...

Can there be infinite regresses of causes? Can infinity be traversed? Is infinity even coherent?  Buckle up for an infinitely edifying video.   Outline of topics covered:   1. What is a paradox? What is infinity?  2. Grim Reaper supertask  3. Paper Passers and beginningless past  4. Ross' Urn  5. Infinite Fair Lottery  6. Hilbert's Hotel  7. Vicious circularity and infinite regresses  8. Potential Solutions  9. Implications (God's existence)   Curious to learn more? Check out my book and website!   Website: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/   Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...

Steven Nemes joins me for a cordial discussion on a potential path from contingent being to the God of classical theism.   ~  I wish to add some clarifications on my response near the end of the video, as I could have been clearer concerning the thrust of my response. Steven's argument against the (live epistemic) possibility of a composite necessary being roughly proceeded as follows:   Composite beings are always a mixture of two distinct principles: a principle of intelligibility (which is, of itself, universal and not tied down to any concrete particular) and a principle of individuation (which is, of itself, particular and indeterminate). Because neither of the two principles demand that they be combined with one another, there must be some extrinsic cause or principle which accounts for their unity. I have three primary responses to this that I did not sufficiently disentangle in the video:   (1) In the case of a metaphysically necessary being (e.g. the neo-classical theistic God of Bill Craig, Ryan Mullins, and co.), it's precisely because it is a metaphysically necessary being that its principle of intelligibility and principle of individuation are necessarily conjoined or united with one another. That need not be explained in virtue of some extrinsic cause -- it's explained in virtue of the being's metaphysical necessity. We would presumably only need a causal explanation if the composite being were such that its two principles are merely contingently united. But that wouldn't be the case for a necessary composite being. And we cannot derive contingency from mere composition, since from the fact that x and y are distinct, it doesn't follow that they could come apart, or that one is accidental to the other, or that they are separable, or that they are possibly absent from reality. For instance, the properties having a radius and having a circumference are distinct but nevertheless inseparable, non-accidentally related, necessarily co-instantiated, and so on. (2) It seems question-begging to claim that ‘neither of the two principles demand that they be united with one another’. This is the very question at issue -- namely, whether there could be a being with distinct parts/principles but which is nevertheless such that its distinct principles demand that they be conjoined and necessarily instantiated in reality. (3) Not in and of itself a response to the argument, but something worth bearing in mind: the argument relies on heavy metaphysical background assumptions that many philosophers deny. Note that these considerations are NOT the end of the discussion, and that Steven himself will have responses, I'll have responses to his responses, Steven... and so on. Hopefully this gives a taste, however, of the complexities involved! ~ For Steven Nemes' work, check out his Academia page! https://fuller.academia.edu/StevenNemes For my work, check out my book and blog! Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason... Blog: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com/

I explain a new argument against classical theism (more specifically, the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity) and rebut three objections to it. ~ Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...  Blog post mentioned at the end: https://majestyofreason.wordpress.com...

Interested in God's existence? Theism? Atheism? Thomism? Creation? Panentheism, pantheism, and Spinozism? The origin and cause of the universe? Russelian monism? Causal finitism? We have just the discussion for you.   Thanks to Dr. Felipe Leon and Micah Edvenson (from Crusade Against Ignorance channel) for joining me to discuss Felipe's argument from material causality against creation ex nihilo. IMPORTANT NOTE:  Near the beginning of the video, Felipe used the term 'classical theism' to describe people like Plantinga, Swinburne, and co. This is an incorrect usage of the term. But this is a mere terminological issue. He means 'traditional theists' or 'orthodox monotheism'. He doesn't mean to pick out the Big Four attributes characterizing classical theism: immutability, simplicity, impassibility, and timelessness. He just means that the theists to which he refers affirm the omni attributes, monotheism, God's perfection, God's necessity, and God's causally originating and sustaining the universe ex nihilo. An alternative understanding of the term doesn't warrant not listening. It was a wonderful conversation. Also, his target is ex nihilo creation. It's "classical theism*cvc*", i.e. classical theism plus classical view of creation. So, it doesn't really matter (in the present context) whether or not he gets immutability, timelessness, and so on correct. What matters is his characterization of ex nihilo creation, since that's his target. So, pointing out a misapplication of 'classical theism' with respect to something other than creatio ex nihilo is not quite relevant. His target is any view according to which there is creation ex nihilo. The specifics about the Divine nature are tangential. I do want to stress, of course, that I disagreed with Felipe's use of 'classical theism'. Classical theism, as I use it, is meant to expressly pick out orthodox monotheism plus the Big Four: immutability, simplicity, timelessness, and impassibility. I would have preferred that he used 'orthodox monotheism' or 'traditional theism'. But the reason I didn't dwell on it or correct it in the dialogue was because (i) it's a terminological issue, and more importantly, (ii) it is irrelevant to his argument, since his argument has nothing to do with the Big Four but is instead aimed at ex nihilo creation. Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...

Why does anything exist? Is there something that necessarily exists? If so, what is its nature?  Today I discuss Dr. Josh Rasmussen's Philosophy Compass article "Cosmological Arguments from Contingency".   ~ Article: https://appearedtoblogly.files.wordpr... Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason... Website: www.majestyofreason.wordpress.com/

In this episode, I chat with Dr. Graham Oppy, professor of philosophy at Monash University, about the nature, purpose, and conditions of success for arguments. We also talk about Feser's Aristotelian proof and existential inertia. Those who wish to pursue these matters further can read "The Normative Status of Logic" (SEP). ~ I have a number of corrections and clarifications to make for what I said between 1:45:45 and 1:47:03.   First, I am simply reporting what seems to me to be Feser's attitude toward his premises. I do not claim this is the only possible or rational interpretation of Feser's level of confidence or certainty. I cannot know Feser's own doxastic states, and I want to renounce any psychologizing of his doxastic states that I may have implied in what I said in this clip. Second, there is evidence for my claims about Feser's thinking his premises are demonstrably certain. At the end of his Five Proofs, Feser writes: "A third problem with [an objection previously considered] is that those who raise it often misunderstand what classical theists like Aquinas mean when they say that God’s existence can be “demonstrated”. What is meant is that the conclusion that God exists follows with necessity or deductive validity from premises that are certain*, where the certainty of the premises can in turn be *shown via metaphysical analysis*. That entails that such a demonstration gives us knowledge that is more secure than what any scientific inference can give us (as “science” is generally understood today), in two respects. First, the inference is not a merely probabilistic one, nor an “argument to the best explanation” which appeals to considerations like parsimony, fit with existing background theory, and so forth, but where some alternative explanation might in principle be correct. Again, it is instead an attempt at a strict deduction to what follows necessarily from the premises. [...]   [T]he argument can successfully be defended against *all objections claiming to show that the conclusion does not really follow or *that the premises are doubtful*. Now, that has been accomplished in this book with respect to the proofs just mentioned, from all of which it follows that God exists." (p. 307) [Emphasis mine] This shows rather forcefully Feser's attitude towards his arguments, and -- at the very least -- my interpretation in the clip is not an uncharitable one. Feser then ends his book with the following:   "Quod erat demonstrandum." (p. 307)   Denotatively, this means 'that which was to be shown'. In fact, however, the connotation is extremely strong, often connoting a decisive proof or demonstration of something. Traditionally, it's placed at the end of formal mathematical proofs whose conclusions follow from indubitable premises and axioms. Its use in philosophy also traditionally signifies an indubitable, certain, demonstrable proof. Consider, for instance, Spinoza's Ethics (1677). Spinoza frequently used it at the end of his philosophical arguments in such a book. It's no coincidence, moreover, that the style and system of the book are, as Spinoza says, "demonstrated in geometrical order", with axioms and definitions followed by propositions. Third, regarding the 'real debate' quote. Here is Feser's full quote: "That is a confident claim, I realize. But natural theology, historically, was a confident discipline. A long fine of thinkers from the beginnings of Western thought down to the present day... have affirmed that God’s existence can be rationally demonstrated by purely philosophical arguments. The aim of this book is to show that they were right, that what long was the mainstream

New atheism is dead (and this video killed it). But what can we learn from it?  Today I discuss and build upon Kaufman's Philosophy Compass article "New Atheism and its Critics".   Article: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/1...   Website: www.majestyofreason.wordpress.com   Book: https://www.amazon.com/Majesty-Reason...