Walden Pod

I respond to Alex O'Connor's arguments against compatibilism, the view that there is no real conflict between determinism and free will. Is free will skepticism the better view, as Alex claims? Will the British ever learn their lesson? CosmicSkeptic - Compatibilism Debunked Subscribe on YouTube here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Consider supporting Walden Pod on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here  Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism  linktr.ee/emersongreen

After listening to Very Bad Wizards' new episode about panpsychism, I hit record and commented on a few clips that stood out to me. Subscribe on YouTube here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Consider supporting the show on Patreon here or Counter Apologetics here An interesting article on panpsychist history by Joe Zadeh Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen

Compatibilism is the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. In other words, a compatibilist is someone who doesn’t have a quarrel with using the term “free will” and who doesn’t think we need to run around with our hair on fire if determinism turns out to be true. By my lights, free will skeptics and libertarians seem to be entirely wrong about the dramatic consequences that would follow from not possessing libertarian freedom.  As you may have gathered, I’ve finally migrated from the free will skeptic camp over to the compatibilist camp. Years ago, learning about determinism and moral luck for the first time rocked my world. But as the dust settled, I wondered if I had been too quick to reject the entire notion of free will. How much does it matter that we don’t have libertarian free will? How much has actually changed? Is our ordinary sense of free will really unsalvageable? Consider supporting the show Subscribe on YouTube here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism Transcript linktr.ee/emersongreen

Can we be ultimately responsible for what we do? No one denies that we can be the proximate cause of our actions. I made this episode because I wanted to. But being the proximate cause of an action is compatible with determinism – no determinist in their right mind would deny that I made this episode because I wanted to. So is there a deeper sense of responsibility that can be attributed to human beings? One which absolves God, the world, ancestors, luck, and society of what we choose to do? This deeper kind of responsibility, which Nietzsche disparagingly called “‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense,” and which is often ascribed to human beings by the religious, arguably requires one to be causa sui – to be the ultimate cause of oneself. Since this is impossible, we can be sure that we do not possess the kind of responsibility that so many seem convinced we have. You can’t be radically self-creating in a way that gets you beyond a compatibilist notion of responsibility. It’s unclear whether our lack of ultimate responsibility for our actions is a problem for libertarian free will. Do libertarians unanimously impute this degree of responsibility to humans? No – some do, some don’t. Regardless, the attacks on free will “in the superlative metaphysical sense” from Nietzsche and Strawson convincingly show that our responsibility for our actions is quite limited. Galen Strawson - Your Move: The Maze of Free Will Tamler Sommers & Galen Strawson - You cannot make yourself the way that you are The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast - The Galen Strawson Interview Consider supporting the show on Patreon here Subscribe on YouTube here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism linktr.ee/emersongreen "The causa sui is the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so far, it is a sort of rape and perversion of logic; but the extravagant pride of man has managed to entangle itself profoundly and frightfully with just this nonsense. The desire for ‘freedom of the will’ in the superlative metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in the minds of the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society involves nothing less than to be precisely this causa sui and, with more than Münchhausen’s audacity, to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of the swamps of nothingness." Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 21 (tr. W. Kaufmann)

I’m joined today by Jack Symes, editor of the new book, Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind. Jack is a Teacher and Researcher of Philosophy at the University of Liverpool, UK and is also the co-host of The Panpsycast Philosophy Podcast. Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism Follow Jack on Twitter @_JackSymes @ThePanpsycast Philosophers on Consciousness: Talking about the Mind Support on Patreon here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here linktr.ee/emersongreen / timestamps / 00:00 Introduction to the book 15:52 The construction problem  20:23 Why philosophy of mind? Why not just neuroscience? 28:28 Does Emerson misrepresent illusionism? 38:11 The terminological mess in philmind 46:21 Different forms of panpsychism 52:20 Illusionism redux: the metaproblem of consciousness 1:01:53 Practical implications of illusionism 1:14:58 Podcasting 1:18:55 Practical implications of panpsychism 1:41:37 Paganism and panpsychism 1:52:26 Pantheism 1:55:48 Panpsycast stories 2:02:05 LIVE SHOW 2:03:13 Parting thoughts

For the full episode, and access to other bonus episodes, subscribe at patreon.com/waldenpod How can one reconcile the reality of mental causation with the accuracy of “the core theory,” which Sean Carroll hails as explaining all of everyday life? Contrary to Carroll’s intention, his proclamation that the laws underlying the physics of everyday life are completely understood is one of the factors that lead some to adopt Russellian panpsychism. (This episode was recorded as a video, which is available to patrons.)

Is a brain necessary for experience? Do we have any good reason to limit the attribution of experience to creatures with complex nervous systems? Actually, no. Some materialists claim that consciousness can only exist in brains–sound reasoning, neuroscience, and physics all point in the same direction. We take a closer look at the reasoning that underlies the claim that complex nervous systems are necessary for experience. A quick note on terminology: In this episode, I use physicalism and materialism interchangeably. And by “consciousness,” I’m referring to subjective experience: the what-it’s-like of consciousness. I try to stick to “experience” for clarity, but when I say “consciousness,” or “mind,” unless otherwise specified, experience is what I mean. Swinburne quote Robert Epstein - Your brain is not a computer Peter Sjöstedt-Hughes - Panpsychism: 3 Reasons Why Our World is Brimming with Sentience YouTube Channel patreon.com/waldenpod linktr.ee/emersongreen

Recently I learned that H.P. Lovecraft had undergone a surprising and dramatic political transformation in the final years of his brief life. I wanted to read a few of Lovecraft's letters and discuss his views on capitalism, socialism, and the influence of the profit motive on artistic expression. (In the middle part of this episode, I also indulge in a bit of culture war stuff, so consider yourself warned.) In these letters from the last several years of his life, his notorious racism seems to fade, and he explicitly rejects the reactionary political ideology he held prior to 1931. He ruthlessly critiques capitalism, speaks glowingly of Marx, and warns us that our only options are socialism or barbarism. Anyone familiar with the author knows how out of kilter this feels compared to the absurdly reactionary person who most of us know as Lovecraft. First episode on Lovecraft @waldenpod Lovecraft Letters: 1937, Catherine Moore 1936 Arthur Sechrist 1934, Helen Barlow Lovecraft Audiobooks: Dagon The Call of Cthulhu At the Mountains of Madness The Shadow Over Innsmouth / timestamps / 00:00 Introduction 02:53 Flawed Characters, Real and Fictional 09:30 Letter to Catherine Moore (1937) 13:00 Letter to Helen Barlow (1934) 15:32 Letter to Arthur Sechrist (1936) 17:23 Art & the Profit Motive 19:52 The Shadow Transcript

I was recently interviewed by Zac of Adherent Apologetics on the subject of problems with physicalism. We outline a few arguments against the view, including physicalism’s conflict with realism about phenomenal consciousness and anti-emergentism, as well as a couple different forms of the vagueness argument against physicalism. We also talk a bit about the tradition of atheist non-physicalism, which is almost entirely behind the recent rise in interest in alternatives to physicalism. Other topics include the science of consciousness, the relationship between neuroscience and the metaphysics of consciousness, the standard thinking that motivates physicalism and where it goes wrong, panpsychism, and other subjects related to philosophy of mind. Subscribe to Zac’s channel and my channel linktr.ee/emersongreen Support on Patreon here emersongreenblog.wordpress.com Rate the show on iTunes here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism Music by ichika Nito. Used with permission.

Today I'm speaking with Dr. Michael Huemer about phenomenal conservatism, a theory in epistemology that seeks to ground justified beliefs in the way things “appear” or “seem” to the subject who holds that belief. We discuss a wide range of issues in epistemology, including internalism vs. externalism, justified true belief, proper functionalism, the epistemic value of psychedelic experiences, religious experiences, radical skepticism, knowledge, conceptual analysis, intuition, and much else. Michael Huemer is a professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado. He is the author of more than seventy academic articles in epistemology, ethics, metaethics, metaphysics, and political philosophy, as well as several books, including Skepticism and the Veil of Perception, Ethical Intuitionism, Paradox Lost, and Dialogues on Ethical Vegetarianism, and his new book, Knowledge, Reality, and Value: A Mostly Common Sense Guide to Philosophy. PC: If it seems to S that P, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some justification for believing that P. Michael’s Website Phenomenal Conservatism - IEP Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism MH YouTube Channel  / / /  linktr.ee/emersongreen For the extended version of this interview, support on Patreon here emersongreenblog.wordpress.com Rate the show on iTunes here Listen to our sister show Counter Apologetics here Subscribe to CA and Walden Pod on YouTube here Follow on Twitter @waldenpod and @OnPanpsychism / / / YouTube version of this episode